Ontario Land Tribunal
Tribunal ontarien de l’aménagement du territoire
ISSUE DATE: April 28, 2026
CASE NO(S).: OLT-25-000526
PROCEEDING COMMENCED UNDER subsection 17(36) of the Planning Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.13, as amended
Appellant: 1413506 Ontario Limited Appellant: 2442760 Ontario Limited Appellant: 2601370 Ontario Inc. et al. Appellant: John DeMarco Appellant: L.A. Land Corporation Subject: Proposed Official Plan Amendment Description: To implement the Howard Bouffard Secondary Plan to guide the urbanization of lands within the Howard Bouffard Secondary Plan Area (OPA 2) Reference Number: 37-OP-2025-005 Property Address: Howard Bouffard Secondary Plan Area Municipality/UT: LaSalle/Essex OLT Case No.: OLT-25-000526 OLT Lead Case No.: OLT-25-000526 OLT Case Name: 1413506 Ontario Limited et. al v. LaSalle (Town)
PROCEEDING COMMENCED UNDER subsection 9(1) of the Ontario Land Tribunal Act, 2021, S.O. 2021, c. 4, Sched. 6
Request by: Town of LaSalle Motion for: Directions Heard: March 20, 2026 In Writing
APPEARANCES:
Parties — Counsel
1413506 Ontario Limited — Analee Baroudi
10447005 Canada Limited — Jonathan Minnes, Kevin Dias
2601370 Ontario Inc. — Jonathan Minnes, Kevin Dias
Laurier Heights Development Inc. — Jonathan Minnes, Kevin Dias
Mira Developments Inc. — Jonathan Minnes, Kevin Dias
2442760 Ontario Limited — Lee English
L.A. Land Corporation — Jeffrey Hewitt
Town of LaSalle — Denise Baker, Kelin Algayer
County of Essex — Claire Bebbington
Propower Mfg. Inc. — Lee English
Crossing View Development Inc. — Analee Baroudi
Sorge Enterprises Inc. — Edwin Hooker
DECISION DELIVERED BY T.F. NG AND ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL
INTRODUCTION
Background
1This matter relates to appeals brought pursuant to s. 17(36) of the Planning Act (“Act”) for an Official Plan Amendment No. 2 (“OPA 2”) in the Town of LaSalle (“Town”), County of Essex (“County”), originally regarding eight appeals.
2Presently, the Town has indicated that remaining appeals remain as described in the Motion filed by the Town for the purpose of requesting the Tribunal to declare unappealed portions of the OPA 2 to be in force and effect.
3The remaining appeals are Appeal No. 011915 (“1413506 Ontario Limited”), Appeal No. 011916 (“L.A. Land Corporation”), Appeal No. 011923 (“2442760 Ontario Limited“), Appeal No. 011924 (“2601370 Ontario Inc.“), Appeal No. 011936 (“Mira Developments Inc.“), Appeal No. 011937 (“10447005 Canada Limited“) and Appeal No. 011938 (“Laurier Heights Development Inc.“).
4The OPA 2 (Municipal Reference No. 37-OP-2025-005/By-law no. 2025-020) is to implement the Howard Bouffard Secondary Plan (HBSP) in order to establish a comprehensive land use planning and urban design, transportation and municipal service infrastructure policy framework to guide new development in the secondary plan area.
5At a previous hearing of a motion from Sorge Enterprises Inc. (“Sorge”), Sorge was granted non-Appellant Party status by this Tribunal, in a Decision subsequently issued November 26, 2025. Sorge was ordered to shelter under the issue of an Appellant, of which the election was to be made within 14 days of the Decision/Order.
HEARING
6The Tribunal had previously scheduled a 15-day Hearing to proceed by video from Wednesday, September 9, 2026 to Tuesday, September 29, 2026.
MOTION
7The Tribunal received a motion in writing (“Motion”), filed by the Town, to declare portions of the OPA 2 that are not appealed and/or not under appeal by the remaining appellants to be in force and effect by operation of law. A determination is required, as the added party (“Party”) – Sorge – objects to the requested relief.
