ONCA 2022

The appellant, Shoreh Forjani, appealed a summary judgment decision that awarded damages to the respondents, George Leslie Scott and Harriet Brav-Baum, for her failure to close a property purchase.

The appellant had refused to close, alleging latent defects.

The respondents subsequently sold the property for a lower price and sued for damages.

The motion judge had granted summary judgment, finding the respondents had mitigated their damages and giving no weight to the appellant's "expert" affidavits due to a lack of evidence regarding their qualifications.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's decision that expert opinions require proper foundation regarding qualifications to be given weight, and that an adverse inference was properly drawn when the appellant obstructed questions about an expert's expertise.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order for extradition to the United States, arguing violations of Charter sections 6 (right to remain in Canada) and 7 (fundamental justice due to sentencing disparity), and that the surrender would be unjust or oppressive under the Extradition Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the Minister's decision was reasonable, had properly considered the Cotroni factors, and that the potential sentencing disparity did not meet the high threshold of "shocking the conscience" required to violate section 7 or render the surrender unjust or oppressive.

The applicant, Shaun Rootenberg, sought an order for the appointment of counsel under s. 684(1) of the Criminal Code for his appeal, having exhausted legal aid options.

The Crown opposed, arguing the appeal lacked arguable merit and counsel was not necessary.

The court found that while the proposed grounds of appeal were weak, they were arguable for the purpose of the application.

Specifically, the second and third grounds, concerning the legal implications of strip searches during pre-trial custody and sentencing credits, involved significant and novel legal components, making the appointment of counsel necessary for a fair and effective appellate review.

The application for the appointment of counsel to advance all three grounds of appeal was granted.

The appellant, Barry James Gallant, appealed a motion judge's finding that the respondent, Miranda Bailey's, obligations as a guarantor on a mortgage loan ended on June 28, 2014, and that she was not bound by subsequent mortgage extensions made without her notice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error.

The motion judge had reasonably interpreted the mortgage documents, including standard terms, the mortgage agreement, and the mortgage schedule, to conclude that the guarantee's duration was limited to the 12-month period set out in the mortgage agreement, thereby modifying the standard terms.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible (NCR) for assault with a weapon and possession of a dangerous weapon, appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition that continued her detention order.

She sought an absolute or conditional discharge, or a new hearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion reasonable.

The court noted the appellant's schizophrenic illness requiring medication, her lack of insight into her condition, and the risk of decompensation and danger to the public without supervision, especially given her history of substance abuse contributing to the index offences.

The court emphasized that her progress occurred under direct hospital supervision and that there was no record of success in a controlled community setting.

The appellant, Matthew Shedden, appealed his convictions for various drug offences, arguing that the search warrant used to obtain evidence was invalid.

The challenge at trial, which contended there were no reasonable and probable grounds to believe drugs would be found at the residence (his mother's home), was unsuccessful.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if the trial judge applied an incorrect legal standard or provided insufficient reasons, the record amply supported the valid issuance of the search warrant.

The court concluded that reasonable inferences could be drawn from the appellant's observed conduct, including frequent visits to the residence between suspected drug transactions, to establish the necessary reasonable grounds.

The appellants, committed to trial for second-degree murder, successfully appealed a judicial review order that had quashed their preliminary inquiry judge's decision and directed committal for first-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal found the reviewing judge erred by substituting his view of the evidence for that of the preliminary inquiry judge, incorrectly identifying jurisdictional errors.

The preliminary inquiry judge had correctly applied the law and did not commit jurisdictional error by finding insufficient evidence for first-degree murder.

The appeal was allowed, the judicial review decision quashed, and the original committal for second-degree murder reinstated.

The appellant, a permanent resident, appealed his robbery convictions, arguing his guilty pleas were uninformed due to misadvice from trial counsel regarding immigration consequences.

He was led to believe that sentences under two years per count would provide a "fighting chance" from an immigration perspective, when in fact, sentences over six months rendered him inadmissible with no right to appeal a removal order.

Applying the test from R. v. Wong, the Court of Appeal found the pleas uninformed and that the appellant suffered subjective prejudice, as he would have opted for a trial or different conditions had he been properly advised.

The convictions were set aside, a new trial ordered, and further proceedings were stayed in the public interest given the served sentences, lack of re-offending, and court resource pressures.

The appellant appealed the granting of a charge against her property under s. 34(1) of the Solicitors Act.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the application judge's finding that the well-established three-step test for ordering a statutory charge was met, specifically that the appellant was unable or unwilling to pay the solicitor's fees.

The court found no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's discretionary decision, which was amply supported by the record.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The applicant, convicted of sexual assault and released on bail pending appeal, sought a variation of his bail conditions to permit travel to Pakistan for a one-month business trip to resell automotive parts.

