Beach Road Villas Inc. v. Gravenhurst (Town), 2025 CanLII 135448

Ontario Land Tribunal

Tribunal ontarien de l’aménagement du territoire

ISSUE DATE: December 23, 2025

CASE NO(S).: OLT-24-000807

PROCEEDING COMMENCED UNDER subsection 51(48) of the Planning Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.13, as amended

Applicant and Appellant: Beach Road Villas Inc.

Subject: Conditions of approval of draft plan of subdivision

Description: To permit the extension of the approved draft plan of subdivision deadline

Reference Number: S2006-06 (Muskoka Ridge)

Property Address: Part of Lot 21, Concession 6

Municipality: Town of Gravenhurst

OLT Case No.: OLT-24-000807

OLT Lead Case No.: OLT-24-000807

OLT Case Name: Beach Road Villas Inc. v. Gravenhurst (Town)

PROCEEDING COMMENCED UNDER subsection 19(1) of the Ontario Land Tribunal Act, 2021, S.O. 2021, c. 4, Sched. 6

Request by: The District Municipality of Muskoka

Request for: Request for Directions

Heard: October 27, 2025 by video hearing

APPEARANCES:

Parties

Counsel

Beach Road Villas Inc.

J. Damstra

District Municipality of Muskoka

E. Veldboom

Town of Gravenhurst

E. Veldboom

DECISION DELIVERED BY C. HARDY AND ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL

Link to Order

INTRODUCTION

1This Decision and Order arises from a Notice of Motion dated February 25, 2025 filed by the District Municipality of Muskoka (“District”) relating to an appeal filed by Beach Road Villas Inc. (“BRV”) for the property known as Part of Lot 21, Concession 6, Town of Gravenhurst (“subject property”). There is considerable history leading up to the appeal which stems from a plan of subdivision originally granted draft plan approval on September 2, 2008. The draft plan approval was accompanied by various conditions and included a lapsing date of August 14, 2013.

2Following the original draft plan approval, there were five separate requests for extensions of the lapsing date, all of which were extended by the District pursuant to s. 51(33) of the Planning Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.13 (“Planning Act”). BRV purchased the subject property on May 3, 2017, and as such, BRV made three of the five requests for extensions of the lapsing date. The most recent extension of the lapsing date provided by the District extended the lapsing date to April 26, 2024, and BRV requested a further extension and the District opted not to exercise its authority under s. 51(33) of the Planning Act.

3Alex Ciccone, who represented BRV at the time the appeals were filed, sent a letter dated April 15, 2024 to staff at the Town of Gravenhurst (“Town”) advising that an appeal was being filed with the Tribunal pursuant to s. 51(33) and/or s. 51(48) of the Planning Act (“Appeal Letter”). The Appeal Letter notes that the last day to file an appeal is May 16, 2024. The Town forwarded the Appeal Letter to the District on May 16, 2024, and on May 21, 2024, the Town advised Counsel for BRV that it was not the approval authority for Plans of Subdivision, but rather, that authority rests with the District.

4On October 9, 2025, the Tribunal was notified of a change in representation for BRV confirming that Jacob Damstra was Counsel of record for BRV.

Preliminary Issue: Leave to Argue Promissory Estoppel

5This was a rehearing of the Motion, ordered at the request of BRV and the direction of the Tribunal Chair. In granting the request for a rehearing, the Tribunal Chair limited the Parties to materials already filed. At the outset of the hearing of the Motion, Counsel for BRV sought leave of the Tribunal to argue the doctrine of promissory estoppel. BRV was required to seek leave of the Tribunal as the originally filed materials did not include arguments pertaining to the doctrine of promissory estoppel.

