Ontario Land Tribunal

Tribunal ontarien de l’aménagement du territoire

ISSUE DATE: December 29, 2025

CASE NO(S).: OLT-25-000535

PROCEEDING COMMENCED UNDER subsection 51(43) of the Planning Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P. 13, as amended.

Appellant: Sharon James-Umana

Subject: Conditions of approval of draft plan of subdivision

Description: Proposed plan of condominium is comprised of four (4) single detached dwellings

Reference Number: 30CDM-23301

Property Address: Registered Plan1445, Block 66 (Registered Plan1445, Block 66)

Municipality/UT: North Dumfries/ Region of Waterloo

OLT Case No: OLT-25-000535

OLT Lead Case No: OLT-25-000535

OLT Case Name: James-Umana v. North Dumfries (Township)

Heard: November 19, 2025, by Video Hearing

APPEARANCES:

Parties Sharon James-Umana

Counsel Jessica De Marinis

Parties Township of North Dumfries

Counsel Michael van Bodegom Adrian Rosu

DECISION DELIVERED BY Kurtis Smith AND ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL

Link to Order

INTRODUCTION

1Sharon James-Umana (“Appellant”) seeks to develop their lands, that are within an existing subdivision, municipally known as Registered Plan 1445, Block 66 (“Subject Lands”), in the Township of North Dumfries (“Township”).

2The proposed development will see the construction of four single-detached dwelling units along an internal private condominium road with associated minimum site-specific regulations. The Subject Lands are within an existing subdivision and surrounded by low-density single detached dwellings. To permit the proposed development, the Appellant sought an application for Draft Plan of Condominium (“DPC”) and an Application to Amendment the Zoning By-law (“ZBA”)

3On April 14, 2025, the Council of the Township approved the DPC, subject to certain conditions, and approved the ZBA.

4On July 3, 2025, the Appellant filed their appeal that is only in respect to the following condition of DPC:

1.32 That the Owner provide an appraisal of the lands subject to the Plan of Condominium, prepared by a qualified appraiser to the satisfaction of the Township, and that the Owner pay the calculated cash-in-lieu (“CIL”) of parkland to the Township in accordance with Sections 42(7) and 51.1 of the Planning Act (“Act”) for the three additional lots created through the Plan of Condominium. (“Parkland Condition”)

5The position of the Appellant is that the Subject Lands were previously subject to the Parkland Condition through conditions of approval of the original subdivision in February of 1987. Therefore, submitting that the DPC Parkland Condition will result in the Subject Lands paying twice leading to “double dipping” for parkland.

6Whereas the position of the Township is that the Parkland Condition for the DPC is imposed under s. 51.1 of the Act and other than the requirement that it be reasonable, there is no other relevant restriction applicable. Furthermore, that the Parkland Condition is only required for the three additional lots being created through the DPC and not the entirety of the Subject Lands.

7The Tribunal marked the Affidavit of Service for the Notice of Hearing as Exhibit 1. There were no issues with the notice, and, as such, the Tribunal proceeded with the hearing.

PARTICIPANT STATUS

8In advance of the hearing the Tribunal received a Participant Status request from Jason Dawtrey. However, the Township and Appellant did not receive the status request in advance. The Tribunal provided sufficient time for the Parties to review the request during the hearing to provide their submissions, if any.

9The Participant Status request of Mr. Dawtrey relates to a dispute regarding the property lines between the Subject Lands and Mr. Dawtrey’s property on Watson Crescent.

10As the appeal before the Tribunal only pertains to the Parkland Condition and the dispute arising from the request is not within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, the Tribunal denied the Participant Status request.

SUBMISIONS AND FINDINGS

11The Tribunal heard fulsome oral and written submissions of the Appellant and Township that forms their positions on the Parkland Condition under appeal.

12The Tribunal will first consider the applicability of s. 42(7) of the Act:

Where land conveyed

(7) If land has been conveyed or is required to be conveyed to a municipality for park or other public purposes or a payment in lieu has been received by the municipality or is owing to it under this section or a condition imposed under section 51.1 or 53, no additional conveyance or payment in respect of the land subject to the earlier conveyance or payment may be required by a municipality in respect of subsequent development or redevelopment unless,

(a) there is a change in the proposed development or redevelopment which would increase the density of development; or

(b) land originally proposed for development or redevelopment for commercial or industrial purposes is now proposed for development or redevelopment for other purposes. 1994, c. 23, s. 25; 2015, c. 26, s. 28 (9).

13The Appellant submitted that by operation of s. 42(7) of the Act, an approval authority cannot require parkland conveyance where parkland or CIL was collected in the context of a previous division of land. They went on to submit that density is not a relevant factor as there was no notional allocation of dwelling made to the Subject Lands at the time of the approval of the original subdivision.

14The Township no longer takes the position that s. 42(7) of the Act is relevant although included that section in the Parkland Condition. The Township submitted that s. 42 authorizes parkland contributions to required pursuant to a municipal by-law and is triggered by development or redevelopment, such as the construction of a building. However, if the Tribunal found that s. 42(7) was relevant, the Township submits that the increase in density on the Subject Lands would authorize the Township to implement the Parkland Condition.

