Court File and Parties

Court File No.: D51814/10 Date: 2012-03-12

Ontario Court of Justice Toronto North Family Court

Between:

Michele Daphne Jean-Francois Acting in Person Applicant

- and -

Anthony Exford Barnes Respondent

Counsel: Carolyn C. McNeill, for the Respondent

Heard: March 8, 2012

Justice: S.B. Sherr

Reasons for Decision

Part One – Introduction

[1] Two matters were argued before me. The first matter was the respondent's motion to change my support orders dated October 4, 2010 and October 25, 2010. The second matter was the applicant's motion asking that the court decline to exercise its jurisdiction to hear the respondent's motion to change my custody order dated October 4, 2010. In this motion to change, the respondent seeks an order for joint custody and access to the parties' son, born on November 23, 2009 (the child). The applicant moved to [name of state omitted] with the child after being served with the motion to change and argues that [name of state omitted] is the appropriate jurisdiction to deal with any parenting issues.

[2] At a case conference held on January 16, 2012, the parties agreed that this court would hear the respondent's motion to change support and at the same time hear the applicant's jurisdictional motion. At the applicant's request, arrangements were made to permit her to participate in these motions from [name of state omitted] by audio-conference.

[3] The parties filed extensive affidavit evidence in support of their motions and made oral submissions. The applicant also provided the court with some documents (including some emails) that were not attached as exhibits to affidavits. In order to address this documentation and some other issues that arose during submissions, the father gave oral evidence and had the opportunity to respond.

Part Two – Factual Background

[4] The applicant is 41 years old. She was born in the United States and lived in Canada from 1998 until November of 2011. She has dual Canadian/United States citizenship.

[5] The respondent is 30 years old. He is a Jamaican citizen and a landed immigrant in Canada. He has lived in Canada since 2002. He does not have Canadian citizenship.

[6] The parties never cohabited and have the one child together. The child is a Canadian citizen.

[7] The child has always resided with the applicant.

[8] The applicant has three older children from a prior marriage. The respondent does not have any other children.

[9] On August 10, 2010, the applicant issued an application in this court for custody and child support, including retroactive support. She asked for child support of $1,000 per month, based on the respondent's income.

[10] The respondent attended at the first appearance date on October 4, 2010, met with duty counsel and then chose to leave. He did not file an Answer or any financial documentation as required by the Family Law Rules and was noted in default. The applicant completed a Form 23C affidavit that day as her evidence in the default hearing.

[11] I granted the applicant final custody of the child. I declined her request to make a "no access" order, as this was not pleaded in her application and the respondent had no notice of this claim. The order was silent as to access. I imputed the respondent's income at $53,000 per annum and ordered him to pay the table amount of child support based on this income, starting on September 1, 2010. I endorsed that the Form 23C did not provide me with adequate evidence to support the applicant's claim for retroactive support and gave her the opportunity to submit further affidavit evidence in support of this claim.

[12] The applicant took advantage of this opportunity and submitted a supplementary affidavit. I ordered on October 25, 2010 that child support would be retroactive to December 1, 2009.

[13] The respondent did not appeal these decisions.

[14] The respondent was incarcerated from November 19, 2010 to March 11, 2011. He pled guilty to charges of weapons dangerous and possession of an instrument of forgery. These charges were unrelated to the applicant or the child.

[15] The respondent issued his motion to change on May 25, 2011.

[16] The applicant was served with the motion to change on June 27, 2011, at her home in Toronto.

[17] On July 21, 2011, the applicant brought a Form 14B motion (chambers motion) asking that the first appearance date of August 17, 2011 be adjourned to a date in December of 2011. This was opposed by the respondent. The applicant advised the court that she had to be in New York until December of 2011 to care for one of her other children. She deposed:

I will be obtaining legal counsel for this matter.

I am in the process of tending to my son who has been hospitalized two weeks ago and is fighting for his life and health.

[18] The applicant made no mention in her affidavit of a plan to move with the child to [name of state omitted]. The adjournment was granted. I endorsed that both parties would be expected to proceed with a case conference on the return date.

[19] The applicant listed her home for sale on July 19, 2011. She sold the home on September 19, 2011 and closed the transaction on October 28, 2011. She then moved with the child to [name of state omitted] and continues to reside there with him. At no time did the applicant advise the respondent or the court about these steps.