8The Motion is for:
- A declaration that the policies of the Howard Bouffard Secondary Plan (the “Secondary Plan”) in the Town’s Official Plan Amendment No. 2 (“OPA 2”) (the “Subject Policies”) that are under appeal on a site- or area-specific basis are the following:
Policy 5.3.2 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j), (k), (l) and (m), The Natural Heritage System;
Policy 5.3.2.1 Environmental Protection Designation;
Policy 5.3.2.2 Feature Assessment/Restoration Overlay;
5.3.3.1 Mixed-Use Corridor Designation;
5.3.3.3 Business Park District Designation;
5.3.3.7 Specific Policy Area 2;
Schedule “F1” Howard Bouffard Land Use Plan on a site-specific basis or as otherwise noted on the Schedule;
Schedule “F2” Howard Bouffard Natural Heritage System on a site-specific basis or as otherwise noted on the Schedule;
Schedule “F3” Howard Bouffard Roads and Active Transportation Plan (only insofar as it relates to the Realignment of Bouffard) on a site-specific basis or as otherwise noted on the Schedule;
(collectively, the “Appealed Policies”).
A declaration that all the policies of the Secondary Plan in OPA 2 (the “Subject Policies”) that are not the above-noted Appealed Policies are not the subject of any appeal before the Tribunal, and therefore, are in full force and effect in accordance with subsections 17(27), 17(30) and 17(30.1) of the Planning Act.
Such further and other relief as the Tribunal may deem just.
Issues
9The issues are thus:
a. whether the non-appellant party can scope or craft issues of an appeal or limit the scope of actual appellants in scoping their appeals;
b. whether the Town of LaSalle can obtain the sought-after declarations.
Chronology
10The following describes the sequence of events:
Town
- The Town filed the motion supported by affidavit on March 3, 2026.
Sorge’s response to motion
- Sorge, the sheltering party, filed a response to motion on March 10, 2026 requesting the following relief:
a. The Respondent requests that the proposed declaration of the Moving Party be amended to note that Section 5.3.1(b) under OPA 2 also remain under appeal.
b. The Respondent further requests that the Tribunal dismiss the relief requested in the Motion seeking a declaration that the policies that are under appeal be under appeal on a site or area specific basis.
c. The Respondent further requests that that the Tribunal confirm that the broader issue of the appropriateness of an Environmental Protection Designation over all lands proposed under OPA 2, remains under appeal.
d. In the alternative, the Respondent request that the Tribunal confirm that the broader issue of the appropriateness of the Environmental Protection Designation over the lands of the Appellants and the sheltering party, Sorge Enterprises Inc., remains under appeal;
e. Such other relief as counsel may advise and the Tribunal may deem just and appropriate.
LA Land’s response to motion and submissions
- One of the Appellants, LA Land, filed a response to motion on March 10, 2026 generally submitting (and without any planning evidence) that:
a. The appeals commenced by the Appellants are made pursuant to subsection 17(36) of the Planning Act. The Town has brought this motion pursuant to subsections 17(27), 17(30) and 17(30.1); those are the incorrect subsections.
b. This motion should be brought pursuant to subsections 17(36) and 17(39).
While L.A. Land’s appeal (and that of the other appellants) has been framed as site-specific due to the nature of the Notice(s) of Appeal, LA Land stated, it is important to recognize that land use designations do not function in isolation.
In fact, L.A. Land’s Issues List frames the issues as applying to all the lands in the Secondary Plan, including L.A. Land’s lands “and other lands similarly designated.”
The primary common issue to the Appellants is the suitability and propriety of the Environmental Designations applied to their lands and, consequently, the lands of others, by way of the Secondary Plan.
Planning frameworks are intended to create coherent, predictable land use patterns across a broader area.
Assigning a designation to one property that is fundamentally different from immediately adjacent parcels — if imposed in error/improperly or without a clear policy rationale or transition strategy — introduces inconsistency into the land use structure.
Doing so can undermine the Secondary Plan’s ability to guide growth, ensure compatibility, and support long-term infrastructure and servicing planning.
From a good planning perspective, adjacent properties should relate to one another in a logical, coordinated manner. When one parcel is treated as an exception, it risks creating a fragmented pattern that is difficult to defend, implement, or expand upon in future decision-making.
Town’s Reply to responses
The Town has replied to the responses on March 13, 2026 stating as follows, with fulsome evidence of the appellants’ correspondence and site specific and geographic area scoping of the issues and the scoping of the respective appeals. See affidavit of Kelin Algayer in support of the Motion and the further affidavit of Kelin Algayer filed with the reply.
