Ontario Land Tribunal
Tribunal ontarien de l’aménagement du territoire
ISSUE DATE: April 30, 2026
CASE NO(S).: OLT-26-000012
PROCEEDING COMMENCED UNDER subsection 69(3) of the Planning Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P. 13, as amended.
Appellant
Amrik and Pooja Shergill
Subject:
Tariff of fees - payment under protest
Description:
To dispute the application fee paid for a MV application
Reference Number:
A-2025-0114
Property Address:
18 Fontainebleu Rd
Municipality/UT:
Brampton / Peel
OLT Case No.:
OLT-26-000012
OLT Case Lead No.:
OLT-26-000012
OLT Case Name:
Shergill v. Brampton (City)
Heard:
April 13, 2026 by video hearing
APPEARANCES:
Parties
Counsel*/Representative
Amrik Shergill
Self-represented
City of Brampton
R. Usmanali*
DECISION DELIVERED BY S. BRAUN AND ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL
Link to Order
INTRODUCTION
1This decision and Order address an appeal by Amrik Shergill (“Appellant”) pursuant to s. 69(3) of the Planning Act (“Act”), concerning payment of fees under protest to the City of Brampton (“City”). The fees paid relate to a minor variance Application (“Application”) seeking three variances to permit the construction of a backyard gazebo on the property located at 18 Fontainebleu Road (“Subject Property”). The fees were calculated in accordance with Schedule A of By-law 85-96, as amended by By-law 209-2025 (“Fees By-law”).
2This was the first hearing event held pursuant to a Notice of Hearing issued by the Tribunal. Given the nature of the appeal, there are no other individuals or entities with an interest in the proceedings.
BACKGROUND
3In the summer of 2025, the Appellant began constructing a gazebo on the Subject Property. On or about September 15, 2025, an on-site investigation was conducted by a City building inspector, who observed the gazebo was in the process of being constructed and that the project required zoning relief. The Appellant was unaware that such relief was required but shortly after being notified, he applied to the Committee of Adjustment (“CoA”) for the following three minor variances to permit:
a) a combined gross floor area (“GFA”) of 40.12 square metres (“sq m”) for two accessory structures (existing shed and gazebo), whereas the by-law permits a maximum combined GFA of 20 sq m for two accessory structures;
b) an accessory structure (gazebo) having a GFA of 29.16 sq m whereas the by law permits a maximum GFA of 15 sq m for an individual accessory structure; and
c) an accessory structure (gazebo) having a mid-point height of 3.14 metres (“m”) whereas the by-law permits an accessory structure having a maximum height of 3m.
4The City’s Fees By-law sets out the fees for residential Minor Variance (“MV”) applications, as follows:
5The Application was processed under the “All Other Variances” category and the Appellant was charged a total fee of $8,970.00, representing three variances at $2,990.00, in accordance with 8.1.4, above.
CLARIFICATION REGARDING SCOPE OF APPEAL
6The City’s Fees By-law, which is in full force and effect, is not under appeal. The appeal before the Tribunal is pursuant to s. 69(3) of the Act. The entirety of s. 69 reads as follows:
Tariff of fees
69(1) The council of a municipality, by by-law, and a planning board, by resolution, may establish a tariff of fees for the processing of applications made in respect of planning matters, which tariff shall be designed to meet only the anticipated cost to the municipality or to a committee of adjustment or land division committee constituted by the council of the municipality or to the planning board in respect of the processing of each type of application provided for in the tariff.
Reduction or waiver of fees
(2) Despite a tariff of fees established under subsection (1), the council of a municipality, a planning board, a committee of adjustment or a land division committee in processing an application may reduce the amount of or waive the requirement for the payment of a fee in respect of the application where the council, planning board or committee is satisfied that it would be unreasonable to require payment in accordance with the tariff.
Same
(2.1) Despite a tariff of fees established under subsection (1), the council of a municipality, a planning board, a committee of adjustment or a land division committee, in processing an application related to development or redevelopment that will include affordable housing units, shall not require the payment of a fee that is greater than the maximum fee prescribed for the type of application being made.
Payment under protest: appeal to Tribunal
(3) Any person who is required to pay a fee under subsection (1) for the processing of an application in respect of a planning matter may pay the amount of the fee under protest and thereafter appeal to the Tribunal against the levying of the fee or the amount of the fee by giving written notice of appeal to the Tribunal within thirty days of payment of the fee.