[20] The applicant did not attend at court on the return date of December 12, 2011. A lawyer did attend on her behalf, as agent only. The lawyer advised the court that she had a legal aid certificate, but had been unable to confirm her retainer with the applicant. She requested an adjournment that was opposed by the respondent. I endorsed that the applicant had provided no acceptable explanation for her non-attendance. I adjourned the matter, peremptory on the applicant and stayed the payment and enforcement of child support.

[21] The applicant attended on the case conference on January 16, 2012, at which time she brought her motion asking the court to decline its exercise of jurisdiction. Timelines were set up for the filing of supplementary affidavits for the hearing of the motions.

[22] On February 1, 2012, the respondent was given a deportation notice by Canada Border Services, arising out of his criminal convictions. He deposed that he has appealed that decision and is entitled to remain in Canada pending the disposition of his appeal process.

[23] There is no court proceeding between the parties in [name of state omitted].

Part Three – Should the Court Decline to Exercise Jurisdiction Over the Parenting Issues?

[24] The following sections of the Children's Law Reform Act (the Act) are applicable to this case:

Purposes, Part III

19. The purposes of this Part are,

(a) to ensure that applications to the courts in respect of custody of, incidents of custody of, access to and guardianship for children will be determined on the basis of the best interests of the children;

(b) to recognize that the concurrent exercise of jurisdiction by judicial tribunals of more than one province, territory or state in respect of the custody of the same child ought to be avoided, and to make provision so that the courts of Ontario will, unless there are exceptional circumstances, refrain from exercising or decline jurisdiction in cases where it is more appropriate for the matter to be determined by a tribunal having jurisdiction in another place with which the child has a closer connection;

(c) to discourage the abduction of children as an alternative to the determination of custody rights by due process; and

(d) to provide for the more effective enforcement of custody and access orders and for the recognition and enforcement of custody and access orders made outside Ontario.

Jurisdiction

22. (1) A court shall only exercise its jurisdiction to make an order for custody of or access to a child where,

(a) the child is habitually resident in Ontario at the commencement of the application for the order;

(b) although the child is not habitually resident in Ontario, the court is satisfied,

(i) that the child is physically present in Ontario at the commencement of the application for the order,

(ii) that substantial evidence concerning the best interests of the child is available in Ontario,

(iii) that no application for custody of or access to the child is pending before an extra-provincial tribunal in another place where the child is habitually resident,

(iv) that no extra-provincial order in respect of custody of or access to the child has been recognized by a court in Ontario,

(v) that the child has a real and substantial connection with Ontario, and

(vi) that, on the balance of convenience, it is appropriate for jurisdiction to be exercised in Ontario.

Habitual Residence

(2) A child is habitually resident in the place where he or she resided,

(a) with both parents;

(b) where the parents are living separate and apart, with one parent under a separation agreement or with the consent, implied consent or acquiescence of the other or under a court order; or

(c) with a person other than a parent on a permanent basis for a significant period of time, whichever last occurred.

Abduction

(3) The removal or withholding of a child without the consent of the person having custody of the child does not alter the habitual residence of the child unless there has been acquiescence or undue delay in commencing due process by the person from whom the child is removed or withheld.

Declining Jurisdiction

25. A court having jurisdiction under this Part in respect of custody or access may decline to exercise its jurisdiction where it is of the opinion that it is more appropriate for jurisdiction to be exercised outside Ontario.

[25] The child was habitually resident in Ontario when the respondent commenced his motion to change. The child was residing in Toronto with the applicant pursuant to a court order (clause 22 (2) (b) of the Act). The child did not move to [name of state omitted] until November of 2011, without the consent or acquiescence (or prior knowledge) of the respondent – six months after the motion to change was started.

[26] This court has jurisdiction to hear the motion to change the parenting order. The issue is whether it should exercise its jurisdiction.

[27] Once jurisdiction is established, the onus shifts to the applicant to show that Ontario is not a convenient forum for the litigation of the claim and that some other forum is clearly more convenient. See: Long v. Seelman, 2012 ONSC 1342, par. 39.

