Administrative Law - ONCA

The moving parties sought to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing their appeal for delay.

The underlying appeal concerned a permanent injunction requiring them to clean up their property in compliance with a municipal property standards by-law.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the delay was inadequately explained, the proposed appeal was frivolous and without merit, and the ongoing delay prejudiced the municipality and the public interest.

The appellants, private practice oral surgeons, appealed a Divisional Court decision dismissing their application for judicial review of a hospital board's decision to cancel their operating room access and hospital privileges.

The board made the decision without a hearing, relying on s. 44 of the Public Hospitals Act, which allows a hospital to revoke privileges when ceasing to provide a service.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the board's interpretation of s. 44 was reasonable, that the termination of the specific operating room access constituted ceasing a 'service', and that the board was not required to hold a hearing or consider the appellants' affidavits.

The appellant's license to practice law was revoked by the Law Society Tribunal in 2020.

After exhausting all appeals up to the Supreme Court of Canada, the appellant brought an application in the Superior Court of Justice seeking Charter declarations and reinstatement of his license.

The motion judge dismissed the application as an impermissible collateral attack on the revocation decision.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the appellant could not use section 24(1) of the Charter to seek a fresh hearing after exhausting statutory remedies, and that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to order reinstatement.

The moving party sought leave to appeal from a Divisional Court order that dismissed his motion for leave to appeal under Rule 2.1.

The Divisional Court had ruled it lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal from decisions of the Information and Privacy Commissioner.

The Court of Appeal found it had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a dismissal of a motion for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed as an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.

The appellant abattoir owner sued the provincial government for negligence, trespass, and conversion after Ministry officials occupied its plant for 19 months following an investigation into illegal meat processing.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding no duty of care and no breach of the standard of care.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that the Ministry owed a duty of care to the targeted suspect, breached the standard of care by unreasonably prolonging its occupation of the plant and allowing meat to spoil, and caused the appellant's inability to sell the plant.

Damages of $3,520,000 were awarded for loss of enterprise value.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion to certify a class action against Ontario for the early cancellation of the Basic Income Pilot Program.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that the certification judge erred by engaging in a merits-based analysis of the breach of contract claim rather than applying the 'plain and obvious' test under s. 5(1)(a) of the Class Proceedings Act.

However, the Court upheld the dismissal of the negligence, breach of undertaking, and Charter s. 7 claims, finding that the government's decision to cancel the program was a core policy decision immune from negligence liability and that the Charter claim failed to plead the requisite principles of fundamental justice.

The Ministry of Health appealed a Divisional Court decision dismissing its application for judicial review of Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decisions.

The Tribunal had found that the Ministry engaged in systemic gender discrimination against Ontario midwives by abandoning equitable compensation principles established in 1993, leading to a significant compensation gap between midwives and community health clinic physicians.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that the standard of review for the Tribunal's decisions is reasonableness, even post-Vavilov.

The Court held that the Adjudicator's liability and remedy decisions were reasonable, as they revealed a rational chain of analysis supported by the evidence, and dismissed the appeal.

The CBC made a freedom of information request for mandate letters sent by the Premier of Ontario to Cabinet ministers.

The Cabinet Office refused disclosure, claiming the letters were exempt under the Cabinet records exemption in s. 12(1) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner ordered disclosure, finding the letters did not reveal the substance of Cabinet deliberations.

The Divisional Court upheld the decision on judicial review.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Attorney General's appeal, holding that the Commissioner's interpretation of s. 12(1) and its application to the mandate letters were reasonable.

The appellant appealed an order confirming emergency orders issued by the municipality's Chief Building Official under the Building Code Act, which required the appellant to pay the costs of terminating an immediate danger posed by an exposed wall.

The appellant argued the application judge failed to consider equitable set-off.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant had not raised the issue of equitable set-off before the application judge and it would be contrary to the interests of justice to allow the new argument on appeal.

The plaintiff developer built stacked townhouses and applied for a condominium exemption under the Condominium Act to bypass Planning Act requirements.

The City granted the exemption but imposed a condition prohibiting the units from being used as boarding or rooming houses.

The developer sued, arguing the City lacked authority to impose conditions and challenging barrier-free accessibility requirements.

The motion judge struck the condition but upheld the accessibility requirements.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the City had broad authority under the Condominium Act and Municipal Act to impose conditions on exemption approvals to protect health and safety.