Hearing
(4) The Tribunal shall hear an appeal made under subsection (3) and shall dismiss the appeal or direct that a refund payment be made to the appellant in such amount as the Tribunal determines.
7Under s. 69(2) a municipal council, planning board, CoA or land division committee is empowered to waive/reduce a fee in respect of an application where it is satisfied that it would be unreasonable to require payment in accordance with the tariff. This is a discretionary power to provide fee relief in relation to a specific application, taking into account specific circumstances surrounding that application. The City adopted a Framework to Guide Discretionary Fee Relief for Minor Variance Applications (“Framework”), which includes suggested guidelines to support fair, consistent and transparent application of this discretionary power.
8The Appellant had applied to the CoA for a reduction or waiver of fees under s. 69(2), which was denied. Although he came to this hearing prepared to argue that the CoA erred in its decision to deny his request resulting from a failure to follow its own Framework, an appeal under s. 69(3) is not an appeal from a decision in s. 69(2). The Act does not provide an appeal route from a decision made under s. 69(2). While individual municipalities may have specific mechanisms in place whereby an applicant may request a review of such a decision, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to conduct any such review.
9The Act does, however, allow the payor of a fee under protest to challenge the fee imposed through an appeal to the Tribunal under s. 69(3). In accordance with s. 69(4), the Tribunal must hear the appeal and must either dismiss it or direct a refund in an amount it determines. The Tribunal does not have the power to direct a refund based on individual circumstances (for instance, financial hardship). This is because s. 69(3) directs the Tribunal to s. 69(1), which speaks to anticipated processing costs for the type of application, as opposed to the actual processing costs of the specific application for which the fee was paid under protest. The relevant test and the narrow issue to be decided on this appeal is whether there is a reasonable connection between the MV application fee paid under protest and the anticipated cost to the municipality to process that type of application.
DECISION
10For reasons that follow, the Tribunal dismisses the appeal having found, on the evidence and argument presented, that there is a reasonable connection between the fee charged and paid under protest and the City’s anticipated costs of processing MV applications.
THE HEARING
11The Tribunal heard from Mr. Shergill, who made submissions and provided evidence as a lay witness. Although he had anticipated that the majority of his case would focus on the CoA decision, once the scope of the appeal was explained, he was careful to ensure that his submissions and evidence focused upon ss. 69(1) and (3). Despite what was understandably a frustrating exercise, Mr. Shergill maintained his composure throughout the hearing and treated the Tribunal, the City’s counsel and the City’s witnesses with the utmost respect.
12For the City, the Tribunal heard from Peter Simcisko and Francois Hemon-Morneau. Mr. Simcisko is a professional land economist and managing partner at Watson & Associates Economists Ltd. (“Watson”). Watson was retained by the City in 2023 to review development application fees and make recommendations to provide for reasonable full-cost recovery. Those recommendations are contained in an April 2024 Development Application Fees Review Study – Phase 2 (“Watson Report”). Based on the foregoing, the City increased its planning application fees through the Fees By-law. Mr. Simcisko was directly involved in both the review and the preparation of the Watson Report. He was qualified, without objection, to provide opinion evidence with respect to municipal land economics, including development application fees and user fee cost recovery.
13Mr. Hemon-Morneau, a Principal Planner/Supervisor with the City was qualified, without objection, to provide opinion evidence in land use planning. However, the opinion provided largely related to the CoA’s denial of relief under s. 69(2), as well as the Framework intended to guide decisions in relation to waiving/reducing application fees. Given the limited scope of the appeal, Mr. Hemon-Morneau’s evidence, while appreciated, was not particularly helpful. This is because the accepted evidence was factual in nature, focusing on the history of the Application and the applicable fees to be charged under the City’s Fee By-law, all of which was already reflected in the record.
Appellant’s Arguments and Evidence
14Mr. Shergill submitted that the present appeal is about equitable access to the planning process for Bramptonians pursuing small-scale residential projects. He submitted that the City’s MV application fees are unreasonably high and nothing more than a revenue generating tool for the City, rather than a mechanism for cost recovery. In his view, the City is using this appeal as an opportunity to justify shifting the financial burden of MV application fees to individual applicants, in contrast to the historical practice of offering CoA services at an affordable cost recovery rate, whereby the financial burden was shared between the tax-base and the applicant.
