Ontario Land Tribunal

Tribunal ontarien de l’aménagement du territoire

ISSUE DATE: October 22, 2025

CASE NO(S).: OLT-24-001174

PROCEEDING COMMENCED UNDER subsection 19(1) of the Ontario Land Tribunal Act, 2021, S.O. 2021, c. 4, Sched. 6

Request by: Lovesick Lake Park Inc.

Motion for: Dismissal Without a Hearing

Heard: April 23, 2025, by Video Hearing, May 20, 2025, by Written Submissions, and August 21, 2025, by Video Hearing

APPEARANCES:

Parties

Counsel

Lovesick Lake Beach Resort Ltd.

A. Lombard

Kawartha Nishnawbe First Nations

C. Reid

DECISION DELIVERED BY S. deBOER AND ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL

INTRODUCTION

1The matter before the Tribunal was a Motion brought forth by Lovesick Lake Beach Resort Ltd. (“Applicant” or “Lovesick”) requesting that the appeal by Kawartha Nishnawbe First Nations (“Appellant” or “KNFN”) be dismissed (the “Motion”). It was the position of the Applicant that KNFN did not meet the criteria of an Appellant or a Party under the qualifying criteria of the Planning Act.

BACKGROUND

2The Applicant submitted an Official Plan Amendment Application (“OPA”) and a Zoning By-law Amendment Application (“ZBA”) to amend lands zoned as “Rural (RU) Zone” and “Recreational Commercial (RC) Zone” to “Recreational Commercial Exception 609 Holding (RC-609h) Zone” (the “Applications”). This amendment would permit a 40-site trailer park expansion on the lands municipally known as 3340 Stricker’s Lane in the Township of Selwyn (“Subject Lands”).

3The Subject Lands currently have 39 seasonal recreational trailer sites and three seasonal cabins along the shoreline of Lovesick Lake. The newly proposed 40 sites would be developed on existing vacant lands located to the south of the existing trailer sites and away from the shoreline of Lovesick Lake.

4The initial Applications were filed in October of 2018. Further submissions were filed in 2023 and 2024. The final submission was deemed complete on October 7, 2024, which included all the requested studies and a revised site plan.

5A public meeting was held on June 17, 2024, concerning the OPA and the ZBA. Public comments were taken into consideration by the Applicant and changes were made to the Applications based on the comments received during the public meeting. A final report was presented to the Council of the Township of Selwyn (“Township”) on November 12, 2024. It was Planning Staff’s recommendation that the Applications be approved in their final form, which included the changes that were made based on the comments from the public meeting.

6Township Council passed the ZBA at the same council meeting of November 12, 2024. The OPA was being processed by the County of Peterborough (“County”). An appeal of the Township’s Decision was received by the Tribunal within the statutory timelines by the KNFN (the “Appeal”).

7The Tribunal had previously scheduled a Case Management Conference (“CMC”) on March 5, 2025. The Applicant was granted Party Status at the beginning of the CMC. The Applicant then submitted that the Appellant did not meet the criteria of an Appellant, and that the Tribunal should dismiss the Appeal due to the Appellant’s ineligibility. The Tribunal Member ruled that a one-day Motion Hearing would be the most appropriate method to determine the issue being raised by the Applicant. The Tribunal scheduled a Motion Hearing to occur by Video Hearing on April 23, 2025.

MOTION HEARING

8The following items were marked as Exhibits to the April 23, 2025, Motion Hearing:

Exhibit 1 – Notice of Motion by Lovesick Lake Beach Resort Ltd., dated April 2, 2025

Exhibit 2 – Affidavit of Diana Keay, dated April 2, 2025

Exhibit 3 – Affidavit of Nodin Webb, dated April 14, 2025

9The Parties were given a fulsome opportunity to argue their cases before the Tribunal. It must be noted that this was the first time that either counsel had appeared before the Tribunal and that both Parties did not understand the full Tribunal process concerning a Motion. It must also be noted that due to some electronic submission issues, the Tribunal did not receive the Applicant’s materials until late in the afternoon the day before the Motion Hearing.

10As a consequence, through discussion of the Motion materials, the Tribunal asked further questions of both Parties. The Tribunal determined that further materials were required and, in fairness, allowed the Parties to submit further evidence with respect to the Motion. The materials would be submitted in a written form as per Rule 10.3 of the Ontario Land Tribunal Rules of Practice and Procedure, and the Tribunal would receive these documents by May 20, 2025. After review of the new documents, the Tribunal would then determine if there were enough materials to render a decision or if a further Video Hearing would be required upon review of the new materials.

