WARNING

The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice should be attached to the file:

This is a case under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act and is subject to one or more of subsections 45(7), 45(8) and 45(9) of the Act. These subsections and subsection 85(3) of the Child and Family Services Act, which deals with the consequences of failure to comply, read as follows:

45.— (7) Order excluding media representatives or prohibiting publication.

The court may make an order:

(c) prohibiting the publication of a report of the hearing or a specified part of the hearing,

where the court is of the opinion that publication of the report would cause emotional harm to a child who is a witness at or a participant in the hearing or is the subject of the proceeding.

45(8) Prohibition: identifying child.

No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child's parent or foster parent or a member of the child's family.

45(9) Idem: order re adult.

The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part.

85.— (3) Idem.

A person who contravenes subsection 45(8) or 76(11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 45(7)(c) or subsection 45(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both.

Court File and Parties

Court File No.: 357-09 Date: 2013-10-28 Ontario Court of Justice

Between:

Windsor-Essex Children's Aid Society, Applicant,

— And —

L.V. and E.J., Respondents.

Before: Justice Barry M. Tobin

Heard on: September 10 and 11, 2013

Ruling released on: October 28, 2013

Counsel:

• Mark Hurley for the applicant
• L.V. on her own behalf
• No appearance by or on behalf of E.J.
• Michael Frank for the Children's Lawyer, legal representative for the children

TOBIN J.:

[1] Introduction

[1] The Society brought a motion pursuant to Rule 16, seeking a finding that the children, K.N.V. born 1996 and M.D.A.V. born 2001, remain in need of protection under subclauses 37(2)(b)(i) and (ii) and clause 37(2)(g) of the Child and Family Services Act (the Act).

[2] The Society further requests an order that the two children be made wards of the Crown with access to the respondent mother.

[3] The respondent mother, L.V., opposes the motion.

[4] Procedural History

[4] This motion was first returnable November 15, 2012. Because of the length of time it has taken for this matter to be argued, a brief explanation is necessary.

[5] On the first return, the matter was not reached by the presiding judge. It was adjourned to November 19, 2012 to determine whether L.V. would be filing material. On that date, the matter was further adjourned to November 26, 2012 with the direction that L.V. file her affidavit material by November 22, 2012.

[6] On November 26, 2012, the motion was adjourned to February 5, 2013 for argument.

[7] On February 5, 2013, L.V. asked that the matter be adjourned as she was attempting to retain counsel. The matter was adjourned to April 2, 2013 for argument, peremptory upon L.V.

[8] L.V. did retain counsel and on April 2, 2013 the matter was adjourned at counsel's request to June 18, 2013 to allow her to prepare.

[9] On June 18, 2013, L.V.'s counsel was removed as solicitor of record. The case was adjourned to June 21, 2013 so L.V. could determine when she would be able to argue the motion.

[10] On June 21, 2013, the date for argument was scheduled and L.V. was given leave to provide her evidence orally.

[11] The matter was argued on September 10 and 11, 2013. L.V. was not represented by counsel.

1: L.V. – UNREPRESENTED BY COUNSEL

[12] For much of the time this case has been ongoing, L.V. was unrepresented by counsel.

[13] While able to articulate her position orally, L.V. had difficulty providing cogent evidence by way of affidavit. Those she filed were sparse and only barely put forward the evidence she needed to rely upon.

[14] As an unrepresented litigant facing a very serious claim and possible consequences to her and her children, it was necessary to allow L.V. some procedural leeway in presenting her case.

[15] I was mindful of the principles to be considered when an unrepresented litigant is before the court. These principles were set out in Cicciarella v. Cicciarella (2009), 72 R.F.L. (6th) 319 (Ont. Div. Ct.) and more recently in Bird v. Bird, 2013 SKQB 157. They were summarized in Cicciarella v. Cicciarella, supra, at para. 45 as follows:

"...in a trial where one party is represented by counsel and the other is not, a trial judge must balance the issues of fairness and be mindful of both parties. In doing so, a trial judge should exercise restraint and should maintain impartiality. While a trial judge may wish to exercise some leeway in procedural matters to the self-represented litigant, he or she must never become an advocate for the self-represented litigant. Finally, a trial judge must not allow assistance to the self-represented litigant to result in the represented side's rights being overridden."