The Town submits that its Notice of Motion dated March 3, 2026 (the “Motion”), inadvertently relies on section 17(27) of the Planning Act (the “Act”). The Town seeks the indulgence of the Ontario Land Tribunal (the “OLT” or “Tribunal”) to make a correction to the references to subsection 17(27) of the Act, and instead, consider, for the purposes of the relief sought through this Motion, section 17(37) of the Act.
The Town also reiterates that the purpose of the Motion is solely to confirm which policies of the Official Plan Amendment No. 2 (“OPA 2”) are under appeal as well as the parts of the Schedules which are under appeal.
This relief sought directly reflects the requirements provided in subsection 17(37) of the Act, which requires a notice of appeal to identify the specific part or parts of the plan appealed, which includes both the specific part or parts of the policies and the specific part or parts of the schedules. Where that information is unclear or disputed, it is appropriate - and necessary - for the Tribunal to confirm the scope of the appeal to ensure procedural fairness, efficiency and certainty in the process.
On September 18, 2025, Ms. Denise Baker, counsel for the Town, sent correspondence to counsel for all of the Appellants in this matter requesting that their clients identify the policies and schedules that it had under appeal as well as to provide their list of issues so the Town would have time to review and prepare materials for circulation to the parties in advance of the scheduled case management conference. Ms. Baker also asked the Appellants to advise if they were interested in having discussions to attempt to scope or resolve their appeals.
On January 9, 2026, Ms. Baker sent further correspondence to counsel for the Appellants enclosing an annotated version of OPA 2 being the Howard Bouffard Secondary Plan (HBSP), identifying the policies that the Town believed, from review of their appeal letters, that were under appeal and the geographic scope under which the Town believed the policies and schedules were under appeal and by whom, together with the corresponding mapping of the client’s lands. The Town asked each of the Appellants to confirm by January 26, 2026 whether or not the Town had correctly characterized their appeal so that it would know whether or not a scoping motion would need to be brought.
Sorge brought a motion at the first case management conference seeking to be made an appellant in this proceeding based on an unfounded allegation that there was a defect in the Notice of Decision that approved OPA 2. This allegation has been considered and rejected by the Tribunal in the Tribunal’s decision dated November 26, 2025.
With the consent of the Municipality, the Tribunal permitted Sorge to participate in this proceeding as a non-appellant party, recognizing that it did not file an appeal and therefore was required to shelter under the appeal of an appellant.
However, the decision to make Sorge a non-appellant party was a conditional decision. In paragraph 75(e) of the Tribunal’s decision of November 26th, 2025, the Tribunal further Ordered that Sorge’s non-appellant status be subject to the specific condition that Sorge would indicate to the Tribunal and the relevant party which issue it would be sheltering under within fourteen (14) days of that Order. Sorge did not comply with this Order of the Tribunal.
In paragraph 20, Sorge alleges in its Notice of Response that the Town has had no discussions with the appellants regarding the scope or characterization of the Appellants’ appeals. This allegation, the Town said, is categorically false.
The Town has had several discussions or correspondence with each of the Appellants to this proceeding which resulted in the Town filing this motion which is to confirm which policies of OPA 2 are under appeal as well as the parts of the Schedules which are under appeal, in accordance with the requirement for the Appellants to identify which part or parts of the plan are appealed as set out in section 17(37) of the Act.
After several discussions and correspondence, the Town and 1413506 Ontario Limited confirmed the scope of that appeal. This has been acknowledged.
The Town has also reached an agreement with Mr. English’s client, 2442760 Ontario Limited, following discussions in which the scope of that appeal was expressly agreed to.
In addition, the Town has also communicated with Ms. Jessica Evola, counsel for Mr. John DeMarco, who has filed a withdrawal of Mr. DeMarco’s appeal on March 1, 2026.
Communications have also occurred with Mr. Jonathan Minnes and Mr. Kevin Dias, counsel for the 2601370 Ontario Inc., and its affiliated corporations including but not limited to, Mira Developments Inc., Laurier Heights Development Inc., and 10447005 Canada Limited, regarding scope and characterization of their clients’ appeal.