Further Written Submissions

11The new materials were received by the Tribunal and were marked as the following:

Exhibit 4 – Lovesick’s Factum dated May 9, 2025

Exhibit 5 – KNFN’s Response Factum dated May 16, 2025

NOTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION

12KNFN filed a Notice of Constitutional Question (“NCQ”) with the Tribunal and the Attorneys General of Ontario and Canada on May 13, 2025. The Notice intended to question the constitutional validity of the definitions of a “public body” and “First Nation” in the Planning Act, RSO 1990, c P.13, as amended (“Act”).

13After receiving and reviewing the NCQ, the Tribunal asked the Parties to submit their materials with respect to two questions listed below concerning the NCQ:

1. Was the Notice of Constitutional Question properly before the Tribunal pursuant to Rule 11.1 of the Ontario Land Tribunal Rules of Practice and Procedure? Was there appropriate service and was that Notice given in a timely fashion?

2. Does the Tribunal have the jurisdiction to rule on the Notice of Constitutional Question and if so, does the Tribunal have the jurisdiction to grant the remedy sought?

14The Tribunal then scheduled a Video Hearing to occur at 10 a.m. on Thursday, August 21, 2025, to hear the written submissions and oral arguments to the two questions listed above that specifically focus on the issue of the NCQ.

POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES CONCERNING THE NCQ

Submissions

15The Tribunal marked the following as Exhibits to the NCQ Hearing event:

Exhibit 6 – Submission materials of KNFN

Exhibit 7 – Submission materials of Lovesick

Position of KNFN

16It was the argument of KNFN that KNFN holds Treaty rights in the lands and waters which includes the lands in the ZBA. It was KNFN’s argument that it holds these Treaty rights under Treaty 20, and these rights have been recognized by the Ontario Court of Justice in R. v. Johnson (2002). KNFN argued that the Government of Ontario agreed to recognize KNFN’s Treaty rights within the area covered by Treaty 20, which includes all of Selwyn Township and the Community of Burleigh Falls.

17KNFN submitted that the Government of Ontario has acknowledged and signed other agreements with KNFN as a First Nation, and the Government has a duty to consult when any decisions are made that could impact KNFN Treaty rights.

18KNFN submitted that the Chief of Council of Curve Lake Frist Nation passed a Band Council Resolution that recognized KNFN as a First Nation and called on the Government of Canada to recognize KNFN as needing their own land base at Burleigh Falls.

Was the Notice of Constitutional Question properly before the Tribunal pursuant to Rule 11.1 of the Ontario Land Tribunal Rules of Practice and Procedure? Was there appropriate service and was that notice given in a timely fashion?

19Rule 11.1 of the Ontario Land Tribunal Rules of Practice and Procedure states:

11.1 Constitutional Questions Where a party intends to raise a question about the constitutional validity or applicability of a matter before the Tribunal, or where the party claims a remedy under subsection 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, notice of a constitutional question shall be served and filed on the other parties to the proceeding, the Attorney General of Canada and the Attorney General of Ontario with proof of service, as soon as the issues requiring notice are known and, in any event, at least 15 days before the question is argued. The notice referred to shall be in substantially the same form as required under the Rules of Civil Procedure for a notice of constitutional question.

20KNFN argued that the NCQ was orally raised briefly during the Hearing event on April 23, 2025. KNFN then formalized the NCQ and served the NCQ on all the required Parties on May 13, 2025. The Tribunal notes that the Attorney General of Ontario acknowledged receipt of the NCQ. The Tribunal asked the Attorney General of Ontario through the Case Coordinator if they would be appearing at the next scheduled Hearing event (August 21, 2025) and the Attorney General of Ontario stated that while they have an interest in the proceedings, it would not appear at the Hearing event. The Tribunal further notes that the Attorney General of Canada did not respond to the NCQ as of this Decision date.

21KNFN submitted that the Parties had received ample opportunity to address the NCQ. Since the Tribunal had set a hearing date in August 2025, KNFN argued that this has given sufficient time for the Parties to respond to the NCQ itself.

