2088217 Ontario Inc. v Halton Hill (Town), 2025 CanLII 88181

Ontario Land Tribunal

Tribunal ontarien de l’aménagement du territoire

ISSUE DATE: August 25, 2025

CASE NO(S).: OLT-24-001109

PROCEEDING COMMENCED UNDER subsection 29(11) of the Ontario Heritage Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. O.18.

Appellant: 2088217 Ontario Inc.

Subject: 2088217 Ontario Inc. v Halton Hill (Town)

Description: To designate property under Part IV of the Ontario Heritage Act

Reference Number: By-law No. 2024-0062

Property Address: 49 Eastern Avenue

Municipality/UT: Halton Hills/Halton

OLT Case No: OLT-24-001109

OLT Lead Case No: OLT-24-001109

OLT Case Name: 2088217 Ontario Inc. v Halton Hill (Town)

PROCEEDING COMMENCED UNDER subsection 29(11) of the Ontario Heritage Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. O.18.

Appellant: 2088217 Ontario Inc.

Subject: By-law to designate a heritage property

Description: To designate property under Part IV of the Ontario Heritage Act

Reference Number: By-law No. 2024-0062

Property Address: 49 Eastern Avenue

Municipality/UT: Halton Hills/Halton

OLT Case No: OLT-24-001109

OLT Lead Case No: OLT-24-001109

OLT Case Name: 2088217 Ontario Inc. v Halton Hill (Town)

PROCEEDING COMMENCED UNDER subsection 9(1) of the Ontario Land Tribunal Act, 2021, S.O. 2021, c. 4, Sched. 6

Request by: 2088217 Ontario Inc.

Request for: Request for Orders regarding Designation By-law

Heard: July 10, 2025 by video hearing

APPEARANCES:

Parties	Counsel
2088217 Ontario Inc.	Mark Flowers, Grace O’Brien
Town of Halton Hills	David Germain, Jaikaran Goraya

DECISION DELIVERED BY A. SNOWDON AND ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL

Link to Order

INTRODUCTION

1The Tribunal heard a motion for Tribunal File No. OLT-24-001109 relating to an appeal brought pursuant to s. 29(11) of the Ontario Heritage Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. O.18, as amended (“Act”), from the Town of Halton Hills’ (“Town”) decision to pass Designation By-law No. 2024-0062 (“DBL”). 2088217 Ontario Inc. (“Appellant”) appealed the decision regarding the property located at 49 Eastern Avenue (“Subject Property”) in the Town.

2The Subject Property is approximately 1.1 acres in size and located on the northeastern side of Eastern Avenue. The lot has a 75-metre frontage on Eastern Avenue. The Subject Property is bordered by a parking lot to the northwest, a rail line to the northeast, open space to the southeast, and residential/commercial properties to the southwest.

3The Subject Property was listed on the Town’s Heritage Register during Phase 3 of the Town’s Heritage Register process and was identified as an example of a Late Victorian industrial building. The Town issued a Notice of Intention to Designate (“NOID”) to the Appellant on June 6, 2024. The Appellant objected to the NOID on July 5, 2024 stating that the issued NOID did not contain a description of the heritage attributes of the Subject Property as required by s.29(4)(b) of the Act. The Town re-issued the NOID with additional information on July 11, 2024 and the Appellant objected again on August 12, 2024.

4On August 26, 2024, the Town council passed By-law No. 2024-0062 to designate the Subject Property. The Town issued a “Notice of Passage of Designating By-Law” on September 5, 2024.

5On October 4, 2024, the Appellant appealed the DBL to the Tribunal on the grounds that the Town did not comply with the Act in designating the Subject Property.

STATUS REQUESTS

6The Tribunal received no requests for Party or Participant status prior to or during the hearing of the motion.

MOTION

7The Appellant brought a Motion for directions seeking:

1. An Order of the Tribunal determining that the DBL is invalid as a result of the designation not being made in accordance with the process and requirements set out in section 29 of the Act.
2. An Order of the Tribunal repealing the DBL.
3. Such other and further relief as the Appellant may request and the Tribunal will allow.

8The Town has responded requesting:

1. An Order of the Tribunal dismissing the Appellant’s motion.
2. Alternatively, an Order of the Tribunal determining that the DBL was void ab initio and, therefore, a nullity.
3. Such further and other relief as the Town may request and the Tribunal may permit.

MATERIALS

9The materials before the Tribunal on the Motion are:

1. Motion Record of 2088218 Ontario Inc. – May 2, 2025 (183 pages)
2. Responding Motion Record of the Town of Halton Hills – May 16, 2025 (146 pages)
3. Reply to the Notice of Response to Motion of 2088217 Ontario Inc. – May 23, 2025 (11 pages)

10Additional materials were supplied as Factums and Books of Authority.

