ONCA 2022

The appellant was convicted of trafficking methamphetamine and appealed, arguing the trial judge misapprehended photographic evidence concerning her knowledge of the bag's contents.

The Court of Appeal found that there was ample evidence to support the trial judge's finding that the appellant knew what was in the bag she passed.

The trial judge properly considered and rejected the defence's submission that the appellant passed the bag unwittingly, and correctly applied the law governing circumstantial evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The National Organized Workers Union appealed the denial of an interlocutory injunction to prevent Sinai Health System from enforcing a mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy.

The union argued that the policy compelled vaccination without informed consent, constituting irreparable harm not remediable by arbitration.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding no error in declining to exercise the Superior Court's residual jurisdiction in labour relations.

The court affirmed that the potential harm of unpaid leave or termination due to non-compliance with a workplace policy is fundamentally related to employment and is remediable by a labour arbitrator through reinstatement and compensation for lost wages, thus not creating a 'remedial gap' that would warrant Superior Court intervention.

The appellant, Joseph Grant-Stuart, appealed his conviction for importing cocaine and possessing it for the purpose of trafficking, and sought leave to appeal his nine-year sentence.

The conviction appeal argued errors in the trial judge's response to a jury question on reasonable doubt and improper Crown closing submissions.

The sentence appeal argued the sentence was unfit due to insufficient weight given to mitigating factors like age and health.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's jury instructions or the Crown's submissions, and that the sentence was fit and within the appropriate range for drug importing cases.

The appellant, injured in a prisoner transport van, sued for negligence alleging design deficiencies.

After settling with the Province, the appellant pursued the driver and the City of Toronto, primarily seeking punitive damages for alleged callous disregard for prisoner safety.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding no conduct warranting punitive damages.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in the assessment of the punitive damages claim or the factual findings, and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The appellant, Dwayne Gordon, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and the imposed sentence of life imprisonment with 14 years parole ineligibility.

The appeal raised three issues regarding conviction: adequacy of jury instructions on identification evidence (including recognition evidence), the instruction on adoptive admissions, and the failure to discharge a juror with colour distinction difficulties.

On sentence, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by considering youth court disposition and conditional discharge as a criminal record.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, found no error in the jury instructions on identification or adoptive admissions, and upheld the decision not to discharge the juror.

While acknowledging errors in considering the appellant's youth record for sentencing, the court found these errors did not impact the parole ineligibility period.

The appeal was dismissed, except for setting aside the victim fine surcharge.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on charges of possession for the purpose of trafficking and proceeds of crime, arguing the trial judge erred in her analysis of circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapplied the analytical framework by examining evidence in a piecemeal fashion, scrutinizing individual pieces against a reasonable doubt standard, and requiring the Crown to negate speculative inferences.

The court held that the trial judge failed to consider the cumulative effect of the evidence as a whole and that alternative inferences inconsistent with guilt must be reasonable, not merely speculative.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, Todd Kehoe, appealed his conviction for trafficking in fentanyl patches, knowingly causing a person to use forged fentanyl patches, and obtaining merchandise by false pretenses.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's s. 24(2) ruling, which dismissed an application to exclude evidence arising from an alleged s. 8 Charter breach.

The Court of Appeal did not need to definitively rule on the s. 8 issue, finding no error in the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis, which properly engaged with a Grant analysis and was owed deference.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of dangerous driving and arson, appealed only the arson conviction.

The appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended expert evidence regarding the cause of the fire, specifically in excluding the possibility that a cigarette accidentally caused it.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge.

The court affirmed the trial judge's entitlement to accept or reject expert testimony and to conclude, based on the evidence, that the fire was intentionally set by the appellant.

The Crown conceded the conviction appeal, acknowledging that the verdicts were unreasonable due to reliance on inadmissible evidence.

The Court of Appeal accepted the concession, setting aside the convictions and entering acquittals.

Antonio Duscio sought a review of a single judge's decision dismissing his motion for release pending the hearing of his appeal from a 16-month sentence for contempt.

The contempt findings related to concealment of assets to avoid execution on a fraud judgment.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to intervene, deferring to the motion judge's discretionary weighing of factors, and dismissed the motion for release.

The court declined to decide whether criminal or civil process governs such release motions.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, raising arguments of insufficient reasons from the trial judge, uneven scrutiny of Crown and defence evidence, and erroneous findings regarding evidence that confirmed the complainant's account.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficient, the scrutiny of evidence balanced, and the corroborating evidence (specifically the complainant's demeanour) properly considered, despite some disagreement with the trial judge's assessment of one piece of corroborating evidence.

