ONCA 2017

The appellant sought to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing its appeal for delay.

The respondent City consented to setting aside the dismissal but sought security for costs as a condition.

The appellant opposed the security for costs order, arguing it was impecunious and that the appeal had merit.

The court considered whether the appeal was frivolous and vexatious, whether the appellant was impecunious, and the merits of the appeal.

The court found the appeal was not frivolous and vexatious, the appellant was impecunious, and while the appeal had little chance of success, ordering security for costs would effectively prevent the appeal from proceeding.

The court dismissed the motion for security for costs and set aside the Registrar's dismissal.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's decision dismissing his wrongful dismissal action.

The appellant, who had worked for the respondent company for over 21 years as general manager of its heat treating division, claimed he had taken a leave of absence to wind up his father's estate in India rather than resigning.

The trial judge found that the appellant had resigned on January 22, 2010, based on evidence including the testimony of his supervisor and substantial circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error and dismissing the appeal with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant was convicted of five carjackings, with direct evidence linking him to one incident and similar fact evidence linking him to four others.

The appellant appealed his conviction on two grounds relating to the trial judge's jury charge on similar fact evidence, arguing the judge erred in instructing the jury on how to assess such evidence and group membership.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the charge faithfully followed the two-step process established in R. v. Perrier and was sufficient to ensure the jury did not improperly use group activity to identify the appellant without specific linkage to the individual acts.

The appellant appealed his conviction on one count of sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code.

Originally charged on a sixteen-count indictment alleging sexual offences against three teenage girls under age 16, the Crown invited dismissal of thirteen counts.

The trial judge acquitted on sexual exploitation and sexual assault charges but convicted on sexual interference.

Seven months later, the trial judge set aside the sexual interference conviction and substituted a sexual assault conviction, imposing a suspended sentence and two years' probation.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: improper reliance on evidence of a witness regarding different counts, misapplication of the burden of proof, and inadequate reasons for differential credibility findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the law and provided sufficient reasons.

The appellants appealed a decision establishing the boundary line between their property and the respondent's property.

The application judge determined that a fence line, rather than a surveyor's measured line, constituted the proper boundary based on surveying principles and historical evidence.

The appellants raised four grounds of appeal, contending the application judge misinterpreted surveyor field notes, failed to properly consider a surveyor's plan, failed to apply proper legal principles, and based the boundary location on facts not in evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding errors and upheld the lower court decision.

The Crown appealed directed verdicts of acquittal on three firearms charges.

The trial judge had granted the respondent's application for a directed verdict, concluding that the evidence was insufficient for a jury to consider whether the respondent possessed an operational firearm.

The appellate court found that the trial judge made three errors of law: applying the wrong test for directed verdicts, improperly weighing competing inferences in favour of the respondent, and assessing the respondent's credibility when she was not entitled to do so.

The court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing his battery claim as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appellant was charged with assaulting a police officer and resisting arrest following an incident on June 1, 2014, and was acquitted on February 17, 2016.

He commenced an action on June 2, 2016, two years and one day after the alleged battery.

The central issue was whether the appellant discovered his potential battery claim within the meaning of section 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act, 2002, which requires knowledge that a legal proceeding would be an appropriate means to seek remedy.

The majority held that the discoverability date was February 17, 2016 (the date of acquittal), not June 1, 2014, because the battery claim and negligent investigation claim were inextricably intertwined and it was reasonable for the appellant to await the outcome of the criminal proceedings before deciding to pursue the civil battery claim.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's damages assessment following a failed real estate transaction.

The motion judge awarded DHMK Properties Inc. damages based on the difference between the agreed purchase price ($5.3 million) and the property's market value in August 2014 ($4.27 million), without accounting for the vendor's warranty obligations regarding net income or providing reasons for the valuation date selection.

The Court of Appeal found two critical errors: the failure to consider the effect of the vendor's warranty on damages calculation, and the unexplained selection of August 2014 as the valuation date rather than the scheduled closing date.

The court set aside the judgment and remitted the damages assessment to the Superior Court.

An appeal from an Ontario Review Board disposition concerning an NCR accused person's Charter rights.

The appellant sought systemic remedies from the Board for violations of his section 8 Charter right arising from unauthorized seizure of urine samples.

The Board found the Charter violation but declined to grant systemic remedies, determining it lacked jurisdiction to do so.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, holding that while the Board has jurisdiction to determine Charter issues and grant individual remedies, it does not have jurisdiction to impose broad systemic or institutional orders.

The Board's mandate is limited to supervising individual NCR accused persons and ensuring their conditions are least onerous and restrictive consistent with public safety.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict dismissing her action against her insurer for damages under unidentified motorist coverage.

The appellant claimed that an unidentified vehicle crossed the center line and caused her to lose control of her vehicle and roll into a ditch.

The jury answered "no" to the question of whether the unidentified driver's negligence caused the accident, but answered "yes" to whether the appellant's evidence of the involvement of an unidentified automobile was corroborated.

