ONCA 2020

The appellant, a young person, appealed his conviction for sexual assault arising from an incident in a high school classroom.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing witness credibility, resolving inconsistencies, and addressing potential collusion and animus.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, noting that discrepancies in witness accounts were natural given their different vantage points and that the trial judge properly considered the complainant's age and the passage of time.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant pharmacy entered into an agreement for telemedicine services and signed an equipment lease.

The telemedicine provider defaulted, and the appellant discovered the lease contained a 'no cancellation' clause requiring continued payments to the respondent lessor.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the 'no cancellation' clause unenforceable under the Tilden Rent-A-Car principle because the lessor failed to take reasonable measures to draw the harsh and oppressive term to the appellant's attention.

The appellant, J.J., appealed a sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge improperly used transcripts of the complainant's police statement and preliminary inquiry evidence for credibility assessments.

The transcripts were provided to the trial judge solely to assist in recalling portions put to the complainant during viva voce evidence.

However, the trial judge considered the entirety of the transcripts, including passages not introduced in evidence, to find the complainant's "three interrogations" internally consistent, thereby preferring her evidence and rejecting the accused's.

The Court of Appeal found this improper use rendered the trial fundamentally unfair, allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial.

The appellants, Ronald Patterson and his family, appealed the dismissal of their motions to strike the jury and declare a mistrial in a motor vehicle personal injury action.

During jury deliberations, a juror accessed extrinsic information (Fault Determination Rules) online and shared it.

The trial judge conducted an inquiry, issued a correcting charge, and dismissed the motions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the trial judge properly inquired into the extrinsic information and effectively addressed its prejudicial effect with a correcting charge, which the jury was presumed to have followed.

The court found no misapprehension of evidence or patent unreasonableness in the trial judge's decision.

The appellants, Pamella and Gregory Radwan, appealed a summary judgment granted to The Energy Credit Union Limited concerning a defaulted "on demand" mortgage.

The Radwans argued the motion judge failed to address their evidence regarding standard charge terms, Pamella Radwan's sophistication, and issues of credibility, and that the reasons were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's findings that the Radwans signed a valid "on demand" agreement, benefited from the funds, and defaulted.

The court affirmed that the lender was not obligated to insist on independent legal advice and that the reasons adequately explained the decision.

The purchaser obtained an order for specific performance, a vesting order, and substantial indemnity costs after a failed real estate transaction.

The vendor appealed and obtained a certificate of stay for the costs order.

The purchaser moved to set aside the certificate of stay, arguing the costs were to be collected via an abatement, not a direct payment.

The vendor moved to stay the vesting order pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the purchaser's motion, finding the costs order was automatically stayed under r. 63.01 as an order for the payment of money.

The Court granted the vendor's motion to stay the vesting order, finding a risk of irreparable harm if the property was transferred pending appeal, and ordered the appeal expedited.

The appellant appealed a sentence of two years less a day for assault causing bodily harm.

He argued the trial judge improperly considered his propensity for violence during a Gardner hearing and mistakenly considered a previous conviction for assaulting his spouse as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's credibility assessment and confirming that the trial judge correctly considered the appellant was on probation for an offence related to the complainant, which was a valid aggravating factor.

The court found the sentence fit given the significant assault and substantial bodily harm.

The appellants, Salvatore Raia and Michael Vitello, appealed their convictions for conspiring to kidnap, sexually assault, and murder Mr. Vitello’s spouse.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's assessment of a key witness's credibility and reliability, and alleged errors in the trial judge's reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's credibility assessment, which was supported by extensive corroborative evidence.

Minor errors in the trial judge's reasons were deemed peripheral and without impact on the credibility assessment.

K.V. sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal against a Superior Court judge's decision to quash a subpoena issued to the prosecuting Crown counsel in his ongoing sexual offence trial.

The Crown opposed, arguing lack of merit and delay.

The Court of Appeal granted the extension, finding the appeal not frivolous and that K.V. had a right to appeal, despite concerns about trial delay, as the complainant's evidence was complete.

The appellant, G.W., appealed convictions for multiple sexual offences, arguing that his work schedule and other commitments precluded him from being alone with the child victims.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's rejection of this defence, noting that the trial judge had found the appellant's credibility undermined by his attempts to minimize opportunities and that ample opportunity for the offences existed.