[28] Although not technically pleaded as such, the applicant's motion is framed under section 25 of the Act. She argues that [name of state omitted] is the more convenient jurisdiction to hear the motion to change for the following reasons:

a) She has been the sole caregiver for the child.

b) The respondent has not seen the child since he was four months old.

c) The respondent is violent and dangerous and should only be granted supervised access in [name of state omitted] if access is granted at all.

d) She did not believe that she or the child were safe in Ontario due to her being the victim of domestic violence by both the respondent and her ex-husband.

e) With the exception of a payment of $220, the respondent has never voluntarily paid child support to her.

f) She says that most of her family resides in the United States. She plans to remain in [name of state omitted] permanently with the child.

g) She cannot afford to litigate this case in Ontario and, given the parenting history between the parties, should not be required to do so.

h) She believes that the respondent will soon be deported from Canada and that neither party will have a connection with Canada. She believes that the respondent is only bringing this motion to buttress his deportation appeal.

[29] The respondent disputed most of the applicant's allegations. He deposed that he was a loving father who was actively involved with all aspects of child care on a daily basis until he went to jail in November of 2010. He deposed that while he was in jail, the applicant learned that he had recently been carrying on an affair with another woman. He said that the applicant was infuriated and unilaterally terminated his access when he was released from jail in March of 2011. He denied that he had ever assaulted or threatened the applicant and deposed that the applicant overstated his criminal record. He argued that the case should be heard in Ontario.

[30] In determining whether to decline to exercise its jurisdiction over parenting issues, the court should consider the purposes of the legislation set out in section 19 of the Act. The analysis under section 25 of the Act is akin to the balance of convenience test in sub-clause 22 (1) (b) (vi) of the Act. The existence of a foreign order should also be considered. See: Dhillon v. Benipal.

[31] In analyzing the balance of convenience, courts should consider the following factors:

1. The location of the majority of the parties;

2. The location of key witnesses and evidence;

3. Contractual provisions that specify applicable law or accord jurisdiction;

4. Geographical factors suggesting the natural forum;

5. The avoidance of a multiplicity of proceedings;

6. The applicable law and its weight in comparison to the factual questions to be decided; and

7. Whether declining jurisdiction would deprive the plaintiff of a legitimate juridical advantage available in the domestic court.

See: Muscutt v. Courcelles, (2002), 60 O.R. (3d) 20 (C.A.); Van Breda v. Village Resorts Ltd., 2010 ONCA 84, 98 O.R. (3d) 721 (C.A.); Long v. Seelman, supra.

[32] Most of the factors set out above are neutral between the parties. There are likely more key witnesses in Canada than in [name of state omitted]. The material facts in dispute will be about the nature of the respondent's relationship with the child and the respondent's conduct. The evidence about these material facts would come from witnesses in Ontario. The child has been in [name of state omitted] for a short time and is pre-school age. While the applicant deposed that her family lived in the United States, she did not give any particulars of family members residing in [name of state omitted].

[33] There are no contractual provisions that specify applicable law or accord jurisdiction. There are no geographical factors suggesting the natural forum. The applicant has not commenced a foreign proceeding.

[34] It will be equally costly and inconvenient for each party to travel to the other's jurisdiction to litigate the issue. The respondent is faced with the additional obstacle that, due to his immigration status, he cannot obtain a visa and travel to the United States for a hearing. The applicant faces no such obstacle.

[35] The evidence did not come close to satisfying me that the applicant or the child would be at risk of physical harm if she came to Ontario for the purpose of litigating the parenting issues.

[36] I am not prepared to agree at this time with the applicant's submission that the respondent's motion to change has no merit and is a waste of time, particularly with respect to the access issue. The respondent provided the court with evidence that suggests that it should treat the applicant's evidence with some caution. According to the applicant, the respondent had not seen the child since March of 2010 (in one other affidavit she deposed that he had not exercised any access) - yet he provided photos of being with his son up until November of 2010.

[37] I also considered the circumstances of the applicant's move to [name of state omitted]. One of the principles that the court must sustain in these matters is to discourage self-help and rather, encourage parties to put the matter before a judge if they cannot resolve custody and access matters between themselves. Howard v. Howard, [1999] O.J. No. 3164, (Ont. Fam. Ct.), per Justice David R. Aston. This is a principle reinforced by section 19 of the Act. The applicant moved surreptitiously to [name of state omitted]. She represented to the court in her affidavit sworn on July 21, 2011 that she had to remain in New York until December of 2011 to care for a critically ill child. She was granted an adjournment on this basis. Despite requests from the respondent's counsel, she has still not provided any evidence confirming that her child's illness was this grave. The applicant did not disclose that she had listed her home for sale two days before her affidavit was sworn and that she was planning to move to [name of state omitted]. The timing of this listing, within weeks of being served with the respondent's motion to change seeking joint custody, combined with her non-disclosure of important information to the court, points in the direction of bad faith. It also undermines the reliability of the applicant's evidence around the parenting issues. Any additional cost or inconvenience to the applicant to litigate the case in Ontario is directly the result of her choices. Absent a clear advantage to her when analyzing the balance of convenience factors (which is not the case here), the applicant should not be rewarded for acting in this manner.