The appellant argued the jury's answers were inconsistent, that the trial judge erred in her charge on the standard of care in emergencies, the burden of proof, and that the charge was unbalanced.

The appellant also challenged the conduct of defence counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury's answers were reconcilable, the trial judge's charge was adequate, and any concerns about counsel's conduct were appropriately addressed.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order dismissing their action against the police services board and an officer for missing and damaged property that had been seized.

The appellants argued their action was an enforcement of a court order under section 16(1)(b) of the Limitations Act, which has no limitation period.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellants' true cause of action was for monetary damages based on allegations of neglect or refusal to return goods and damage to property, not enforcement of the original order of disposition.

Since the action was commenced more than two years after the appellants knew the property had been forfeited to the Crown, it was barred by the two-year limitation period under section 4 of the Limitations Act.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action for a declaration that his daughter holds assets in a numbered company in trust for him.

The motion judge had characterized the claim as involving a resulting trust and found it statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that no limitation period applies to claims against a trustee of a resulting trust for property still in the trustee's possession.

The court also found it appropriate to entertain the appellant's new argument on appeal, as it raised a pure question of law and the record provided a complete evidentiary basis for determination.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision granting the respondent bank judgment for amounts owing on a line of credit, overdraft lending agreement, and two Visa cards.

The motion judge also dismissed the appellants' counterclaim and awarded substantial indemnity costs of $60,000 to the bank.

The appellants raised various arguments including delay in bringing the action, the impact of double mortgage payments, Charter rights, and procedural issues.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in any of the appellants' arguments and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice dated February 16, 2017.

The appeal was abandoned on consent, and costs were fixed in the amount of $2,500 payable to the respondent.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault on three grounds.

The first ground challenged the trial judge's finding that the appellant's Charter s. 10(b) rights were properly advised, arguing the police officer failed to inform him of his right to consult counsel in private.

The Court of Appeal rejected this ground, finding the trial judge properly ensured the appellant understood his rights and made an informed decision to speak without counsel.

The second ground challenged a misstatement regarding drug testing of the complainant, but the Court found this immaterial as the trial judge's finding of incapacity to consent was based on overwhelming evidence of intoxication.

The third ground challenged the trial judge's credibility finding regarding the appellant's fabricated evidence about drinking, but the Court found this finding was open to the trial judge and there were other unimpeachable reasons to reject the appellant's evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants sought to review an order of Roberts J.A. refusing to extend the time to file a motion to review and set aside a security for costs order made by Laforme J.A., and to obtain a stay of both that order and the underlying summary judgment.

The appellants had defaulted under two mortgages and obtained summary judgment against them.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with Roberts J.A.'s decision, which was based on the appeal being wholly without merit and the justice of the case not warranting the orders sought.

The motion to review was dismissed with costs.

The moving party sought an extension of time to appeal from a decision dismissing his motion to set aside a consent order made in 2009.

The consent order had dismissed the moving party's action against the respondent, the executor of an estate.

The moving party alleged fraud and subsequently discovered facts as grounds for setting aside the order, claiming the executor falsely represented that estate assets remained.

The motion judge found no misrepresentation and that the moving party had failed to prove fraud or demonstrate after-acquired facts warranting the order's rescission.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for extension of time, finding no bona fide intention to appeal within the relevant period, no adequate explanation for the delay, and no merit to the proposed appeal.

The appellant, a 54-year-old man with schizophrenia and a history of violence and harassment, appealed the Ontario Review Board's decision to order his continued detention at a forensic psychiatric facility rather than grant a conditional discharge.

The appellant had been found not criminally responsible in 2008 and lived in the community until December 2015, when he decompensated after stopping his antipsychotic medication.

The Board found he posed a significant threat to public safety due to his lack of insight into his mental illness, likelihood of discontinuing medication if discharged, and history of assaultive behavior.

The Court of Appeal upheld the detention order, finding it was the least onerous and least restrictive alternative available.

Motion to extend time to seek leave to appeal from a Superior Court decision confirming an arbitral award.

The moving parties' counsel missed the 15-day deadline by 7 days due to mistakenly believing the deadline was 30 days.

The respondent conceded the delay was caused by counsel error with no prejudice, but argued the proposed appeal lacked merit.

The court found arguable merit in the procedural fairness issue regarding the arbitrator's refusal to arbitrate disputes involving one of the moving parties without inviting submissions.

The motion was allowed, granting the moving parties 10 days to file a motion for leave to appeal, with costs fixed in their favour.

The Crown sought leave to appeal a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that set aside a conviction for impaired operation of a motor vehicle and ordered a new trial.

The SCAC judge found that the respondent's s. 10(a) Charter rights had been breached because he was not properly informed that he was subject to a criminal investigation when questioned in the ambulance.

The Crown argued the SCAC judge erred in finding a detention occurred and that the respondent was deprived of an opportunity to make submissions on relevant case law.

The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal, finding that neither the significance nor clear error branches of the applicable test were met.