6Counsel for BRV argued that nothing new is being advanced, rather, BRV wished to apply the legal doctrine of promissory estoppel to the facts that the Tribunal has before it. BRV argued that pursuant to s. 8(2) of the Ontario Land Tribunal Act, 2021, S.O. 2021, c. 4, Sched 6, (“OLTA”) the Tribunal has the authority to determine questions of law and fact, unless that jurisdiction is limited. Thus, BRV argued that leave is not required. If the Tribunal determines that leave is required, Rule 10.10 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Practice and Procedure (“Rules”) allows the Tribunal to grant leave to BRV. BRV argued that despite promissory estoppel not being explicitly stated in the originally filed materials, the idea of promissory estoppel was referenced and as such, there would be no prejudice to the District. Further, one week prior to the hearing of the Motion, BRV put the District on notice that it intended to argue promissory estoppel.

7The District, supported by the Town of Gravenhurst (“Town”), argued that the filed materials contain a multitude of evidence giving rise to legal arguments, but there is a process to raise arguments properly so that all parties have an opportunity to respond. BRV did not specifically raise a promissory estoppel argument in the filed materials and should be barred from doing so during viva voce submissions. Advising the District one week prior to the hearing of the Motion is prejudicial as it would introduce new evidence that was not argued during the previous motion and would circumvent the Tribunal Chair’s direction that limited the parties to materials already filed.

8The Tribunal considered the arguments of the parties and determined that leave was required, and the Tribunal further determined that the request for leave to raise the doctrine of promissory estoppel was denied. The hearing of the Motion is a rehearing wherein the Tribunal Chair limited the parties to materials already filed. The Tribunal does not have the jurisdiction to deviate from the Tribunal Chair’s direction and as such, cannot allow new argument to be presented. While the Tribunal agrees that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is a legal concept, any argument that a party intends to put forward must be included in written materials so that all parties know the case that needs to be met. The Tribunal finds that it would be unfair to allow BRV to introduce new argument given the directions that were explicitly provided in the context of the re-hearing of the Motion.

MOTION TO DISMISS

9The Town was, and remains, supportive of the District’s position on the Motion and did not file any independent materials. The District filed a Motion for an Order of the Tribunal determining BRV’s appeals invalid for the following reasons:

• The Appeal Letter does not disclose a valid appeal under s. 51(33) or s. 51(48) of the Planning Act;
• The District not exercising its authority pursuant to s. 51(33) of the Planning Act to extend the lapsing date is not a statutory right of appeal;
• A Draft Plan of Subdivision approval lapsing date cannot be appealed once the lapsing date has passed;
• A lapsing date is not suspended during an appeal pursuant to s. 51 of the Planning Act unless it has been expressly suspended; and
• An Order confirming that the Draft Plan of Subdivision bearing the District file number S2006-6 lapsed on April 26, 2024.

10Counsel for the District submitted that the Motion is straightforward and the question to be determined is whether BRV can initiate an appeal after a lapsing date has passed, and that answer is no.

11BRV submitted that the Tribunal must determine whether a viable ground of appeal has been raised by BRV, considering that planning processes must be fair by making them open and accessible (s. 1.1(d) Planning Act).

12The Tribunal separated the issues into subheadings, however, some of the submissions and argument apply to both issues as set out below.

Section 51(48): Did the Conduct of the District Constitute a Withdrawal?

13Section 51(48) of the Planning Act reads as follows:

Appeal

(48) Any of the following may appeal any of the changed conditions imposed by the approval authority to the Tribunal by filing with the approval authority a notice of appeal that must set out the reasons for the appeal, accompanied by the fee charged by the Tribunal:

1. The applicant….

14The District argued that rights of appeal within s. 51 of the Planning Act, are limited to ss. (34), (39), (43) and (48). The Appeal Letter referred to one of the four appeal rights, being s. 51(48). The District argued that s. 51(48) of the Planning Act is clear in providing a right to appeal a change of conditions and, given that there were no change to the conditions imposed by the District, no right of appeal pursuant to s. 51(48) exists.