[38] I considered that even if the case is heard in Ontario, it might be a pyrrhic victory for the respondent. This court is alive to potential enforcement challenges.

[39] Most of the applicant's arguments went to the merits of the parenting claim, not to the factors that needed to be addressed under section 25 of the Act. She has not satisfied her onus to show that the case should be heard in [name of state omitted]. Her motion is dismissed.

Part Four – The Motion to Change Child Support

4.1 Change in Circumstances

[40] The respondent's motion to change support is governed by subsection 37 (2.1) of the Family Law Act that reads as follows:

Powers of court: child support

(2.1) In the case of an order for support of a child, if the court is satisfied that there has been a change in circumstances within the meaning of the child support guidelines or that evidence not available on the previous hearing has become available, the court may,

(a) discharge, vary or suspend a term of the order, prospectively or retroactively;

(b) relieve the respondent from the payment of part or all of the arrears or any interest due on them; and

(c) make any other order for the support of a child that the court could make on an application under section 33.

[41] On October 4, 2010, this court imputed the respondent's income at $53,000 per annum. This was based on the applicant's evidence that the respondent worked full-time as a telemarketer for Omega Telemarketing, part-time for a company inspecting water tanks and ran his own disc jockey business.

[42] The respondent was able to satisfy me that he does not earn the income imputed to him and likely never did. While the income from the respondent's work as a disc jockey was likely in cash, I find it unlikely that his alleged income from the other two employers would have been in this form. He would have received T4's from these businesses. The respondent filed tax information showing employment income of $7,859 in 2009 and only social assistance payments in 2010 – nowhere near the employment income that the applicant deposed that he earned from the telemarketing company or the water tank inspection company.

[43] I find that there has been a change in circumstances that justifies changing the support order.

[44] The next step is to determine the appropriate amount of ongoing support.

4.2 Fixing the Respondent's Income

[45] The respondent submitted that he was willing to pay child support from January 1, 2011 based on his total 2011 income of $14,203. He felt that any child support arrears prior to that date should be rescinded on the basis that he did not earn sufficient income to pay any support pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines (the guidelines).

[46] The respondent has a grade 12 education. He claimed that he has had little education or training and that he has historically worked at minimum wage jobs as a laborer. He deposed that he has held three short jobs as a laborer in the past year. He acknowledged that he has worked in the past as a disc jockey, but stated that he earned little income from this. He said that he worked as a disc jockey from 2005-2009, but stopped when he was shot in a nightclub. He stated that he was unable to earn income from November of 2010 until March of 2011 due to his incarceration.

[47] The respondent testified. I did not find him to be a credible witness. I did not believe that he has only been earning the amounts that he has claimed.

[48] The applicant provided evidence that the respondent was working as a disc jockey in nightclubs in 2010, contrary to the respondent's evidence that he stopped doing this in 2009. She provided pictures, business cards of the respondent and emails to support this. I found that the respondent was not honest and dissembled in trying to explain this evidence.

[49] The applicant also asked that an email dated August 20, 2010 that was purportedly sent by the respondent to her be put to him when he testified. In this email the respondent expressed anger about the applicant calling him a thief and her constantly complaining to him about money matters. He accuses her of denying him access to the child. He asks her to allow the child to come and visit him at his condo and says that he bought the place for her and the child to visit. [1] This email is answered by a purported email by the applicant angrily reminding the respondent of various monies that he has stolen from her. The respondent accused the applicant of fabricating these emails and denied any memory of them. I did not believe him. The level of anger, the particularized accusations and the consistency of the allegations in the emails with the parties' current perspectives made it highly unlikely that one person wrote them.

[50] The respondent's credibility was further tarnished by his statement that he was innocent of the criminal charges for which he pled guilty in 2011 – a conviction that included a crime of dishonesty – possession of an instrument of forgery. He claimed that he pled guilty to the charges in order to be released from pre-trial detention. He cannot plead guilty in one court and then ask for a different finding in another court.