The Crown opposed the variation, arguing that the applicant posed a flight risk due to his dual citizenship, the absence of an extradition treaty with Pakistan, and the potential profit from the business venture relative to the existing bail amount.

The court considered the flight risk and the public interest balance, distinguishing the case from a prior refusal and a more serious precedent.

The motion judge granted the variation, allowing the travel, but increased the bail amount from $60,000 to $125,000, finding that the applicant did not pose a serious flight risk and that there were no residual public safety concerns.

The appellant appealed an application judge's decision that the respondent was free to sell a property to a third party despite the appellant's right of first refusal under a lease.

The appellant had exercised its right of first refusal by matching a third-party offer, which included a 30-day financing condition.

The appellant failed to obtain financing, requested an extension which was refused, and the agreement expired.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's commercially reasonable interpretation that the right of first refusal was exercisable only once and was spent after the appellant failed to waive the financing condition.

P.C. appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference and sought leave to appeal his four-year sentence.

The appeal raised grounds concerning the trial judge's jury charge, specifically the language used to refer to the unrepresented accused's evidence versus his submissions, and the sufficiency of assistance provided to the unrepresented appellant.

Additionally, the appellant challenged the trial judge's factual findings at sentencing, particularly regarding penetration, and the weight given to mitigating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no reversible error in the jury charge, that sufficient assistance was provided to the appellant, and that the sentencing judge was entitled to make factual findings not explicitly determined by the jury's verdict.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellants sought to set aside an order dismissing their motion to stay the enforcement of certain costs orders from lower court proceedings.

However, the Supreme Court of Canada subsequently dismissed their application for leave to appeal with costs, rendering the appeal before the Court of Appeal moot.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as moot, and costs were fixed in favour of the respondents.

The appellant, Ahmad Durani, appealed his convictions for criminal negligence causing death while street racing and failing to remain, and his global sentence of 5 years' imprisonment.

The convictions stemmed from a street race that resulted in a fatal collision.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in analyzing the actus reus and mens rea of criminal negligence and in applying the presumption for failing to remain.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both conviction and sentence appeals, finding the trial judge's conclusions were rooted in evidence and that the appellant's conduct constituted a marked and substantial departure from the norm.

The court also found the trial judge correctly rejected the appellant's statements as "evidence to the contrary" for the failing to remain charge.

The appellant appealed an order striking his statement of claim and dismissing his action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, agreeing that the pleaded facts did not establish a breach of the Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act, 2005, nor did they provide a basis for a civil cause of action against the City.

The appeal on costs was also dismissed, with the Court finding the original costs order reasonable.

This is a Crown appeal concerning jury instructions on the mens rea for sexual assault, specifically when the defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent is unavailable.

The trial judge instructed the jury that the Crown must prove the knowledge element (accused knew of, was wilfully blind or reckless as to, absence of consent) and allowed them to consider evidence of the respondent's mistaken belief.

The Court of Appeal held that while the knowledge element is always part of the Crown's burden, the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury to disregard evidence of legally ineffective mistaken beliefs, effectively allowing an unavailable defence through the "back door." The court allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittal, and ordered a new trial.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed an appeal by CTO Boost Inc. against a summary judgment enforcing a settlement agreement with Idea Notion Development Inc. CTO had repudiated the settlement, claiming fraudulent invoices, after accepting an offer.

The appeal challenged the admissibility of "without prejudice" communications, the motion judge's evidence analysis, the fraudulent misrepresentation defence, and the exercise of discretion.

The Court affirmed the motion judge's findings, holding that "without prejudice" documents were admissible to prove the settlement's existence and that CTO entered the agreement with knowledge of potential discrepancies.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing her defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred in finding a published photo was not defamatory and in upholding the respondents' defence of responsible communication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge applied the proper legal framework from Pointes Protection and Grant v. Torstar, and her conclusions were entitled to deference.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of a commercial lease termination provision, specifically whether proposed remodelling rendered continued possession by the tenant "impracticable." The motion judge had granted summary judgment to the landlord, finding the renovations bona fide and that the premises would cease to exist.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in construing the termination provision too narrowly and in isolation from other lease provisions, failing to consider whether the tenant could remain in possession during renovations.

The appeal was allowed, the summary judgment and costs order were set aside, and the action was remitted to the Superior Court for continuation.

The appellant, Wendy Sin Ming Ho, appealed the dismissal of her action against the Crown and four tribunals.

She alleged psychological harm from harassment and threats at an Ontario hospital (1999-2000) and subsequent failures by various tribunals to provide redress.

The motion judge dismissed her amended pleading, finding no vicarious liability for the Crown regarding hospital employment issues or quasi-judicial decisions, no Charter breaches, and no basis for a civil court to compel a criminal investigation by the RCMP.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error, no viable cause of action against the Crown, and that fresh evidence did not assist her claim.

The appeal and a motion to file fresh evidence were dismissed.