Administrative Law - ONCA

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed an appeal, setting aside a motion judge's order that had granted certiorari with mandamus in aid.

The motion judge had compelled a Justice of the Peace to complete a bail hearing that the Justice of the Peace had aborted due to a proposed surety's misconduct and subsequent false denial.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by granting prerogative relief in the absence of jurisdictional error, as the Justice of the Peace's decision to abort the hearing was a discretionary exercise based on an assessment of fairness, not a jurisdictional overreach.

The applicant sought a review of a motion judge's decision that dismissed her motion to extend the time to perfect her motion for leave to appeal from a Divisional Court order.

The Divisional Court had dismissed her application for judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's decision, noting unacceptable delay and lack of merit in the proposed appeal, as the underlying Human Rights Tribunal decision was fact-based and the Divisional Court found no question of law warranting intervention.

The review motion was dismissed.

The moving party, Glenn Bogue, brought three panel review motions before the Court of Appeal for Ontario, seeking review of single judge orders.

Two motions related to his appeal of a Law Society of Ontario license suspension, and the third concerned litigation over his mother's property.

The court dismissed all motions as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.02, finding that the moving party repeatedly failed to advance his appeals and misused the panel review procedure.

Additionally, the court revoked his existing fee waivers pursuant to section 4.10 of the Administration of Justice Act.

The applicants sought an extension of time to bring a motion for leave to appeal an order of the motion judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that while the applicants had a timely intention to appeal, their explanation for the delay was inadequate, there was continuing prejudice to the public interest due to delayed enforcement of an environmental order, and the proposed appeal lacked merit.

The court emphasized that lack of merit alone can be determinative in such motions.

This motion before a single judge of the Court of Appeal for Ontario concerned the applicant's attempt to reopen a previously administratively dismissed motion for review.

The applicant had failed to perfect his review motion by a deadline imposed by a three-person panel of the Court.

The single judge determined that she lacked jurisdiction to hear the current motion, as it sought to vary or set aside an order of a panel, which is prohibited by Rule 61.16(6.1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Registrar's administrative dismissal was found not to be an independent 'order or decision' reviewable under Rule 61.16(5), but rather an administrative act flowing directly from the panel's order.

The motion was quashed for want of jurisdiction, with costs awarded to the respondent.

The judge also noted that, even if jurisdiction existed, the motion would have been dismissed on its merits due to the underlying appeal being meritless, the applicant's incredible explanation for missing the deadline, and the interests of justice given the repeated litigation of the same issues.

This is an appeal from a Divisional Court decision that granted judicial review, quashing an administrative decision and a request for bids related to the procurement of identification cards.

The Ministry of Transportation (MTO) required card stock to be produced in Canada, which Thales DIS Canada Inc. (Thales) challenged as discriminatory under the Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA).

The Divisional Court found the MTO's decision and request for bids unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Divisional Court misapplied the reasonableness standard of review by conducting a de novo assessment instead of focusing on the administrative decision-maker's reasons.

The Court of Appeal concluded that the Director's decision was reasonable and that the request for bids was not separately subject to judicial review given the existence of an adequate internal dispute resolution process.

The Crown sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Justice concerning findings on due diligence and penalty reduction in regulatory offence charges under the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

The motion for leave was dismissed as the proposed grounds of appeal did not meet the high bar under s. 131 of the Provincial Offences Act.

The court found that the alleged errors involved the misapplication of well-established legal principles rather than issues requiring the Court of Appeal's guidance on statutory interpretation or general legal principles.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of two separate actions (2017 and 2020) against the Bank of Nova Scotia and its officers/employees.

The 2017 action was dismissed for inadequate pleadings and as an abuse of process.

The 2020 action was dismissed as a replication of the 2018 dismissed action and an abuse of process.

The appellant also raised an argument of reasonable apprehension of bias against the motion judge in the 2017 action due to a past partnership.

The Court of Appeal upheld both dismissals, finding no error in the motion judges' analyses, including the rejection of the bias argument, and dismissed both appeals with costs to the respondent.

This appeal concerns the interpretation of "involved in the incident" under section 268(2) of the Insurance Act, which dictates liability for statutory accident benefits.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the Superior Court's decision that an arbitrator erred in law by introducing a causation requirement into the test for "involvement" in a priority dispute between an insured snowmobile's insurer (Gore Mutual) and the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund.

The Court held that temporal, spatial, and participatory factors were sufficient to establish involvement, without requiring a direct causal link to the injuries.

The Durham Regional Police Services Board and Christopher Delaney appealed a Divisional Court decision that found the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario's (HRTO) decisions unreasonable.

The HRTO had ruled that a settlement agreement for a second human rights application also settled a prior, undecided first application by Joseph Briggs, and subsequently cancelled a favourable decision for Briggs on the first application as an abuse of process.

The Divisional Court reversed the HRTO, finding its interpretation of the settlement unreasonable and deciding the matter itself rather than remitting it.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court's finding that the HRTO's decision was unreasonable due to its narrow interpretation of the factual matrix and exclusion of relevant evidence (Form 25).

The Court of Appeal also affirmed the Divisional Court's discretion to decide the matter rather than remitting it, citing the inordinate delay and the binary nature of the issue.

The appeal was dismissed, confirming that the settlement did not cover the first application.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible for assault and uttering threats, appealed a disposition by the Ontario Review Board (ORB) ordering her detention at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH).

She argued the ORB erred in finding she posed a significant threat, seeking an absolute or conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the ORB's determination of significant threat was reasonable, based on her history of violence, treatment-resistant schizophrenia, lack of insight into her illness and medication, and the risk of decompensation leading to violent behaviour if medication ceased.