15The District referred to the Plan of Subdivision which was first given Draft Plan Approval on September 2, 2008 by By-law 2008-09-02 (“By-law”). Part B of the By-law is titled Conditions and enumerates 26 conditions to be satisfied. Part C of the By-law is titled Lapsing Provision and sets out the timeline for fulfilment of conditions. The District argued that the By-law makes it clear that the lapsing provision was not a condition as it was not included as one of the 26 conditions in Part B but rather, was given its own section in the By-law separate and apart from the Conditions. Further, the District argued that this is in keeping with the Planning Act as s. 51(25) permits Approval Authorities to impose conditions and does not mention lapsing provisions as conditions. Rather, s. 51(32) of the Planning Act permits Approval Authorities to set time periods for approvals, which shall lapse at the expiration of such time period. The District submitted that the Planning Act makes it clear that it does not consider lapsing provisions to be conditions and neither should the Tribunal.

16BRV argued that the District’s conduct constituted a withdrawal which established a right of appeal pursuant to s. 51(48) of the Planning Act. BRV referred to 1807086 Ontario Inc. v. Asphodel-Norwood (Town), 2019 CanLII 81723 (ON LPAT) (“Asphodel”) where the Parties agreed that Approval Authorities must act reasonably when exercising discretion pursuant to s. 51(44) of the Planning Act and the Tribunal found that the Approval Authority acted reasonably in adding a condition to the Draft Plan and that the condition was reasonable. BRV argued that in this case, the Tribunal should exercise its discretion and read into s. 51(48) of the Planning Act a right to appeal a withdrawal by an Approval Authority noting that withdrawal has a more significant impact than a changed condition. Denying BRV a right to appeal the withdrawal is a denial of natural justice and procedural fairness and would eliminate the safeguard against misuse of withdrawals by approval authorities¹. BRV submitted that like Evergreen, the Tribunal can read in withdrawal, which it argued is the ultimate change of condition.

17In the event the Tribunal accepts BRV’s arguments that it can read into s. 51(48) a right to appeal a withdrawal, BRV argued that the District’s actions and correspondence demonstrate that prior to the expiry of the lapsing date, the District withdrew the draft plan approval and closed its file. Over the course of several months, the District led BRV to believe it would extend draft plan approval. The District making an internal decision to refuse the request and notifying BRV after its right to appeal under s. 51(43) expired was in effect a withdrawal of draft plan approval.

18BRV took the Tribunal to communications from District staff which made references to closing several files, including BRV’s. These communications amount to a withdrawal, even if the word “withdrawal” was not used. BRV argued that the District’s withdrawal is appealable under s. 51(48) and the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to interpret the Planning Act purposively referring to the purpose of the Act and procedural fairness. In this case, the District withdrew the draft plan approval and BRV filed its appeal which has the effect of freezing the lapsing of the draft plan approval until the appeal is decided by the Tribunal.

19The District disagrees with BRV’s assertion that reference to closing a file equals withdrawal of approval. However, the District argued that whichever word was used is not determinative. Looking at the facts and evidence, District staff had a request to extend a lapsing date and the District chose not to do so. The District pointed to correspondence where staff noted that the request for an extension was denied and as such, the file was closed. The District argued that the withdrawal was not considered by the District, what was before the District was a request to extend a lapsing date and the District chose not to exercise its discretion. The District argued that BRV’s assertion that a lapsing date is not final until the Tribunal decides the appeal is flawed. The District submitted that the Province clearly provided for a pause in the operation of a lapsing period in s. 51(32), but limited the application of the pause to appeals pursuant to s. 51(39). Given that the lapsing provision was not “paused”, the Tribunal does not have the jurisdiction to extend a draft plan of subdivision that has lapsed.

