ONCA 2023

The appellant law firm appealed the dismissal of its application seeking to set a market rate for lease renewal and compensation for renovations, and also sought leave to appeal a costs order from a prior cross-motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's findings that the respondent landlord did not breach its duty to act in good faith during lease negotiations, that the expert evidence was properly considered, and that compensation for renovations was not warranted.

The court also refused leave to appeal the costs order from the cross-motion, finding no strong grounds to interfere with the motion judge's discretion.

The moving party (respondent in the appeal) sought security for costs of the appeal and trial.

The court granted security for costs of the appeal ($20,000) due to the appellant's unpaid costs from a previous motion, significant unpaid child support arrears, and questionable financial conduct, despite the appeal concerning the best interests of a child.

The court refused security for trial costs, finding legitimate issues were litigated.

Costs of the motion were awarded to the moving party.

This is a motion to quash an appeal from a trial judge's costs order.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario quashed the appeal, finding that leave to appeal was required for an appeal solely from a costs order under s. 133(b) of the Courts of Justice Act, and the appellant had not sought leave.

The court also directed the distribution of security for costs previously posted by the appellant, awarding a portion to the respondent for prior appeal costs and the current motion costs, with the remainder returned to the appellant.

The appellant, Dorothy Groves, appealed her conviction for second-degree murder and her sentence of life imprisonment with 13 years parole ineligibility.

She argued the trial judge erred in admitting a statement she made to a special constable, claiming it was not voluntary, and in failing to properly instruct the jury on the two forms of accident.

She also sought a reduction in her parole ineligibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding the trial judge correctly assessed the voluntariness of her statement and adequately instructed the jury on the defence of accident as it related to intent.

The court also found the sentence imposed was fit, considering both aggravating factors (criminal record, violent offences) and mitigating factors (intellectual disability).

The appellant, Julie Menard, appealed her conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's thorough reasons regarding witness credibility and reliability.

The appeal against sentence was also dismissed, with the exception of a consensual reduction of the Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order from lifetime to 20 years, in light of the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Ndhlovu.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered whether a general revocation clause in a will was effective under s. 52(1) of the Succession Law Reform Act to revoke existing beneficiary designations by instrument for Registered Retirement Income Fund (RRIF) and Tax-Free Savings Account (TFSA) plans.

The court affirmed the application judge's finding that the clause, which revoked "all Wills and Testamentary dispositions," did not "expressly relate to the designation" as required by the Act.

Consequently, the prior beneficiary designations remained valid.

The court also confirmed that a conflicting Superior Court decision (Ashton Estate) on this point was "plainly wrong." The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant brought an application under s. 680 of the Criminal Code to set aside a detention order.

Because a non-publication order under s. 517 of the Criminal Code was imposed at the bail hearing, and the decision contains information covered by that order, the Court of Appeal withheld the publication of its reasons until the ban ceases to be in effect.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action against the Dryden Police Services Board and Anishinaabe Abinoojii Family Services and their employees.

The action stemmed from a warrantless entry into their home by a child protection worker and police officers.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of claims against the Society defendants due to the expiry of the limitation period.

However, it set aside the summary judgment dismissing claims against the Dryden Police related to the lawfulness of the entry, including negligence, false arrest, false imprisonment, assault and battery, trespass, invasion of privacy, and Charter breaches (ss. 7 and 9), finding the motion judge erred in concluding the entry was lawful under the CFSA without sufficient evidence of statutory preconditions.

The Court also reinstated Mr. Land's claims for negligent investigation and malicious prosecution, while dismissing Ms. Henry's similar claims due to her participation in a diversion program.

The appellants hired the respondents for a backyard renovation project with milestone payments.

After disputes and delays, the appellants terminated the contract and sued for breach of contract and unjust enrichment.

The trial judge dismissed the appellants' claims, finding no fundamental breach, but awarded damages to the respondents for the balance of the contract despite the lack of a valid counterclaim.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim, noting the contract provided a juristic reason for the payments made.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to set aside the damages awarded to the respondents, as the proper party had not filed a counterclaim.

The appellant pleaded guilty to impaired driving, drug trafficking, and firearms offences, and was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment just before the COVID-19 pandemic lockdown.

On appeal, he sought a sentence reduction based on the totality principle and the harsh conditions of incarceration caused by the pandemic.

