Ontario Land Tribunal

Tribunal ontarien de l’aménagement du territoire

ISSUE DATE: January 13, 2026

CASE NO(S).: OLT-25-000538

PROCEEDING COMMENCED UNDER subsection 41(12) of the Planning Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.13, as amended

Appellant: TSL-Dairy LP

Subject: Site Plan

Description: To permit development of the subject property as a self-storage facility with industrial condominium

Reference Number: PC2024-0299 / D07-12-24-0122

Property Address: 1015 - 1045 Dairy Drive

Municipality/UT: Ottawa/Ottawa

OLT Case No.: OLT-25-000538

OLT Lead Case No.: OLT-25-000538

OLT Case Name: TSL-Dairy LP v. Ottawa (City)

Heard: October 1-3, 2025, by Video Hearing

APPEARANCES:

Parties	Counsel
TSL-Dairy LP ("Applicant" / "Appellant")	Matthew Helfand
City of Ottawa ("City")	Timothy Marc

DECISION DELIVERED BY K.R. ANDREWS AND ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL

INTRODUCTION

1This appeal concerns a Site Plan approval for the lands municipally known as 1015 - 1045 Dairy Drive in the City of Ottawa (the "Subject Property").

2The proposed development is for a self-storage facility with light industrial uses, comprised of four buildings. Two larger buildings are proposed for self-storage warehousing and two smaller central buildings are intended to accommodate a mix of light industrial uses.

3No Official Plan Amendment ("OPA") or Zoning By-law Amendment ("ZBA") is required. At the time of the Hearing, two variances were required to achieve full compliance with the Zoning By-law; however, since then, the variances have been approved and now only the approval of the Site Plan is outstanding to proceed with the development.

4In the present appeal, only one single issue stands between the City and the Applicant regarding approval of the Site Plan. That issue involves the City's insistence that a six-metre-wide corridor along the eastern edge of the Subject Property be conveyed to the City for the purpose of a future bicycle / pedestrian pathway (the "pathway lands") at no cost to the City as a condition of Site Plan approval. The Applicant opposes this requirement, submitting that the City does not have the jurisdiction to demand it. The Applicant further emphasizes that the planned composition of the development will be negatively impacted by the loss of this area of land.

5For the reasons that follow, the Tribunal accepts the Applicant's position and finds that the City does not have the statutory authority to demand conveyance of the pathway lands for free as a condition of Site Plan approval.

Analysis

6The Parties jointly confirm that there is no dispute regarding the merits of approving the proposed Site Plan, save and except for the issue regarding conveyance of the pathway lands. The Tribunal heard evidence in support of approving all other aspects of the Site Plan (while setting aside the conveyance issue) and similarly finds that the proposed Site Plan satisfies all of the requisite statutory tests. Having come to this conclusion, the remainder of this decision rests on whether the City is authorized to demand conveyance of the pathway lands through the Site Plan approval process. This, the Tribunal finds, is an entirely legal question.

The Official Plan Adjustments Act, 2023 ("OPAA")

7The operation of the OPAA is central to the City's assertion that it has the authority to demand conveyance of the pathway lands. It is exclusively on this basis that the City makes its claim. Before addressing this submission, the Tribunal finds that the history and context of the OPAA is important to consider. None of this contextual background is contentious between the Parties.

8The OPAA was passed as part of Bill 150 in December 2023. At the time, the Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing had recently resigned amid concerns that certain Ministerial modifications affecting select municipal Official Plans ("OPs") were not made in a manner that maintained the public trust. Bill 150 was tabled by the new Minister, and the OPAA effectively functions to reverse the impugned Ministerial modifications and retroactively approve the former versions of the affected municipal OPs.

9The following are the relevant operational sections of the OPAA that concern the present matter:

• S. 1(1) identifies the decisions of the prior Minister that are "deemed to have never been made".
• S. 1(2) re-approves the affected municipal OPs with the majority of the controversial modifications made by the prior Minister deleted.
• S. 1(3) prescribes the dates that these re-approvals are deemed to have been given, which dates are retroactive and correspond to the original dates of council approval (i.e. before the prior Minister's modifications were made).
• S. 3 addresses certain effects of the retroactively approved / amended OPs, stating at s. 3(2):

Conformity with official plan as approved

3(2) Any decision of a municipality or the Ontario Land Tribunal made under the Planning Act, as well as any by-law passed or public work undertaken by a municipality, on or after the date on which the approval of an official plan or an amendment to an official plan is deemed to have been given under subsection 1(3) must conform with the official plan, as approved or amended, while that approval is in effect.

10To be clear, the City's OP is one of those identified in the OPAA which was deemed to have been approved pursuant to s. 1(3).