20The Tribunal disagrees with BRV’s interpretation of the Asphodel case. In Asphodel, the Approval Authority added the lapsing period as a condition and s. 51(48) of the Planning Act specifically allows an appeal of a condition. In this case, the lapsing date was not included as a condition. The Tribunal was persuaded by the District’s argument that the Planning Act does not consider lapsing provisions to be conditions. The Tribunal finds that based on the evidence, the lapsing period was not a condition. The District made a clear distinction in the By-law between “General Conditions” and “Lapsing Provision” demonstrating that there was no intent to make the lapsing provision one of the 26 enumerated conditions. Further, the Planning Act clearly distinguishes lapsing provisions from conditions and the District’s By-law is consistent with the Planning Act in clearly separating the two.

21The Tribunal finds that it cannot read withdrawal into s. 51(48), which would result in the creation of a new right of appeal. BRV pointed to Evergreen arguing that if the Tribunal denies BRV the right to appeal the withdrawal it would be a denial of natural justice and procedural fairness. Evergreen was a minor variance case where the question was not whether a statutory right of appeal existed, but rather, whether the indefinite tabling of a file by the Committee of Adjustment amounts to a decision. It was the decision which triggered the appeal right and in Evergreen, the Tribunal was tasked with determining whether a deferral amounted to a decision. The Tribunal finds this distinguishable from the case at hand. Distinct from Evergreen where a right of appeal existed, the matter before the Tribunal is whether a statutory right of appeal exists or whether the Tribunal has the discretion to create a right of appeal. The Tribunal has determined that it is outside of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to create an appeal where one does not exist.

22Section 51(48) of the Planning Act is clear in providing a right of appeal to a change of conditions. The District referred the Tribunal to the Ontario Municipal Board’s determination in Tuczynski v. Brant (County), 2011 O.M.B.R. No. 876 71 (“Tuczynski”) where the Board found that in the absence of a change of conditions, no appeal pursuant to s. 51(48) can exist. The Tribunal recognizes that the facts in Tuczynski and the case at hand are distinct, however, the Tribunal finds that the conclusion is the same. Section 51(48) clearly limits appeals to situations where there has been a change in conditions. The District has not changed any of the conditions and the lapsing provision was never included as a condition, as such, no appeal pursuant to s. 51(48) is available to BRV.

23The Planning Act is clear in its language. If it were the intent of the Legislature to create a right to appeal an Approval Authority’s withdrawal of a DPS, the Legislature would have used the word “withdrawal” in s. 51(48) as it did in s. 51(44). Rather, withdrawal was explicitly omitted from s. 51(48) and the Tribunal can neither create a new right of appeal nor accept BRV’s argument that withdrawal can be construed as an ultimate change in condition. The Legislature used the word “or” in s. 51(44) to distinguish between two choices for an Approval Authority. The Tribunal finds that it follows that an appeal right was created in s. 51(48) for one of these two choices, not both. Had the Legislature intended to create a right of appeal to a withdrawal, it would have clearly done so and it is beyond the jurisdiction of this Tribunal to do what the Legislature clearly did not intend.

24Similarly, the Tribunal finds the language in the Planning Act is clear and unambiguous with respect to “freezing” the operation of a lapsing period. The Legislature expressly set out in s. 51(32) the limited application of the “freeze” to appeals pursuant to s. 51(39) of the Planning Act and the “freeze” cannot be read into other rights of appeal under s. 51.

25Despite the Parties submissions on the use of the words “closure” and “withdrawal” being irrelevant, the Tribunal cannot agree. Words are important and references to “closure” in District staff correspondence do not have the same meaning as “withdrawal” under the Planning Act. Given the Parties’ arguments did not focus on this interpretation, the Tribunal will not go into further analysis.

26The Tribunal finds that the District’s actions do not amount to a withdrawal. The Tribunal acknowledges that the correspondence may have led BRV to believe draft plan approval would be extended, however, the correspondence amounted to general communications between the District and BRV. District staff were responding to BRV’s inquiries and awaiting a determination on the extension request from the District. The correspondence provided status updates, but it was not determinative of the extension request. The Tribunal cannot find that communications between the District and BRV over the course of several months preceding the ultimate decision to refuse the extension request was, in effect, a withdrawal of draft plan approval. Based on the evidence, the Tribunal finds that the District did not use its discretion to extend the lapsing date and this choice does not amount to a withdrawal.