The court also upheld the ORB's refusal of a conditional discharge, noting its inquisitorial function was fulfilled and a detention order was necessary for public safety, as the Mental Health Act would not provide sufficient control in all foreseeable situations.

The appellant sought judicial review and appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) which found her accident benefits claim statute-barred.

The Divisional Court dismissed both, stating judicial review was only available in "exceptional circumstances" given the statutory appeal right.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the further appeal, clarifying that while judicial review is always available, it is a discretionary remedy and will only be exercised in rare cases where alternative remedies (like reconsideration and statutory appeal) are inadequate.

The Court affirmed the LAT's finding on the limitation period as reasonable and provided guidance on handling concurrent appeal and judicial review proceedings.

Mr. Kalu sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order for his extradition to the United States on charges of mail fraud and money laundering.

He argued the surrender would violate his s. 7 Charter rights and be unjust or oppressive due to risks of systemic racism in the US, potential deportation to Nigeria, and the impact on his family.

The Court of Appeal applied a reasonableness standard of review, finding the Minister's decision fell within a range of reasonable outcomes.

The court dismissed Mr. Kalu's fresh evidence and rejected his new argument regarding pre-trial custody credit, affirming that such credit is a matter for the sentencing stage in the requesting state.

This appeal addresses a priority dispute between insurers regarding Statutory Accident Benefits (SABS) where the claimant had basic mandatory SABS coverage from one insurer (Chubb) and both basic mandatory and optional enhanced SABS coverage from another (Continental).

The Superior Court Appeal Judge (SCAJ) had found the claimant was not a "deemed named insured" under Continental's policy, making Chubb the priority insurer for basic SABS, but still held Continental liable for all SABS under an OPCF 47 endorsement, ordering Chubb to reimburse Continental for basic SABS.

The Court of Appeal upheld the SCAJ's finding that the claimant was not a "deemed named insured" under Continental's policy, clarifying that "regular use" requires actual use, not just theoretical access.

However, the Court of Appeal reversed the SCAJ's decision on reimbursement, holding that the OPCF 47 endorsement displaces the statutory priority rules (s. 268 of the Insurance Act) for the optional benefits insurer, meaning Continental, as the OPCF 47 insurer, is solely responsible for both basic mandatory and optional enhanced SABS without a right to reimbursement from Chubb.

This decision addresses two appeals by an accused found not criminally responsible (NCRMD) from disposition orders of the Ontario Review Board (ORB).

The first appeal (C68888) challenged a 2020 detention order with community living privileges, which was ultimately adjourned as moot due to a subsequent disposition.

The second appeal (C69217) arose from a 2021 ORB hearing following the revocation of the accused's community living privileges and his re-detention due to new harassment incidents.

A central issue in the second appeal was the ORB's new practice of issuing general detention orders to a "Forensic Service" without specifying the security level of the unit.

The Court of Appeal expressed concern that this practice might hinder the ORB's ability to ensure the least onerous and least restrictive disposition, emphasizing the need for specificity regarding conditions and security levels.

The Court admitted fresh evidence regarding the accused's transfer to a secure unit and the withdrawal of criminal charges.

The Court maintained the 2021 disposition and dismissed the second appeal.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible in 2008 for aggravated assault, appealed the Ontario Review Board's decision to continue her detention order.

She sought an absolute or conditional discharge, arguing the Board failed to adequately explain its finding that she remained a significant threat to public safety and neglected its inquisitorial duty to explore less restrictive dispositions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's reasons transparent and intelligible, and that it had no further inquisitorial duty given the record and the appellant's position that she did not want restrictions.

The Crown appealed a lower court's decision to set aside a conviction against Becker Bros.

Trucking Inc. for operating a commercial motor vehicle in an unsafe condition, contrary to the Highway Traffic Act.

The appeal judge had ruled that certified Ministry records and copies of documents produced by the driver were inadmissible.

The Court of Appeal found that the appeal judge erred in both conclusions, holding that the Ministry's certified documents were admissible as "statements" under s. 210(7) of the HTA, and that the documents produced by the driver were admissible under s. 216.1(5) of the HTA or as an exception to the hearsay rule (admissions by documents in possession).

The Court allowed the Crown's appeal, reinstating the conviction and sentence.

The Minister of Training, Colleges and Universities appealed a Divisional Court decision that quashed the "Student Choice Initiative" framework, which mandated an opt-out system for non-essential student ancillary fees at Ontario colleges and universities.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the framework was unlawful.

For colleges, the framework conflicted with section 7 of the Ontario Colleges of Applied Arts and Technology Act, 2002, which protects student governing bodies' normal activities.

For universities, the framework interfered with their statutory self-governance and institutional autonomy, a fundamental principle implicit in their establishing Acts.

The court clarified that the Minister's action was an exercise of executive authority, not prerogative power, and must yield to conflicting legislation.

The appellant, Lina Ahmed, appealed the dismissal of her action against Justice of the Peace Louise Logue under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The action alleged a Charter infringement due to the Justice of the Peace's refusal to accept a peace bond application.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that a Justice of the Peace enjoys absolute immunity from civil liability in the exercise of judicial functions, rendering the claim frivolous and devoid of merit.

The Court also affirmed the motion judge's discretion to dismiss the action without seeking submissions from the appellant, as permitted by Rule 2.1.01(3).

The appellant challenged the Toronto Police Services' (TPS) authority to impose bag searches as a condition of entry into Allan Gardens during the 2010 G20 summit, alleging tortious conduct and Charter breaches.

The Court of Appeal found that the TPS lacked legal authority, as agents of the City under the Trespass to Property Act, to create such a condition.

The court held that the police conduct infringed the appellant's freedom of expression (s. 2(b)), right against arbitrary detention (s. 9), and right against unreasonable search and seizure (s. 8) under the Charter.

The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was awarded modest Charter damages.