Ontario Land Tribunal

Tribunal ontarien de l’aménagement du territoire

ISSUE DATE: July 31, 2025

CASE NO(S).: OLT-25-000203

PROCEEDING COMMENCED UNDER subsection 22(1) of the Development Charges Act, 1997, S.O. 1997, c. 27

Appellant: Rinaldi Holdings Inc.

Subject: Determination of the development charges

Reference Number: DC BL 2022-71

Property Address: 399 Vansickle Road

Municipality/UT: St. Catharines/Niagara Region

OLT Case No.: OLT-25-000203

OLT Case Name: Rinaldi Holdings Inc. v. Niagara (Region)

Heard: May 26, 2025 by video hearing, written submissions completed June 9, 2025

APPEARANCES:

Parties

Rinaldi Holdings Inc. ("Applicant")

Regional Municipality of Niagara ("Region")

Counsel

Callum Shedden Darien Ekblad (articling student)

Paul DeMelo

DECISION DELIVERED BY W. DANIEL BEST AND ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL

INTRODUCTION

1This Decision and Order arises from an appeal filed by the Applicant pursuant to s. 22(1) of the Development Charges Act, 1997, S.O. 1997, c. 27 ("DCA"), against the decision of the Region to impose a development charge ("DC") in the amount of $379,925.84 for the development at the property located at 399 Vansickle Road ("Subject Property").

2The appeal was heard on May 26, 2025 by video hearing and written final arguments were filed in the following manner:

• Closing submissions by the Applicant on June 2, 2025;
• Closing submissions and Response by the Region on June 4, 2025; and
• Closing submissions and Reply by the Applicant on June 9, 2025.

3The dispute between the Parties is that the Region, when calculating the DC, determined that the commercial rate would apply to the development for the tenant, Goodwill Industries ("Goodwill"), in accordance with the Niagara Development Charge By-law No. 2022-71 ("DCBL"). The Applicant's interpretation of the DCBL leads them to believe that the "industrial rate" would apply to the Goodwill development.

4The Tribunal heard evidence from three witnesses. Two witnesses were qualified to provide opinion evidence in their field of expertise below:

Applicant

Nel Scarry

Provided fact evidence in her role as Vice-President of Operations at Goodwill Industries Niagara

Applicant

Craig Larmour

Qualified by the Tribunal to provide expert opinion evidence in the field of Land Use Planning

Region

Beth Brens

Qualified by the Tribunal to provide expert opinion evidence in the field of municipal finance including the area of development charges.

5The following materials were identified as Exhibits and marked as follows:

• Exhibit 1: Book of Documents;
• Exhibit 2: Book of Authorities; and
• Exhibit 3: Curriculum Vitae and Acknowledgement of Experts Duty of Beth Brens.

DECISION

6The Tribunal dismisses the appeal.

POSITION OF THE APPLICANT

7Mr. Shedden, counsel for the Applicant, stated that Regional Council erred in its interpretation and application of the DCBL in determining the development, to be leased by the Applicant to Goodwill, does not meet the definition of "Industrial Use" under the DCBL.

8Mr. Shedden argued that Goodwill is a processor of waste and recyclable materials, including manufacturing and producing rags through the processing of clothing and other textiles.

9Mr. Shedden submitted that the Region erred in the interpretation of the "Industrial Use" in that it requires a user to be a manufacturer, producer, and processor in order to fit within the "Industrial Use" DC charge.

10Mr. Shedden stated that the definition of "Industrial Use" in the DCBL is not clear and unambiguous due to the following:

• There are no definitions of manufacturing, producing, or processing;
• The definition of "Industrial Use" includes the word "manufacturing" to define "manufacturing".

11Mr. Shedden cited 2222868 Ontario Inc. v Grimsby (Town), 2020 ONCA 376 at paragraph [32] to present his framework that Regional Council interpreted "Industrial Use" incorrectly:

The modern principles of statutory interpretation apply equally to the interpretation of a municipal by-law and a statute. Thus, the interpretation of the DC By-law involves consideration of the text of the by-law, the intent of Regional Council, and the purpose and scheme of the DC By-law as a whole.

12Mr. Shedden argued that Regional Council incorrectly concluded that the preamble of the definition of "Industrial Use" in the DCBL requires an operation to engage in direct manufacturing as a prerequisite to the subsequent subsections. Mr. Shedden continued that an ordinary reading of the text recognizes that the phrase "used for or in connection with manufacturing" expands the scope of qualification beyond direct manufacturing, and the word "by" serves as a connective term that introduces subsections (a) through (d) as examples of activities that qualify as being "in connection with" manufacturing.