Finally, the Town has communicated with Mr. Jeffrey Hewitt, counsel for L.A. Land and obtained confirmation from his client that there were no concerns with how the appeals were characterized in the January 9, 2026 version of the Howard Bouffard Secondary Plan. It is of note that there were no changes made to the January 9, 2026 version of the Howard Bouffard Secondary Plan that was circulated to the Appellants that impacts his client’s Appeal. The only changes that were made were: (a) to reflect the withdrawal of Mr. DeMarco’s appeal; (b) to clarify that the OPA 2 and Business Park policies were under appeal by Mr. English’s client and to clarify the geographic scope of Mr. English’s client’s appeal; (c) and to address the geographic scope of Ms. Baroudi’s client’s appeal to include not only her client’s lands but also the lands within 120 metres of her client’s lands, encompassing the entirely of the Woodlot which is a subject of her client’s concerns.
The Town acknowledged that discussions were not held with Mr. Hooker on behalf his client, Sorge. That is because the purpose of this Motion is to confirm what policies are under appeal and the geographic scope to which they apply based on the appeal letters filed, in accordance with 17(37) of the Act. As Mr. Hooker’s client, Sorge, is not an appellant and did not file an appeal letter, it should not be expected to discuss which policies are under appeal as it has no standing as a non-appellant to speak to which policies are under appeal by the Appellants.
The Town stated that, to provide Sorge standing on this Motion given the nature of this motion, would effectively confer Sorge the appellant status it previously sought and which the Tribunal has already denied.
If Sorge wished to challenge the Tribunal’s earlier determination as to its status as a non-appellant, the appropriate procedural step would have been to bring a motion for review under section 23 of the Ontario Land Tribunal Act, which it has not done.
As such, it is submitted that Sorge’s response to motion should be dismissed.
In paragraph 14, Sorge also raises issues relating to the relief sought by the Town to scope the policies under appeal as well as their geographic application, which should be limited to the sites owned by the Appellants that have not withdrawn their appeals. The Town submits that there is no basis for including any policies or sites that were under appeals that have been withdrawn. In particular, there is no basis to discuss the application of the appeal of Mr. John DeMarco, which has been withdrawn in accordance with Ms. Jennifer Evola’s email to the OLT and the parties on March 1, 2026 and for which the Tribunal has accepted and confirmed the withdrawal.
In this regard, Rule 8.3 of the OLT Rules of Practice and Procedure is instructive.
In the context of the withdrawal of Mr. DeMarco’s appeal, Rule 8.3 provides that a non-appellant party may not raise new issues and may only participate by sheltering under an issue raised by an appellant, and only for so long as that issue remains in dispute. Mr. DeMarco’s issues no longer remain in dispute, and therefore, Sorge cannot shelter under such issues.
To the extent Sorge seeks relief to have the appeals, which have been scoped site specifically or to geographic areas which do not include Sorge, to apply to the Sorge lands, such relief would again require the Tribunal to elevate its status to that of an Appellant, contrary to the Tribunal’s prior ruling.
The Town submits that, given that Sorge’s appeal status is limited to sheltering only, the costs incurred in responding to this attempt to again seek the status and rights of an appellant are wasteful and unnecessary.
Ultimately, the Town submits that the Tribunal’s decision of November 26, 2025 arising from the previous motion brought by Sorge should be applied consistently and should dismiss the relief sought in Sorge’s Response to Motion.
On September 18, 2025, the Town circulated correspondence to all appellants, including L.A. Land, for the purpose of scoping the appeals from the outset.
Further to the September correspondence, on January 9, 2026, the Town circulated an email attaching an annotated version of the Howard Bouffard Secondary Plan and the associated mapping, in which the L.A. Land’s appeal was identified as being site-specific in nature.
On January 28, 2026, the Town received response from Mr. Hewitt confirming implied agreement that his client was satisfied with the identified scope. Notwithstanding Mr. Hewitt’s email, the Town inquired one more time if Mr. Hewitt’s client had any concerns of the scope identified in the Town’s documents circulated on January 9, 2026. In response, on February 4, 2026, Mr. Hewitt once again confirmed that his client had no concerns with the manner in which the L.A. Land’s appeals had been characterized as a site specific appeal. The Town relied upon this response in filing its motion. To the extent that L.A. Land’s Notice of Response seeks to deviate from that agreement, the Town stated, it should be disregarded.
Specifically, the materials circulated by the Town on January 9, 2026 repeatedly identified the appeal as site-specific, including on pages 14, 17, 19, 41 and 42 of the annotated version of the Howard Bouffard Secondary Plan. As mentioned, this characterization was confirmed as appropriate in both January 28th, 2026 and on the February 4th, 2026 correspondence from Mr. Hewitt. The contrary position now advanced is therefore surprising and inconsistent with the filed appeal letter and the written record confirming same.