The appellate court found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's factual findings, which were thoroughly grounded in the evidence and owed deference.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, judgment creditors of 798839 Ontario Limited (39), appealed a summary judgment decision.

The original motion judge found that 39 had not satisfied the contractual prerequisites to acquire an interest in a mining development, specifically by failing to expend the required funds on the specified property, with a portion diverted to another project.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's interpretation of the contract and finding no error in her consideration of the factual matrix.

The court emphasized that contractual interpretation must primarily rely on the plain language of the agreement and that surrounding circumstances should not overwhelm the text or create a new agreement.

The appellant was convicted of various firearm and drug offences, as well as possession of the proceeds of crime, after police executed a search warrant at his apartment and found firearms, drugs, and cash.

On appeal, the appellant argued the verdicts were unreasonable as they relied on circumstantial evidence that failed to prove his knowledge and control over the contraband.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the convictions for possession of a loaded restricted firearm, possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of a prohibited device, finding the evidence insufficient to establish the requisite knowledge and control.

The conviction for possession of the proceeds of crime was upheld, and the global sentence was reduced to five years.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for a home invasion robbery where an occupant was shot.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a 'mixed witness' Vetrovec instruction and a W.(D.) instruction regarding a co-perpetrator's testimony, which was exculpatory at trial but inculpatory during a prior guilty plea.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury charge adequate when read as a whole.

The sentence appeal was granted only to credit the appellant with 90 days of pre-sentence custody on consent of the Crown.

The appellant appealed an order regarding cross-examination on his affidavit in a bankruptcy proceeding.

The respondent confirmed it would not attempt to cross-examine the appellant before the disposition of the bankruptcy trial, rendering the appeal moot.

The Court of Appeal declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot appeal and dismissed it, awarding costs to the respondent.

This is a Crown appeal from a stay of proceedings imposed under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in a youth matter.

The respondent was 12-13 years old at the time of the alleged offences.

The application judge erred by not applying the R. v. Jordan framework, which was subsequently clarified for youth matters by R. v. K.J.M. The Court of Appeal found that the 18-month ceiling from Jordan was not exceeded and there was no basis to maintain the stay.

The appeal was allowed, the stay set aside, and a new trial ordered.

This appeal concerned a massive fraud perpetrated against a Paraguayan pension fund (Cajubi) by the appellants.

The trial judge found the appellants liable for fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty, awarding over $20 million in damages and punitive damages.

On appeal, the appellants raised numerous grounds, including the corporate identification doctrine, limitation periods, unpleaded conspiracy, lack of reliance, and apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, affirming the trial judge's findings, particularly regarding the inapplicability of corporate attribution where it would undermine the integrity of the legal system and allow fraudsters to benefit.

The appellants, former directors of a non-profit daycare centre, appealed the dismissal of their application for leave to commence a derivative action against a former director and administrator for alleged misappropriation of funds.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the action was bound to fail, noting that the board of directors and the Public Guardian and Trustee had already investigated the allegations and taken no action.

The appeal and leave to appeal costs were dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her action against the City of Toronto and its representative regarding property tax arrears.

The motion judge had found her claims were statute-barred and that the City was entitled to collect the arrears.

On appeal, the appellant argued the motion judge erred in his conclusions, demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias, and should not have granted summary judgment while her claim against her former solicitor remained outstanding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors, no reasonable apprehension of bias, and no risk of conflicting judgments.

This appeal concerned the application of the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002, to an oppression remedy claim under the Ontario Business Corporations Act.

The shareholder (appellant) advanced three claims based on discrete oppressive acts: failure to distribute profits, unauthorized sale/transfer of business, and unauthorized corporate dissolution.

The motion judge summarily dismissed the entire action as statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal held that while the first two claims were discoverable more than two years before the action was commenced and thus statute-barred, the claim regarding the unauthorized corporate dissolution was not, as it occurred and was discovered later.

The appeal was allowed in part, permitting the corporate dissolution claim to proceed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for damages due to abandoning a 10-year commercial lease.

The appeal focused on two grounds: whether Kevin O’Neill was personally liable as a tenant and whether outdoor storage was a permitted use of the premises, justifying abandonment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the lease was unambiguous regarding Kevin O'Neill's personal liability and that the appellants failed to demonstrate an implied term for outdoor storage or a mutual mistake regarding permitted uses.