[16] These cases direct the trial judge to conduct a procedurally flexible hearing, but one that is fair to all parties. The unrepresented litigant must be given an opportunity to be heard in an effective fashion. The other parties must not be prejudiced by any leeway given. See also Family Law Rules, subrules 2(3)(a) and (c).

[17] L.V. was given leave to present her evidence on the motion orally. The reason for this was her obvious struggle in presenting her evidence by way of affidavit. She was able to express herself clearly and forcefully when doing so orally rather than by way of affidavit.

[18] In order to ensure this leeway given was not prejudicial to the Society or Children's Lawyer, both were given time to conduct oral questioning of L.V. before the hearing of the motion. They were also given the opportunity to cross-examine L.V. on her oral evidence given on the hearing of the motion.

[19] At the hearing of the motion, I engaged to the extent of explaining the process to be followed, the legal tests to be applied and when necessary refocusing the evidence being provided so it would be directed to the issues raised in the case. My purpose in proceeding in this matter was to give L.V. the opportunity to provide her evidence on the issues raised, including the ability to answer or address the evidence of the Society.

2: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS – SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION

[20] Rule 16 of the Family Law Rules permits a party to make a motion for summary judgment. The following sub-rules in Rule 16 are relevant to this case:

When Available

16.(1) After the respondent has served an answer or after the time for serving an answer has expired, a party may make a motion for summary judgment for a final order without a trial on all or part of any claim made or any defence presented in the case.

Evidence Required

(4) The party making the motion shall serve an affidavit or other evidence that sets out specific facts showing that there is no genuine issue requiring trial.

Evidence of Responding Party

(4.1) In response to the affidavit or other evidence served by the party making the motion, the party responding to the motion may not rest on mere allegations or denials but shall set out, in an affidavit or other evidence, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.

Evidence Not From Personal Knowledge

(5) If a party's evidence is not from a person who has personal knowledge of the facts in dispute, the court may draw conclusions unfavourable to the party.

No Issue for Trial

(6) If there is no genuine issue requiring a trial of a claim or defence, the court shall make a final order accordingly.

[21] Rule 16(6) is mandatory: If the court concludes that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial of a claim, the court shall make a final order accordingly.

[22] On a motion for summary judgment, the court is required to take a hard look at the merits of the case to determine if there is a genuine issue for trial. The onus is on the Society to show that there is no genuine issue for trial. See Children's Aid Society of Hamilton v. M.N., [2007] O.J. No. 1526 (Ont. S.C.J.).

[23] Summary judgment should proceed with caution. It is not, however, limited to or granted only in the clearest of cases. The court must ensure the best interests of the children are adequately addressed on the available evidence. If the evidence does not raise a triable issue as to where the best interests lie, those best interests themselves call for a resolution without the delay associated with the trial and the resulting prolongation of the state of uncertainty about the children's future. See Jewish Child and Family Services of Toronto v. A.(R.), [2001] O.J. No. 47 (Ont. S.C.J.).

[24] Courts should be very cautious in granting summary judgment in child protection cases since the stakes for the family are so high and the granting of summary judgment deprives the parent of his or her day in court and the procedural safeguard of cross-examination of witnesses before a judge. See C.R. v Children's Aid Society of the District of Thunder Bay, 2013 ONSC 1357.

[25] The responding party, faced with a prima facie case for summary judgment, must provide evidence of specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. In other words, once the moving party shows there is no genuine issue for trial the responding party must prove that his or her defence has a real chance of success.

[26] Mere allegations or blanket denials, or self-serving evidence not supported by specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial, are insufficient to defeat a claim for summary judgment. See Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto v. A.(M.), [2002] O.J. No. 2371 (Ont. C.J.).

[27] The court is entitled to assume that the record contains all the evidence that the parties would present at trial. See Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Hylton, 2012 ONCA 614 at para. 5.

[28] In determining if there is sufficient evidence led by the parent, the question is not whether there is any evidence to support their position, but whether the evidence is sufficient to support a trial. See C.A.S. Dufferin v. J.R., [2002] O.J. No. 4319.