This decision concerns a third motion brought by the applicant to reopen an appeal abandoned in 2003, following his 1996 convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and sexual touching, and subsequent dangerous offender designation.

Previous motions to reopen were dismissed in 2005 and 2013, with the latter upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court of Appeal, assuming without deciding jurisdiction for successive motions, found no change in circumstances or merit in the proposed appeal, emphasizing the critical need for finality in criminal proceedings.

The motion was dismissed.

The appellant, Reshane Hayles-Wilson, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and sought leave to appeal his 15-year parole ineligibility period.

The appeal raised three grounds: improper Crown submissions regarding tailoring evidence, an erroneous two-step deliberation instruction to the jury, and improper Crown submissions on motive to lie.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred on all three grounds but concluded that these errors, individually or collectively, did not undermine the safety of the verdict given the overall fault-free trial and clear instructions on burden of proof and reasonable doubt.

The court also found no error in principle or manifest unfitness in the sentence.

Both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal were dismissed.

The appellant, Patrick Gregory Ellis, appealed support and related orders made after an uncontested trial, which was uncontested because his pleadings were struck due to wilful non-compliance and refusal to provide financial disclosure.

The respondent, Amy Dawn Lamothe, brought a motion to quash the appeal.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion on two bases: first, courts typically do not hear appeals from unopposed proceedings, and no exception was warranted; second, the appellant had chronically and wilfully breached numerous court orders, causing prejudice.

The appeal was quashed, and the appellant was barred from initiating further financial proceedings without paying outstanding amounts or obtaining leave.

Costs were awarded to the respondent on an elevated scale.

The Joint Liquidators of Stanford International Bank Limited (SIB) appealed the dismissal of their negligence claim against The Toronto-Dominion Bank (TD Bank).

SIB was a vehicle for a massive Ponzi scheme.

The Liquidators claimed TD Bank was negligent in providing correspondent banking services by failing to detect and protect SIB from insider abuse.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that TD Bank did not owe a novel duty of care to monitor SIB for internal fraud, as this fell outside the scope of TD Bank's undertaking as a correspondent bank.

The court also affirmed the trial judge's alternative finding that even if a duty existed, there was no breach of the standard of care, and that the trial judge's procedural rulings regarding witness recall were fair.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision that dismissed their Rule 59.06 motion as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and imposed a leave requirement for any further motions in the underlying action.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's decision, concluding that the Rule 59.06 motion was a third attempt to re-litigate issues already decided, which constituted vexatious conduct and an abuse of process.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondent.

D.D. appealed his conviction for sexual interference and sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of the adult complainant.

The trial judge improperly evaluated the complainant's testimony, given when she was 18, as if she were a child, inferring truthfulness from "childlike details" rather than applying adult credibility criteria while considering the childhood context of the events.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their action for negligent misrepresentation, which was found to be statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The trial judge also found the action could not succeed on the merits.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the appellants, as professional engineers, knew or ought to have known of their claim much earlier than when they filed their statement of claim, despite the respondents' ameliorative efforts and superior expertise.

The court emphasized that an expert report was not necessary for discoverability in these circumstances.

The appeal was dismissed.

This is an appeal from a motion judge's decision to dismiss an action for damages related to alleged improper transactions undertaken by the respondents while administering an estate.

The appellants raised three grounds of appeal: errors in credibility assessment, reliance on inadmissible hearsay, and an incorrect finding that respondents could act as attorneys under a Power of Attorney (POA) while the principal was still capable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, affirming the motion judge's credibility findings, finding no reliance on inadmissible hearsay, and confirming that the standard form POA allowed attorneys to act before incapacity, as it had no conditions or postponed effective date.

Full indemnity costs were awarded to the respondents due to the appellants' frivolous allegations.

The appellants, Greta Energy Inc. and Great Grand Valley 2 Limited Partnership, appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action against Pembina Pipeline Corporation and BluEarth Renewables Inc. The case involved the sale of bundled assets, some subject to Rights of First Refusal (ROFRs).

The appellants alleged that the respondents manipulated asset prices in bad faith to prevent the exercise of ROFRs, breaching duties of good faith and honest performance, inducing breach of contract, and conspiracy.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the respondents did not breach their duty of good faith, did not owe a fiduciary duty, did not conspire, and did not induce breach of contract, as their actions were commercially reasonable and not intended to "eviscerate" the ROFRs.

The appeal was dismissed.