The City's Position

11The City asserts that the OPAA provides the necessary authority to demand conveyance of the pathway lands.

12The City contends that, as a consequence of s. 3(2) of the OPAA, any Site Plan now proposed within the City is subject to a conformity test with the City's OP. In line with this contention, the City provided evidence to show that Schedule C3 of the City's OP indicates the presence of a Major Pathway planned for north of Old Montreal Road, east of Dairy Drive, and west of Cardinal Creek, which appears to cross the eastern edge of the Subject Property. The Tribunal accepts that it does. Consequently, the City submits that the present Site Plan application would not be consistent with the City's OP if it does not account for and provide a six-meter-wide corridor for the pathway.

13In addition to Schedule C3 of the OP, the City highlighted the following policies of the OP which it contends supports the forced conveyance of lands without compensation as a condition of Site Plan approval:

• Policy 4.1.2 3c) references the Transportation Master Plan and provides for the acquisition of pedestrian and cycling networks at the time of development approval where such networks are identified in the OP.
• Policy 4.1.2.6 provides that new development "will provide" for direct connections to planned pathway and cycling facilities.
• Policy 4.1.2.11 provides that during the review of development the City shall require the provisions of pedestrian and cycling facilities.
• Policy 4.1.2.11e) states that the City shall require the provision of such facilities "wherever identified by Schedules C3...the TMP and associated plans".
• Policy 4.1.7.1 provides:

1. Under the provisions of the Planning Act, the City may require the dedication of lands for pedestrian or bicycle pathways and road and public transit rights of ways as a condition of development approval, and at no cost to the City

14Given these policies, the City submits that there is "general and mandatory language in the Official Plan requiring the provision at the time of development approval at no cost of the Major Pathways shown on Schedule C3 to the Official Plan".

15In further support of its submissions, the City cites Wilson St. Ancaster Inc. v Hamilton (City), 2024 CanLII 30616 (ON LT), in which the Tribunal made the following determinations:

[4] Having reviewed and evaluated the evidentiary and detailed legal submissions of the Parties, the Tribunal finds that s. 3(2) of the OPAA imports a requirement for the Tribunal to consider conformity of the SPA to the Legislatively Approved UHOP under an appeal pursuant to s. 41(12) of the Act. While the Tribunal finds that the proposed Redline Conditions and Redline Development Concept would implement the Settlement ZBA in accordance with those requirements under s. 41(4) and s. 41(7) of the Act, and the disputed VIA Condition was found to be reasonably requested by the City, the SPA cannot overcome a lack of conformity with the retroactively in force Legislatively Approved UHOP and the directive under s. 3(2) of the OPAA that any decision of the Tribunal must conform to the official plan in effect.

and

[48] Having considered the submissions of the Parties, the Tribunal finds that s. 3(2) of the OPAA creates a new official plan conformity test in Affected Municipalities on an appeal of a site plan control application under s. 41(12) of the Act. The language of s. 3(2) of the OPAA is conclusive that any decision of a municipality or the Tribunal made under the Act must conform with the official plan as approved or amended. The provincial government did not carve out that only certain decisions had to conform, it specified that all decisions in Affected Municipalities were to conform, in this case, to the Legislatively Approved UHOP.

16The City urges the present Member to come to a similar conclusion, insofar as the Tribunal found that "s. 3(2) of the OPAA creates a new official plan conformity test in Affected Municipalities on an appeal of a site plan control application under s. 41(12) of the Act". On this basis, the City submits that the subject Site Plan conditions do not conform with the City's OP unless it includes a provision to convey the pathway lands to the City for free.

The Applicant's Position

17The Appellant disagrees with the City and asserts that there is no statutory authority available for the City to force the conveyance of its land as a condition of Site Plan approval. In establishing its position, the Appellant relies on the well-recognized legal principle that the "taking of property by the state must be authorized by law, and triggers a presumptive right to compensation which can be displaced only by clear statutory language showing a contrary intention" (see: Annapolis Group Inc. v. Halifax Regional Municipality, 2022 SCC 36, [2022] 2 SCR 772, at para. 21).

18The Appellant submits that only the Planning Act can possibly provide the clear statutory language for a forced conveyance of land as a condition of Site Plan approval, because the Planning Act is the legislative instrument that covers the scope of what may constitute a condition of Site Plan approval.

19In support of its position, the Appellant goes on to explain that the present appeal was brought pursuant to s. 41(12) of the Planning Act, through which the Tribunal is being asked to make two separate but related Site Plan approvals: (i) approval of plans and drawings under s. 41(4); and (ii) approval of conditions under s. 41(7). It is through s. 41(7) that the City is seeking to impose a condition requiring the Applicant to convey the pathway lands. Consequently, the Appellant submits, the authority to require this particular conveyance must be found there if it exists.

