ONCA 2020

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting and relying on the complainant's prior consistent statement to a doctor that her injury was caused by 'forced intercourse'.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge improperly used the statement to bolster the complainant's credibility rather than for a permissible purpose under the narrative as circumstantial evidence exception.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for child luring after communicating online with an undercover police officer posing as a 14-year-old.

The appellant claimed he knew the person was not a minor and only met them for a 'gotcha' moment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) framework and drew logical inferences from the text messages.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, though the victim surcharge was set aside.

The appellant was convicted of historical sexual assault and sexual interference against a complainant over whom he held a position of trust.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to reconcile inconsistencies, overemphasizing his demeanour during a police interview, and assigning too much weight to the complainant's youthfulness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments and findings were open to him.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, engaging in stereotypical reasoning, and failing to appreciate his motive theory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions that the complainant did not consent and was incapable of consenting were sound and entitled to deference.

The applicant, serving a five-year sentence for incest, applied for bail pending his sentence appeal.

He argued that the sentencing judge erred in upholding the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence under the Nur framework and that his sentence was unfit.

The motions judge dismissed the application, finding that while the constitutional challenge was not without merit, the applicant failed to demonstrate that a successful appeal would result in a significantly lower sentence such that he would have already served it by the time the appeal is heard.

The appellant, the former developer of a condominium, appealed the dismissal of its application to declare the respondent condominium corporation's notices of sale against its units null and void.

The appellant had refused to pay common expenses and a special assessment levied by the new owner-elected board after the appellant turned over control with depleted accounts.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings that the special assessment was validly levied under an adopted budget and that the notice provided sufficient and accurate reasons.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a second degree murder conviction arising from a fatal stabbing and challenged the admission of his police statement, the exclusion of images from the deceased’s phone, and the jury charge on bad character evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 146(2) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act was not triggered because the appellant was neither detained nor subject to reasonable grounds for belief that he committed the offence when interviewed, and the statement was voluntary under the confessions rule.

The court also upheld the exclusion of phone images as minimally probative and unduly prejudicial, and found no error in the limiting instruction on bad character evidence.

On sentence, the court upheld the adult life sentence, finding no error in the sentencing judge’s factual findings, YCJA analysis, or treatment of IRCS, and rejected the proposed fresh evidence as lacking cogency.

The appellant sought judicial review of the Minister's decision ordering his unconditional surrender to the requesting state, arguing that a four-year delay between the arrest of his co-conspirators and the extradition request constituted an abuse of process.

The Minister concluded the delay was adequately explained by the requesting state and did not offend notions of fair play.

The Court of Appeal held that the Minister was entitled to accept the requesting state's representations and found her decision reasonable.

The appeal from the committal order was abandoned and dismissed, and the application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act and the granting of summary judgment and broad injunctive relief in a defamation action brought by the respondent union and its members.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the anti-SLAPP motion, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the harm suffered by the respondents outweighed the low public interest in the appellant's expression.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part regarding the injunctive relief, narrowing the publication ban to prohibit only defamatory statements and setting aside the restrictions on the appellant's movements and communications as overly broad and unjustified by the defamation findings.

The appellants appealed their custodial sentences for production and possession for the purpose of trafficking in marijuana.

They sought a suspended sentence or an intermittent custodial sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle by the sentencing judge and held that the sentences were fit.

The appeals from sentence were dismissed, except that the victim surcharges were set aside.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, unlawful confinement, and breach of recognizance, as well as his 4.5-year sentence, arising from a home invasion.

He argued the unlawful confinement conviction violated the Kienapple principle as it was not a separate delict from the robbery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding sufficient evidence of domination and coercive restraint distinct from the robbery.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 4.5-year sentence reflected no error in principle and fell within the fit range, though the victim surcharge was set aside.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abated due to the death of the respondent.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their negligence actions arising from a fire that destroyed an historic mansion shortly after a plumber repaired a leaking pipe using a blowtorch.

At trial, the appellants did not call expert evidence on the standard of care, arguing the plumber's conduct was egregious.

The trial judge found the plumber's conduct was not egregious and that expert evidence was required to establish the standard of care for soldering.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in the conclusion that the appellants failed to discharge their burden of proving a breach of the standard of care without expert evidence.

The mother transferred title of the family cottage to herself and two of her children as joint tenants, while registering a life interest for her other two children.

After the mother's death, a dispute arose over the nature of the life interest.

The motion judge found that the respondent had an exclusive life interest in the property.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the mother's actual intention was to gift the property to the appellants while granting the respondent a non-exclusive life-time licence to occupy the cottage, consistent with historical family use.

The appellant was convicted of several offences arising out of an armed home invasion and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment.

He appealed his convictions and sentence, and his counsel pursued production of records to advance an alibi and alternate suspect defence.

However, the appellant was subsequently found inadmissible to Canada for serious criminality and deported.

As he was no longer amenable to the court's jurisdiction, the appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant, a high school teacher, was convicted of sexual assault and sexual exploitation of a former student.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge misapplied the burden of proof, applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence, and erred in assessing credibility.

He also appealed his one-year sentence as harsh and excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's credibility assessments and concluding the sentence was fit given the extent of the manipulation and grooming.

The appellant property manager appealed the dismissal of its summary judgment motion, arguing that the respondent condominium corporation's action for construction defects was a nullity because it failed to provide owners with notice under s. 23(2) of the Condominium Act, 1998 before issuing a notice of action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, taking the rare step of overruling its own previous decision in Medhurst.

The Court held that applying the modern approach to statutory interpretation, non-compliance with the notice provision does not render an action a nullity, as doing so would undermine the consumer protection purpose of the Act and cause injustice to the condominium owners the provision was designed to protect.

The appellant entered into a building contract for a new home and paid a 25% deposit.

She later repudiated the contract after failing to agree on modifications to reduce costs.

The trial judge dismissed her claim for the return of the deposit, finding it was a true deposit subject to forfeiture upon repudiation.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in interpreting the deposit provision and in denying relief from forfeiture.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the deposit retained its character and that forfeiture was not unconscionable or disproportionate to the damages suffered by the respondents.

The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking in persons and theft, arguing the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding the definition of exploitation, prior inconsistent statements, and psychological safety, and erred by amending the indictment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury instructions were adequate and the amendment caused no prejudice.

The sentence appeal was allowed on consent to credit the appellant for 14 days of pre-trial custody, reducing his sentence to 29 months and 7 days.

The appellant appealed his convictions for criminal negligence causing death, criminal negligence causing bodily harm, and aggravated dangerous driving.

He argued that the trial judge erred in applying the modified objective test by failing to account for his state of panic after being chased by assailants, and by improperly using the automatism standard to assess mens rea.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the modified objective test.

The court held that a reasonable person in the appellant's circumstances would have foreseen the risk, as the imminent peril had passed, and the trial judge did not err in her consideration of the incapacity defence.