15Referencing 2021 census data from the City’s website which shows an average total income of $45,400.00 and a median household income of $111,000.00, he argued that the City’s MV fees are unaffordable and not in keeping with the cost of living. Using his own application as an example, he argued that $8,970.00 is unreasonable as it is equivalent to 20% of the average Bramptonian’s before tax income or 8% of the median household income. He also called attention to the construction estimate for his gazebo, totalling $20,340.00, arguing that almost $9,000.00 for three MVs is disproportionate to the cost of the project and not reflective of the City’s anticipated costs of processing such an application. He submitted the fees are disproportionate to the typically small-scale nature of projects requiring minor variances, negatively impacting the ability of residents to participate in the planning process and are therefore unreasonable.
16Contrasting s. 8.1 of the Fees By-law with a market survey of planning application fees in other cities in the Greater Toronto Area (“GTA”) included in the Watson Report (excerpt below), the Appellant pointed out that the City’s MV application fees do not align with the average fee charged in other large municipalities in the GTA.
17Although on cross examination he conceded that the City eventually approved the increases now reflected in the current Fees By-law, in support of his position regarding the unreasonableness of the fees, the Appellant drew attention to a City Staff Report dated October 2, 2024 (Recommendation Report – 2024 Fee Changes for Development Applications), which discusses Watson’s review and recommendations. He noted that, at that time, the City’s own staff recommended against increasing MV application fees and drew attention to the following excerpt:
The City has historically chosen to offer the Committee of Adjustment (CofA) service at a substantially subsidized rate to maintain accessibility for Brampton residents who need to seek modest permissions to facilitate changes to their properties. Watson identified that, in the case of Minor Variance applications, the City is recovering 15% of the costs to provide this service…In consideration of the City’s need to balance resident accessibility to this service, staff are recommending that there be no change at this time to the fees for this service. (Emphasis added)
18He also drew attention to an August 14, 2025 news article in the Brampton Guardian, titled “Unprecedented and Disproportionate Hike: Massive 1,600% Increase in Brampton’s Property Minor Variance Fees Draws Criticism”. The article notes that prior to the December 2024 increase in application fees, the fee for residential MV applications was set at $720.00. The article quotes two City Councillors who raised concerns that increased fees would lead to increased non-compliance and would be a significant burden on the average homeowner. With respect to cost recovery, one of the Councillors challenged staff to find efficiencies and do something else to recover processing costs rather than implementing the fee increase.
19Mr. Shergill submitted that the City applied a blanket $2,990.00 fee for each MV he requested without providing any study, breakdown or rationale on why such fees were needed in this case. In his view, the assessed fee of $8,970.00 for three separate variances represents an egregious over-reach, is not representative of the anticipated processing cost to the municipality and is an obvious mismatch with the scope of his small-scale backyard gazebo project.
20Based on the foregoing, he urged the Tribunal to allow the appeal and direct a partial refund in the amount of $5,980.00, leaving the remaining levy at $2,990.00 which, he submitted, is more reasonable and in line with the average MV fees charged by other large GTA municipalities.
City’s Arguments and Evidence
21Mr. Simcisko explained that the Act requires fees to be designed to recover the anticipated cost of processing each type of application, as distinct from actual processing costs relating to any one specific application. He provided a comprehensive overview of the fee review conducted by Watson, explaining that an Activity-Based Costing methodology was used to assign resource costs (both direct and indirect) to the activities undertaken to process specific application types, including MV applications.
22Although the Act does not define processing, Mr. Simcisko noted that processing activities typically include, but are not limited to: initial intake, various rounds of review, internal and external consultations and preparation of reports/recommendations. He testified that the following are the major components of the full costs of processing:
- Salary, wage and benefit costs for staff directly involved;
- Materials and supplies utilized in the provision of processing services;
- Indirect support, overhead functions and cost-drivers such as human resources, information technology and maintenance services;
- Capital costs in relation to assets such as vehicles and physical space.
23He went on to testify that the reasonableness of the City’s processing efforts was tested by considering each individual’s annual level of involvement across all application types, as well as their non-processing related responsibilities (for instance, planning policy development). Effort estimates were also reviewed and compared across application types to ensure the relative processing effort for each application type was reasonable.