[29] In interpreting Rule 16, Rule 2 of the Family Law Rules must be considered. As well, reference to subsection 1(1) of the Act – which provides that the paramount purpose of the Act is to promote the best interests, protection and well-being of children – is necessary to the interpretation of the Act. See Children's Aid Society of Hamilton v. M.W., [2003] O.J. No. 220.

3: EVIDENCE CONSIDERED

[30] I have read and rely upon the following documents:

(a) Affidavits of Marie Bondy, sworn November 8, 2012 and July 30, 2013;

(b) A transcript of questioning of L.V. taken July 29, 2013; and

(c) With the consent of counsel for the Society and Children: a letter dated January 19, 2013 signed by R. G. J. and the affidavits of L.V. sworn January 31 and March 21, 2013.

[31] I also considered the oral evidence given by L.V. at the hearing of the motion.

4: LITIGATION HISTORY

[32] L.V. is the mother of the two children, K.N.V. and M.D.A.V. Service upon K.'s biological father was dispensed with by Order of Phillips J., dated December 29, 2011. The biological father of M.D.A.V. is unknown. There are no other persons considered to be a parent to the children as defined in the Act.

[33] On July 8, 2011, Justice Phillips found the children were in need of protection under subclauses 37(2)(b)(i) and (ii) and clause 37(2)(g) of the Act. The children were made wards of the Society for a period of four months. The bases of the findings were as follows:

(a) Historical concerns related to the mother's mental health;

(b) Adult conflict between the mother and her extended family members;

(c) Dental neglect of the children;

(d) Non-compliance with home schooling requirements;

(e) The home environment put the children at risk; and

(f) The report of Dr. Janet Orchard who psychologically assessed the children found they presented with emotional issues as a result of their problematic relationship with their mother.

[34] As part of the plan of care adopted by the court, the mother was to attend for a parenting capacity assessment and follow all reasonable recommendations resulting from this assessment. As well, she was to sign releases as requested by the Society in order to allow it to monitor terms of the plan of care.

[35] The Society's status review application initiated in respect of Justice Phillips' order was issued October 4, 2011. K.N.V. was then 15 years of age and M.D.A.V. was 10. The Society sought the same finding and relief as in this motion: that the children remain in need of protection and that they be made wards of the Crown with access to the mother.

[36] The mother filed her answer and plan of care seeking an order returning the two children to her care.

[37] As set out above, the Society's motion for summary judgment was filed November 13, 2012.

5: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS – CONTINUED FINDING CHILDREN ARE IN NEED OF PROTECTION

[38] The Society seeks a finding that the children are in need of protection under clauses 37(2)(b) and (g) of the Act. These clauses are as follows:

37(2) A child is in need of protection where,

(b) there is a risk that the child is likely to suffer physical harm inflicted by the person having charge of the child or caused by or resulting from that person's,

(i) failure to adequately care for, provide for, supervise or protect the child, or

(ii) pattern of neglect in caring for, providing for, supervising or protecting the child.

(g) there is a risk that the child is likely to suffer emotional harm of the kind described in subclause (f)(i), (ii), (iii), (iv) or (v) resulting from the actions, failure to act or pattern of neglect on the part of the child's parent or the person having charge of the child.

[39] Clause 37(2)(f) provides:

37(2) A child is in need of protection where,…

(f) the child has suffered emotional harm, demonstrated by serious,

(i) anxiety,

(ii) depression,

(iii) withdrawal,

(iv) self-destructive or aggressive behaviour, or

(v) delayed development,

and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the emotional harm suffered by the child results from the actions, failure to act or pattern of neglect on the part of the child's parent or the person having charge of the child.

[40] Child protection proceedings are unlike ordinary civil litigation as the court can choose a flexible approach that would admit evidence arising at any time up to the date of court hearing, subject to disclosure to all parties, in considering whether a child is in need of protection. See Children's Aid Society of Hamilton-Wentworth v. K.R. and C.W., [2001] O.J. No. 5754 (Ont. S.C.J. F.C.). This is applicable here as the children have been in care for almost three years.

5.1: Clause 37(2)(b) – Risk of Physical Harm

[41] The risk of physical harm means real, not speculative, risk. The Society does not need to prove an intention to cause physical harm as a pre-requisite to a finding under this clause. See Children's Aid Society of Niagara Region v. P.(T.), [2003] O.J. No. 412.