13Mr. Shedden stated that Regional Council failed to properly apply the disjunctive language used repeatedly throughout the definition of "Industrial Use" in the DCBL. By disregarding the ordinary meaning of the word "or" as written in subsections (a) through (d), Regional Council imposed an unduly restrictive requirement that an operation must manufacture, produce, and process new goods from raw materials to qualify as an "Industrial Use". An ordinary reading of the word "or" allows manufacturers, producers, or processors to qualify independently throughout the definition, without requiring all three functions to be present in every case.

14Mr. Shedden maintained that Regional Council's restrictive interpretation of the definition of "Industrial Use" is contrary to the intent of Regional Council in establishing the Grant Program. He continued that the Grant Program is designed to encourage investment in the Niagara Region by incentivizing industrial development through the elimination of DCs for eligible uses. Regional Council's interpretation of "Industrial Use" would require a development to manufacture, produce, and process new goods from raw materials on site to qualify. This incorrect, narrow reading would exclude nearly all potential applicants, effectively undermining the Grant Program's purpose and discouraging industrial investment in the Niagara Region.

15Ms. Scarry focused her evidence on describing Goodwill's operational processes at the Subject Property related to donation intake, processing and preparation of goods for retail, and recycling, repurposing, and reprocessing systems for unsalable goods.

16Ms. Scarry advised of current advanced processing operations and future processing plans at the Subject Property, including, but not limited to, rag ripping, wire stripping, and textile recycling.

17Mr. Larmour stated that Goodwill is leasing the development from the Applicant, and that Goodwill is a partner in waste collection and diversion, highlighting that the development is anticipated to divert an additional two-and-a-half million pounds from landfill through a new rag ripping operation and wire stripping operation.

18Mr. Larmour stated that the Region has partnered with charities on waste diversion, and Goodwill and the Region have a long-standing partnership. He cited Section 8 of Technical Memo 2 Waste Generation Trends, dated December 2023, that acknowledges "textile recycling" is primarily taken care of by charities and refers to the collection of same as "textile disposal" and "textile waste". He continued that the Section further informs that local charities are anticipated to remain in the primary role for collection and diversion of textile waste.

19Mr. Larmour opined that the DC Background Study ("DCBS") that informs the DCBL identifies waste collection and material recovery facilities as Industrial Uses.

20Mr. Larmour contended the following for operations at Goodwill constitute an "Industrial Use":

• Collection of used textile and non-textile products is waste collection, which is an "Industrial Use" as defined by the DCBL;
• Processing of said products is part of a material recovery facility, which is an "Industrial Use" as defined by the DCBL;
• Storage and distribution of said processed products is an "Industrial Use", as defined by the DCBL;
• Retail sale of said processed products is permitted within an "Industrial Use", as defined by the DCBL;
• Diversion of unsold products into recycling streams (e.g. rag ripping operation and wire stripping operation) is part of a material recovery facility, which is an "Industrial Use" as defined by the DCBL; and
• Offices and administrative spaces related to the processing, storage, and distribution of something is an "Industrial Use", as defined by the DCBL.

POSITION OF THE REGION

21Mr. DeMelo, counsel for the Region, contended that the Applicant seeks to categorize Goodwill as a "waste processing and recycle facility". Mr. DeMelo maintained that Goodwill receives donated goods that are then sold to the general public where no manufacturing is taking place.

22Mr. DeMelo reasoned that a reading of the language used by the Region in the definition of "Industrial Use" makes it clear that the uses that are further enumerated in subsections (a) through (d) must be used for, or in connection with, manufacturing and are not stand-alone uses to be examined independently.

23Mr. DeMelo stated that, when dealing with a s. 20 of the DCA complaint, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is limited to the application of the definitions in the by-law itself and not on external definitions or considerations.

24Ms. Brens, the Associate Director of Budgets, Planning, and Strategy, advised that she has direct oversight of the DCBL at the Region. Ms. Brens stated the operation of Goodwill does not meet the definition of "Industrial Use".

25Ms. Brens stated that overall use of the development has to be "used for or in connection with manufacturing" in order for the "industrial rate" to be applied. Ms. Brens continued that the definition of "commercial" is wide and broad. She continued that, based on the architectural drawings, the "commercial rate" was correctly applied.

26Ms. Brens identified that Regional staff visited other Goodwill facilities, as the development was not built. Ms. Brens provided the following insights to the Applicant's links to "Industrial Use":

• The existence of a trash compactor is not specific to an "Industrial Use";
• Wire stripping does not denote an "Industrial Use" as they are not manufacturing the wire but processing it;
• Storage does not denote an "Industrial Use";
• Bailers are not being used in conjunction with manufacturing;
• Rag stripping is not an "Industrial Use"; and
• Industrial scale washers/dryers do not tie into the interpretation of industrial or commercial use.

