ONCA 2019

The appellant sought leave to amend his Statement of Claim to assert an alternative claim for a 33% ownership interest in the corporation, based on the theory that escrow release conditions had not been satisfied.

The motion judge denied the amendment, finding it constituted a new, statute-barred cause of action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the proposed amendments did not assert a new cause of action but rather sought alternative relief based on material facts already pleaded in the original Statement of Claim.

The court found no presumed or actual non-compensable prejudice to the respondents.

The appellant appealed his conviction for drug possession, raising various Charter issues regarding the lawfulness of the initial traffic stop, the search incident to arrest, and questioning after invocation of the right to counsel.

The trial judge rejected all Charter arguments.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the initial stop was lawful based on reasonable grounds, the search was a lawful incident of arrest and not unduly intrusive, and while the questioning after invocation of the right to counsel may have constituted a breach of s. 10(b), any such breach would not have resulted in exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2).

The appellant was arrested on a surety warrant that had been rescinded by an administrative judge over a month prior to the arrest, but the rescission was not recorded on CPIC.

A pat-down search incident to arrest and a subsequent strip search yielded cocaine and marijuana.

The trial judge found the arrest lawful and the searches reasonable.

On appeal, the court found the arrest was unlawful because: (1) the surety warrant had been validly rescinded by the administrative judge; (2) the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds for the arrest; and (3) the police failed to make reasonable inquiries when the appellant informed them the warrant had been dealt with in court.

The court also found the strip search violated section 8 of the Charter.

The evidence was excluded under section 24(2) and verdicts of acquittal were substituted.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment granted in favour of the respondent.

The appellant argued that the motion judge erred by deciding the case on summary judgment when the record was deficient.

The Court of Appeal rejected this submission, finding that the motion judge was able to analyze the legal relationship based on the evidentiary record.

The court determined that the appellant was the purchaser of travel products on behalf of its customers and the respondent was the seller, making the appellant responsible for the invoices.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant was convicted of possession of a firearm obtained by crime, possession of property obtained by crime, break and enter to steal a firearm, and break and enter with intent to commit an indictable offence.

The appellant appealed on the grounds that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and incorrectly applied the rules of circumstantial evidence in finding that the appellant was the perpetrator of the break-in and that the rifle was a firearm within the meaning of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusions were well-grounded in the evidence and that there was no reasonable alternative inference.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict awarding approximately $186,000 in damages for a motor vehicle accident, significantly less than their claim of over $10 million and the respondent's pre-trial settlement offer of $500,000.

The appellants argued that the jury improperly assessed the plaintiff's credibility through evidence of his criminal record and unlawful conduct, and that the jury was misled on the test for causation and the standard of proof for future damages.

The Court of Appeal rejected all arguments, finding that the trial judge properly exercised her gatekeeping function, correctly charged the jury on credibility and causation, and that the jury's verdict was reasonable.

The appellants recovered nothing after costs were set off.

The appellant was convicted of trafficking in property obtained by crime and possession of property obtained by crime after police discovered $1,136,555 in cash in his vehicle.

The primary issue at trial was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant knew the funds were proceeds of crime.

The appellant testified he believed the money was "Shoah Gelt" (money belonging to Jewish people in Europe or Asia seeking to move funds to safety).

The trial judge rejected this testimony and convicted the appellant.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on three grounds: improper application of the W.(D.) test, insufficient reasons for conviction, and a grossly disproportionate sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder and discharging a firearm with intent to wound.

The primary issue at trial was the identity of the shooter.

Two Crown witnesses gave conflicting evidence: one victim initially denied recognizing the shooter but later identified the appellant at trial, while the appellant's former co-accused initially identified the appellant but later testified that he himself was the shooter.

The trial judge admitted the co-accused's preliminary inquiry testimony for its truth under the principled exception to hearsay.

The trial judge failed to provide a W.(D.) instruction regarding the exculpatory identification evidence of both witnesses.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the jury required proper instruction on how to use the conflicting exculpatory evidence in assessing whether a reasonable doubt existed.

The applicant sought an extension of time to perfect a motion for leave to appeal from an order dismissing his motion for security for costs against the trustee in his bankruptcy.

The trustee had sought re-appointment following the discharge of the original trustee to realize on the appreciated equity of the bankrupt's property.

The lower court judge dismissed the security for costs motion, finding that the trustee was not a nominal plaintiff and that the justice of the case did not warrant the order.

The applicant failed to meet the perfection deadline and sought an extension.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the extension motion, finding insufficient intention to appeal, prejudice to the respondent, and no prima facie merit to the proposed appeal.

The appellant appealed his sentence imposed following conviction on firearms offences and a verbal threat charge.

The appellant abandoned his conviction appeal.

On the sentence appeal, the Crown conceded that the facts underlying the firearms offences were less serious than those in comparable cases establishing a 7 to 11 year sentencing range.

The court found the sentencing judge erred in imposing a 7-year sentence and reduced the concurrent sentence for the firearms and threat offences from 7 years to 6 years, resulting in a global sentence of 7 years.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his personal claims by the motion judge in two actions against the Attorney General of Canada and individuals employed by Environment Canada.

The motion judge had ordered security for costs of $230,000 on a joint and several basis.