In addition to the above-noted confirmations from Mr. Hewitt, on November 15, 2025, Mr. Hewitt also circulated the Schedule attached to his client’s appeal, indicating the scope of L.A. Land’s appeal.
It appears that Mr. Hewitt is now attempting to amend his position in order to permit Mr. Edwin Hooker’s client, Sorge, to shelter broadly.
The Town submits that this is inappropriate and will directly result in unnecessary costs for the Town, which relied on the January 28th, 2026 and February 4th, 2026 confirmations when preparing its materials, as well as unnecessary costs to the hearing in this matter, including additional costs associated with the filing of this motion, additional costs in mediation and additional costs associated with a contested hearing.
While it is an operation of law that the unappealed portions of OPA 2 are in force and effect, the Town submits that the circumstances of this proceeding, in particular Mr. Hewitt’s Notice of Response, demonstrate why Tribunal confirmation of what is - and is not - in force and effect is critically important to ensure that this does not continue to change over the course of the hearing process.
Further, with respect to Mr. Hewitt’s assertion that the relief sought does not represent “good planning”, the Town notes that although Mr. Hewitt filed an affidavit from a land use planner, that planner does not state that the scoped, site-specific approach fails to constitute good planning. In the absence of any such evidence, there is no basis for L.A. Land’s position. Moreover, this motion does not address the question of good planning because the Tribunal is not being asked to approve any policies at this time, simply to issue an order confirming which policies are under appeal and the geographic extent to which they are under appeal.
Finally, with respect to the alternative relief sought by L.A. Land, the Town has no objection and provides a revised draft order reflecting that language.
Ultimately, the Town relied on Mr. Hewitt’s repeated confirmations that his client had no concerns with the policies identified or the site specific identification of the L.A. Land appeal as circulated by the Town. Had those confirmations not been provided, the Town would have addressed that issue at the outset of these proceedings.
The email from Case Coordinator Situ attaching the Notice of Written Motion confirms the procedural timelines, including the three-day period for a reply to any Notice of Response. The reply is being filed in accordance with this direction. The Town asks the Tribunal to proceed to issue a decision confirming the scope of the appeals as set out in the draft Order.
Finally, section 1.1 of the Act identifies the purposes of the Act as including a fair, open, and efficient planning system. Confirming that these proceedings are scoped in accordance with the March 9th, 2026 version of the Howard Bouffard Secondary Plan, promotes a timely and efficient hearing process.
Sorge’s submissions
11Sorge submitted that the Tribunal retains authority to modify and approve Official Plan’s for relevant areas related to the issues at play, which may include lands beyond those of the remaining appellants. As such, the Tribunal retains inherent jurisdiction to make a decision with regards to the identification of the EP designation on all relevant lands within OPA 2 as opposed to only the lands of the remaining Appellants.
12There is no prejudice to the Town in qualifying the relief sought to allow for the Tribunal to exercise its normal, customary and inherent jurisdiction to make a decision with regards to the EP designation as a whole and not just as it relates to the lands of the remaining Appellants.
13In the Tribunal’s decision in Shouldice, Re (2013), 2013 CarswellOnt 5073, 76O.M.B.R. 447 (O.M.B.), there was an attempt to withdraw the appeal except as it related to the specific lands of the party. The Tribunal stated that this would not be condoned by the Tribunal in circumstances where that withdrawal is made for the purpose of defeating the requests for party status to the proceeding.
14It is submitted that the Town seeks to preclude consideration of lands within the EP designation, other than the lands of the Appellants. The motion, as worded, is an attempt to effectively dismiss and unduly restrict the sheltering party’s ability to participate in the broad questions raised by the Appellants respecting the EP Designation and related policy provisions.
15The policies within OPA 2 with regards to the EP Designation relate to all lands that are proposed to be included within the EP Designation. It is inappropriate to scope the issues on a site-specific basis when the policies that will apply to the entirety of the proposed EP designated lands remain in dispute.
16Tribunals and/or Courts have consistently recognised that scoping appeals on a site-specific basis is unduly restrictive and inherently inconsistent with an evaluation of the broader public interest.