27Ms. Brens confirmed that the inclusion of subsections (a) through (d) in the definition of "Industrial Use" is intended to avoid interpretations where a single use is broken down into different elements and have different rates applied when the use as a whole is "Industrial Use" that is connected with manufacturing. The language is intended to provide clarity and not create a series of sub-categories that would exclude the first principle in the definition from the rest of the definition.

LEGAL CONTEXT

28This is an appeal made pursuant to s. 22(1) of the DCA. An appeal under this subsection is an appeal of the Region's decision on a complaint regarding the application of its DCBL. The requirements for a complaint, including the statutory grounds for a complaint, are set out in s. 20(1) of the DCA.

29[Sub]section 20(1) of the DCA sets out three grounds for a complaint:

• The amount of the DC was incorrectly determined;
• Whether a credit is available to be used against the DC or the amount of the credit or the service for which a credit was given was incorrectly determined; or
• There was an error in the application of a DC by-law.

ISSUE

30The sole issue to be addressed by the Tribunal is whether the functions of Goodwill fall within the meaning of "Industrial Use" within the DCBL.

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

31The Tribunal has considered the evidence before it, as well as the submissions of counsel and finds that the appeal should be dismissed for the reasons that follow.

32The Tribunal agrees with the Region's argument that the wording of the DCBL in its entirety, including the purpose of the DCA and the DCBL, demonstrates that the operation of Goodwill is not an "Industrial Use" within the meaning of the DCBL.

33As outlined in Trafalgar Heights Inc. v. Town of Oakville and Regional Municipality of Halton, 2023 CanLII 28266 (ON LT) ("Trafalgar Heights Decision"), the Tribunal's authority in this matter is:

The Tribunal's authority here is to ascertain whether the Complaints are valid in that the DCBLs were applied incorrectly. The DCBLs exist and are not subject to change by the Tribunal. The Tribunal must evaluate the Parties' interpretations of the DCBLs to make a finding on the Appeal's validity.

The introduction and importation of new language into the respective DCBLs is not the role of the Tribunal. Such action would alter the DC policy decisions of the Region and Town. The Tribunal's role is to implement the specific requirements of the DCA and finds that there was no incorrect or erroneous application of the DCBLs by the Region and Town.

Is the Language Unclear and Unambiguous

34The Tribunal does not agree with the Applicant that the definition of "Industrial Use" is "unclear and unambiguous." The Applicant cites Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v Canada, 2005 SCC 54 ("CTMC Decision"), which states:

It has been long established as a matter of statutory interpretation that "the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament": see 65302 British Columbia Ltd. v. Canada, 1999 CanLII 639 (SCC), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 804, at para. [50]. The interpretation of a statutory provision must be made according to a textual, contextual and purposive analysis to find a meaning that is harmonious with the Act as a whole. When the words of a provision are precise and unequivocal, the ordinary meaning of the words play a dominant role in the interpretive process. On the other hand, where the words can support more than one reasonable meaning, the ordinary meaning of the words plays a lesser role. The relative effects of ordinary meaning, context and purpose on the interpretive process may vary, but in all cases the court must seek to read the provisions of an Act as a harmonious whole.

35The Tribunal reviewed the definitions of "Industrial Use" and "Commercial Purpose". The definitions are as follows:

"industrial use" means land, buildings or structures used for or in connection with manufacturing by:

(a) manufacturing, producing, and processing goods for a commercial purpose, as well as storing and/or distribution of goods manufactured, produced or processed on site;

(b) research or development in connection with manufacturing, producing or processing good for a commercial purpose;

(c) retail sales by a manufacturer, producer or processor of goods they manufactured, produced or processed, if the retail sales are at the site where the manufacturing, production or processing takes place;

(d) office or administrative purposes if it is:

(i) carried out with respect to manufacturing, producing, processing, storage or distributing of something; and

(ii) in or attached to the building or structure used for that manufacturing, producing, processing, storage or distribution.

"commercial purpose" means any building or structure used, designed or intended for use for or in connection with the purchase and/or sale and/or rental of commodities; the provision of services for a fee; or the operation of a business office, including but not limited to:

(a) Accommodations including but not limited to hotels and motels, bed and breakfast, or short-term rentals;

(b) Personal or self-storage facilities;

(c) Wholesale trade;

(d) Retail trade;

(e) Auto repair shops;

(f) Car sales/dealers;

(g) Warehousing of goods where manufacturing, producing, and processing of the goods is not completed on site;

(h) Food Services;

(i) Parking structures not used exclusively by a residential structure.

36The Applicant argues that the CTMC Decision framework is how the "Industrial Use" in the DCBL should be interpreted and that the Tribunal must look at the purpose and intent of the DCBL to determine the meaning, not rely simply on the plain meaning of the words.

37The Tribunal finds that the definition of "Industrial Use" is clear and that any interpretation of "Industrial Use" that does not premise "used for or in connection with manufacturing by" [emphasis added], fails to properly apply the policy decision of the Region.

