ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE DATE: 2024 08 19 COURT FILE No.: Hamilton Information No. 22-47101642
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
EMILY RAJCZAK-McGUIGAN
Before: Justice J.P.P. Fiorucci
Heard on: March 15, April 30 and July 19, 2024 Reasons for Judgment released on: August 19, 2024
Counsel: Tara Mimnagh...................................................................... counsel for the Federal Crown Cristina Valeri................................ counsel for the accused Emily Rajczak-McGuigan
FIORUCCI J.:
INTRODUCTION
[1] On July 3, 2022, at 1:18 a.m., the accused, Emily Rajczak-McGuigan, was found by police in the driver’s seat of a motor vehicle, unconscious but breathing. The vehicle had been involved in a minor collision with a sign but had minimal damage. The keys were in the ignition and the car was in drive.
[2] Once the police were able to wake the accused, she exhibited signs of impairment, including slow, quiet, rambling, and slurred speech, and difficulty walking. Evidence of drug use was on the passenger seat, including a cooking spoon with residue which the police suspected to be fentanyl, hypodermic needles, and a torch.
[3] The police found controlled substances and Canadian currency when they searched the vehicle and its contents, which resulted in charges against the accused. The Crown sought arraignment only on the charges of possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime under $5,000.00. The Crown withdrew the charge of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.
[4] The accused elected to be tried in the Ontario Court of Justice and entered not guilty pleas to both charges. The parties filed an Agreed Statement of Facts (ASF) which was made Exhibit 1 on the trial. Detective Constable Ryan Blake, the lone Crown witness, was qualified to give expert opinion evidence relating to possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking.
[5] The accused testified. She was the only Defence witness. The accused admitted that she was in possession of the methamphetamine and the other drugs the police found in the vehicle but denied that she intended to traffic the drugs. The accused testified that her purpose for possessing the drugs at that time, and shortly before police found her, was to overdose and end her life. She admitted that the cash was hers and testified about the potential sources of those funds.
[6] I find the accused not guilty of both offences for the reasons set out in this judgment. The Crown has failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused’s possession of the methamphetamine was for the purpose of trafficking. I am also left in a state of reasonable doubt that the currency, or any portion of it, was derived from the sale of drugs.
THE DRUGS, CURRENCY AND OTHER PROPERTY SEIZED BY THE POLICE
[7] The police seized the following items from within the vehicle: (i) a Hershel backpack on the passenger seat which contained numerous packaged hypodermic needles and cooking spoons, and $288.60; (ii) a Louis Vuitton bag which contained a scale with suspected drug residue and $331.95; (iii) a scale in the open glove box; and (iv) a bag tucked between the driver’s side door that contained a large bag of mixed drugs, packaged separately.
[8] The ASF lists the drugs that the accused had in her possession in the bag between the driver’s side door:
(a) A bag of Methamphetamine: 16.26 grams; (b) A bag of Methamphetamine: 11.36 grams; (c) Fentanyl: 1.22 grams (weighed in clear plastic bag); (d) Fentanyl/Heroin Benzodiazepine: 2.81 grams (weighed in clear plastic bag); and (e) Syringe with residue-Fentanyl; Methamphetamine; Benzodiazepine.
LEGAL PRINCIPLES
[9] The accused is presumed innocent, and that presumption can only be displaced if her guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt by the Crown. I must instruct myself in accordance with the criminal standard of proof set out in R. v. Lifchus, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 320. A reasonable doubt must be based on reason and common sense. It is logically derived from the evidence or absence of evidence. It is not sufficient to believe that the accused is probably guilty or likely guilty. On the other hand, it is virtually impossible to prove anything to an absolute certainty and the Crown is not required to do so because such a standard of proof is impossibly high.
[10] In this case, the accused testified and gave exculpatory evidence. I am required to consider and apply the principles in R. v. W.(D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742:
(1) If I believe the testimony of the accused, I must find her not guilty; (2) If I do not believe the accused’s evidence, but the evidence leaves me with a reasonable doubt, I must find her not guilty; (3) Even if the accused’s evidence does not leave me with a reasonable doubt, I must ask myself whether, on the basis of the evidence I do accept, I am convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.