17In the Tribunal’s decision in “MacVicar”, Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4029 (O.M.B.) (MacVicar v. Thunder Bay, 2009 OMBD no. 581), whereby the Appellant withdrew their appeal, the Tribunal stated that there are certain circumstances where the withdrawal of the last remaining appeal could prejudice sheltered parties. The Tribunal noted that in these circumstances the Tribunal should intervene.
18Further, in the Divisional Court decision of Q. v Minto Management Ltd. (1984), 1984 CanLII 2118 (ON HCJ), 46 O.R. (2d) 756, the Court determined that appeals are not only matters between two parties but also engage the public interest to which a Tribunal must consider and bring its own expertise to bear.
19These decisions were cited with approval in Artstone Holdings Limited et al. v. Hamilton (City) (2022) CanLII 93033 ONLT.
20The allegations that have been put forth by the Appellant parties are general in nature as they involve the Town’s lack of study in support of the EP designation, the introduction of policies within OPA 2 that are unduly restrictive, and the impugned policy provisions which are equally applicable to all remaining lands within the EP Designation – not just the subject lands of the remaining Appellants.
21As such, it is submitted that the Tribunal must consider the public interest in making a decision with regards to this Motion and reserve for itself discretion consistent with the persuasive reasoning in the Artstone decision and the court’s binding decision in Minto.
22It is submitted that the question remaining for adjudication is the extent, if any, of a designated area for environmental protection (i.e., the EP designation under OPA 2).
23Restricting the issues of the Appellants to their subject lands defies common sense and logic and neuters the rights of the sheltered parties to lead evidence, effectively prejudicing that Party from its full and active participation in the Hearing.
24A decision of the Tribunal in favour of the Motion would not offer the best opportunity for a fair, just, and expeditious resolution of the merits of the proceeding.
Decision/Findings
25The Tribunal finds that the Town’s Motion is appropriate and will be granted for the reasons that follow.
Preliminary objection of LA land – LA Land’s response.
26The Town had made a correction on its error in quoting section (“s.”) 17(27) and s.17(30) of the Act in its motion. In its Reply notice, the Town explained that under s.17(37) of the Act, the Appellants are to properly define their appeal, which they did in conjunction with the Town. Thus, the currently agreed to and clearly scoped site specific and area specific appeals now pertain to the remaining appeals of the appellants.
27The Tribunal accepts that the Town had inadvertently referred to s.17(27) instead of s.17(37) and overruled the preliminary objection.
28LA Land had gone on to submit that its appeal is described site specific for the purposes of the appeal, however, it claims that its issues are framed to include other lands that (though not under appeal) are caught under OPA 2.
29Without providing any evidence, it claims that it is not good planning to hold that sections of OPA 2, not under appeal, should be declared in force, since, different designations among adjacent lands will result. This, it said, represents poor planning since the appeal matters have been scheduled for hearing just six months from present date.
30The Tribunal finds that this argument is circular. It can be argued that since other lands and by extension, other landowners, (except the appellants), have thought it fit, or perhaps by default, have not appealed, then those landowners can be regarded as being content that their lands fall under the policies of the OPA 2 regime.
31Further, for sections and policies of OPA 2, that have not been appealed or have been withdrawn from appeal, it is efficacious and appropriate that those landowners who have not appealed or are outside the appeal period, be rendered able to make applications for development unimpeded, with the in force and effect sections of OPA 2.
32LA Land’s appeals are site specific and pertains to those specific sections and portions of the OPA 2. It has previously confirmed and concurred with the Town as regards its appeals being site specific, hence inducing the Town to take up this motion to obtain the requested reliefs.
Sorge’s submissions
33Sorge cited Artstone and placed heavy reliance on that Tribunal case. The Tribunal finds that the case cited does not assist Sorge. In that case, the Hamilton City wide Rural Hamilton Official Plan and Urban Hamilton Official Plan (RHOP and UHOP) (OPs) were in issue.
34There, the City and the remaining appellants have coordinated a joint position that 500 hectares (“ha”) in total developable area should be identified for future urban development (including 330 hectares in the Elfrida area [“Elfrida Area”]). In support of the joint position, the appellants withdrew their appeals for areas outside the mapped 500 hectares. As such, focusing the Hearing on the designations and policies in the mapped 500 ha. The movers, Castandgrey and Country (“C&C”), owned lands outside of the proposed 500 ha but within the Elfrida Area originally identified by the City-approved OPs and subsequently removed by the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing (“MMAH”) modification. C&C did not own the lands when the appeals against MMAH modification were filed; they acquired the lands and then obtained Party status “on condition that they shelter under existing issues as outlined in the PO dated…”.