JURISDICTION OF THE TRIBUNAL

11When considering this Motion, the Tribunal must give specific attention to the jurisdiction and authority of the Tribunal. The Tribunal’s power to make a decision regarding the requested relief on this Motion requires interpretation of the relevant statutes to determine if the Tribunal is within its authority. To do this, the Parties have provided arguments on the authority and jurisdiction of the Tribunal with regards to the requested relief and the relevant legislation.

[Section 29](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/rso-1990-c-o18/latest/rso-1990-c-o18.html#sec29_smooth) of the [Act](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/rso-1990-c-o18/latest/rso-1990-c-o18.html)

12Designation of a property to be of cultural heritage value or interest is legislated under s. 29 of the Act.

29 (1) The council of a municipality may, by by-law, designate a property within the municipality to be of cultural heritage value or interest if,

(a) where criteria for determining whether property is of cultural heritage value or interest have been prescribed, the property meets the prescribed criteria; an

(b) the designation is made in accordance with the process set out in this section. 2005, c. 6, s. 17 (1); 2019, c. 9, Sched. 11, s. 7 (1); 2022, c. 21, Sched. 6, s. 4 (1).

13The appeal of a designation by-law is outlined in ss. 29(11) and 29(13) of the Act:

(11) Any person who objects to the by-law may appeal to the Tribunal by giving the Tribunal and the clerk of the municipality, within 30 days after the date of publication under paragraph 4 of subsection (8), a notice of appeal setting out the objection to the by-law and the reasons in support of the objection, accompanied by the fee charged by the Tribunal. 2019, c. 9, Sched. 11, s. 7 (6); 2021, c. 4, Sched. 6, s. 74 (2).

(13) If a notice of appeal is given within the time period specified in subsection (11), the Tribunal shall hold a hearing and, before holding the hearing, shall give notice of the hearing to such persons or bodies and in such manner as the Tribunal may determine. 2019, c. 9, Sched. 11, s. 7 (6).

14The Powers of the Tribunal, given under the Act, are set out in s. 29(15):

(15) After holding the hearing, the Tribunal shall,

(a) dismiss the appeal; or

(b) allow the appeal in whole or in part and,

(i) repeal the by-law,

(ii) amend the by-law in such manner as the Tribunal may determine,

(iii) direct the council of the municipality to repeal the by-law, or

(iv) direct the council of the municipality to amend the by-law in

15To determine the Tribunal’s authority to make a decision, it is necessary to interpret the powers and jurisdiction afforded by the statute. Section 29(15) of the Act details what the powers of the Tribunal are “after holding the hearing”. It is important to define what a ‘hearing’ is in the context of this appeal and clarify the permitted actions of the Tribunal under s. 29(15) of the Act.

16The Appellant stated ‘hearing’ is a broad term and that a motion is a type of hearing. They highlighted that s. 29(15) of the Act does not specify that the ‘hearing’ is a ‘hearing of the merits’. They introduced case law to show this.

17The Appellant introduced 2515496 Ontario Inc. v Toronto (City), 2020 CanLII 50011 (ON LPAT) (“251ON”) wherein it states in paragraph 1 that the matter in “this hearing session was a motion”. The decision also states in paragraph 56 that “the Tribunal set a time and place for the hearing of the appeal in the form of the Case Management Conference”. The Appellant stated that this shows that motions and Case Management Conferences have been referred to as hearings.

18The Town stated that s. 29(15) of the Act uses the phrase “the hearing” and as such implies that there is only one ‘hearing’, the ‘hearing of the merits’.

19The Appellant refuted this by pointing out that phased hearings exist and it is common to deal with threshold issues such as motions both in the lead up to a merit hearing and during merit hearings.

20To interpret the legislation and define ‘hearing’, the Tribunal applies the principles of modern statutory interpretation as laid out in Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC), [1998] 1 SCR 27. Paragraph 21 states (emphasis added):

21 Although much has been written about the interpretation of legislation (see, e.g., Ruth Sullivan, Statutory Interpretation (1997); Ruth Sullivan, Driedger on the Construction of Statutes (3rd ed. 1994) (hereinafter “Construction of Statutes”); Pierre-André Côté, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada (2nd ed. 1991), Elmer Driedger in Construction of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983) best encapsulates the approach upon which I prefer to rely. He recognizes that statutory interpretation

cannot be founded on the wording of the legislation alone. At p. 87 he states:

Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.

