ONCA 2019

The appellant appealed a sentence of two years imposed for offences involving her own very young daughter.

The appellant sought to reduce the global sentence to one year by making the sentences concurrent rather than consecutive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the global sentence, finding the two-year sentence entirely deserving of the appellant's conduct.

The court confirmed that a weapons prohibition was mandatory and could not be changed.

However, the court modified the prohibition order based on fresh evidence regarding the appellant's employment prospects after sentence, reducing the age restriction from sixteen to fifteen years in specified paragraphs.

The appellant appealed his sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice, arguing that the sentencing judge erred by refusing to grant enhanced credit for 89 days spent in lockdown during his 528 days of pretrial custody.

The appellant relied on the principle from R. v. Duncan that particularly harsh presentence incarceration conditions can provide mitigation beyond the 1.5 credit under s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle and upheld the sentencing judge's discretionary finding that the appellant did not experience particularly harsh treatment as required by Duncan.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's acceptance of the complainant's evidence regarding the appellant driving a dump truck at her, resulting in the truck becoming stuck on rocks.

The court rejected the appellant's photographic evidence and found no error in the trial judge's refusal to adjourn proceedings to permit a last-minute s. 11(b) Charter application.

The court also found no impropriety in the appointment or conduct of amicus.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a condominium corporation, sought to appeal a motion judge's decision staying its action in favour of arbitration.

The respondents moved to quash the appeal on the basis that it was barred by section 7(6) of the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The Court of Appeal allowed the motion to quash, finding that the appeal was statutorily barred.

The court rejected the appellant's arguments that it was denied natural justice and that the pith and substance of its claim was an oppression remedy under the Condominium Act that could not be precluded by arbitration clauses.

The court found that the motion judge correctly applied the test for determining whether claims fell within the scope of arbitration clauses and that the arbitrator could determine its own jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed a sentence of seven years imposed for four counts of providing immigration advice without a license contrary to s. 91(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and one count of counselling misrepresentation in an immigration application contrary to s. 126 of the IRPA.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in law or principle by the trial judge.

The court upheld the trial judge's decisions regarding denial of enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody due to delay caused by the appellant, reliance on victim impact statements, consideration of future risk, imposition of maximum sentences, consecutive sentencing, and failure to address bail conditions as a mitigating factor.

An insurer appealed a decision finding that an insured's adult daughter was covered under a homeowner's insurance policy after she was injured falling from a porch.

The daughter had lived with her mother for over 60 years, paid rent, and performed household chores.

The policy excluded coverage for persons residing in the household except residence employees.

The application judge found the daughter was not a residence employee but was covered as a tenant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the insurer's appeal, holding that once a person is established as a member of the household, they cannot be covered as a tenant under the exclusion clause, regardless of whether they pay rent.

The appellant appealed an order terminating spousal support following the respondent's retirement.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in finding that the respondent's retirement constituted a material change in circumstances and, alternatively, that even if such a change occurred, the trial judge erred in terminating spousal support.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the respondent's retirement at age 57 with a full pension constituted a material change in circumstances under the consent order, which expressly contemplated changes whether "foreseen or foreseeable, unforeseen or unforeseeable." The court also found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the parties' means and needs, including consideration of the appellant's capital assets and the compensatory rationale for spousal support.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

This appeal concerns a motion to change a custody and access order.

The trial judge rejected a proposed settlement negotiated by the parties during trial without providing reasons, then proceeded to hear the trial and rendered a decision maintaining the children's primary residence with the respondent in the Niagara region rather than allowing them to move to Ottawa with the appellant.

The majority upheld the trial judge's decision on the merits, finding that although the trial judge erred in failing to provide reasons for rejecting the settlement, the findings made after trial confirm the custody order was in the children's best interests.

The majority reduced the costs award from $40,000 to $30,000.

Justice Nordheimer dissented, arguing that the trial judge's knowledge of the settlement terms compromised his impartiality and that the settlement should have been approved.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's order dismissing his action against the respondents (his former legal counsel) under Rule 21.01(3)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure as an abuse of process.

The appellant had alleged that the respondents failed to follow his instructions, misled and deceived him, and failed to provide competent legal services in an unjust dismissal case under the Canada Labour Code.

The motion judge found that the same issue had been previously determined by Adjudicator Monteith, whose findings were upheld by the Federal Court on judicial review.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in dismissing the action as an abuse of process and affirming the costs award.

The appellant, a corporation operating a Canadian Tire store, appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing a defamation action under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The motion judge found that a Facebook post and media article by the respondents describing poor customer service at the store related to a matter of public interest.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no extricable error of law or palpable and overriding factual error.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

An inmate serving a life sentence for first-degree murder appealed the dismissal of his habeas corpus application challenging his emergency transfer from a medium-security to a maximum-security institution and the increase in his security classification.

The inmate alleged procedural unfairness based on inadequate disclosure of information under the Corrections and Conditional Release Act (CCRA) and argued the Warden's reclassification decision was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that the Institution complied with statutory disclosure requirements, adequately justified information withheld under CCRA s. 27(3), and that the Warden's decisions were reasonable and procedurally fair.

The appellant appealed a Family Court decision resolving numerous issues arising from his separation from the respondent, a common law partner.

