ONCA 2022

The appellant, Armando Scarlato Jr., appealed the dismissal of his breach of contract action on a motion for summary judgment.

He alleged the respondents, Richard Buzbuzian and Jason Monaco, breached an agreement to pay him a commission or finder’s fee for introducing them to a third-party corporation for a proposed IPO.

The motion judge found that emails exchanged did not constitute a contract, lacking essential terms, and alternatively, that the appellant was estopped by a settlement with the third party.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that no contract was formed, emphasizing deference to findings of contractual interpretation as mixed fact and law, and concluding that the term sheet did not remedy the contractual deficiencies.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondents.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment that awarded the respondent damages for a failed agreement of purchase and sale.

The appellant argued that the respondent's sales representative made a misrepresentation regarding future property price increases, which induced him to enter the agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's finding that the alleged misrepresentation was a non-actionable prediction, not a statement of fact, and there was no evidence it was made dishonestly or negligently.

Roger Poirier (appellant) sued multiple defendants for fraud and misrepresentation related to a failed business investment.

He settled his claim with one defendant, Jerry Friedberg, but failed to disclose this settlement to the other defendants for six months.

The motion judge stayed the action against the remaining defendants, finding the non-disclosure to be an abuse of process.

Poirier appealed, arguing the motion judge applied an incorrect legal test and made palpable and overriding errors of fact.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that immediate disclosure of settlement agreements that fundamentally alter the litigation landscape is mandatory, and failure to do so constitutes an abuse of process warranting a stay of proceedings, regardless of prejudice to the non-settling parties.

This is an appeal from orders concerning the equalization of net family property and costs in a divorce proceeding.

The appellant husband challenged the trial judge's recalculation of the respondent wife's pension value, the payment order, and the costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the husband's appeal, finding no error in the pension valuation or the enforcement order, and refused leave to appeal the costs.

The court also granted the wife's request to amend the enforcement deadline to allow for a period to pursue cash payment before pension rollover.

The applicant, M.S., sought bail pending appeal after being convicted of five counts of sexual interference and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment.

The application was dismissed as the court found that while the appeal was not frivolous and the applicant would surrender, the public confidence component under s. 679(3)(c) of the Criminal Code was engaged due to the serious nature of the child sexual abuse offences and the weak grounds of appeal.

Ida Covello appealed a motion judge's order dismissing her motion to set aside a default judgment obtained by Flex Park Inc. arising from a mortgage.

Covello alleged the mortgage was fraudulent due to a law clerk's falsification of information in other transactions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's decision that the law clerk's activities did not affect the validity or enforceability of Covello's mortgage.

The court also rejected Covello's attempt to introduce fresh evidence and her reliance on the Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act, neither of which were relevant or met the necessary legal tests.

The appellant, a professional accountant and second-time bankrupt, appealed a conditional discharge order requiring him to pay $325,000 to the Trustee.

The application judge found the appellant untruthful, evasive, and in breach of disclosure obligations under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, including failing to disclose businesses, records, property, vehicle sales, and loans/inheritance from his mother.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the conditional discharge was based on the appellant's conduct and disclosure breaches, not surplus income under s. 68.

The court also addressed improper ex parte communications by the Trustee, finding no miscarriage of justice.

The appellants sought to appeal the dismissal of their application challenging outdoor gathering restrictions imposed as public health measures during the COVID-19 pandemic, which was initially dismissed for lack of public interest standing.

The Court of Appeal determined that the underlying application was moot because the challenged regulations were no longer in force.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the appeal regarding Mr. Baber's private interest standing, finding that this issue was also moot and that a decision would not resolve any live controversy or bind future hypothetical challenges.

The appellant, a traditional Chinese medicine practitioner, appealed his sexual assault conviction.

The appeal centered on whether the trial judge erred by introducing a new theory of liability (removal of a towel exposing genitals) late in the trial, which differed from the Crown's primary theory (vaginal examination).

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's introduction of this new theory, and subsequent conviction based on it, was unfair to the appellant as it constituted a drastic change made too suddenly and too late, prejudicing the defence.

The court held that while judges are not confined to parties' theories, trial fairness considerations may preclude new bases of liability inconsistent with how the case was litigated.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, J.A., appealed his convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault.

The central issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in admitting the appellant's police statement as voluntary evidence.