[51] The respondent also deposed that until a few days before this hearing he had no knowledge that the applicant had sued him in the Superior Court of Ontario. The applicant said that she gave the respondent a car in 2010 and that he turned around and sold it the next day and kept the proceeds. She provided documentation to support the transfer of the car and the lawsuit. She provided angry email exchanges between the parties about the car. She attached a copy of the style of cause of the lawsuit to her response to motion change form as well as to her affidavit of December 14, 2011. I did not believe the respondent's claims of surprise about the lawsuit.

[52] The respondent has no medical reason for not working. He appears to be healthy, intelligent and employable on a full-time basis. I did not find it credible that he would have earned such little income in the past three years.

[53] The applicant's evidence that the respondent would frequently have large amounts of cash on him and drove a Lexus was corroborated by the respondent's ex-girlfriend (the other woman in the 2010 affair). This witness deposed that the respondent regularly kept thousands of dollars of cash on him during their relationship (from July-November of 2010). She said that he worked as a disc jockey, entertainment promoter and driver and provided security for private dancers. She said that he worked full-time and appeared to be financially stable. She said that he was in possession of a Lexus vehicle. I treated this evidence with caution as this witness had motive to be upset with the respondent and was not cross-examined. If I had found the respondent to be credible, I would likely have given this evidence little weight. However, since I did not believe the respondent and it corroborated other evidence before me, I gave it some consideration.

[54] I find that the respondent is earning cash income that supplements his declared employment income. In the alternative, I find that the respondent is intentionally under-employed as described in clause 19 (a) of the guidelines and that additional income should be imputed to him.

[55] It is difficult to assess how much income the respondent is actually earning. I have already found that the applicant provided inaccurate information about the respondent's income sources in her Form 23C affidavit that formed the basis of the existing order. Likewise, I have no confidence in the respondent's evidence about his income.

[56] I have decided to impute an additional $18,000 per annum to the respondent's declared income of $14,203. The evidence convinces me that the respondent has additional cash business ventures or has the ability to earn this income from these ventures. This figure is three-quarters of the cash amount ($24,000) that the applicant, in her Form 23, estimated that the respondent earned as a disc jockey. I haven't used her full estimate of the respondent's cash income, as she has shown a readiness to overstate facts.

[57] The respondent's income will be fixed at $32,203 for ongoing child support purposes. The guideline table amount for one child at this income is $271 per month.

4.3 Arrears

[58] The decision to reduce arrears is discretionary. It is not a strict mathematical exercise. In assessing whether to make a retroactive downward variation of child support, many courts are now relying upon the criteria set out in D.B.S. v. S.R.G.; Laura Jean W. v. Tracy Alfred R.; Henry v. Henry; Hiemstra v. Hiemstra, 2006 SCC 37 (DBS). See: Galloway v. Cassino (Barrett), 2008 ONCJ 577; H.F. v. P.F., 2007 ONCJ 170; Grala v. Grala, 2008 ONCJ 556; Corcios v. Burgos; D.M. v. S.A., 2008 NSFC 15, with some modifications. The four primary factors for the court to consider are:

a) The reason for the delay in bringing the motion to change.

b) The conduct of the parties.

c) The circumstances of the child, both past and present.

d) Any undue hardship to either party.

[59] Where the child support payor can establish a change in circumstances during the time that arrears were accumulating, which rendered him or her unable for a substantial period of time to make the full amount of the child support payments, the court may provide relief to the payor in a later proceeding to vary the child support order or rescind arrears. See: Corcios, supra.

[60] The respondent was unable to provide a valid explanation for leaving court and defaulting on the original application. This will be a factor in assessing the arrears issue. It would not be just to permit a process where the payor defaults, the recipient incurs the time and cost of the litigation and then once the order is enforced, the payor comes back to court and says, "please do it all over again - you didn't have the correct financial information- I'm ready to participate now".

[61] The respondent provided some explanation for his delay in moving to change the order. He was in jail from November of 2010 until March of 2011. He then had to obtain legal aid and retain a lawyer.

[62] The respondent has engaged in blameworthy conduct. I have found that he has not disclosed his actual income. Further, he has only paid nominal child support on a voluntary basis. He has failed to recognize that part of being a parent is providing adequate financial support for his child. He could and should have been paying appropriate child support since December 1, 2009.