The appeal involved three main categories of claims: financial rulings (spousal support, child support, unjust enrichment), property-related claims (the Shirrick property and Magdalan property), and a claim for wrongfully withdrawn funds.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on all grounds, finding no legal errors or palpable and overriding errors of fact.

The court confirmed the trial judge's determination that the Shirrick property was jointly owned at separation and that the appellant was not entitled to an increased share based on greater financial contributions.

The court also upheld the dismissal of the Magdalan property claim, finding no causal connection between the respondent's refusal to participate in the purchase and the appellant's losses.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

Appeals from determinations made by an application judge regarding the will of the late Peter Trezzi.

The deceased operated a successful construction business through two corporations: Across Canada Construction Ltd. (ACC) and Trezzi Construction Ltd. (Trezzi Construction).

Peter was the sole shareholder of Trezzi Construction.

The central disputes concerned whether Peter could effectively bequeath assets held by Trezzi Construction to his son Albert; whether his wife Gina owned 50 per cent of ACC shares; and whether Gina was entitled to an extension of time to file a surviving spouse's election under the Family Law Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three appeals, upholding the application judge's determinations on each issue.

The appellants, a geneticist and his corporation, appealed a trial judgment dismissing their defamation action against the respondents for publishing an article in New Scientist magazine criticizing their prenatal paternity test as unreliable.

The trial judge found the respondents established the defences of justification, fair comment, responsible communication, and qualified privilege.

On appeal, the appellants abandoned their substantive grounds and raised a new allegation of reasonable apprehension of bias based on the trial judge's conduct and reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the bias allegation was raised tactically and lacked merit.

The appellant appealed his conviction on multiple counts of domestic violence offences and his dangerous offender designation with an indeterminate sentence.

The trial judge had convicted the appellant of two counts of aggravated assault, one count each of sexual assault, assault causing bodily harm, assault, assault with a weapon, uttering a death threat, and breach of a probation order, while acquitting him on eight other counts.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's use of cross-count similar fact evidence and the dangerous offender designation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's approach to the cross-count evidence and confirming that the statutory criteria for dangerous offender designation were met.

An employee sought long-term disability benefits from her insurer after being injured in an automobile accident.

The insurer denied her claim after two years, determining she no longer met the definition of "total disability" under the policy.

The employee filed a grievance under her union's collective agreement with her employer, which was settled.

She then commenced an action against the insurer for breach of contract and punitive damages.

The motion judge dismissed the action on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction, as the dispute arose from the collective agreement and was subject to exclusive arbitral jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the employee's entitlement to long-term disability benefits fell within the exclusive grievance and arbitration provisions of the collective agreement.

The appellants sought to appeal a motion judge's decision dismissing their motion to stay an action in favour of arbitration.

The respondents raised a jurisdictional objection based on section 7(6) of the Arbitration Act, 1991, which provides that there is no appeal from the court's decision on a motion to stay.

The Court of Appeal held that section 7(6) precludes any appeal from a decision on a motion to stay, whether granting or refusing the stay, and therefore dismissed the appeal on jurisdictional grounds without reviewing the motion judge's analysis.

The appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition finding that she continued to pose a significant threat to public safety and refusing an absolute discharge.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder in 2004 for theft of a motor vehicle and assault on police officers.

After 15 years in psychiatric care, the Board considered two incidents—a May 2018 threat to kill a co-resident and an October 2018 assault on a bus passenger—in concluding she remained a significant threat.

The appellant argued the Board improperly relied on unproven allegations based on hearsay evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board properly applied the legal test and appropriately considered hearsay evidence in its inquisitorial proceedings.

The appellant was convicted of child luring contrary to s. 172.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and communicating with a person believed to be under 18 for sexual services contrary to s. 212(4).

He was one of 104 people caught in a police sting operation on Backpage.com.

The appellant claimed he believed he was engaged in role-play with an adult, not a 16-year-old.

The trial judge rejected this evidence and found the appellant actually believed the person was 16.

The appellant was sentenced to the mandatory minimum of 12 months' imprisonment under s. 172.1(2)(a) and 6 months under s. 212(4), to be served concurrently.

On appeal, the conviction was upheld.

The sentence appeal was allowed in part: the mandatory minimum under s. 172.1(2)(a) was declared unconstitutional as grossly disproportionate in reasonably foreseeable circumstances, though the 12-month sentence imposed was fit.

The victim surcharge was set aside.

Two appellants were convicted of first degree murder in the death of Jagtar Gill, who was beaten with a metal bar, stabbed multiple times, and had her throat slashed.

The Crown's theory was that Bhupinderpal Gill (the victim's husband) and Gurpreet Ronald (with whom Gill was having an affair) conspired to commit the murder, with Ronald as the perpetrator.

The trial judge failed to instruct the jury on the included offence of second degree murder for Ronald, leaving only verdicts of guilty of first degree murder or not guilty.

The appellants appealed on the basis that this instruction was erroneous and prejudicial to both their defences.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, finding that the trial judge erred in law by failing to leave second degree murder as a possible verdict for Ronald, and that this error tainted the verdict against Gill as well, as it undermined his defence that Ronald acted alone without planning and deliberation.