The appellant contended that the trial judge, after finding an inducement, failed to adequately consider all oppressive circumstances in determining if his will was overborne.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the trial judge correctly applied the legal test for voluntariness and considered all relevant circumstances, and that the finding of voluntariness was entitled to significant appellate deference.

This decision addresses a request by the respondent (defendant in the original action) to limit the scope of a new trial on liability and damages, which had been ordered by the Court of Appeal in a prior decision.

The court dismissed the request, emphasizing that the evidence and issues were complex, interrelated, and interdependent.

Limiting the trial to specific issues would risk artificial credibility assessments and unreliable fact-finding.

The appellant appealed an order striking his pleadings without leave to amend.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's decision, finding her reasons careful and complete, and her articulation of legal principles clear and correct.

The court noted the appellant's self-drafted pleadings were unacceptable and that his later apology and amended drafts were strategic, not genuine.

The appeal was dismissed.

This decision addresses the appellant's desire to abandon his appeal, raising concerns about his current mental capacity.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario determined it has the discretion to reject a Notice of Abandonment if the appellant lacks capacity, likening the test to that for entering a guilty plea.

The court decided to proceed to a second stage of analysis to determine whether to accept the abandonment, setting a case management conference to explore the evidentiary record on capacity and offering to appoint counsel for the appellant for this limited purpose.

This is an appeal from a Superior Court of Justice order concerning an estate trustee's conflict of interest and a claim for compensation.

The appellant argued that the application judge made palpable or overriding errors in her findings of fact and application of law.

The Court of Appeal found no such errors, affirming the lower court's determination that a conflict of interest prevented the appellant from continuing as estate trustee and upholding the decision on the appellant's compensation claim.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant, Feisal Noor, appealed his conviction on firearms-related charges, arguing that his s. 9 Charter right against arbitrary detention and s. 8 Charter right against unreasonable search and seizure were violated.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the police had reasonable suspicion for an investigative detention and that the handgun was found in plain view during a lawful struggle, thus dismissing the Charter application and affirming the conviction.

The appellants, Alton Grant and Shaqwan Kawano, appealed their first-degree murder convictions.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on how to assess exculpatory eyewitness identification evidence, specifically regarding a key witness whose testimony arguably contradicted the Crown's theory of identity.

This error was deemed serious and not curable.

The court dismissed Grant's Charter s. 11(b) application for unreasonable delay and found the verdict against him was not unreasonable.

However, due to the misdirection on eyewitness identification, the appeals were allowed, and new trials were ordered for both appellants.

The appellant appealed his conviction for multiple violent offences and his designation as a dangerous offender, which resulted in an indeterminate sentence.

The primary focus of the appeal was the dangerous offender designation under s. 753(1)(a)(iii) of the Criminal Code, which allows for designation based on the brutal nature of a single offence compelling a conclusion of future unrestrained behaviour.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentencing judge's decision, finding no error in the assessment and weighing of conflicting expert psychiatric evidence regarding the appellant's future risk of violent reoffence.

The court affirmed that the sentencing judge was entitled to prefer the Crown's expert's opinion, which considered clinical factors in addition to actuarial tests, and that the evidence supported the conclusion that the appellant constituted a threat to public safety requiring an indeterminate sentence.

The conviction appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order striking his claim against the respondents (lawyers of his former employer) without leave to amend.

The motion judge found the claims were covered by absolute privilege as they related to lawyers' work in contemplation of litigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the respondents had no duty to the appellant and their interactions were through litigation, and upheld the refusal to grant leave to amend.

The appellant, Narine Loojune, appealed an order that substituted the Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) as guardian of property for his catastrophically injured nephew, Dataram Loojune.

The substitution was ordered due to the appellant's repeated failure to comply with court-ordered obligations to account for his nephew's property.

The appellant sought to adjourn the appeal to submit fresh evidence alleging fraud by a PGT employee and argued the motion judge applied the wrong legal test and was biased.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the adjournment application, finding no credible evidence to support the claims or impact the appeal.

The court affirmed the motion judge's application of the "best interests" test and found no evidence of fraud, harassment, or judicial bias.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay costs to the PGT.

The appellant appealed a judgment finding him liable for the respondent's severe ankle injury under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal, including alleged errors in factual findings, disregard for evidence timing, failure to appreciate an affidavit's relevance, and errors in credibility assessment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's detailed reasons, factual conclusions, evidentiary decisions, or credibility findings, emphasizing the deference owed to the trial judge.