[11] Even if I do not accept the accused’s exculpatory testimony, her evidence — viewed in the context of all of the evidence — may leave me in a state of reasonable doubt about her guilt. If it does, she is entitled to an acquittal. I can accept all, some or none of a witness’s evidence. R. v. H.(S.M.), 2011 ONCA 215.
[12] The overriding consideration is whether the evidence, as a whole, leaves the trier of fact with any reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused. The evidence favourable to the accused must be assessed and considered with the conflicting evidence offered by the Crown as a whole, not in isolation. The burden never shifts from the Crown to prove every element of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.
[13] In this case, the Crown relies on circumstantial evidence and asserts that portions of the accused’s testimony assist in making out the case against her on both charges. When the Crown’s case consists wholly or substantially of circumstantial evidence, the trier of fact must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused’s guilt is the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence as a whole. R. v. Villaroman, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 1000, at para. 20; R. v. Lights, 2020 ONCA 128, at para. 36. As the Court of Appeal for Ontario stated in R. v. Lights, “[f]undamentally, it is for the trier of fact to determine whether any proposed alternative way of looking at the case as a whole is reasonable enough to raise a doubt about the guilt of the accused”.
[14] When assessing the circumstantial evidence, I must consider "other plausible theories" and "other reasonable possibilities" which are inconsistent with guilt. R. v. Villaroman, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 1000, at para. 37. Other plausible theories or other reasonable possibilities "must be based on logic and experience applied to the evidence or the absence of evidence, not on speculation".
ANALYSIS
[15] Det. Cst. Blake was qualified to give expert testimony about the basic drug characteristics and effects of methamphetamine, pricing and value of methamphetamine, the sale and distribution of drugs, including indicia of trafficking, the preparation of drugs for sale, methods of use of methamphetamine and general consumption patterns and dosing of methamphetamine.
[16] Det. Cst. Blake opined that possession of 27.62 grams of methamphetamine is consistent with possession for the purpose of trafficking, since methamphetamine is typically sold or consumed at the point level, which is 0.1 grams and, therefore, 27.62 grams reflects approximately 276 doses if consumed at the average dose. Det. Cst. Blake also testified about the value of the methamphetamine that the accused had when the police located her in the vehicle: approximately $2,208.00 if sold at the point level ($8/point being the median of prices for a point), approximately $1,795.30 if sold at the gram level (median price of $65/gram) and just under $700 if purchased at the ounce level ($700/ ounce), since the accused had just under an ounce of methamphetamine.
[17] Det. Cst. Blake testified about the characteristics of a typical meth addict. Since the withdrawal from methamphetamine is significant, a person addicted to the drug will be looking for their next high. The officer gave a profile of an addict as someone who is not working, and who is living a lifestyle that would not permit them to purchase or have larger amounts of the drug. Det. Cst. Blake opined that, even if an addict had the money to buy wholesale, it would be very uncommon for them to keep large quantities on their person because of the safety risk of being robbed by other drug users with whom they would associate, and the risk of detection by law enforcement and prosecution for possession for the purpose of trafficking.
[18] Det. Cst. Blake also gave evidence about the high from methamphetamine lasting longer than other controlled substances-between four and twelve hours. Det. Cst. Blake said that someone engaged in a binge, would not use more than 3 grams per day. Therefore, at this most extreme level of binge consumption, the accused had about nine days worth of methamphetamine. However, the officer qualified his evidence on this point by saying that he would not expect a user to be able to binge for nine days because of the physical effects on the body, which can cause excited delirium, requiring medical attention. Det. Cst. Blake agreed with the general proposition that someone who has used methamphetamine for a long period of time would go through a larger amount per day than someone who just started using the drug.
[19] According to Det. Cst. Blake, his opinion that a person in possession of 27.62 grams of methamphetamine had it for the purpose of trafficking is bolstered by the person also being in possession of $619 cash. When the accused was found in the vehicle, she was actually in possession of $620.55 in cash. In essence, Det. Cst. Blake said that he would not expect a meth addict to have roughly an ounce of the drug and be in possession of that quantity of cash. Since drug trafficking is a cash business, especially street-level traffickers will keep cash on them, and it is often bundled or kept in certain denominations.