The developer's cross-appeal regarding accessibility requirements was dismissed as moot.

The appellant, who was found not guilty by reason of insanity for multiple murders and sexual offences in the 1970s and 1980s, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his continued detention at a high-security facility.

At his annual review, all parties jointly submitted that he should be transferred to a less secure facility for a 90-day independent psychiatric assessment to explore a potential move to a less secure environment.

The Board rejected the joint submission.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the Board's decision unreasonable because it failed to adequately explain its rejection of the joint submission, misapprehended the evidence regarding the utility of the assessment, and failed to fulfill its inquisitorial duty to explore the least onerous and least restrictive disposition.

The respondent, a re-elected city councillor, filed a supplementary financial statement showing he exceeded the allowable campaign spending limit for expressions of appreciation.

Under s. 88.23(2) of the Municipal Elections Act, this triggered automatic forfeiture of his office.

The application judge granted relief from forfeiture, finding the error was inadvertent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that there is no jurisdiction to grant relief from forfeiture under s. 98 of the Courts of Justice Act because s. 88.23(2) is a statutory penalty and the legislative scheme deliberately precludes such relief.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application to quash a municipal bylaw establishing an administrative penalty system for parking infractions.

He argued the bylaw was ultra vires, conflicted with provincial statutes, violated the Charter, and was enacted in bad faith.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the bylaw was explicitly authorized by statute, did not conflict with provincial legislation, and did not engage sections 7 or 11(d) of the Charter as it involved no penal consequences.

The Town of Grimsby appealed a decision declaring that a private works yard was a permitted use on the respondent's property, which was zoned as a 'Utility Zone'.

The Town argued the use must be related to a public or quasi-public utility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge correctly applied the modern principles of statutory interpretation.

The zoning by-law unambiguously defined 'Works Yard' as a permitted use without restricting it to public or utility purposes, and the by-law's plain language governed.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a Divisional Court decision dismissing appeals from Superior Court orders affirming a decision of the Chief Building Official.

The respondent argued no appeal to the Court of Appeal was available.

The Court of Appeal clarified that leave to appeal remains available under s. 6(1)(a) of the Courts of Justice Act for decisions made under s. 26 of the Building Code Act, 1992.

However, the motion for leave was dismissed on the alternative ground applying the Sault Dock test.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice that substituted a conviction for an acquittal on charges of failing to comply with building inspector's orders.

The moving party argued that his defence—that he had previously obtained the required permits—was not a collateral attack on the orders.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, finding that the proposed appeal raised a question of law respecting the interpretation and application of the doctrine of collateral attack, and that special grounds existed.

The appellant, found unfit to stand trial, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that rejected a joint submission without explicit prior notice.

The Board imposed a more restrictive disposition than proposed, citing the appellant's ongoing violent behaviour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's probing questions during the hearing provided adequate notice of its concerns regarding the joint submission, satisfying the requirements of procedural fairness.

The appellants appealed a decision dismissing their application to set aside a municipal investigator's report.

The investigator had concluded that the respondent municipality properly held in camera meetings under the Municipal Act exception for advice subject to solicitor-client privilege.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that under sections 223.16 and 239.2(9) of the Municipal Act, an investigator's report can only be set aside on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

The court also rejected arguments that the investigator exceeded her jurisdiction or that the municipality failed to prove it properly appointed the investigator.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action against the Law Society of Upper Canada after his statement of claim was struck out as disclosing no reasonable cause of action and being an abuse of process.

The appellant alleged a long history of unfair treatment, including administrative suspensions, disciplinary proceedings, and bankruptcy opposition.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the individual acts did not give rise to viable causes of action as pleaded and that many claims were settled by prior releases.

However, the Court found the motion judge erred in refusing leave to amend the pleading to properly allege the tort of misfeasance in public office based on a cumulative pattern of bad faith conduct.

The appeal was allowed in part to grant leave to file a fresh as amended statement of claim.

The appellant owned two handguns registered in the 1980s.

Under the new Firearms Act, he had until December 31, 2002, to re-register them as grandfathered s. 12(6) handguns.

He failed to do so, and his registrations expired.

In 2007, he applied to re-register the handguns, but the Registrar refused in 2009 because he no longer held a valid licence with s. 12(6) privileges.

The provincial court and superior court upheld the refusal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant lost his grandfathered status by failing to continuously hold a registration certificate, and was therefore ineligible for a licence and registration under the Act.