ONCA 2023

The appellant sought leave to appeal the global sentence of 15 months' imprisonment for drug trafficking and breach of undertaking, arguing the sentencing judge erred in assessing addiction as a mitigating factor.

The Court of Appeal found no legal error, clarifying that the sentencing judge's finding was factual and that addiction was properly weighed against aggravating factors, including the commercial motive, repeat offending, and breach of release conditions.

The Court upheld the sentence, finding it within the appropriate range and that a conditional sentence was insufficient for denunciation and deterrence.

The appellant sought an extension of time to seek leave to appeal a Divisional Court decision that dismissed her appeal of a Law Society Tribunal decision.

The appellant also sought to set aside the Divisional Court's decision based on an apprehension of bias, arguing that the lack of hearing transcripts hindered her ability to prove bias.

The Court of Appeal applied the four-factor test for extensions of time, finding that while the appellant intended to appeal and there was no prejudice to the respondent, the delay was significant and the bias allegations lacked particulars and cogent evidence.

The court concluded that the proposed appeal lacked merit and dismissed the motion for an extension of time with costs.

The appellant, convicted of serious drug and firearm offences and sentenced to 20 years, sought bail pending appeal.

The Crown conceded the appeal was not frivolous but argued against release due to flight risk and public interest concerns.

The court found the appellant was not a flight risk given his strong release plan and compliance history, and that detention was not necessary in the public interest, balancing enforceability and reviewability interests.

The application for bail pending appeal was granted.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.

He appealed his conviction and sentence, alleging four errors in the trial judge's jury charge: an inadequate rolled-up instruction, an imbalanced charge, confusing references to "accident," and improper instructions on after-the-fact conduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal rejected the first three grounds but found that the trial judge erred by failing to provide proper cautionary or limiting instructions on the use of after-the-fact conduct evidence, particularly its relevance to distinguishing between murder and manslaughter beyond assessing intoxication.

The conviction appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The sentence appeal was not addressed.

The appellant, D.M., appealed his conviction and sentence for making child pornography and making arrangements to commit sexual offences against children.

The conviction appeal, based on the voluntariness and unequivocal nature of his guilty plea, was dismissed, with the court finding the trial judge had properly addressed any equivocation.

The sentence appeal was allowed.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred by failing to consider significant mitigating factors, including the appellant's early guilty plea and difficult background, and by not addressing Gladue principles due to the issue of Indigeneity not being raised at trial.

Despite the lack of a formal Gladue report on appeal, the court considered the appellant's progress in embracing his Indigenous identity in prison.

The original three-year consecutive sentence was reduced to 30 months.

The appellant, Ahmad Mohammad (also known as Ahmad Yousef), brought three appeals from Superior Court orders dismissing his actions under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal considered dismissing the appeals and revoking the appellant's fee waivers under the Administration of Justice Act.

The court found the proceedings to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, lacking intelligible grounds or causes of action.

The panel review motions for two appeals (McMaster University and Chaimowitz) were dismissed under r. 2.1.02, and the third appeal (Google) was dismissed under r. 2.1.01 for failure to perfect.

The court also revoked the appellant's fee waivers and prohibited further fee waiver requests without judicial permission.

No costs were awarded.

The appellant, Pierre Senatus, appealed his conviction for aggravated assault and other charges, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.

He claimed his trial counsel failed to introduce exculpatory social media posts and did not raise a reasonable apprehension of bias against the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found no basis for the ineffective assistance claim, concluding that the alleged evidence was either not provided to counsel, lacked evidentiary value, or that counsel's actions were competent.

The court also determined there was no basis for a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellant, Brent William Diehl, appealed his conviction for sexual assault with a weapon, arguing that the trial judge relied on myths and stereotypes in assessing credibility and applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's analysis, which correctly applied the principles of credibility assessment and reasonable doubt, and did not engage in stereotypical reasoning or uneven scrutiny.

The trial judge's assessment of the complainant's evidence as credible and reliable, and the appellant's account as illogical, was upheld.

The mother (C.V.F.), as appellant, sought a review of a prior order refusing a stay of a trial decision concerning parenting time and decision-making authority, and a further extension of time to perfect her appeal.

The Court of Appeal panel dismissed the motion for review, finding no basis to interfere with the previous order, which was deemed to be in the child's best interests given the extensive and prolonged litigation.

The panel also refused any further extensions for perfecting the appeal, citing multiple delays and the mother's failure to address deficiencies in her appeal materials or even read the trial decision.

The appellant, Krzysztof Harasiuk, appealed a 24-month sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to 10 offences, arguing the sentencing judge erred in rejecting a joint submission for "time served." The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal, reducing the sentence to "time served." The Court found that the sentencing judge improperly applied a fitness test rather than the stringent "administration of justice into disrepute" standard required for departing from joint submissions.