Section 51(33): Amendment and Extension

27Section 51(33) of the Planning Act reads as follows: Extension

(33) The approval authority may extend the approval for a time period specified by the approval authority, but no extension under this subsection is permissible if the approval lapses before the extension is given, even if the approval has been deemed not to have lapsed under subsection (33.1).

28Section 51(43) of the Planning Act reads as follows:

Appeal

(43) At any time before the approval of the final plan of subdivision under subsection (58), any of the following may appeal any of the conditions to the Tribunal by filing with the approval authority a notice of appeal that must set out the reasons for the appeal, accompanied by the fee charged by the Tribunal:

1. The applicant….

29BRV submitted that the Tribunal must first determine whether to grant BRV leave to amend the typographical error in the Appeal Letter which inadvertently appealed s. 51(33) of the Planning Act, rather than s. 51(43), which BRV intended to appeal. Secondly, the Tribunal must determine whether the lapsing date was extended.

30BRV argued that the caselaw establishes that lapsing is a condition of draft plan approval that is subject to a right of appeal pursuant to s. 51(43) of the Planning Act.

Leave to Amend Appeal

31BRV argued that the Tribunal should allow an amendment to the Appeal Letter and Appeal Form as s. 51(33) was inadvertently listed as an appeal ground, however, it was understood that BRV intended to appeal the refusal of the Town to extend the lapsing date pursuant to s. 51(43). Allowing the amendment will provide the best opportunity for a fair, just and expeditious resolution of the merits of the case, as required by s. 12(2) of the Ontario Land Tribunal Act, 2021 S.O. 2021, c. 4 Sched. 6.

32BRV submitted that Rule 7.8 of the Tribunal’s Rules allow the Appeal Letter to be amended, and Rule 1.4 lets the Tribunal adopt the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, which allow pleadings to be amended subject to non-compensable prejudice. BRV argued that the combination of these Rules and provisions provides the Tribunal with the discretion to grant BRV leave to amend the Appeal Letter. The Ontario Municipal Board in Lawton v. Middlesex Centre (Township), [2009] O.M.B.D. No. 869 allowed an amendment to an Appeal Form and BRV argued that the Tribunal should do the same because it was clear to all parties that BRV intended to appeal the lapsing date of the draft plan approval. Given the early stage of the proceedings, there would be no prejudice to the District or the Town in allowing the amendment and denying same would deprive BRV of a substantive right of appeal.

33The District argued that there is nothing before the Tribunal establishing that it was the intent of BRV to appeal pursuant to s. 51(43) of the Planning Act. There is no evidence before the Tribunal establishing that the reference in the Appeal Letter to subsection (33) was typographical. Further, the District argued that the appeal was launched pursuant to s. 51(33) of the Planning Act and a decision by an Approval Authority not to extend a lapsing date is not appealable.

34At the outset, the Tribunal notes that it does not have the authority to allow amendments to an appeal which would expand the appeal beyond the grounds and reasons set out in the initial notice. As such, in determining the matter, the Tribunal looks to the reasons set out in the Appeal Letter. The timeline for filing appeals and setting out reasons is governed by statute and the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to extend statutory timelines.