Recent cases which have cited the above passage with approval include: Canada (Procureure générale) c. Hydro-Québec, (sub nom. R. v. Hydro-Québec) 1997 CanLII 318 (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213 (S.C.C.); Royal Bank v. Sparrow Electric Corp., 1997 CanLII 377 (SCC), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 411 (S.C.C.); Verdun v. Toronto Dominion Bank, 1996 CanLII 186 (SCC), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 550 (S.C.C.); Friesen v. R., 1995 CanLII 62 (SCC), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.).

21Therefore, applying these principles requires an interpretation of the ordinary meaning of the text, the entire context of the Act, and purpose and intention of the statute.

22The ordinary meaning of the text is the understanding that comes to mind when the words are read in their immediate context. It is the natural meaning when the provision is read through. While ‘hearing’ may be a term that is used when referring to multiple event types, ‘hearing’ is generally understood to mean a ‘hearing of the merits’. It is implied in the Tribunal’s Rules for Practice and Procedure that the terms ‘hearing’ and ‘motion’ are not the same or interchangeable.

23Rule 1.2 in the Tribunal’s Rules for Practice and Procedure define the following (emphasis added):

"hearing event" means a procedure held by the Tribunal at any stage of a proceeding and includes a motion, case management conference and hearing, whether these are held in the form of an in person hearing, electronic hearing or written hearing, and does not include a cross-examination on an affidavit not held before the Tribunal;

24Given that the Tribunal’s definition lists ‘hearing’ and ‘motion’ as separate types of hearing events, it can be concluded that these are distinct events. Additionally, the definition does not list ‘hearing of the merits’ as an example. The Tribunal finds that a ‘motion’ is not a ‘hearing’ for the purposes of this motion.

25When the context of the Act is interpreted, it is clear that the statute did not intend for ‘hearing’ to also include ‘motion’. This is demonstrated in s. 29(16) which states (emphasis added):

(16) Despite the Statutory Powers Procedure Act and subsections (13) and (15), the Tribunal may, on its own motion or on the motion of any party, dismiss all or part of the appeal without holding a hearing on the appeal if,

(a) the Tribunal is of the opinion that,

(i) the reasons set out in the notice of appeal do not disclose any apparent ground upon which the Tribunal could allow all or part of the appeal, or

(ii) the appeal is not made in good faith, is frivolous or vexatious, or is made only for the purpose of delay;

(b) the appellant has not provided written reasons in support of the objection to the by-law;

(c) the appellant has not paid the fee charged by the Tribunal; or

(d) the appellant has not responded to a request by the Tribunal for further information within the time specified by the Tribunal. 2019, c. 9, Sched. 11, s. 7 (6); 2021, c. 4, Sched. 6, s. 74 (2).

26The phrasing here differentiates ‘motions’ and ‘hearings’ leading to the understanding that motions are not considered to be hearings in the context of s. 29(15).

27When looking at s. 29(16) of the Act, a ‘motion’ is a separate event from a ‘hearing’. The context of the Act beyond s. 29(15) distinguishes ‘motions’ and ‘hearings’ as independent events. The Tribunal finds that a ‘motion’ and a ‘hearing’ in the context of s. 29 of the Act are not the same.

28The interpretation of the purpose and intent of the legislation in s. 29(15) can be taken from the permitted actions listed. Section 29(15) gives the Tribunal the power to “dismiss the appeal” or “allow the appeal in whole or in part”. This implies that the appeal has been heard. However, to hear the appeal would require a hearing on the merits of the appeal. The appeal is not before the Tribunal, a motion is and therefore the Tribunal cannot “allow the appeal in whole or in part”. It is illogical that the legislation was intended to allow an appeal without hearing it.

29The Tribunal finds that the Motion before the Tribunal does not meet the requirements of a hearing of the appeal and therefore the Tribunal does not have the authority to grant the relief as empowered by the statute.

Sections 8 and 9 of the Ontario Land Tribunal Act

30The Appellant proposed that regardless of s. 29(15), the Tribunal has the authority and jurisdiction under ss. 8 and 9 of the Ontario Land Tribunal Act (“OLTA”) to make a decision on this Motion.

31The Appellant argued that this is supported by Toronto (City) v. Goldlist Properties Inc., 2003 CanLII 50084 (ON CA) which stated:

The Court says…that it is implicit that one matter within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to decide in a proceeding, for the purpose of carrying out its mandate, is the scope of its jurisdiction in that proceeding.

32The Tribunal agrees that it has both the authority to determine the scope of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and the duty to do so.

33Section 8 of the OLTA details the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in matters as follows:

8 (1) The Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction in respect of all matters in which jurisdiction is conferred on it by this or any other Act.

Same (2) The Tribunal has authority to hear and determine all questions of law and fact with respect to all matters within its jurisdiction, unless limited by this or any other Act.