The Crown and the appellant agreed to an 18-month sentence reduction.

The Court of Appeal accepted the joint proposal, finding that the pandemic resulted in significantly harsher conditions than anticipated at sentencing, and reduced the sentence by 18 months.

The appellant, Shelly Legault, brought a motion within her appeal against TD General Insurance Company.

The motion sought relief from filing all trial transcripts for the appeal record and leave to amend her notice of appeal to include a mid-trial ruling and a costs decision.

The court dismissed the request to be relieved from filing all transcripts, agreeing with the respondent that the full record was necessary given the appellant sought a new trial.

However, the court granted leave to amend the notice of appeal to specify grounds regarding the payment of non-expert witnesses and to appeal the costs award.

The appellant, who suffered from schizophrenia and represented himself at trial, appealed his first-degree murder conviction.

He argued he was unfit to stand trial and urged the Court of Appeal to overturn or modify the 'limited cognitive capacity' test from R. v. Taylor to require that an accused be capable of making rational decisions in their best interests.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the Taylor test, clarifying that while an accused must have a reality-based understanding of their legal predicament and the ability to make decisions, they need not possess 'analytic capacity' to make decisions in their own best interests.

The Court also dismissed grounds of appeal relating to the voluntariness of statements made to a Crown psychiatrist and refused to admit fresh psychiatric evidence to substitute a verdict of not criminally responsible.

Following an appeal, the Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement.

The appellants were ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal, fixed at $27,689.52 inclusive of HST on a partial indemnity scale.

This appeal concerned a dispute over a shared boundary between lakefront cottage properties and the location of a dock.

The trial judge found the boundary to be ambulatory, extending to the water's edge, and that the land under the dock was adversely possessed, but the dock could not impede riparian rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the main appeal, which challenged the boundary determination and the application of accretion/avulsion principles, and the cross-appeal, which challenged the adverse possession finding.

The court found no reversible error in the trial judge's determination of the boundary based on grantor's intent and upheld the adverse possession finding, noting it was supported by evidence.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing her motion for net arrears of child and spousal support and section 7 expenses, and granting the respondent's cross-motion to terminate all support.

The Court of Appeal emphasized the high degree of deference owed to family support decisions.

Finding no material error, serious misapprehension of evidence, or error of law in the motion judge's detailed analysis, the court dismissed the appeal.

The appellant sought a panel review of a motion judge's decision refusing to stay a trial judge's order requiring her to vacate a property pending appeal.

The trial judge had ordered the property sold and found no unjust enrichment or joint family venture.

The motion judge denied the stay, finding no serious issue, no irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favoured the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for review, holding that the appellant failed to articulate any errors of fact or law warranting intervention.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault causing bodily harm and forcible confinement against his spouse, as well as his sentence of 7 months' incarceration.

The trial judge had accepted the complainant's evidence over the appellant's, finding the appellant not credible.

The Court of Appeal found no error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact in the trial judge's credibility assessments or treatment of the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors for a serious domestic assault.

The appellant was convicted of accessing child pornography following the execution of a search warrant at his residence where police obtained passwords for electronic devices and seized digital evidence.

The trial judge found multiple Charter breaches but admitted most of the seized evidence, excluding only material obtained from a cellphone.

On appeal, the court held that the trial judge erred by characterizing the s. 8 breach as minimal despite findings that officers routinely sought passwords without valid consent, reflecting systemic misconduct.

Applying the Grant framework anew, the court excluded the contents of a computer but admitted evidence from a USB thumb drive and photographs taken during the search.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The moving party law firm sought an order under Rule 15.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to be removed as the lawyer of record for the appellant in a receivership proceeding.

The firm had filed a notice of appeal on behalf of the appellant to prevent the sale of two condominium units, despite intending to have no further involvement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the firm had launched a 'zombie appeal' that jeopardized the receivership proceedings and abused its status as an officer of the court.

The firm was ordered to remain on the record until the final disposition of the receiver's motion to quash the appeal, prioritizing the administration of justice over the firm's interests.

The appellants appealed an order striking out their statement of defence and crossclaim and granting judgment against them for $49,628.11.

They argued the motion judge failed to give reasons for the decision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the record clearly disclosed the basis for the order: the appellants failed to answer undertakings despite multiple opportunities and court orders, and failed to respond to the motion to strike.

The evidentiary record supported the judgment amount.