35The appeals pertain to whether and where lands should be identified in the OPs for future urban expansion. The MMAH had modified the City’s adopted OPs to remove reference to certain areas identified for future urban boundary expansion including the area relevant to the motions, known as the Elfrida Area.
36The motions sought the Tribunal’s refusal of the appellants’ scoping of and partial appeals withdrawals and confirmation that the Tribunal retains the authority to modify the RHOP and UHOP for some or all of the lands known as the Elfrida Area, including the movers’ properties.
37There, the Tribunal determined that a core issue was whether the Tribunal has statutory authority to adjudicate on specific matters withdrawn by the appellants. In that case, the Tribunal found that, while the geographic area related to the appeals has been reduced, the broader planning question – where should the Hamilton Urban Boundary be drawn – remains in dispute, such that the full Elfrida Area remains under appeal for the Tribunal’s consideration.
38There, the Tribunal declined to engage in determination of the appellants’ intended narrowing of appeals. The Tribunal determined its scope of authority – in the case of new OPs with widespread and long-term effects – the scope should not be unduly limited.
39In the instant case, the appeals relate to an Official Plan Amendment, not a new Official Plan. The instant case relates to a secondary plan, not a primary Official Plan. The boundary of the HBSP area is as delineated and the remaining appellants have not jointly proposed a reduction of the area boundary of the HBSP to exclude Sorge.
40Here the Appellants have scoped their issues and appeals on a site-specific or area specific basis for their own respective lands. This was done in accordance with the requirements of s. 17(37) of the Act. The remaining appellants’ appeals remain for adjudication and have not been partially withdrawn.
41The Tribunal in the instant case is able to determine that the Appellants have scoped their appeals on a site-specific and/or area specific basis in accordance with the Act, and the Tribunal is not restricted in holding the unappealed portions of the HBSP to be in force and effect.
Conclusion
42In conclusion, the Tribunal finds that, while Sorge has the right as Party to bring a motion, regrettably it does not have Appellant’s entitlements to craft issues nor to scope the appeals. It had originally vied to be an Appellant in this matter, but unfortunately it failed to file its appeal on time. This Panel denied its motion to be an Appellant and granted it non-Appellant party status.
43Sorge had to shelter under issues of an Appellant and was under the Tribunal’s order to elect to do so within 14 days of the Decision/Order. This it apparently failed to do within the stipulated time frame.
44Rule 8.3 of the Tribunal Rules of Practice and Procedure allows Sorge to shelter. If there are no issues to shelter, the non-Appellant party will not participate in the appeals.
45I find that Sorge as a sheltering party cannot participate in crafting issues nor in scoping appeals. There are no primary rights of an appellant that accrue to the non-Appellant party. Further, there are no primary remedies that exist for a sheltering party. Sorge has secondary rights to shelter under the issues of an Appellant, and is subject to the issues and scope of the appeal of an Appellant.
46There are, in effect, three categories of Parties in this case – the Appellants, the non-Appellants and the added Party.
47Admittedly, Parties under rule 8.1 of the Tribunal’s Rules can participate fully in a proceeding. In the particular matter of this s.17(36) appeal case, the non-appellant Party’s rights presuppose that there are issues to shelter under. Non-appellants have no rights to craft or scope issues or demand crafting of the extent of the appeals or to scope limits of an appeal. Only the respective appellants can do that.
48“Rule 8.3 Non-Appellant Party A party to a proceeding before the Tribunal which arises under any of subsections 17(24) or (36) […] of the Planning Act […] who is not an appellant of the municipal decision or enactment may not raise or introduce a new issue in the proceeding. The non-appellant party may only participate in these appeals of municipal decisions by sheltering under an issue raised in an appeal by an appellant party and may participate fully in the proceeding to the extent that the issue remains in dispute.”
49In the Tribunal’s view, Sorge is attempting to gain appellant’s status or elevate itself as an appellant through the reliefs requested in its response to motion (“Response to Motion”).
50Sorge is not an appellant and therefore cannot dictate what issues are to be listed for hearing nor how appeals are to be scoped in terms of whether the appeals are site-specific or area-specific. As such, Sorge’s demands on amending the Town’s motion or requiring the general Environmental Protection Designation issue to remain, for other non-appellants, has no basis. Only appellants can scope appeals and characterize their appeals as site-specific and/or area-specific.