20The Appellant acknowledges that s. 41(7) provides authority to the City to demand certain types of conveyances, such as for highway widenings, pedestrian access to and from the land, easements for servicing, and public transit right of ways. However, the Appellant contends that this circumstance only bolsters their argument, because the list of purposes for the conveyances of land is a closed list and it does not include pathways.

21Turning to the operation of the OPAA, the Appellant highlights that this statute provides no language speaking to land conveyances whatsoever. To be clear, the City does not claim that it does; as already stated, the City contends that the OPAA operates to require the Tribunal's decision be consistent with the City's OP, and further that various OP policies speak of a planned pathway over the Appellant's land, and the OP further mentions that land for pathways should be conveyed at the time of development approval. In response to this last point, the Appellant submits that policy is not a statute, so it cannot provide the requisite clear statutory language as contemplated by the Supreme Court. Furthermore, even if policy could be deemed a statute, the Appellant submits that the policy language cited by the City is not sufficiently clear to allow for the taking of land without compensation.

22In addition to these submissions, the Appellant contests the City's claim that the OPAA provides for a general conformity test for Site Plan approval. Rather, the Appellant contends that s. 3(2) of the OPAA creates an OP conformity test in only highly specific situations, which involve only circumstances whereby the implementation of the former Minister's modifications (which were later reversed by operation of the OPAA) had some effect on approving the proposed development.

23To demonstrate how it submits that the OPAA is meant to operate in relation to Site Plan approval, the Appellant highlighted the contextual circumstances that were dealt with in Wilson St. Ancaster Inc. v Hamilton (City), the same case cited by the City in its submissions. The Tribunal notes that, like the City of Ottawa, the City of Hamilton's OP was affected by the impugned Ministerial modifications, later reversed by the OPAA.

24In that case, an applicant originally sought a site-specific OPA and ZBA to permit a mid-rise development. The application was then appealed to the Tribunal. Subsequently, but before the appeal was considered, the former Minister modified Hamilton's OP, introducing policy that made the Applicant's OPA unnecessary. Subsequent to this, the applicant withdrew the OPA appeal, and the City and the Applicant settled the ZBA matter on the basis that the proposed ZBA then conformed with the newly modified OP in accordance with s. 24(1) of the Planning Act.

25Following this, Bill 150 was passed, reverting Hamilton's OP back to what it was previously by operation of the OPAA. This caused the Tribunal-approved ZBA to no longer conform with the current (previously former) policies of Hamilton's OP. Regardless, the then non-conforming ZBA was in effect, and the applicant proceeded to seek Site Plan approval to proceed with the development. It was at this point that Wilson St. Ancaster Inc. v Hamilton (City) was considered by the Tribunal, and the Tribunal found that the Site Plan application could not be approved when it did not conform with the re-instated policies of the Hamilton OP - thus halting a development that could not have otherwise proceeded to the Site Plan approval stage, but for the impugned Ministerial modifications that were no longer in effect.

26The Appellant argues that this is exactly how the OPAA was designed to operate - to close a loophole that would otherwise allow development to proceed that was initially enabled by the impugned Ministerial modifications. By contrast, in the present case, the Appellant submits that the policies proffered by the City to support conveyance of the pathway lands were not touched by the modifications made by the Minister, so the OPAA serves no remedial or otherwise practical purpose.

27Given the clear intent and purpose of the OPAA, together with the surrounding historical context of Bill 150 and the well accepted operation of the Planning Act concerning Site Plan approvals (insofar as there is no requirement to conform with the OP), the Appellant argues that the OPAA does not create a new general conformity test. Given that the City grounds its claims on the basis that it does, the Appellant argues that the City's position is untenable.

28In summary, the Appellant argues that there is no statutory language authorizing the City to demand conveyance of the pathway lands; not through the Planning Act, nor the OPAA. Furthermore, the Appellant submits that the City's contention that the OPAA provides for a general OP conformity test is flawed, for not taking into account the purpose, object, and intention of the legislation. On either basis, the Appellant submits that the City's bid to acquire the pathway lands for free, through the conditions of Site Plan approval, must fail.

Tribunal's Findings

29The Tribunal finds that the City does not have the jurisdiction to demand conveyance of the Appellant's land for free for the purpose of the proposed pathway. The Tribunal finds that this amounts to expropriation without compensation, which cannot be done without clear statutory language to permit it. This finding rests with the Tribunal's determination that the legislative authorization claimed by the City does not meet the threshold set by the Supreme Court in Annapolis Group Inc. v. Halifax Regional Municipality.