[20] When asked about the presence of two scales, Det. Cst. Blake said that a scale is a tool of both traffickers and users. He also said that the presence of indicia of drug use does not diminish his opinion that the methamphetamine was possessed for the purpose of trafficking. He explained that lower-level drug traffickers often sell drugs to support their own habit.
[21] Det. Cst. Blake testified that methamphetamine is a stimulant which activates the central nervous system, causing alertness. Therefore, according to Det. Cst. Blake, someone would not typically fall asleep from methamphetamine use. However, at another point in his evidence, when asked whether his opinion regarding possession for the purpose of trafficking would change if the person was found unconscious, Det. Cst. Blake said that he would not expect a person to be unconscious because of personal use of methamphetamine “unless they had overdosed from methamphetamine”. The officer also testified that a user of methamphetamine may have speech that is sped up, slurred or incoherent.
[22] Det. Cst. Blake juxtaposed the manner of use and effects of methamphetamine and opioids such as fentanyl and heroin. Methamphetamine is typically inhaled through a meth pipe, but it can also be orally consumed and injected. Although fentanyl can be smoked, it is often used intravenously. According to Det. Cst. Blake, a person in an unconscious state from drug use is more likely to be someone who has used an opioid, which is a depressant.
[23] In cross-examination, Det. Cst. Blake agreed that if the methamphetamine in this case had been packaged in small dime bags, it would have provided further support for his opinion that it was possessed for the purpose of trafficking because it would have suggested that the drugs had already been weighed and packaged to be made ready for distribution. Det. Cst. Blake agreed with defence counsel’s suggestion that the “major component” of his opinion that the methamphetamine in this case was possessed for the purpose of trafficking was the quantity.
[24] I have considered the accused’s evidence in the context of all the evidence. There was nothing in the substance of her evidence or the way she testified that caused me to disbelieve her evidence.
[25] I found the accused, Ms. Rajczak-McGuigan, to be a witness who gave her evidence in a balanced and forthright fashion. She admitted that she sold drugs to help support her own drug addiction. She admitted that she was in active addiction throughout her pregnancy which culminated in the birth of her son on June 29 about four days before her arrest. She admitted that, at the time, she was addicted to three drugs that she used daily: fentanyl, methamphetamine, and crack cocaine.
[26] Throughout her testimony, the accused admitted unflattering, personally difficult and potentially incriminatory facts. For instance, she admitted that she had lied to Ontario Works, telling them that she was paying rent when she was not, so that she could obtain public funds to which she was not entitled, which she used to purchase drugs.
[27] When the accused was unsure about the answers to questions posed by Crown counsel, she took great care not to simply deny suggestions put to her by the Crown. She agreed with Crown counsel’s suggestion that some of the cash that the police found could have been funds she had received from the sale of drugs, although she could not say for certain. When Crown counsel suggested to her that the entire $619 that the police seized was from the sale of drugs, the accused responded:
…I’m just going to be honest, like, I honestly don’t know the exact answer to, like, almost a lot of these questions, so I don’t want to feel like I’m lying or anything. Like, I know, like, that’s what I said. There’s no way for me to directly, like, answer honestly and say, yes, for sure that was from OW or, yes, for sure that was from selling drugs or, yes, that little amount was from my mom. So, I don’t want to come across like I’m lying. I honestly don’t know exactly …like, with the money.
[28] When Crown counsel pressed on, the following exchange occurred:
Q. And all I wanted to do was suggest to you that all of the money came from selling drugs rather than these other two sources. A. Again, I wouldn’t even be able to say yes or no. Like, obviously, I don’t want to say yes and incriminate myself or whatever, but I’m not – I don’t know. I actually don’t know.
[29] The accused was also forthright when Crown counsel suggested to her that she gave Madison, a fellow addict, drugs on the night in question to borrow her car. The accused said, “again, I can’t say for sure, but I’m assuming that’s probably what happened”. Although the accused could not remember whether she gave Madison drugs to use the car that night, based on her relationship and prior experiences with Madison, she was willing to concede that it was likely. The accused’s willingness to make appropriate concessions bolstered her testimonial credibility.