51The Tribunal notes that each appellant had individually scoped their appeals in concurrence with the Town. Each characterization has been consented to and agreed to by the respective appellant (the correspondence between parties evidencing agreement and appeals scoping).
52Further for any appeal that has been withdrawn, eg. The John DeMarco appeal, the site and his issues would be excluded from the proceedings.
53The Tribunal finds that the Town’s motion is to confirm those policies of OPA 2 that are under appeal. Section 17(37) requires the notice of appeal to identify the specific parts of policies and schedules under appeal. The Tribunal’s role as regards the Town’s motion is to establish clarity of the issues and scope of the appeals to go to the hearing.
54To be clear, the Tribunal is not adjudicating on the merits of the appeals nor is it approving the policies that are under appeal. It is merely confirming the scope of the policies and schedules of the remaining appeals to facilitate the fair and expeditious hearing of the proceedings pursuant to rule 1.3 of the Tribunal’s Rules.
55The Tribunal notes that s.17(38) – Decision final – provides: “If one or more persons or public bodies have a right of appeal under subsection (36) in respect of all or part of the decision of the approval authority, but no notice of appeal is filed under that subsection and the time for filing appeals has expired,
a. the decision of the approval authority or the part of the decision that is not the subject of an appeal is final; and
b. the plan or part of the plan that was approved and that is not the subject of an appeal comes into effect as an official plan or part of an official plan on the day after the last day for filing a notice of appeal.”
56The Tribunal finds that the Town’s motion to declare the non-appealed sections and policies of the OPA 2 to be in force and effect is fully supportable. The HBSP with the highlighted portions of the appealed sections of OPA 2 is attached as Schedule A.
57Sorge’s requested reliefs are denied.
ORDER
58THE TRIBUNAL ORDERS that the motion of the Town of LaSalle is granted:
(a) The appeals of L.A. Land Corporation and 2601370 Ontario Inc. and its affiliated corporations including but not limited to, Mira Developments Inc., Laurier Heights Development Inc., and 10447005 Canada Limited, are scoped site-specifically;
(b) The appeal of 2442760 Ontario Limited is geographically scoped to those lands which are subject to OPA 2 in the area bounded to the south by Laurier Parkway, to the east by Howard Avenue, to the north by Concession Road 6 and to the west by Huron Church Line Road;
(c) The appeal of 1413506 Ontario Limited is geographically scoped to include the lands owned by 1413506 Ontario Limited as well as lands located within the boundaries of OPA 2 which are within 120 metres of the lands owned by 1413506 Ontario Limited;
(d) The policies of the Howard Bouffard Secondary Plan that remain under appeal are shown as highlighted in Schedule A to this Order;
(e) By operation of law under subsection 17(38) of the Planning Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P13, all of the unappealed policies are now in force and effect.
(f) The coming into effect of certain portions of the Howard Bouffard Secondary Plan in the Town of LaSalle’s Official Plan Amendment No. 2 is without prejudice to the positions taken by the Parties to any site-specific and/or area-specific appeal, so that if those appeals proceed to a hearing, either on their own or as may be consolidated with another appeal, the Town will not take the position that the Tribunal ought not to approve site- or area-specific modifications to the affected sections, tables, definitions, maps, schedules, and associated text on the basis that they deviate from or are inconsistent with such sections, tables, definitions, maps, schedules, and associated text on a Town-wide basis (or as approved in respect of the same sections, tables, definitions, maps, schedules and associated text). However, this does not affect the Town’s right to assert that the approved sections, tables, definitions, maps, schedules and associated text should be applied to the specific sites or areas without modification on the basis that they constitute good planning.
(g) Sorge Enterprises Inc.’s requested relief in its Response to Motion are denied.
“T.F. NG”
T.F. NG VICE-CHAIR
Ontario Land Tribunal Website: www.olt.gov.on.ca Telephone: 416-212-6349 Toll Free: 1-866-448-2248
The Conservation Review Board, the Environmental Review Tribunal, the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal and the Mining and Lands Tribunal are amalgamated and continued as the Ontario Land Tribunal (“Tribunal”). Any reference to the preceding tribunals or the former Ontario Municipal Board is deemed to be a reference to the Tribunal.

