ONCA 2017

The applicant sought a stay pending appeal of an order requiring her to discharge a certificate of pending litigation registered against a residential property.

The application judge had found no valid agreement of purchase and sale existed between the parties and ordered the applicant to discharge the CPL.

The Court of Appeal granted the stay, finding the applicant met the RJR-MacDonald test: she raised serious issues on appeal, demonstrated irreparable harm based on the property's unique custom-built nature, and the balance of convenience favoured granting the stay given the respondent's lack of evidence regarding prejudice from the CPL's continued registration.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court judgment that found a binding agreement for the purchase and sale of their Brampton home and ordered specific performance.

The appellants argued the application judge erred in concluding there were no material facts in dispute, that the respondents' offer was null and void, and that there was no evidence supporting a finding of counteroffer.

The Court of Appeal rejected all arguments, finding that the appellants' signing and returning of the offer, combined with subsequent conduct consistent with a binding agreement (accepting a deposit cheque and restricting home revisits to those permitted by the offer terms), established a binding contract.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code against the disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated October 31, 2016.

The appeal was dismissed.

An addendum was issued after the reasons were prepared and signed, noting that counsel for the appellant subsequently provided the reasons for a ruling of July 31, 2014, which stayed the criminal harassment charge.

The trial judge's reasons, which detailed the evidence including the effect on the victim and the appellant's assessment under the Mental Health Act, were acknowledged by counsel to undermine many of the arguments made during the appeal, though the court found these reasons did not change the basis for dismissing the appeal.

An appeal against an Ontario Review Board disposition denying expanded privileges and absolute discharge for an individual found not criminally responsible on a charge of criminal harassment.

The appellant argued the Board failed to conduct a separate and specific analysis of whether his conduct would constitute a serious criminal offence with real risk of physical or psychological harm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's reasons demonstrated proper consideration of the seriousness of the offence and the risk to the community.

The moving party, William Watters, sought a stay of judgment pending his application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

Watters was a director and shareholder of a franchisee that operated a Cora restaurant and had given a personal guarantee of the franchisee's indebtedness.

The motion judge granted summary judgment against Watters on the guarantee in the amount of $117,000 and dismissed his counter-claim as statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Watters' appeal but allowed Cora's cross-appeal regarding the amount owing.

Watters then sought a stay pending leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The motion was dismissed on the grounds that Watters failed to demonstrate a serious issue of national importance, irreparable harm, or that the balance of convenience favoured a stay.

The appellant appealed from a motion judge's order enforcing a settlement agreement between the appellant and the Ontario respondents arising from the appellant's suspension from the Knights of Columbus.

The appellant argued that only an agreement in principle existed and that it was not finalized by the April 22, 2016 deadline.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that a binding settlement agreement had been reached, noting that the essential terms had been agreed upon, settlement funds had been provided, and the release form had been executed by some respondents before the appellant attempted to terminate the agreement.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for damages based on negligence, nuisance, and the strict liability doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher.

The trial judge found that the appellant had dumped thousands of truckloads of material on his rural property, improperly constructed a swale, and obstructed a culvert, all of which caused severe flooding to the respondent's neighbouring property over more than 12 years.

The trial judge awarded general damages of $250,000 and punitive damages of $125,000, totaling $390,000.

The appellant challenged only the damages awards.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment, finding no palpable error in the general damages award and rejecting arguments that the punitive damages were excessive or unsupported by evidence.

This appeal concerns a boundary dispute between two cottage owners on Lake Erie.

The respondents constructed a road and steps on what they believed was their property to improve access to the lakeshore, permitting the appellant and other neighbours to use these improvements.

Upon discovering that much of the work had been performed on the appellant's adjacent lot, the appellant sued for trespass damages.

The respondents counterclaimed for title by adverse possession.

The trial judge dismissed the appellant's trespass claim and granted the respondents title to approximately 3,400 square feet by adverse possession.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in law by granting the adverse possession claim without making an explicit finding that the respondents had effectively excluded the appellant from possession.

The evidence demonstrated the opposite—the respondents had permitted the appellant and others to use the road and steps freely.

The applicant brought three motions seeking extensions of time to seek leave to appeal from dismissals by lower appeal courts of his convictions on three separate charges: one assault on a police officer conviction from 1993, and two provincial offences convictions from 2014-2015 under the Trespass to Property Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three motions.

For the 1993 conviction, the applicant's delay of nearly 23 years was found to be inordinate and unjustifiable, with no bona fide intention to appeal demonstrated within the prescribed time.

For the two provincial offences convictions, the applicant's delay of over three months was inadequately explained, and the proposed appeals failed to meet the high threshold for granting leave to appeal under the Provincial Offences Act, as they involved questions of fact rather than law alone.

The appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition maintaining a detention order for his care.

The appellant had been found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for assault, forcible confinement, and criminal harassment.