[42] Failure to address the risks that lead to the finding that the children were in need of protection can support a finding they remain in need of protection on the same basis. If risk has not been addressed in a meaningful way or through the passage of time, the risk, previously found, continues. The risk remains real.

[43] The mother did not participate in a parenting capacity assessment since this expectation was articulated in the plan of care adopted by Justice Phillips when he made his order of July 8, 2011. She avoided attempts to have the assessment completed. Though stating she would do so now, no specifics were given to suggest that this would be the case.

[44] The Society's evidence, which was not contradicted, is that it is not able to determine whether the mother has addressed the mental health concerns identified when the children were found to be in need of protection. I accept this evidence.

[45] The mother, as a party answering a motion for summary judgment, must put her best foot forward showing there is a genuine issue for trial. She was given a considerable period of time to do so. As well, at the motion she was able to give her evidence orally, just as she would at a trial. The mother did not provide evidence that she addressed the mental health concerns. She has had over two years to participate in a parenting capacity assessment as arranged by the Society but has not done so. She did not provide evidence that she sought out, participated in and benefitted from counselling or other mental health treatment.

[46] There is no evidence the finding made by Justice Phillips based on the mother's then outstanding medical health concerns, has been addressed.

[47] I find therefore the Society has met its onus in demonstrating that the children remain in need of protection under subclauses 37(2)(b)(i) and (ii). The mother has not put forward evidence that requires a trial to determine material facts relative to this issue.

[48] There is no need for a trial to establish the material facts necessary for the determination of this finding.

5.2: Clause 37(2)(g) – Risk of Emotional Harm

[49] Justice Phillips found that the psychological assessments prepared by Dr. Janet Orchard contained evidence sufficient to support a finding under clause 37(2)(g) as "both [children presented] with emotional issues as a result of their problematic relationship with the respondent mother."

[50] In Ms. Bondy's affidavit of November 8, 2012, she deposed that the mother last attended for access with the children on July 15, 2011. The mother stopped attending because of an incident that occurred on that date. She brought a birthday present to access to give to her son. Doing so was against Society rules for access. The mother protested. Police were summoned. The mother's evidence was that she was treated disrespectfully and unnecessarily roughly by the police.

[51] Following this incident she did not return for access but did speak with the children regularly on the telephone.

[52] In Ms. Bondy's second affidavit of July 26, 2013, she deposed that she and the mother arranged for a supervised visit between the mother and M.D.A.V. on M.D.A.V.'s birthday. This occurred at the Society's office. K.N.V. did not attend. Interaction between the mother and M.D.A.V. was appropriate and no issues were observed by Ms. Bondy during the visit.

[53] A second visit with M.D.A.V. occurred on May 9, 2013. Again, there were no concerns noted and Ms. Bondy observed the interaction between M.D.A.V. and her mother to be positive. Access visits with M.D.A.V. have continued, most recently supervised at the Windsor Art Gallery. No problems have been observed during these visits.

[54] On July 24, 2013, K.N.V. attended at a meeting at the Society with Ms. Bondy, the mother and the children's services worker. Ms. Bondy observed that K.N.V. appeared uncomfortable at this meeting. K.N.V. assured his mother that he was fine and that he loved her. I admitted and considered the statements of the child under the state of mind exception for the hearsay rule. They were offered by the Society and not challenged by the mother.

[55] In the Dr. Orchard report, referred to at paragraph 34 footnote 10 of Justice Phillips' reasons, it states that, "[K.N.V.] loves [his mother] and knows she loves him but he is tormented by the anger he feels toward her. He perceives her as having failed him and as having mistreated him tremendously. He feels resentful and terribly hurt. He has a tendency to internalize these emotions and therefore is vulnerable to depression and low self-esteem."

[56] In the Dr. Orchard report concerning M.D.A.V., referred to at paragraph 35 footnote 11 of the decision, it states that her social and emotional functioning reflect, "...her awareness of past difficulties in her relationship with her mother and in the care giving she experienced."

[57] These facts grounded the clause 37(2)(g) finding made by Justice Phillips.

[58] In this case there is no evidence that the mother has addressed in a meaningful way the behaviours that gave rise to the finding at first instance based on clause 37(2)(g).