15The Tribunal finds that s. 42(7) of the Act does not apply. The Subject Lands are not being redeveloped as they have yet to be developed since the creation of the Block in 1987. The Tribunal accepts the position of the Appellants that the original subdivision did not contemplate density. Moreover, the proposed development maintains a low-density residential development that is present in the surrounding context.

16The Tribunal will now consider the applicability of s. 51.1 of the Act that is directed to be used by virtue of s. 9(2) of the Condominium Act:

Land conveyed or dedicated for parkland

1(1) Subject to subsection (1.1), the approval authority may impose as a condition to the approval of a plan of subdivision that land in an amount not exceeding, in the case of a subdivision proposed for commercial or industrial purposes, 2 per cent and in all other cases 5 per cent of the land included in the plan shall be conveyed to the local municipality for park or other public recreational purposes or, if the land is not in a municipality, shall be dedicated for park or other public recreational purposes. 1994, c. 23, s. 31; 2022, c. 21, Sched. 9, s. 18 (2).

17The Appellant submits that the Township may impose the Parkland Condition through s. 51.1(1) of the Act. However, they disagree that it should be impose twice on the same lands and submits that by operation of s. 42(7) an approval authority cannot require an additional Parkland Condition where parkland or CIL was collected in the context of a previous division of land.

18As stated above, the Township submits that s. 51.1(1) of the Act permits an approval authority, in this case the Township can impose a condition for parkland and that other than the requirement that it be reasonable, there is no other relevant restrictions applicable.

19The Tribunal finds that by virtue of s. 51.1(1) of the Act, an approval authority may impose a Parkland Condition as part of the conditions of DPC and accepts the submissions of the Township that the only requirement of imposing said condition is the reasonable test pursuant to s. 51(25). Additionally, the Tribunal does not accept the Appellant’s submissions regarding s. 42(7) as the DPC does not constitute development or redevelopment therefore does not apply to this matter. As well, the Tribunal notes that s. 51.1(3) allows the approval authority to require cash-in-lieu instead of physical land as shown below:

Payment in lieu

(3) If the approval authority has imposed a condition under subsection (1) requiring land to be conveyed to the municipality and subsection (2) does not apply, the municipality may require a payment in lieu, to the value of the land otherwise required to be conveyed. 2015, c. 26, s. 32 (2).

20Finally, the Tribunal will consider s. 51(25) of the Act to consider the reasonableness of the Parkland Condition:

Conditions

(25) The approval authority may impose such conditions to the approval of a plan of subdivision as in the opinion of the approval authority are reasonable, having regard to the nature of the development proposed for the subdivision, including a requirement,

(a) that land be dedicated or other requirements met for park or other public recreational purposes under section 51.1;…

21As noted above, the Appellant submits that the Parkland dedication has been satisfied through the conditions of the original subdivision. Therefore, submitting that Parkland Condition is not reasonable, relevant, necessary, or equitable because the Subject Lands have previously paid through the entire original subdivision, no notional allocation of units were made to the Subject Lands and as such is not increasing the density of the Subject Lands, in which is not relevant or applicable, and therefore results in the Township “double-taking” with respect to the parkland contribution.

22The Township submits that the Parkland Condition is relevant and necessary since the DPC creates three additional lots, therefore increasing the density of the Subject Lands and correspondingly increase the demand on and cost of the Township park system. Additionally, the Township further submits that Parkland Condition is equitable because it takes into account the original CIL condition as the Parkland Condition is only imposed on the three additional lots being created, which increases the overall density of the Subject lands. Therefore, submitting that the Parkland Condition is reasonable.

23The Tribunal accepts the submissions of the Appellant as the Subject Lands has already provided CIL for parkland through the original subdivision. Moreover, the Subject Lands have not been developed since their creation. The Tribunal does not accept the submissions of the Township relating to the increased burden of the park system through the development of the DPC as the Proposed Development does not contemplate a higher density than the previously developed portion of the original subdivision. Moreover, the Subject Lands CIL for parkland was provided through the original subdivision and the Subject Lands have sat undeveloped, therefore suggesting that once developed the Subject Lands will start to utilize the Township’s park system. The Tribunal therefore finds that the Parkland Condition is not reasonable and should not form part of the DPC conditions.

ORDER

24THE TRIBUNAL ORDERS THAT the appeal is allowed, and that the conditions imposed by the Township be amended to remove the Parkland Condition.

“Kurtis Smith”

Kurtis Smith

Member

Ontario Land Tribunal

Website: www.olt.gov.on.ca Telephone: 416-212-6349 Toll Free: 1-866-448-2248

The Conservation Review Board, the Environmental Review Tribunal, the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal and the Mining and Lands Tribunal are amalgamated and continued as the Ontario Land Tribunal (“Tribunal”). Any reference to the preceding tribunals or the former Ontario Municipal Board is deemed to be a reference to the Tribunal.