35The Tribunal cannot agree with BRV that it was clear that the section references in the Appeal Letter and Appeal Form were typographical errors. The Tribunal finds it significant that both the Appeal Letter and the Appeal Form contain the same reference to s. 51(33) and neither document included any reference to, nor inference that, BRV was appealing conditions. The content of the Appeal Letter and/or the Appeal Form must indicate the intention to appeal pursuant to a specific section of the Planning Act and be supported by sufficient reasons for the appeal. Had BRV included in the Appeal Letter and/or Appeal Form reasons explaining that it was appealing conditions, the Tribunal may have been able to conclude that the reference to s. 51(33) of the Planning Act was a typographical error thereby allowing a correction to the misidentified section. However, that is not the case. A plain reading of s. 51(43) makes it clear that the provision allows appeals related to conditions. There is nothing in the initiating appeal documents that indicate BRV’s intention to appeal any conditions, and the Tribunal cannot allow BRV to expand upon its appeal reasons that were set out in the initial notice after the statutory time period to initiate the appeal has passed.

36Given the Tribunal’s determination to deny the request for leave to amend the Appeal Letter, the Tribunal does not need to consider the submissions relating to the extension of the lapsing date. However, the Tribunal will briefly set out the positions of the Parties and the Tribunal’s findings.

Was the 30-day Extension Applied to the Lapsing Date?

37BRV argued that the second branch of the Tribunal’s consideration relating to its appeal pursuant to s. 51(43) is whether there was an automatic extension of the lapsing date from April 26, 2024, to May 27, 2024. It submitted that the Appeal Letter was sent to the Town on May 15, 2024, and then forwarded to the District by the Town on May 16, 2024. Thus, if the Tribunal finds that the lapsing date was automatically extended by 30 days, the Appeal Letter was filed in time.

38BRV argued that District staff confirmed that a 30-day extension would be automatically granted if comments were not received, and a decision not provided to BRV prior to the lapsing date. BRV brought the Tribunal to an email from Lisa Marden which stated “(y)ou will either get a copy of the report or a copy of the 30-day extension by the lapsing date”. BRV did not receive comments, nor a decision, prior to the lapsing date of April 26, 2024. BRV submits that the absence of formal confirmation of the 30-day extension is immaterial given the history of extensions and the communications with the District. BRV argued that the promise to apply the 30-day extension if a report was not provided prior to the lapsing date amounts to a decision of the District pursuant to s. 51(33) of the Planning Act. As such, BRV requests that the Tribunal make a finding of fact that there was an automatic 30-day extension of the lapsing date thereby making BRV’s Appeal Letter timely.

39As noted above, the District argued that rights of appeal within s. 51 of the Planning Act, are limited to ss. (34), (39), (43) and (48). The reference in the Appeal Letter to s. 51(33) does not create an appeal right as there is no right to appeal the decision of an Approval Authority not to exercise its discretion. The District argued that the extension of a lapsing date is a discretionary authority given to an Approval Authority pursuant to s. 51(33) and it must be exercised before the approval lapses. Further, s. 51(56) of the Planning Act limits the Tribunal’s authority on appeals pursuant to ss. 51(34) and 51(39) to any decisions that could have been made by the Approval Authority. Therefore, neither the Approval Authority nor the Tribunal has authority to extend a lapsing date after the approval has lapsed, which is the case at hand.

40The District argued that BRV’s submission that correspondence from District staff amounted to an automatic 30-day extension is flawed. If the Tribunal accepts BRV’s submissions that there was an extension, the District argued that it has limited effect because the Tribunal’s decision in Sifton Properties Limited v. Middlesex (County) 2023 CanLII 112262 (ON LT) confirmed that appeals under s. 51(43) must be launched in advance of a lapsing date. The District submitted that BRV is ultimately requesting that the Tribunal create a new avenue of appeal under s. 51 of the Planning Act, that is a right to appeal an expired lapsing date. The District argued that this ignores a plain reading of s. 51 and emphasized that if the Province intended to create a right to appeal an expired lapsing provision, it would have done so

41The Tribunal cannot agree with BRV that the absence of formal confirmation of the 30-day extension is immaterial. Prior extensions to the lapsing date were formally confirmed through amendments to the By-law, an example of which was included in Exhibit 2 to the District’s Motion Record. The Tribunal cannot agree that emails and telephone calls over the course of a number of months automatically extended the lapsing date. Nor can the Tribunal agree that an email from Ms. Marden indicating that BRV would get an extension if they did not receive a copy of a report created an automatic extension.