The Board accepted a joint submission from the appellant's counsel and physician to continue detention with increased community passes.

The appellant argued the Board erred in accepting the joint submission without properly discharging its inquisitorial duty.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board was entitled to rely on the joint submission and had conducted its own inquiry concluding the appellant remained a significant threat to public safety.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and failure to comply with a recognizance.

The appellant was arrested during a traffic stop on Highway 401 when police discovered cocaine and marijuana in the vehicle.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's testimony that the drugs belonged to another passenger and convicted him based on circumstantial evidence and credibility findings.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment, misapprehension of evidence, or the reasonableness of the verdict.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault arising from injuries sustained by his cellmate at a correctional facility.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's admission of expert evidence regarding footwear impressions on the victim's face, the jury charge regarding inconsistencies in the appellant's statements, and the trial judge's response to a jury question on reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her applications for prerogative relief and a Charter application challenging various provisions of the Criminal Code and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The appellant was charged with six counts under the IRPA for providing immigration advice without proper credentials.

She sought declarations that reverse onus clauses and other statutory provisions violated her Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that since the appellant had been released on bail, the policy against granting Charter or prerogative relief during ongoing criminal proceedings applied.

The court also noted that the Crown's decision to prefer a direct indictment and stay the preliminary inquiries rendered the appeal moot.

The respondents, a corporation and four individual shareholders, sued the Crown for damages arising from two theories of liability: forced incorporation and failure to enforce.

Under the forced incorporation theory, the respondents alleged that Crown misconduct forced them to incorporate their partnership, resulting in tax liability they would have avoided as Indians under section 87 of the Indian Act.

Under the failure to enforce theory, they alleged the Crown failed to properly implement an anti-smuggling initiative, causing them to compete unfairly against unlicensed contraband manufacturers.

The Crown appealed a motion judge's decision refusing to strike the claims.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the forced incorporation appeal, allowing it to proceed to trial, but allowed the failure to enforce appeal in part by striking the fiduciary duty claims while permitting the negligence and misfeasance claims to proceed.

A lawyer was found by the Hearing Division to have knowingly participated in mortgage fraud in seven real estate transactions, resulting in approximately $625,000 in losses.

The Hearing Division imposed the presumptive penalty of licence revocation.

The Appeal Division, by a 3-2 majority, reversed the penalty and substituted a two-year suspension, citing the Law Society's inordinate investigative and procedural delay as an exceptional mitigating circumstance.

The Divisional Court dismissed the Law Society's appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Law Society's appeal, set aside the Appeal Division's decision on penalty, and reinstated licence revocation.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order dismissing a motor vehicle negligence claim.

The motion judge found that the appellant made a left-hand turn facing a yellow light in front of an oncoming truck driven by the respondent, who did not run a red light as alleged.

The motion judge concluded there was no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the respondent's responsibility for the accident.

The appellant argued the motion judge reversed the evidentiary burden and erred in granting summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding the motion judge correctly applied the burden of proof and the appellant failed to meet the onus that shifted to her to demonstrate contributory negligence.

This is a costs endorsement on appeal.

The appellant appealed an order from the Superior Court of Justice dated March 24, 2016.

The Court of Appeal, in accordance with the agreement of counsel, awarded costs to the respondents in the amount of $10,000, all inclusive.

The respondent brought a claim for unjust enrichment to recover money she paid to acquire and renovate a house registered in the appellants' names.

The motion judge granted summary judgment in favour of the respondent, finding unjust enrichment and awarding her $221,914.11.

The appellants appealed, arguing that summary judgment was inappropriate given conflicting evidence regarding the parties' agreement and that the motion judge's reasons were insufficient.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment, finding that the motion judge failed to adequately explain how she resolved conflicts in evidence, made insufficient credibility findings, and failed to properly analyze the equities and mutual benefits exchanged between the parties.

A unionized Crown employee appealed the dismissal of his claim arising from his employment termination in 2014.

The employee pleaded conspiracy to injure, unlawful means conspiracy, misfeasance in public office, abuse of process, defamatory libel, and slander against the Crown and several Crown managers.

The motion judge dismissed the claim under Rule 21.01(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding that the essential nature of the claim arose out of the collective agreement and therefore fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Grievance Settlement Board.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the motion judge's application of the legal test or characterization of the pleadings.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action for damages arising from a municipal tendering process and termination of an agreement of purchase and sale.

The trial judge found that while the respondent Town breached its tendering process by accepting a non-compliant bid, the appellants failed to demonstrate they would have been awarded the contract.

The appellants did not meet their burden of proving on a balance of probabilities that the contract would have been awarded to them, as the trial judge found it more probable the Town would have re-tendered.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding it was open to the Town to reject all bids and re-tender with different specifications.

The agreement of purchase and sale was also properly terminated in good faith for legitimate business reasons.