38Ms. Brens, the individual at the Region whose role includes direct oversight of the DCBL, and the only witness qualified in the area municipal finance and accounting, including DCs, provided the Tribunal with an overview of the mechanics and implementation of the DCBL itself. Ms. Brens' evidence was that definition of "Industrial Use" in the DCBL is clear, and the Region implemented the DC correctly.

39The Tribunal also finds that the interpretation of "Industrial Use" by the Region in this appeal is harmonious with the DCA and the DCBL. The Region's interpretation of "Industrial Use" is consistent with the context and purpose of the DCBL.

40The Applicant argued that the Region's interpretation of the "Industrial Use" definition is in error in that it requires a user to be a manufacturer, producer, and processor in order to fit within the "Industrial Use" DC category. This interpretation was not put forth by the Region. The Tribunal finds that the Applicant's interpretation fails to incorporate the preamble identified in paragraph [37] above, and that the uses detailed in subsections (a) through (d) of the "Industrial Use" definition must be used for or in connection with manufacturing and not stand-alone uses.

41The Applicant claims that Goodwill is a processor of goods and accordingly falls within the definition of "Industrial Use" under the DCBL. To support this position, the Applicant presents the definition of "processing" with the "industrial property class" in the Assessment Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. A.31. The Applicant's argument is flawed as it fails to incorporate the definition of "Industrial Use" in the DCBL, incorporating "used for or in connection with manufacturing by" [emphasis added].

42As former Vice-Chair Makuch found in Alphabet Self Storage Victoria Inc. v Hamilton (City), 2022 CanLII 73904 (ON LT), the DCA does not require conformity or consistency with language in a municipality's zoning by-laws or planning instruments. Vice-Chair Makuch went further and identified that extraneous sources for interpretation are not necessarily relevant to the categorization of uses in a DC by-law. These findings are relevant to this matter before the Tribunal, and when applied, refutes the position of the Applicant.

43In summary, the Tribunal finds the that the language in the DCBL is very clear in its ordinary and plain language, intent, and purpose.

Is Goodwill a Commercial Operation

44The Applicant argued that Goodwill's operations are properly described as the "processing of recyclable and waste products". The Tribunal agrees with the Region that the "primary use of the property is to receive donated goods that are sold to the public and no manufacturing is taking place".

45The conclusion reached in paragraph [43] above was supported by Ms. Scarry, who under cross-examination confirmed that no manufacturing was occurring on the Subject Property. Mr. Larmour stated under cross-examination that he had no reason to disagree with Ms. Scarry that no manufacturing was occurring on the Subject Property.

46The Region highlighted the Applicant's architectural drawings that were produced in evidence as follows:

• The architectural drawings presented by the Applicant identify that approximately 40% of the building on the Subject Property is used for the retail operations where goods are sold, and that approximately another 40% is the warehouse where the goods are received, processed, and made ready for either sale or are packaged to be sent to other locations where they are recycled or processed into other products, including other facilities not operated by Goodwill where polyester fabric is turned into spools of polyester, and the balance of the site being used as office space for the corporate headquarters of Goodwill;
• The operations of Goodwill on the Subject Property is like that of a retail operation where goods are received, stored, and processed before sale, and that the only difference is that because it relies on donated goods it does not control the inventory and is dependant on donations alone; and
• As for the component of the building that is used for offices, these offices are used as the corporate headquarters for Goodwill and not with respect to the "manufacturing, producing, processing, or distribution of something" as required by subsection (d) of the definition of "Industrial Use".

The Tribunal finds that the architectural drawings do not reflect the definition of an "Industrial Use" as defined by the DCBL and their inclusion in the exhibits assisted in providing context to the matter before the Tribunal.

47The Tribunal finds that, based on the evidence presented, Goodwill's operations at the Subject Property do not meet the definition of "Industrial Use" in the DCBL and fall within the broad parameters of "Commercial Purpose" under the DCBL.

SUMMARY

48The Tribunal finds that:

• The amount of the DC was correctly determined by the Region.
• No credit is available to be used against the DC.
• There was no error in the application of the DCBL by the Region.

ORDER

49THE TRIBUNAL ORDERS THAT the appeal is dismissed.

"W. Daniel Best"

W. DANIEL BEST MEMBER

Ontario Land Tribunal Website: www.olt.gov.on.ca Telephone: 416-212-6349 Toll Free: 1-866-448-2248

The Conservation Review Board, the Environmental Review Tribunal, the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal and the Mining and Lands Tribunal are amalgamated and continued as the Ontario Land Tribunal ("Tribunal"). Any reference to the preceding tribunals or the former Ontario Municipal Board is deemed to be a reference to the Tribunal.