When the second instalment of $130,000 was not paid by the deadline, the motion judge dismissed the appellant's personal claims while granting the corporate plaintiffs an extension to post the security.

The Court of Appeal found this was a reversible error, holding that the motion judge failed to apply the same balancing exercise to the appellant as he did to the corporate plaintiffs, and that the factual inference that the appellant no longer wished to pursue his claim was not supported by the record.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision that quashed a conviction under the Lobbying Act.

The respondent, a former senior advisor to the Prime Minister, became executive director of the Canada School of Energy and Environment (CSEE) within the five-year post-employment lobbying prohibition period.

He engaged in communications with Industry Canada officials regarding the extension of an uncommitted portion of a $15 million grant to prevent forfeiture.

The Court of Appeal held that the Lobbying Act was unambiguous and that the respondent's communications constituted prohibited lobbying activity respecting the awarding of a financial benefit.

The Court reinstated the conviction, rejecting the appeal judge's reliance on irrelevant factors such as who initiated the communications and whether government officials considered the conduct to be lobbying.

The appellant, president of the Amalgamated Transit Union (International), appealed the dismissal of a motion to strike an action brought by four rank-and-file members of the International's Toronto-based affiliate, Local 113.

The members sought a declaration that certain provisions of the International's Constitution were void for unconscionability, arguing these provisions prevented disaffiliation.

The motion judge dismissed the motion to strike but granted a temporary stay pending exhaustion of the International's constitutional amendment process.

The Court of Appeal upheld both the dismissal of the motion to strike and the temporary stay, finding the action presented arguable issues of unconscionability and that the court had jurisdiction to determine the matter.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder of his wife following a trial by jury.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant attempted a planned murder-suicide.

The defence argued an unknown assailant was responsible.

The appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility of 15 years.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's jury instructions regarding the mental state required for murder, the treatment of the appellant's post-offence conduct and suicide attempt, and alleged imbalance in the instructions.

The appellant also made unsupported claims that evidence and exhibits were tampered with.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals.

Appeal of a Divisional Court decision upholding College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario policies requiring physicians who object to providing certain medical procedures on religious grounds to provide effective referrals to non-objecting providers.

The appellants, individual physicians and physician organizations, challenged the policies as violating their freedom of conscience and religion under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and their equality rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the policies infringe freedom of religion, the infringement is justified under s. 1 of the Charter as a reasonable limit demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.

The court emphasized the importance of equitable patient access to health care services, particularly for vulnerable populations, and the role of family physicians as gatekeepers in the health care system.

The appellant appealed his conviction for numerous firearms offences arising from an incident in downtown Toronto where he attempted to discard a loaded handgun.

He challenged the conviction on the basis that the trial judge erred in failing to grant a stay of proceedings based on the failure of police to preserve CCTV footage, contrary to section 7 of the Charter.

The trial judge applied the framework from established case law and found no breach of section 7.

The appellant received a remedy through a jury instruction regarding the failure to preserve evidence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The sentence appeal was rendered moot as the appellant had already served his sentence, and leave to appeal sentence was refused.

The appellant appealed her conviction for fraud exceeding $5,000 arising from misrepresentations related to Ontario Works social benefits.

The appellant initially qualified for benefits as a sole-support parent and was obligated to report changes in income, assets, or living circumstances.

The Crown alleged the appellant failed to disclose a change of residence and a change in her benefit unit status.

The trial judge convicted the appellant without making clear findings on whether she was co-habiting with Mr. Weedmark and misapprehended evidence regarding the tenancy agreement.

The Court of Appeal found these errors were material to the verdict and allowed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a committal order for extradition to the United States on charges of murder.

The appellant challenged the admissibility of a critical statement made during a phone conversation with a Nashville police detective, arguing that because he was located in Toronto when the call was made, the evidence was gathered in Canada and must satisfy Canadian rules of evidence, which would render it inadmissible due to alleged Charter violations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the extradition judge's decision, finding that evidence obtained by telephone where the call is made by a police officer located in the United States to a person located in Canada for an American investigation is gathered where the officer is located, and therefore need not meet Canadian evidentiary requirements.

The appellants appealed from an order of the application judge that determined the respondents had not substantially interfered with an easement in favour of the appellants, assuming the easement to be valid.

The Court of Appeal found the evidentiary record before the application judge was insufficient to support any conclusions on the issues.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the application judge's order, and remitted the matter to the Superior Court of Justice for a fresh hearing or trial.

The court identified numerous unresolved questions regarding the validity of the easement, including issues relating to the title history, the precise location and dimensions of the easement, compliance with part lot subdivision control provisions, and whether the respondents' actions constituted substantial interference with the easement rights.

The appellant appealed his conviction on charges of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of oxycodone.

The trial judge dismissed the appellant's Charter application alleging breaches of sections 8 and 9 rights based on an anonymous Crime Stoppers tip and subsequent police surveillance.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in applying the Debot factors, concluding that the anonymous tip was neither credible nor compelling, and that the surveillance provided minimal corroboration.

The court determined that the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the appellant, thereby breaching his Charter rights.

Under section 24(2) analysis, the court found that exclusion of the evidence was appropriate given the seriousness of the state conduct, the profound impact on the accused's Charter-protected rights, and the need to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.