[30] The accused gave compelling evidence about her addiction and its effect on her mental state leading up to, and after, the birth of her son on June 29. I accept her evidence that throughout her pregnancy she was in active addiction, using crystal meth, fentanyl, and crack cocaine. I accept her testimony that, in the two weeks leading up to her arrest, she was in and out of hospital, was not in good health and was depressed to the point of not wanting to live anymore.
[31] The accused gave evidence about the emotions she experienced when she gave birth to her son, including guilt for not being able to care for her children, and how that led to her decision to end her life in the hours leading up to her arrest:
…I got pregnant in active addiction and I used throughout that pregnancy and I was in the – my son was born June 29th, so before that arrest I had been in and out of hospital for the last couple of weeks and I gave birth to my son. I didn’t know what was going to happen there. I kind of was just like – and I have a seven-year-old son that my mom had been taking care of, taking care of since he was two because of my drug addiction. So, I just really couldn’t live with myself anymore and I was just done, like, I didn’t want to live that lifestyle anymore, I really heavily isolated myself, and I just wanted to die. So, that basically was my intentions of that day.
[32] I accept the accused’s evidence that, although she continued to use drugs in the two-week period leading up to her arrest, she stopped selling drugs in that period because of her condition and mental state. As the accused said:
It was basically the last, like, two weeks leading up to what happened. Like I said, I was in and out of the hospital, I had extremely swollen legs, The Transcript of the Proceedings on April 30, 2024, at pg. 56 of the Examination-in-Chief of the accused says “lengths”. However, the audio of the proceedings confirms that the accused said “legs”, as I had recorded in my notes from the trial. I was extremely pregnant, I was crazy with my emotions, I couldn’t – I was falling asleep all the time, like, I was not in good health, so depressed, I literally just did not want to live anymore. I was just, like, yeah, I don’t know. And I was no longer answering my phone to people. I was distant, I didn’t even care to do that anymore. I just – like, I internally knew, like, the end was coming or something, like, I just didn’t care.
[33] The accused explained that in that two-week period leading up to her arrest she was using the drugs and money she had left. I accept as plausible her explanation as to how she came into possession of the methamphetamine. It is not implausible that one of the bags contained what was left from her having purchased an ounce, which was her usual practice, and that the other bag had been given to her by the male she had given fentanyl to in the past when he was sick.
[34] The Crown questions the plausibility of anyone giving away a significant quantity of drugs for free. It may very well be an uncommon occurrence. However, I found the accused to be a credible witness and I find that it might reasonably be true that the male was either compensating the accused for having given him drugs in the past or was showing off. Furthermore, the critical question on the trial is not how the accused came to be in possession of the drugs, but rather her intentions in respect of the drugs that the police found, at the time they found them.
[35] The accused testified that she was trying to end her life in the vehicle by overdosing on drugs. Again, she gave compelling evidence about texting a friend to obtain syringes and wanting “to do it quickly” once she had decided to kill herself and had committed to doing it. The accused explained how she did not weigh the “very large chunk” of fentanyl and the methamphetamine she cooked as quickly as she could in the spoon, and how she sucked up as much as she could into the syringe to inject it to end her life.
[36] There is confirmatory evidence for the accused’s evidence that she intended to die by suicide by overdosing. In the backpack found on the passenger seat were numerous packaged hypodermic needles and cooking spoons and the syringe sent for testing was found to contain fentanyl, methamphetamine, and benzodiazepine. The accused’s condition was not inconsistent with someone who had overdosed. She was unable to undergo DRE testing related to the impaired operation investigation due to her level of impairment and had to be transported to St. Joseph’s Hospital as she required medical clearance.
[37] The accused’s evidence prompted me to ask counsel for submissions on whether there must be contemporaneity of the actus reus and the mens rea to find the accused guilty of possession for the purpose of trafficking. If I were to accept the accused’s evidence that she intended to die by suicide by overdosing in the vehicle, could I also find that she had an intention to traffic in the methamphetamine found in her possession?
[38] Crown counsel argued that, on the totality of the evidence, I should find that the accused intended to traffic the methamphetamine found by the police. The Crown says the only way the accused could have abandoned a prior intention to traffic is if she had been successful in ending her life. Otherwise, the substantial quantity of drugs in her possession remained available for her to sell, which by her own admission she needed to do to sustain her addiction.