[63] The applicant deposed that she is not working. It is a logical inference that the lack of support by the respondent has meant that the child's circumstances have been adversely affected.

[64] While an order for an immediate payment of arrears might create a hardship for the respondent, this hardship can be adequately addressed by an order that the arrears be repaid in affordable installments. I will make such an order. However, this accommodation is conditional on the respondent maintaining his ongoing and arrears support payments in good standing.

[65] I have also considered that the respondent has been earning less than I imputed to him in my original order. I gave less consideration to his argument that he couldn't afford to pay child support when he was incarcerated for four months. Where the under-employment or unemployment is the result of one's own actions (an event over which the payor had some control) or misconduct, the support obligations will not be reduced or cancelled. See: Luckey v. Luckey; Maurucci v. Maurucci, [2001] O.J. No. 4888 (Ont. Fam. Ct.); Sherwood v. Sherwood, [2006] O.J. No. 4860 (Ont. S.C.).

[66] I looked at two time periods in assessing the reduction of support arrears. The first period forms the retroactive portion of the respondent's motion. This is the period from December 1, 2009 until he started his motion to change in June of 2011 (19 months). For this period, based on the considerations set out above, I will give him a significant, but not full, credit for the differential in the support he would have paid based on an income of $32,203 and what he was actually ordered to pay, based on an income of $53,000. The full amount of the difference during this period would have been $3,705 ($490-295 = 195 per month x 19 months).

[67] The second period of time is from when the motion to change started until today. This is not a retroactive claim. I have given the respondent full credit for the differential in the guideline table amounts during this period, being;

July 1, 2011 - December 31, 2011 - 6 months at $195 per month = $1,170

January 1, 2012 – March 2012 – 3 months at $218 per month [2] = $654

Total: $1,824

[68] The respondent also claimed that he paid some money to the applicant that was not reported by her or recorded by the Family Responsibility Office. He offered absolutely no evidence in support of this claim and he will not receive any credit for this.

[69] I find that the support arrears should be reduced by $4,500. The respondent will be permitted to repay the arrears as adjusted by this order at the rate of $179 per month (so that the entire support payment will be $450 per month), starting on April 1, 2012.

Part Five – Conclusion

[70] An order will go on the following terms:

a) The applicant's motion asking that this court decline to exercise jurisdiction is dismissed.

b) The respondent's motion to change child support and reduce outstanding arrears will be granted in part as follows:

i) The existing child support arrears as reflected in the records of the Family Responsibility Office shall be reduced by $4,500.

ii) The existing child support order shall be changed to provide that the respondent shall pay to the applicant the guideline table amount of child support for one child, based on his imputed income of $32,203 per annum, in the sum of $271 per month, on the first day of each month, starting on April 1, 2012.

iii) The order of December 12, 2011 that stayed support and the enforcement of support is terminated.

iv) The respondent may pay the remaining child support arrears at the rate of $179 per month on the first day of each month, starting on April 1, 2012. However, if he is more than 30 days late in making any ongoing or arrears support payment, the entire amount of arrears shall immediately become due and payable.

v) Nothing in this order precludes the Family Responsibility Office from enforcing arrears from any government source (such as income tax or sales tax refunds) or lottery or prize winnings.

vi) The respondent shall annually provide the applicant with complete copies of his income tax returns and notices of assessment by June 30th, starting in 2013.

vii) A support deduction order shall issue.

[71] If either party seeks costs, they are to serve and file written submissions with the trial coordinator's office no later than March 27, 2012. The other party will then have until April 12, 2012 to provide a written response. The written submissions should not exceed two pages, not including any offer to settle or bill of costs.

[72] I will hold one more conference to give directions for the completion of this case and to see if there is any opportunity for resolution. This will be held on May 4, 2012 at 9 a.m. If the applicant wishes to participate by audio-conference she is to notify the trial coordinator's office about this no later than April 27, 2012, in order that they may make the necessary arrangements.

Justice S.B. Sherr

Released: March 12, 2012

Footnotes

[1] The respondent did not disclose that he owned a condominium in his financial statement. He denied owning any property in his testimony.

[2] This is based on the new table amount of child support as of January 1, 2012, being $271 per month. The table amount prior to January 1, 2012 was $295 per month.