24Mr. Simcisko opined that the foregoing methodology aligns with s. 69 of the Act, and he advised it has been consistently applied in similar fee reviews elsewhere in the Province. He further opined that fee review resulted in reasonable estimations of the anticipated processing efforts for each application type, noting that the estimated average cost of processing a MV application is $11,949.00.
25Prior to the City enacting the current Fees By-law, the application fee for a MV application was a flat $720.00. Drawing attention to the Watson Report, Table 3-3 (2023 Planning Application Cost Recovery Levels By Application Type), Mr. Simcisko noted that, based on the average processing cost of $11,949.00 and the 418 MV applications received in 2023, the City’s annual processing cost for this application type was approximately $5 million. He further testified that, with the $720.00 application fee charged, the City was recovering approximately 15% of processing costs.
26On cross examination, Mr. Simcisko was questioned with respect to the discrepancy between the fees charged by the City and those charged for the same services in other GTA municipalities. He explained that it is not a simple “apples to apples” comparison, noting that processing costs can differ from municipality to municipality for a variety of reasons, and the manner in which a municipality opts to recover costs of processing services is a matter of policy at the discretion of individual municipal Councils. He noted that one cannot ascertain a municipality’s level of cost recovery simply by looking at the fees they charge, as some may opt to impose fees below the level of full cost recovery, as distinct from this case, where the City opted for fees which do result in full-cost recovery.
27The Appellant took Mr. Simcisko to census data published on the City’s website, and asked questions with respect to affordability of the City’s MV application fees in light of such data. Mr. Simcisko explained that questions of affordability were not part of the scope of Watson’s review, which was concerned with studying application processing efforts and the costs associated therewith. He noted that the City’s decision to opt for full cost recovery was a matter of Council discretion.
28Mr. Simcisko explained that even if the City chose to charge $0.00 for a MV application, the average cost to process that application would remain at $11,949.00. He further explained that the Act requires cost-justification by application type and does not permit cross-subsidization of planning fee revenues across application types, meaning that if a municipality charges MV application fees below the full cost to process that type of application, it is not permitted to make up the revenue shortfall by increasing the fees for other categories, such as zoning by-law applications. With reference to By-law 209-2025, Mr. Simcisko noted that the City now charges a flat fee of $11,949.00 for most MV applications (above/below grade door/window related; driveway and/or parking related; additional residential unit; and “After the Fact” applications). He testified that this is reflective of the average cost of processing a MV application.
29Finally, the Appellant took Mr. Simcisko to the “All Other Variances” category of the Fees By-law, and questioned Watson’s recommendation to require a separate fee for each variance, rather than charging a flat fee per application, like some other municipalities in the GTA. Mr. Simcisko reiterated that the average cost to process any MV application is $11,949.00 and although the fees as set out in the Fees By-law were designed to cover the anticipated full costs of processing, the City has chosen to charge less and “take a bit of a hit on simpler applications”. He went on to explain that, notwithstanding the $2,990.00 fee charged for each variance in this category, the average cost to process any variance application is still $11,949.00. He also noted that the maximum fee payable is $11,949.00 which, he opined, ensures no MV application can exceed the City’s total processing costs.
30While there was some discussion about whether the Appellant should have been charged $11,949.00 (reflective of an “After the Fact Variance”), ultimately, Mr. Simcisko acknowledged that the Application was processed under the “All Other Variances” category and the fee charged and paid under protest was $8,970.00. He provided an overall opinion that the fees at issue in this appeal are aligned with both the Fees By-law, the requirements of s. 69(1), and are reflective of the City’s anticipated full processing cost of $11,949.00 for MV applications.
31The City submitted, with reference to previous Court decisions, including Eurig Estate (Re), 1998 CanLII 801 (SCC), [1998] 2 S.C.R. 565, as well as previous Tribunal decisions, including Metropia Minto (Sixteenth) Holdings Inc. v. Markham (City), 2025 CanLII 34629 (ON LT) (“Metropia”) and Slessor Square LPI Inc. v. Milton (Town), 2025 CanLII 124743 (ON LT) (“Slessor”) that:
- the fees levied need not precisely match the City’s actual costs of processing;
- there must be a reasonable connection between the fee charged and the City’s anticipated costs to process the type of application for which the fee is paid; and
- the appropriate measure of reasonableness is not the costs incurred by the Appellant or the fees charged relative to the cost of the development.