[39] Furthermore, the Crown says that the accused’s own testimony should lead me to find that the only reasonable inference is that she was in possession of the methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking. Since the accused acknowledged that she was in active addiction at the time and that the only way she was able to sustain her addiction was to deal drugs, the drugs she had were available for sale or to give away to gain some benefit, such as a trade for using the vehicle. The Crown pointed to the accused’s acknowledgement that she may have given Madison drugs to borrow the vehicle as proof that, in or around the time of her arrest, the accused was trafficking drugs. It demonstrated her relationship with the drugs she had in her possession. They were a commodity for distribution and for sale to support her own addiction.
[40] The authors of Drug Offences in Canada, 4th Edition (Bruce A. MacFarlane, Robert J. Frater and Croft Michaelson, Thomson Reuters Canada Limited) discussed the principle of contemporaneity:
The principle of contemporaneity, occasionally referred to as the principle of concurrence, is a doctrine with deep historical roots that focusses on the relationship between the mens rea and the actus reus. It maintains that an offence requiring proof of fault cannot be proven unless the mens rea and the actus reus coincide. As early as 1798, the Court of King’s Bench in England observed that “It is a principle of natural justice, and of our law … (that) the intent and the act must concur to constitute the crime”: Fowler v. Padget (1798), 101 E.R. 1103, at p. 1106.
The principle thus requires that there be some form of temporal overlap between the prohibited conduct and the mental fault. The rationale is simple: a failure to show this linkage would mean that an accused could be punished for conduct without the requisite fault, or for a guilty thought without any accompanying act.
[41] The authors ask the question: “How, then, can the principle of contemporaneity apply to drug offences and, in particular, a charge of possession for the purpose of trafficking?”. Reference was then made to R. v. Wright (Craig George), a decision of the England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in which the accused was charged with possession of cannabis with intent to supply and the issue of contemporaneity was argued. The prosecution argued that the plants the accused had were more than he needed for personal use, “…and that he was growing the plants with the intention of selling the cannabis, or some of it, once it had matured”.
[42] In Wright, the Court said:
Our conclusions on those rival submissions are as follows. There is no doubt that the appellant was in possession of cannabis as defined in the statute. That aspect of Mr Skyner’s submissions is plainly correct. But we agree with the submission for the appellant that to come within section 5(3) of the 1971 Act the intention to supply must be an intention to supply the thing of which the defendant is in possession. There was no suggestion in this case that the appellant intended to supply the immature plants of which he was in possession at the material time. As the full court said in granting leave, the useable part of each plant would have been the flowering heads, but since these plants were in their infancy there were as yet no flowering heads. The case against the appellant was that he intended to grow the plants to maturity and then to harvest a crop from them and then to supply the harvested crop, or some of it, to others. Thus the intended supply was a supply of the harvested product of the process of cultivation, not a supply of the plants as they existed and were in his possession at the time to which the charge related.
[43] It is trite law in Canada that a conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking requires the Crown to establish two essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that the accused was in possession of an illegal substance (the actus reus); and (2) that the possession was for the purpose of trafficking (the mens rea). As the authors of Prosecuting and Defending Drug Cases, Second Edition state:
To establish that the possession was for the purpose of trafficking, the Crown has to show that the accused had an intention to traffic the drugs. Any of the forms of trafficking-such as selling, giving, transferring, or delivering-will suffice for the purpose of establishing possession for the purpose of trafficking.
[44] The possession offence in s. 4 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA) is of a much different character than the s. 5(1) trafficking and s. 5(2) possession for the purpose of trafficking offences. They are distinct offences that expose an accused to very different maximum penalties. For instance, an offender found guilty of a s. 4(1) possession offence in respect of a Schedule I substance such as methamphetamine, if prosecuted by indictment, is liable to a term of imprisonment not exceeding seven years, and much lesser penalties if prosecuted by way of summary conviction. An offender found guilty of a s. 5(1) or 5(2) offence in respect of the same substance is liable to imprisonment for life.
