ONCA 2017

On appeal from convictions for possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking and simple possession, the appellants challenged the trial judge's findings.

The appellants, common law spouses, were convicted of two counts of possession of oxycodone and Percocet for trafficking purposes, and one count of simple possession of methadone.

The trial judge found both appellants in joint possession and guilty of trafficking.

The appellants appealed on grounds including misuse of prejudicial evidence regarding child endangerment and lack of mens rea.

The Court of Appeal allowed both appeals, finding the trial judge improperly admitted and relied upon evidence of child endangerment to infer trafficking intent, and that there was insufficient evidence of the mens rea required for the respondent's conviction.

The appellant was arrested on a charge of importing cocaine under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and was detained in custody.

Following conviction by jury, the appellant filed an application for judicial interim release under section 523(2)(a) of the Criminal Code, alleging a change in circumstances.

The trial judge dismissed the application on the tertiary ground.

The appellant then brought an application in the nature of habeas corpus with certiorari in aid, seeking declarations regarding the court's jurisdiction to review bail and challenging the absence of a review mechanism as violating her Charter rights.

The Superior Court judge dismissed the application.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that Parliament deliberately chose not to provide a review mechanism for trial judge orders under section 523(2)(a), and that habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy in these circumstances.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on four counts of sexual offences involving a five-year-old complainant.

The trial judge found the Crown had not proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Crown advanced four grounds of appeal: (1) erroneous approach to the complainant's testimony; (2) improper imposition of a memory requirement for adoption of the videotaped statement under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code; (3) reliance on evidence outside the trial record; and (4) findings of fact without evidentiary foundation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no legal error and emphasizing the deference owed to trial judges on credibility findings and evidentiary assessments.

The appellant appealed both his conviction for aggravated assault and his sentence of 18 months imprisonment plus two years probation.

The conviction arose from an incident in which the appellant's motor vehicle struck and severely injured a pedestrian in a parking lot outside a pub, following an altercation with another patron.

The appellant argued the collision was inadvertent, while the Crown alleged it was intentional.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding the trial judge's factual findings and credibility determinations were reasonable and entitled to deference, and the sentence was fit and within the appropriate range.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and sought leave to appeal his sentence of 48 months' imprisonment.

Following a search warrant execution, police found five 100 microgram fentanyl patches and other drugs.

The appellant pleaded guilty to simple possession but the Crown rejected this plea.

He was convicted after trial of possession for the purpose of trafficking based primarily on expert police opinion regarding the quantity.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge improperly abdicated his role by deferring entirely to the expert's opinion on the ultimate issue.

The conviction was set aside and substituted with a conviction for simple possession.

The sentence was reduced to one day of imprisonment in addition to time already served, as the appellant had already served over three years.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing their action regarding a property sale.

The appellants challenged the sale on multiple grounds, including that procedures in a manual were not followed, that the motion judge was biased, that no auction occurred, and that the sale was improvident.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the lower court judgment, holding that the manual procedures did not have the force of law, the bias argument lacked merit, the motion judge properly accepted evidence that the auction occurred, and the appellants had adequate notice and failed to provide credible evidence of impropriety.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their claim against their insurer.

The trial judge found that the insurer had fully met its contractual obligations to the appellants.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings of fact, noting that while the appellants framed the issue as one of fairness and family wellbeing, the case was fundamentally about the nature of the insurer's obligations under the insurance contract and whether those obligations were met.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $2,500.

This is an appeal from a damages award in a defamation action.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's assessment of both compensatory and punitive damages awarded to the respondent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the trial judge properly applied legal principles in quantifying damages.

The court rejected the appellants' argument that the award was out of line with other defamation cases involving political figures, noting that the trial judge found this was a personal matter, not a political case.

The appellants' conduct—repeating false statements with knowledge of their falsity and intent to continue—warranted substantial punitive damages for deterrence purposes.

The union sought leave to proceed with a certification application and unfair labour practice complaint before the Ontario Labour Relations Board following the appointment of a receiver over the debtor company.

The motion judge dismissed the union's motion, finding that the stay imposed by the receivership order prevented the certification application from proceeding and that the union could not pursue an unfair labour practice complaint without a valid certification application.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred in refusing to lift the stay.

The court found that the motion judge's concerns about the certification application were speculative and unsupported by evidence, and that employees' labour rights should not be unduly inoculated against by insolvency proceedings.

The court granted leave to proceed with both the certification application and the unfair labour practice complaint.

Appeal of a motion judge's decision dismissing a father's motion to change a custody order.

The father sought sole custody and primary residence of the parties' child, alleging a material change in circumstances based on the failure to implement a parenting coordinator as ordered by the trial judge.

The motion judge found no material change in circumstances and, in the alternative, would not have granted sole custody due to risk of parental alienation.

The appellate court upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the ongoing conflict between the parties and the failure to appoint a parenting coordinator were anticipated by the trial judge and did not constitute a material change in circumstances.

The court noted that a parenting coordinator was subsequently appointed and the plan had not failed.

