W A R N I N G
THIS IS AN APPEAL UNDER THE
AND IS SUBJECT TO S. 45 OF THE ACT WHICH PROVIDES:
- (7) The court may make an order,
(a) excluding a particular media representative from all or part of a hearing;
(b) excluding all media representatives from all or a part of a hearing; or
(c) prohibiting the publication of a report of the hearing or a specified part of the hearing,
where the court is of the opinion that the presence of the media representative or representatives or the publication of the report, as the case may be, would cause emotional harm to a child who is a witness at or a participant in the hearing or is the subject of the proceeding.
(8) No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child’s parent or foster parent or a member of the child’s family.
(9) The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part.
CITATION: Children’s Aid Society of the Regional Municipality of Waterloo v. V.L., 2007 ONCA 113
DATE: 20070221
DOCKET: C45891
COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
RE:
THE CHILDREN’S AID SOCIETY OF THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF WATERLOO (Applicant/Respondent in Appeal) – and – V. L. (Respondent/Appellant in Appeal)
BEFORE:
LABROSSE, SHARPE and BLAIR JJ.A.
COUNSEL:
Brigitte Gratl
for the appellant
Kimberley A. Putman
for the respondent
HEARD & RELEASED ORALLY:
February 20, 2007
On appeal from the judgment of Justice P.B. Hambly of the Superior Court of Justice dated August 11, 2006.
E N D O R S E M E N T
[1] This is an appeal from an order dismissing an appeal from an order for Crown wardship with no access.
[2] The child was born on August 17, 2004. The mother was 16 years old. When it became apparent that the mother was unable to care for the child, on November 17, 2004, the Children’s Aid Society of the Regional Municipality of Waterloo, on the basis of a voluntary agreement, obtained an order for five months wardship, with access to the parents, as the child was found to be in need of protection.
[3] On the status review of that order, the Crown brought a motion for summary judgment seeking an order to have the child made a ward of the Crown without access in order to place the child for adoption. By that time, the concerns about the mother being able to care for the child had escalated into issues involving domestic violence, emotional instability, financial instability, housing issues, family instability, lack of support and, most dramatically, the mother’s addiction to crack cocaine.
[4] On September 28, 2005, the status review judge noted that the mother was transient, had at times exercised access to the child only sporadically, had incurred criminal charges, had developed a serious and significant addiction to cocaine, and had never shown or demonstrated a consistent commitment to counselling. In addition, there was no real plan of care in existence for the child put forward by the mother or any family members.
[5] The status review judge concluded that the Society had shown a prima facie case for Crown wardship without access and the mother had not led evidence sufficient to demonstrate that there was a genuine issue to be tried. As the mother had no chance of success in having the child returned to her and he granted the motion for summary judgment.
[6] The mother appealed. Her access was terminated by the summary judgment but no attempt to stay the judgment was ever sought.
[7] At the hearing of the appeal, on August 11, 2006, the mother filed fresh affidavit evidence. She claimed that her life was now stable, that she had addressed her drug addiction and that family members put forward plans to care for the child.
[8] In detailed reasons, the appeal judge made a complete review of the facts of the case including the relevant facts dealing with the mother, the Society, the reasons of the status review judge and the fresh evidence. He also reviewed the applicable law and jurisprudence. He concluded that the status review judge had made no errors.
[9] With respect to the fresh evidence, the appeal judge stated that he had considerable difficulty in accepting why the family members did not come forward to support the mother when she was having such a terrible struggle from September 2004 to September 2005. He found their explanations unimpressive. He admitted the fresh evidence but declined to give effect to it as it would not be in the best interest of the child to send the matter to trial on the basis of that evidence.
[10] The appeal judge also noted that the evidence before the status review judge was that the bond between the mother and child was weak as a result of the mother’s failure to take the necessary steps to put herself in the position where she could care for the child without supervision. On the other hand, the child was adoptable and had been with a family who wished to adopt her since August 2005 (this should be October 2005).
[11] The appeal judge dismissed the appeal.
[12] In our view, the appeal judge did not make any error. His inferences and conclusions are supported by the evidence and he applied the law correctly.
[13] The mother submitted additional fresh evidence on this appeal. She has turned her life around in commendable fashion. However, at this stage, such evidence cannot change the result reached by both lower courts. The last supervised access by the mother was on September 22, 2005. Her father, M.L., had only attended one visit with the child prior to the granting of the summary judgment. Her mother, K.L., and her current partner, G.E., have never met the child. The child has been with an adoptive family since October 2005. She is 2½ years old. It would not be in her best interest to be removed from her adoptive family and placed with the appellant.
[14] In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it must be assumed that the Society is properly exercising its statutory duty and acting in the best interest of the child. Time is an important consideration in the Child and Family Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.11 and a child is not to be kept in limbo while a parent having difficulties attempts to straighten out her life.
[15] For these reasons, the appeal is dismissed without costs.
“J.M. Labrosse J.A.”
“Robert J. Sharpe J.A."
“R.A. Blair J.A.”