It emphasized the importance of joint submissions for judicial efficiency and certainty, concluding that the proposed sentence, which amounted to 14 months with credit for pre-sentence custody and house arrest, would not have brought the administration of justice into disrepute, especially considering the resource savings from the omnibus plea.

The appellant sought to withdraw his guilty plea to one count of uttering threats, claiming he was pressured due to being in custody and unable to afford trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the plea was informed and voluntary.

The court noted that while pressures exist when pleading guilty in custody, the plea comprehension inquiry conducted by the trial judge, coupled with the appellant's representation by counsel and lack of voiced concerns at the time, indicated a clear and informed waiver of his right to trial.

The appeal against sentence was also dismissed as the sentence had already been served.

The appellant, Robert Lavergne, appealed his 17-month global sentence for sexual assault and sexual exploitation, arguing the sentence was unfit and that post-sentence changes to conditional sentencing law (Bill C-5) required reconsideration, including the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence for sexual exploitation.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal.

The court found that the changes in law did not compel a reconsideration of the sentence or the constitutional challenge, as the trial judge's imposed sentence was fit and exceeded the minimum, and a conditional sentence would not have been imposed even under the new law.

The sentences were not demonstrably unfit, considering the profound psychological harm to the victims and the appellant's abuse of trust as a teacher.

Mr. Clare appealed his conviction, arguing his guilty plea was involuntary due to ineffective assistance of counsel.

He had pleaded guilty to possession of hydromorphone for trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the plea inquiry transcript and trial counsel's notes, finding that the plea was informed and voluntary.

The court concluded that the appellant had not met the high threshold required to establish ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of second-degree murder, appealed on two grounds: the constitutionality of the amended s. 232(2) of the Criminal Code regarding provocation, and alleged errors in the trial judge's jury charge on the Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) defence.

The Court of Appeal declined to rule on the constitutional question, finding it was raised tactically for the first time on appeal and lacked an air of reality.

The court also found no reversible error in the NCR instructions, clarifying that the jury was properly guided on the disjunctive nature of the s. 16 test.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a young person, appealed convictions for sexual assault and unlawful confinement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the conviction appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient as they did not provide an adequate pathway to support the convictions, particularly regarding the appellant's role as a party to the offences.

The trial judge's instruction on party liability under section 21 of the Criminal Code was found to be erroneous, and the reasons failed to specify how the appellant aided or abetted the commission of the offences.

The appellant, D.G., appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The trial judge had found significant credibility issues with the complainant's evidence, including inconsistencies and missing journals, but still convicted.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons inadequate for failing to explain how he could believe the complainant's evidence despite these identified credibility problems.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellants, U.K. and R.P., appealed their convictions for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in jury instructions regarding fabrication as post-offence conduct and the application of the W.(D.) principles.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by instructing the jury on fabrication of trial evidence without independent evidence, and by providing a deficient fabrication instruction that failed to distinguish between disbelieved and fabricated evidence, explain independent evidence, or require consideration of alternative explanations.

Furthermore, the trial judge erred in the W.(D.) instruction by conflating the appellants' evidence and treating defence evidence as an all-or-nothing proposition.

These errors were deemed prejudicial, going to the heart of credibility assessment and the burden of proof.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso.

The appellant, N.H., appealed his convictions for four counts of assault and one count of sexual assault, and his three-year custody sentence.

The primary ground of appeal was ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically regarding counsel's limited role under s. 486.3 of the Criminal Code, failure to pursue exculpatory evidence, and the appellant's seating arrangement at trial.

The Court of Appeal found no basis for the claims of unfair trial or ineffective assistance, concluding that counsel acted competently and went beyond their limited appointment.

The court also dismissed the appellant's complaint about appeal delay.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Mostafa Alkhalil, appealed his conviction for sexual assault and unlawful confinement, and sought leave to appeal his six-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal.

The court found no misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge regarding the victim's testimony.

It affirmed that the trial judge correctly considered the appellant's creation of an expectation of trust and the victim's lack of consent as aggravating factors.

The sentence was deemed proportionate and consistent with sentencing principles for serious sexual offences involving vulnerable victims.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, and making sexually explicit materials available to a child.

The appeal challenged these convictions on grounds of the trial judge's misapprehension of the complainant's evidence regarding her mother's presence during the alleged sexual touching, and the sufficiency of the trial judge's reasons.

The majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference and ordering a new trial on those counts, finding that the trial judge had materially misapprehended key evidence and provided insufficient reasons.

However, the conviction for making sexually explicit material available was upheld.

The dissenting judge would have dismissed the entire appeal, arguing that the trial judge correctly applied the common sense approach to child witnesses and that reasons were sufficient.