34Section 8(2) specifically states that the Tribunal’s authority ends where it is “limited by this or any other Act”. In this matter, the Act empowers the Tribunal with specific authority in s. 29(15) which limits the Tribunal’s authority under s. 8 of the OLTA.

35Section 9 of the OLTA describes the authority of the Tribunal:

9 (1) The Tribunal has authority to make orders or give directions as may be necessary or incidental to the exercise of the powers conferred on the Tribunal under this or any other Act.

Conditions

(2) The Tribunal may include in an order conditions that it considers fair in the circumstances, including a condition that the order comes into force at a future fixed time or on the performance of terms imposed by the Tribunal.

Interim orders

(3) The Tribunal may make an interim order without notice if it is of the opinion that it is necessary to do so, but no such order shall be made for any longer time than the Tribunal may consider necessary to enable the disposition of the proceeding.

Relief

(4) Unless another Act specifies otherwise, the Tribunal may, as it considers to be appropriate,

(a) make an order granting all or part of the relief applied for; or

(b) make an order granting relief that is additional to or different from the relief applied for.

36Section 9 of the OLTA empowers the Tribunal with necessary or incidental authority which allows the Tribunal to perform tasks related to the explicit authority conferred upon the Tribunal by statutes.

37The requested relief in the Motion asks that the Tribunal order that the DBL is invalid for not adhering to the process and requirements laid out in s. 29 of the Act and subsequently to repeal the DBL.

38These requests are neither necessary nor incidental as the express powers given to the Tribunal under the Act state that an appeal can be allowed wholly or in part after holding a hearing. Section 29 of the Act does not imply that the Tribunal is authorized to repeal a by-law without first hearing the appeal. The Tribunal can make an appropriate decision on the appeal once the Tribunal has heard the merits of the appeal and not before. To override the powers given in the statute would be deemed ultra vires.

39Furthermore, the Act confers specific authority to the Tribunal and this cannot be superseded by s. 9(4) of the OLTA. Relief

40The Appellant introduced case law examples to show that motions with similar relief have been before the Tribunal and the Courts.

41Both, Wasaga Beach (Town) Zoning By-Law 99-65 Re [2000] 40 O.M.B.R. 338 and SmartCentres Inc. Re [2010] 65 O.M.B.R. 507 were matters under the Planning Act and are unrelated to this matter before the Tribunal.

42In 251ON, the matter before the Tribunal, under s. 34 of the Act, was a motion seeking to have the Appellants demolition permit deemed consented as the City did not notify the Appellant of its decision within the statutory time limit. Section 34 of the Act explicitly lays out the resolution given the City’s failure to meet the timeline requirements. Following the determination that the conditions in the statute were not met, the Tribunal determined that there was nothing to adjudicate and closed the file.

43This appeal is regarding the issuing of the DBL, however the grounds for the appeal and this Motion are in relation to the issuance of the NOID. The Appellant stated that the NOID was not issued in accordance with the procedure detailed in s. 29(4) of the Act. There is no provision in s. 29(4) of the Act to appeal or object to the NOID to the Tribunal. The path for objection of a NOID is through the issuing body.

CONCLUSION

44The Tribunal is a creature of statute. Its jurisdiction, powers, and limitations are defined and limited by the statutes that empower it. The Tribunal does not have powers beyond those explicitly granted and necessarily implied by the statute.

45In this matter, the Tribunal finds that it does not have the authority under s. 29(15) of the Act or ss. 8 or 9 of the OLTA to grant the relief requested in the Motion before it. The Tribunal finds that ‘motions’ and ‘hearings’ are distinct events and that the legislation does not intend them to be considered interchangeable. Furthermore, there are no provisions under s. 29 of the Act to allow the Tribunal to make a decision to deny, wholly allow, or allow-in-part the appeal without hearing the merits of the appeal, nor does ss. 8 or 9 of the OLTA give the Tribunal the authority to override the powers granted by the Act.

ORDER

46THE TRIBUNAL ORDERS THAT the Motion to determine that By-law No. 2024-0062 is invalid and repealed is dismissed.

47The Member is not seized.

“A. Snowdon”

A. SNOWDON

MEMBER

Ontario Land Tribunal

Website: www.olt.gov.on.ca Telephone: 416-212-6349 Toll Free: 1-866-448-2248

The Conservation Review Board, the Environmental Review Tribunal, the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal and the Mining and Lands Tribunal are amalgamated and continued as the Ontario Land Tribunal (“Tribunal”). Any reference to the preceding tribunals or the former Ontario Municipal Board is deemed to be a reference to the Tribunal.