[59] The mother's failure to address her mental health supports a finding that the risk to the children under 37(2)(g) remains real. During this hearing, the mother struggled, sometimes without success, to control her emotions when talking about past events and when listening to counsel's submissions. Argument of the motion was adjourned overnight so she could compose herself and have time to prepare her submissions.

[60] Both K.N.V. and M.D.A.V. are at risk of emotional harm, as originally described by Dr. Orchard, by reason of their mother not addressing in a meaningful way her mental health.

[61] On this basis, I find the children remain in need of protection under clause 37(2)(g). The Society met its onus and the mother did not provide specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for hearing in relation to this finding. I find there is no need for a hearing to establish material facts necessary to the determination of a finding under clause 37(2)(g).

6: DISPOSITION: THE STATUTORY PATHWAY

[62] The Act provides a statutory pathway that is to be followed in a child protection application. See L.(R.) v. Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1995] O.J. 119.

[63] The starting point in determining the proper disposition is to consider ss. 57(1). If the children remain in need of protection the court must then determine if a court order is necessary to protect the children in the future: See CFSA ss. 57(1) and (9).

[64] For the reasons that follow I am satisfied that the children remain in need of protection and an order is necessary to protect the children in the future.

[65] The next step is to consider which one of the orders under ss. 57(1), paras 1, 2, 3 or 4 or s. 57.1 should be made in the best interests of the children. It is necessary to consider the circumstances enumerated in CFSA ss. 37(3) when determining the children's best interests. See CFSA ss. 57(1).

[66] The court must consider what efforts the Society or another Society or person has made to assist the children before the intervention under Part III of the CFSA. See CFSA ss. 57(2).

[67] Before making an order removing the children from the parents, the court must enquire into the least disruptive alternatives that would adequately protect the children. See CFSA ss. 57(3).

[68] If the children are to be removed from a parent's care, the court is to consider whether there are family or community placements before making a society or Crown wardship order. See CFSA ss. 57(4).

[69] I am also guided by the following.

[70] A Crown wardship order is the most profound order that a court can make. To take someone's children from them is a power that a judge must exercise only with the highest degree of caution and only on the basis of compelling evidence and only after a careful examination of possible alternative remedies. See Catholic Children's Aid Society of Hamilton-Wentworth v. Jill G.-T. (1996), 90 O.A.C. 5, 23 R.F.L. (4th) 79, [1996] O.J. No. 1394, 1996 CarswellOnt 1428 (Ont. Div. Ct.).

[71] When determining whether an order of Crown wardship is an appropriate disposition, the issue is not whether the children will be better off with parents other than the natural parents. The issue is whether the children will receive a level of parenting care that is below the minimum standard tolerated by our community. See Sask. Minister of Social Services v. E.(S.), [1992] 5 W.W.R. 289 (Sask.Q.B.) and Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. A.(N.), 2010 CarswellOnt 11079 at para. 311.

6.1: Material Facts Relating to Disposition

[72] The children have been in care of the Society since November 25, 2009. This being the case the option of a continued Society wardship order is not available. See C.F.S.A. s. 70.

[73] The two plans presented on this Summary Judgment Motion are the Society's for Crown wardship with access and the mother's for return of the children to her care without or in the alternative with supervision.

[74] The Society's plan of care dated November 3, 2011 sets forth the services it intended to provide to the mother. Though the plan is dated it remains, on the evidence, an appropriate one in the circumstances of this case. It is a proper plan as required by s. 56 of the Act.

[75] There is no doubt that the mother loves her children profoundly. They are always on her mind and she misses them. She wants more time to see if they can be returned to her care. However, permanency planning within a timeframe sensitive to the children's needs requires that legal process not be used as a strategy to allow a parent time to develop the ability to parent. In this case, much time has been provided to the mother but to no avail. The mother has not cooperated with the Society so services could be ascertained and implemented to assist her in having the children returned safely to her care.

[76] In child protection proceedings, the genuineness of an issue must arise from something more than a heartfelt expression of a parent's desire to resume care of the child. There must be an arguable notion discernible from the parent's evidence that she faces some better prospects than what existed at the time of the removal of the child from her care and that she has developed new abilities as a parent. See Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. R.(H.), [2000] O.J. No. 5853 (Ont. C.J.). This is the case here. The mother offered no evidence she would parent any differently than she did when the children were apprehended. She has not engaged in any services that could lead to any other conclusion.