Hydro One appealed an application judge's decision declining to grant a general declaration that the Ontario Provincial Police must produce accident reports containing driver and owner information to parties who suffer property loss in motor vehicle accidents.

Hydro One argued that while section 200(1) of the Highway Traffic Act requires drivers to provide such information on request, this provision is unavailable when only property loss occurs and no representative is present at the scene.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, finding that although it may have had jurisdiction, it was not appropriate to take jurisdiction due to the absence of an active lis, lack of necessary factual record, and absence of interested parties including the Privacy Commissioner and Attorney General.

The appellant contractor scratched approximately 180 windows while performing cleaning services at a newly constructed commercial building and reimbursed the building owner about $134,000 for the damage.

It sought indemnification under its commercial general liability policy, but the insurer denied coverage relying on “your work” exclusions.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action.

The Court of Appeal held that the occurrence causing the property damage was the scratching of the windows during the cleaning operation and that the damage arose out of the insured’s work.

Because the property damage fell squarely within the policy’s exclusions, coverage was properly denied and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, Elizabeth Gayle and Fedrick Gayle, appealed their convictions for first degree murder in the death of Tiffany Gayle, a 15-year-old who was beaten to death in their home.

The appellants challenged various evidentiary rulings and jury instructions made at trial.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's admission of evidence regarding prior discreditable conduct, the baseball bat, or the jury instructions regarding after-the-fact conduct and the modes of participation in the homicide.

Appeal from a Superior Court judgment determining ownership of disputed shares in a family company, Mic Mac Realty (Ottawa) Ltd. The trial judge found that the appellant failed to establish that his father had gifted the shares to him inter vivos or that the gift was completed by the executors.

Accordingly, the shares fell into the residue of the estate and belonged to the respondent as residuary beneficiary.

The trial judge also found the respondent's claim was not statute barred and held that the respondent held the shares in constructive trust for the appellant.

The appeal was dismissed.

On remand from the Supreme Court of Canada following the Ledcor decision, the Court of Appeal for Ontario reconsidered its earlier dismissal of a class action appeal.

The appellant challenged Bell Mobility's seizure of prepaid credits, arguing that Bell's contractual terms and subsequent communications created an obligation to wait until after expiry before seizing funds.

The court affirmed its previous decision, holding that the expiry date was determined at the time of top-up purchase and reflected in the PIN receipts and phone cards, not in subsequent reminder messages or account page displays.

The court found that the appellant's real complaint concerned misrepresentation or promissory estoppel, neither of which were amenable to class proceeding resolution.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal and cross-appeal in a civil matter.

The respondents (Jarbeaus) were successful on the cross-appeal while the appellant (McLean) was unsuccessful on the appeal.

The court awarded costs to the Jarbeaus in the amount of $75,000, allocated as $18,000 to the cross-appeal and $57,000 to the appeal, inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes.

The court declined to fix prejudgment interest or vary the trial costs award of $231,000.

A tenant obtained summary judgment against a landlord for recovery of losses arising from a fire at leased premises under a commercial lease.

The landlord appealed, and the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in interpreting the lease by failing to apply binding appellate authority regarding contractual allocation of risk, failing to assign meaning to all contested lease terms, and ruling that the tenant's breach of its insurance covenant did not bar its subrogated claim.

The Supreme Court of Canada remanded the matter for reconsideration in light of Ledcor Construction.

On remand, the Court of Appeal affirmed its original decision, holding that the correctness standard of review applied to extricable questions of law within the motion judge's interpretation of the negotiated lease.

A partner in a national accounting firm was called into a meeting and told to retire after 22 years of partnership.

The firm later invoked a partnership agreement provision allowing the policy board to request a partner's resignation if it unanimously determined it was in the partnership's best interest.

The partner sued for breach of the partnership agreement.

The motion judge granted summary judgment, finding that the firm breached the agreement because the policy board did not make an independent determination based on evidence, and the decision was predetermined by the CEO.

The court awarded expectation damages for lost profits and retirement benefits, plus aggravated damages for reputational harm.

The firm appealed, but the appeal was dismissed.

A non-party former solicitor sought leave to intervene in an appeal where the defendant appellant was challenging a summary judgment order granting forfeiture of a deposit and costs, claiming the documentary record was incomplete due to the solicitor's negligence.

The Chief Justice of Ontario granted the intervention, finding that the interests of justice favoured a complete evidentiary record.

The court declared that the appellant had waived solicitor-client privilege with respect to the solicitor's file and communications pertaining to the matters in dispute.

The appellant appealed his conviction on several drug trafficking charges arising from Project Dolphin, a joint forces investigation into drug trafficking in Thunder Bay.

The central issue concerned the admissibility of evidence extracted from the appellant's Blackberry device, which was seized incident to an arrest that was later found to be arbitrary.

The trial judge found Charter breaches but admitted the evidence under section 24(2).

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the Grant framework for admissibility of constitutionally-tainted evidence.

The court also upheld the admission of hearsay evidence from a deceased co-conspirator and evidence from a co-conspirator's guilty plea under the co-conspirators' exception to the hearsay rule.