32The City urged the Tribunal to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the Appellant failed to present any evidence to establish that the fees at issue are unreasonable. Relying on the documentary evidence submitted and the testimony of Mr. Simcisko, the City submitted that the fees are, in fact, reasonably connected to the cost of processing a MV application, were levied pursuant to a validly enacted tariff by-law, and were properly designed to recover only the anticipated costs of processing the type of application at issue, in accordance with s. 69(1).
33Finally, it was submitted that the Application was erroneously categorized and charged fees under “All Other Variances”, whereas it should have been categorized as an “After the Fact Variance” and subject to a flat fee of $11,949.00. According to s. 8.1.5 of the Fees By-law, an “After the Fact Variance” is an application resulting from a registered compliant, construction inspection, building order or enforcement action where the construction or commencement of the use requiring a variance has already taken place without approval. Despite this administrative error which led to the levying of a fee of $8,970.00, the City advised that it was not seeking to recover the balance, requesting only that the appeal be dismissed.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
34The Act requires that an application fee be designed to meet only the anticipated costs of the City for processing the type of application to which that fee relates. As noted in Metropia, on an appeal under s. 69(3),
The test that the Tribunal applies is reasonableness. It is not correctness. A municipality does not have to have fees that precisely match costs. As noted in Eurig, there must be a connection between the fee and the cost of the services provided, but the connection does not need to be perfect. Fee structures may vary among municipalities. The key objective is that the fees are reasonable.
35The Tribunal was not presented with compelling evidence to find that the City’s MV fees are unreasonable or that they include a profit-generating component, as argued by the Appellant. The Tribunal was persuaded by the City’s evidence, which demonstrates the application fees reflected in the City’s current Fees By-law were designed to meet only the anticipated processing costs relative to each application type based on a comprehensive study of processing activities and the direct and indirect costs thereof.
36No evidence was presented to contradict Mr. Simcisko’s evidence that the City’s average cost to process a MV application is $11,949.00 and that, while some “simpler applications” in the “All Other Variances” category are subject to a reduced fee, the average processing costs thereof remain $11,949.00. Mr. Simcisko was clear that the “All Other Variances Category” specifies a maximum amount chargeable to ensure that no application exceeds the total processing cost of $11,949.00. He was also clear that although an “After the Fact Variance” fee should have been imposed in this case, that category of fee also only meets anticipated processing costs and does not include any additional amounts relative to investigation/enforcement actions, the costs of which were not part of the scope of Watson’s review.
37A municipality may not charge more than the anticipated costs of processing an application, but it may opt to charge less. The Tribunal accepts Mr. Simcisko’s opinion that the difference in the City’s fees relative to other municipalities could be the result of a number of factors, one of which could be a decision to collect less than what it costs to process an application and make up the revenue shortfall elsewhere. Without more evidence behind the lesser fees charged in other municipalities, the straight comparison of the City’s fees relative thereto was not considered compelling evidence of unreasonableness.
38As noted in Slessor, the appropriate measure of reasonableness is not the amount of the fee relative to the cost incurred by the Appellant. The focus on an appeal under s. 69(3) is the City’s costs of processing, not the Appellant’s costs or the amount of the application fee relative to the cost of the proposed development. With respect to arguments attacking the affordability of MV fees in general, as previously mentioned, this is not an appeal of the Fees By-law itself, which is in full force and effect. Although some City Councillors raised concerns regarding the proposed increase to MV fees and the affordability thereof, similar to the case of Metropia, this was not considered compelling evidence of the unreasonableness of those fees, given the Act’s emphasis on cost recovery.
39On the totality of the evidence and argument presented, the Tribunal is satisfied that the City has established a reasonable connection between the MV application fee levied and paid under protest and the anticipated cost to the City to process that type of application.
ORDER
40The Tribunal orders that the appeal is dismissed.
“S. Braun”
S. BRAUN
VICE-CHAIR
Ontario Land Tribunal
Website: www.olt.gov.on.ca Telephone: 416-212-6349 Toll Free: 1-866-448-2248
The Conservation Review Board, the Environmental Review Tribunal, the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal and the Mining and Lands Tribunal are amalgamated and continued as the Ontario Land Tribunal (“Tribunal”). Any reference to the preceding tribunals or the former Ontario Municipal Board is deemed to be a reference to the Tribunal.