30Examining both the Planning Act and the OPAA, the Tribunal finds that neither provide the clear language necessary to displace the presumptive right to compensation when the City takes land for the proposed purpose (the pathway). The OPAA does not address powers to take land at all, while the Planning Act provides a limited list at s. 41(7), where it may demand a conveyance of land as a condition of Site Plan approval, but not for the purpose of a pathway.

31To address the City's contention that the necessary authorization to demand conveyance of the pathway lands comes through the OPAA in conjunction with certain City's OP polices, the Tribunal finds that policies of an OP cannot constitute the "clear statutory language" contemplated by the Supreme Court. This is because OP policy is not law. Furthermore, there is no law which vests powers to a municipality allowing it to take lands on the basis of such OP policies, nor due to a lack of conformity with the OP generally.

32Lastly, while the question need not to be answered given the above findings, the Tribunal agrees with the Appellant's submissions regarding the correct interpretation of s. 3(2) of the OPAA, insofar as it does not establish a general OP conformity test for Site Plan approvals. While the words of s. 3(2) of the OPAA does not expressly carve out exceptions to the stated requirement that all decisions of the Tribunal must conform with the City's OP, the analysis does not end there. Statutory interpretation requires such words to be read not only in their grammatical and ordinary sense, but also in their entire context and harmoniously with the scheme and object of the OPAA, and the corresponding intention of the legislature (see: Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC), [1998] 1 SCR 27, at para. 21).

33The Tribunal finds that the purpose of Bill 150 is clear, given the historical context of its incarnation, insofar as it was passed to reverse the impugned Ministerial modifications made by the former Minister. This section worked as it was supposed to in Wilson St. Ancaster Inc. v Hamilton (City), addressing the unique circumstances that arose when a ZBA was approved during the brief time when the impugned Ministerial modifications to Hamilton's OP were in effect. Member Mason recognized this at paragraph 60 of her decision, where she states:

Presumably the provincial government recognized that by deeming the Ministerially Approved [modifications] to have never existed, it would leave orphaned planning instruments, such as the Settlement ZBA, that no longer manifested the underlying policies of the official plan. It is reasonable to assume that the provincial government inserted the requirement for official plan conformity in s. 3(2) of the OPAA in order to flush out such planning instruments now without lineage at the next milestone in the planning process.

34Unlike that situation, the Tribunal does not find that the OPAA was intended to impact developments that could have proceeded regardless of the Ministerial Modifications.

35The Tribunal further does not accept that the legislature could have intended to create a two-tier legislative scheme, as the City suggests, where Site Plan approvals in some municipalities must adhere to an OP conformity test, while such approvals in other locales do not. This would create an imbalance of municipal powers in the province. The Tribunal additionally finds that it is inconceivable that that legislature would consciously prescribe a new general legislative test for certain municipalities based solely on the happenstance circumstances of those municipalities having been previously subject to the impugned Ministerial OP modifications. The Tribunal finds that all of this would be simply too chaotic and random for it to be the intention of the legislature.

36Based on these findings, either together or independently, the Tribunal rejects the City's claim that it has the authority through the OPAA to demand the conveyance of the Appellant's lands as a condition of Site Plan approval. Given this conclusion and the Tribunal's earlier uncontested finding that approval of the Site Plan and its conditions otherwise satisfy all of the requisite statutory tests, the appeal is allowed.

37None of these findings, of course, necessarily prevent the City from acquiring the pathway lands through expropriation or a regularly negotiated purchase and sale agreement. Despite the evidence of City's witness, who stated that the City sought the acquisition of the pathway lands for free through the Site Plan approval process because it does not have the budget to purchase it, the City remains empowered to do so.

ORDER

38THE TRIBUNAL ORDERS that, in accordance with the provisions of sections 41(12.1) of the Planning Act:

1. The plans and drawings attached to this Order as Attachment 1 are hereby approved; and
2. The conditions attached to this Order as Attachment 2 are hereby approved.

39The Member may be spoken to should any issues arise with respect to the implementation of this Order, including the fulfillment of the conditions

"K.R. Andrews"

K.R. ANDREWS MEMBER

Ontario Land Tribunal Website: olt.gov.on.ca Telephone: 416-212-6349 Toll Free: 1-866-448-2248

The Conservation Review Board, the Environmental Review Tribunal, the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal and the Mining and Lands Tribunal are amalgamated and continued as the Ontario Land Tribunal ("Tribunal"). Any reference to the preceding tribunals or the former Ontario Municipal Board is deemed to be a reference to the Tribunal.

Attachment 1

Attachment 2