WARNING
THIS IS AN APPEAL UNDER THE
CHILD AND FAMILY SERVICES ACT
AND IS SUBJECT TO S. 45 OF THE ACT WHICH PROVIDES:
- (7) The court may make an order,
(a) excluding a particular media representative from all or part of a hearing;
(b) excluding all media representatives from all or a part of a hearing; or
(c) prohibiting the publication of a report of the hearing or a specified part of the hearing,
where the court is of the opinion that the presence of the media representative or representatives or the publication of the report, as the case may be, would cause emotional harm to a child who is a witness at or a participant in the hearing or is the subject of the proceeding.
(8) No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child’s parent or foster parent or a member of the child’s family.
(9) The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part.
COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
CITATION: Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. N.B., 2013 ONCA 472
DATE: 20130715
DOCKET: C57142
Hoy A.C.J.O, Simmons & Juriansz JJ.A.
BETWEEN
Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto
Applicant (Respondent)
and
N.B., A.F. and D.B.
Respondent (Appellant)
Anthony Macri, for the Appellant
Shamshad Bee, for the Respondent
Heard and released orally: July 5, 2013
On appeal from the judgment of Justice Kevin Whitaker of the Superior Court of Justice, dated April 2, 2013.
ENDORSEMENT
[1] We reject the appellant’s argument that the appellant has demonstrated a violation of s.7 of the Charter because of the improper admission of hearsay evidence, opinion evidence, and business records evidence on a motion for summary judgment in which the Society sought Crown wardship without access.
[2] Under the Family Law Rules the admission of hearsay evidence is not prohibited on a summary judgment motion. In this case the appellant mother consented to the protection finding and did not object to the admissibility of the evidence now impugned on appeal or seek to cross-examine on it. Although we agree that the Society’s reliance on hearsay evidence could present procedural unfairness in a particular case, as the appellant was represented by counsel in the Court below and did not raise the issue, we are not persuaded that any procedural unfairness occurred in this case.
[3] In our view, this decision did not rest on hearsay evidence or conflicting evidence. On our review of the record, admissible evidence and admissions made by the appellant justify the disposition made by the motion judge. While it may be that there was some conflicting evidence in the material before the motion judge, on our review of the record, the mother had not presented an adequate plan for the care of her children to justify an alternate disposition.
[4] In these circumstances there was no genuine issue requiring a trial, the appeal is therefore dismissed.
“A. Hoy A.C.J.O.”
“J. M. Simmons J.A.”
“R. G. Juriansz J.A.”