42The extension of the lapsing date varies a provision set out in the By-law. There must be a formal process to both confirm the extension and amend the lapsing date set out in the By-law. The Tribunal finds that varying a provision in the By-law cannot be affected through email exchanges with District staff in the absence of a formal confirmation that the lapsing date was extended prior to expiry. The Tribunal was not persuaded by BRV that the lapsing date was automatically extended for 30 days as a result of email exchanges with District staff.

43The Tribunal finds that the discretionary decision of an Approval Authority to extend a lapsing date must be exercised prior to the approval lapsing. The District did not extend the lapsing date, the draft plan approval has lapsed, and the Tribunal has no authority to extend a draft plan approval that has already lapsed.

SUMMARY

44The central issue to be determined by the Tribunal in the Motion is the validity of BRV’s appeal based on the Appeal Letter and Appeal Form. For the reasons set out above, the Tribunal has determined that no valid appeals have been raised by BRV.

45The Tribunal carefully considered the filed materials and the viva voce submissions of counsel and finds that it does not have the jurisdiction to create a right of appeal and allow BRV to initiate an appeal pursuant to s. 51(43) after the lapsing date has expired. Further, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to create an appeal right that the Legislature had no intent to create by reading in “withdrawal” to s. 51(48).

46As has been well documented in numerous Tribunal decisions, the Tribunal cannot allow a party to amend its Appeal Form or Appeal Letter to expand its appeal reasons. The timeline for launching appeals pursuant to s. 51 of the Planning Act are governed by statute and the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to deviate from these timelines.

47The exchange of correspondence between District staff and BRV does not amount to an extension of the lapsing provision. As set out above, the Tribunal finds that amending the lapsing provision in the By-law requires more formality than mere e-mail exchanges providing status updates from District staff.

48Based on the analysis and reasons above, the Tribunal finds that:

• The Appeal Letter does not disclose a valid appeal under s. 51(33) or s. 51(48) of the Planning Act;
• There is no statutory right to appeal a decision of the District to not exercise its authority pursuant to s. 51(33) of the Planning Act;
• The Tribunal cannot allow an amendment to an appeal that expands the appeal beyond the reasons cited in the initiating documents;
• A Draft Plan approval lapsing date cannot be appealed once the lapsing date has passed;

ORDER

49UPON MOTION to this Tribunal by District Municipality of Muskoka for an Order for direction to determine the validity of the appeals pursuant to s. 51(33) of the Planning Act and s. 51(48) of the Planning Act, and after the hearing of the motion;

50THE TRIBUNAL ORDERS THAT the motion brought by District Municipality of Muskoka is granted, and the Tribunal provides the following directions for the purposes of the appeals before the Tribunal:

• Beach Road Villas is denied leave to amend its appeal;
• No valid appeal under s. 51(33) or s. 51(48) exists; and
• the Tribunal has no authority to extend a draft plan of subdivision that has lapsed.

51THE TRIBUNAL FURTHER ORDERS THAT the appeals brought by Beach Road Villas Inc. are dismissed.

“C. Hardy”

C. HARDY

VICE-CHAIR

Ontario Land Tribunal

Website: www.olt.gov.on.ca Telephone: 416-212-6349 Toll Free: 1-866-448-2248

The Conservation Review Board, the Environmental Review Tribunal, the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal and the Mining and Lands Tribunal are amalgamated and continued as the Ontario Land Tribunal (“Tribunal”). Any reference to the preceding tribunals or the former Ontario Municipal Board is deemed to be a reference to the Tribunal.

Footnotes

1. 1Evergreen Environmental Inc. v. Oshawa (City), 2020 CanLII 104961 (ON LPAT) (“Evergreen”)