[45] Maximum sentences help determine the gravity of the offence and thus the proportionate sentence and “are one of Parliament’s principal tools to determine the gravity of the offence”. R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, at para. 96. The gravity of the trafficking and possession for the purpose of trafficking offences is tied to “the wrongfulness of poisoning people and communities”. R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46, at para. 60, and paras. 87-92. In R. v. Parranto, Justice Moldaver stated:
Trafficking in such substances causes both direct and indirect harms to society. Directly, the distribution and abuse of hard drugs leads to addiction, debilitating adverse health effects, and, all too frequently, death by overdose. As Lamer J. (as he then was) astutely observed, where addiction and death occur -- as they so often do -- those who oversee the distribution of these drugs are personally "responsible for the gradual but inexorable degeneration of many of their fellow human beings" (R. v. Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045, at p. 1053).
[46] Justice Moldaver went on to observe that “[t]rafficking also leads indirectly to a host of other ills, including an increase in all manner of crime, committed by those seeking to finance their addiction, as well as by organized crime syndicates”. Since much of this criminal activity is violent, “trafficking has come to be understood as an offence of violence, even beyond the ruinous consequences it has for those who abuse drugs and in the process, destroy themselves and others”. Justice Moldaver includes amongst the dangers posed by trafficking in hard drugs: (i) the impact on families; (ii) the intergenerational trauma; and (iii) the costs to society in terms of health care, law enforcement expenses, and lost productivity.
[47] Given that an accused found guilty of possession for the purpose of trafficking a Schedule I substance, such as methamphetamine, is exposed to much more severe penalties than an offender in “simple” possession of that substance, the requirement for the Crown to prove that the accused intended to traffic in the drug as part of the mens rea element of the offence makes good sense. It is consistent with Parliament’s decision to legislate separate offences with very different maximum penalties.
[48] The Public Prosecution Service of Canada’s current practice and approach to the simple possession offence provides further support for the view that it is a very different offence than possession for the purpose of trafficking. The PPSC routinely exercises discretion not to proceed with prosecutions for simple possession, even of hard drugs such as fentanyl and methamphetamine, so as not to criminalize those addicted to substances.
[49] The mens rea element of the offence requires the Crown to prove that the accused was in possession of the substance with the intention or purpose of trafficking the substance. As in the Wright case, I also find that the intention to traffic must be an intention to traffic in the thing of which the accused is in possession. In other words, the actus reus and mens rea must coincide. In this case, the material time at which I must assess the accused’s intention in relation to the methamphetamine is when she was found by the police unconscious in the vehicle in possession of those drugs.
[50] I accept the accused’s evidence, and find as a fact that, before the police arrived, she had injected fentanyl, likely together with methamphetamine, trying to overdose and die by suicide. I find as a fact that the accused did not intend to traffic the methamphetamine found by the police because she did not expect to survive the injection that she had administered to herself.
[51] In the circumstances of this case, the fact that the accused may have trafficked drugs earlier in the day, in exchange for the use of the vehicle, does not bear any relevance on the issue of whether she intended to traffic the methamphetamine located and seized by the police since I have found as a fact that she intended to overdose and die by suicide in the vehicle.
[52] Notwithstanding the substantial quantity of methamphetamine and the cash that the accused had in her possession when she was found by the police unconscious in the motor vehicle, the Crown has not established beyond a reasonable doubt that the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the whole of the evidence is that the accused is guilty of possessing the methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking. Accordingly, I find her not guilty of that charge.
[53] The accused had no clear recollection of the source of the Canadian currency in her possession at the time of her arrest. Notwithstanding her admission that at least a portion of that cash could have been monies left over from the sale of drugs, she was unsure. She provided other potential sources of the funds. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the cash was bundled or kept in certain denominations consistent with trafficking. The evidence does not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was in possession of Canadian currency knowing that all or part of the currency was obtained by or derived directly or indirectly from the commission in Canada of an offence punishable by indictment. The accused is found not guilty of the proceeds of crime offence.
CONCLUSION
[54] I find the accused, Ms. Rajczak-McGuigan, not guilty of the offences of possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime under $5,000.00.
Released: August 19, 2024 Signed: Justice J.P.P. Fiorucci