DATE: 20030926
DOCKET: M30275-C40533
COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
RE: HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN (Respondent) v. LINTON CLIFF GYLES (Applicant)
BEFORE: O’CONNOR A.C.J.O.
COUNSEL: Alan D. Gold for the applicant
Alexander Hrybinsky for the respondent
HEARD: September 10, 2003
E N D O R S E M E N T
[1] On September 10, 2003, I made an order releasing the applicant pending appeal. I attached a term to the release order directing that he not perform any duties or functions of councillor for the balance of his term.
[2] The Crown asked that I also include a condition prohibiting the applicant from running in the upcoming municipal election. I reserved my decision on that request. I am not prepared to add the additional condition sought by the Crown.
[3] There is no statutory bar to a person in the applicant’s circumstances from standing for election to municipal office. The only legislative prohibition is found in s. 91(1) of the Municipal Elections Act, 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 32. The Act prohibits individuals from standing for election when they have been convicted of either a corrupt practice as set out in ss. 89-90 of the Act or of an offence under the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, s. C-46 in connection with a municipal election. The offences of which the applicant now stands convicted fall under neither head and as such do not attract the s. 91(1) prohibition.
[4] The policy underlying the legislative scheme would seem to be that it is up to the electorate to decide whether it wishes someone with a criminal record, other than a record referred to in the Municipal Elections Act, to represent it.
[5] I accept Mr. Gold’s submission that there is little risk that the applicant, if elected, would commit an offence similar to those of which he now stands convicted while on bail pending appeal. Given that, I am not persuaded that I should interfere with the normal electoral process through the imposition of a condition in the bail order.
[6] In making this ruling, I distinguish an order prohibiting the applicant from running for election from the order I made precluding the applicant from carrying out his duties as a municipal councillor during his present term of office. When the applicant was elected to his present term, the electorate was not aware of the convictions that give rise to this appeal. That being the case, it is, in my view, in the public interest that the applicant be prohibited from carrying out his duties as councillor during the balance of the present term.
[7] For the above reasons, I deny the Crown’s request to add the additional condition to the applicant’s release order.
“Dennis O’Connor A.C.J.O.”