[77] The children are in the care of their maternal aunt and uncle. They have been there for some time and the Society is committed to maintaining this placement for the children. The evidence is uncontradicted that the children have and continue to thrive in this placement. They are doing well academically, socially and behaviourally. K.N.V. attends bi-weekly and sometimes weekly counselling. M.D.A.V. is not in counselling as it has not been seen necessary that she do so. Both children have integrated into the family of relatives with whom they now reside.

[78] The children's needs; physical, mental and emotional, are being met in their current placement. In their current placement, they will continue to have continuity of care by family members. Their counsel expressed no reservations with respect to the relief sought by the Society and to that limited extent I consider this to be consistent with their views and wishes.

[79] As Justice Pazaretz stated at para. 43 of Children's Aid Society of Niagara Region v. S.(C.), [2008] O.J. No. 3969 (Ont. S.C.), "No genuine issue for trial exists where there is no realistic possibility of an outcome other than that as sought by the applicant." This is the case here.

[80] I find on the evidence that it is in the best interests of the children that they be made wards of the Crown. A hearing is not required to determine any material facts with respect to this disposition sought by the Society.

6.2: Access by the Mother

[81] I now turn to the issue of access.

[82] The Act provides at Subsection 59(2.1) that Court shall terminate access with a Crown Ward unless the relationship between the person and the child is beneficial and meaningful for the child.

[83] A person claiming access has the onus of meeting, on the balance of probabilities, that access would be meaningful and beneficial. The opportunity to be adopted is not a factor in this case.

[84] In Children's Aid Society of Niagara Region v. J.C., R.R. and S.B., [2007] O.J. No. 1058, the Divisional Court stated:

[29] "Beneficial" has been held to mean "advantageous". "Meaningful" has been held to mean "significant" (Children's Aid Society of the Niagara Region v. M.J., supra, at para. 45). The person seeking access must prove that her relationship with the child brings a significant positive advantage to the child. The only positive factors which the trial judge identified in regard to the mother's relationship with the children at the time of trial was that she loved the children, the children loved her, and through her access she conveyed to the children that she loved them and wanted to be part of their lives. Standing alone, these findings were inadequate to satisfy the requirement that the relationship between the children and their mother was "beneficial" within the meaning of s. 59(2)(a) of the Act. More is required than love, the display of love, the fact that the mother had cared for the children in the past, the fact that the mother was the biological parent, and the fact that some visits were pleasant, especially when various negative factors impacting on the children's emotional health, were identified.

[85] The Society and counsel for the children support a finding that access be ordered in this case. K.N.V. is 17 years of age and should have the opportunity to have access with his mother subject to his wishes. M.D.A.V. has resumed supervised access visits with her mother and the observations of the worker are that these visits have been positive.

[86] I find that access by the mother is beneficial and meaningful to the children. Given their ages, their views and wishes are to be given serious consideration.

[87] I am satisfied the evidence supports a finding that access between the mother and the children is beneficial and meaningful to them and that it is in their best interests.

7: ORDER

[88] The children K.N.V., born July 15, 1996, and M.D.A.V., born April 18, 2001, are found to remain in need of protection under subclauses 37(2)(b)(i) and (ii) and clause 37(2)(g) of the Act.

[89] The children are made wards of the Crown and placed in the care of the Windsor-Essex Children's Aid Society.

[90] The respondent, L.V., shall have access with the children a minimum of one time per month for a minimum of two hours per visit, to be supervised by the Windsor-Essex Children's Aid Society, or a third party approved by it, and such access shall be in accordance with the wishes of each child.

[91] The children shall have access to the respondent, L.V., a minimum of one time per month for a minimum of two hours per visit, to be supervised by the Windsor-Essex Children's Aid Society, or a third party approved by it, and such access shall be in accordance with the wishes of the children.

[92] The respondent mother L.V. shall be permitted to call the children every Wednesday sometime between 4:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m.

[93] A child may call the respondent mother at any time, in accordance with his or her wishes.

[94] There is no need for a trial to establish the material facts that are necessary to the determination of the application of the Windsor-Essex Children's Aid Society.

Released: October 28, 2013

"original signed and released"

Barry M. Tobin Justice