22KNFN argued that sufficient notice had been given, and was done so in an appropriate manner, which allowed enough time to allow all the notified Parties to respond to the NCQ.

Does the Tribunal have the jurisdiction to rule on the Notice of Constitutional Question and if so, does the Tribunal have the jurisdiction to grant the remedy sought?

23It was KNFN’s argument that the purpose of the NCQ is to question the constitutional validity of the statute in question, in this case the constitutional validity of s. 34(2.1) of the Act which defines a “public body” as including a First Nation, and that the definition of a First Nation in the Act is defined as a recognized “band” in the Indian Act.

24It is this definition that is the focus of the NCQ argument put forth by KNFN. KNFN continued with their argument that the Act discriminates against unrecognized First Nation communities that are not a part of the Indian Act bands by excluding these First Nations as a part of the definition of a “public body”. KNFN continued to argue that this attacks KNFN’s rights under s. 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“Charter”) as this narrow definition would treat KNFN as “less Aboriginal” than other recognized Indian Act bands and would further marginalize and neglect this First Nation community.

25It was KNFN’s argument that the Ontario Land Tribunal Act (“OLTA”) gives the Tribunal exclusive jurisdiction in respect of all matter in which jurisdiction is conferred on it by this or any other Act as stated in s. 8(1) of the OLTA. Also, KNFN argued that the under s. 8(2) of the OLTA, the Tribunal has the authority to hear and determine all questions of law and fact with respect to all matters within its jurisdiction, unless limited by this or any other Act.

26KNFN argued that the Tribunal has clear jurisdiction pursuant to the OLTA to rule on the NCQ and has the authority to administer the requested relief in the NCQ. In Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Assn. v. Douglas College 1990 CanLII 63 (SCC), [1990] 3 S.C.R. 570, [1990] S.C.J. No. 124, KNFN argued that the Supreme Court of Canada held that an arbitration board, which had been appointed by the Parties under a collective agreement, but which was empowered by statute to decide questions of law, had the power to determine the constitutionality of a mandatory retirement provision in the collective agreement and that “…A Tribunal must respect the Constitution so that if it finds invalid a law it is called upon to apply, it is bound to treat it as having no force or effect.”

27In Cuddy Chicks Ltd. v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), KNFN argued that the Court held that a labour relations board, which had been created and empowered by statute to decide questions of law, had the power to determine the constitutionality of a provision in the empowering statute that denied collective bargaining rights to agricultural workers.

28KNFN continued with its argument that in the case of Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin; Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Laseur [2003 SCC 54], the Supreme Court of Canada addressed the jurisdiction of administrative Tribunals to rule on constitutional issues “…Administrative Tribunals which have jurisdiction — whether explicit or implied — to decide questions of law arising under a legislative provision are presumed to have concomitant jurisdiction to decide the constitutional validity of that provision.”

29The remedy that KNFN is seeking is a Tribunal ruling that the definition of a First Nation in the definition of “public body” be deemed as inoperative for this particular matter. KNFN argued that the Tribunal should use the more encompassing term of “Indigenous communities” as stated in the Provincial Planning Statement, 2024 (“PPS”) which, in turn, would consider KNFN as having consulting status on a by-law that may affect its Treaty rights and thereby qualifying KNFN as an Appellant to the Appeal.

30KNFN continued to argue that it was not consulted as it should have been by the Applicant or by the County pertaining to the Applications.

Position of Lovesick

Was the Notice of Constitutional Question properly before the Tribunal pursuant to Rule 11.1 of the Ontario Land Tribunal Rules of Practice and Procedure? Was there appropriate service and was that notice given in a timely fashion?

31It was Lovesick’s argument that KNFN did not provide an Affidavit of Service demonstrating that it had properly served the Attorney General of Ontario and Canada.

32Lovesick submitted that KNFN did not raise the NCQ in a reasonable time, or at least 15 days before the April 23, 2025, Motion. As such, it was Lovesick’s argument that the NCQ does not comply to Rule 11.1 of the Ontario Land Tribunal Rules of Practice and Procedure, nor does it comply to s. 109 of the Courts of Justice Act.

Does the Tribunal have the jurisdiction to rule on the Notice of Constitutional Question and if so, does the Tribunal have the jurisdiction to grant the remedy sought?

33Lovesick argued that the requested relief by KNFN is outside of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. In the case of Mothers Against Wind Turbines Inc v Ontario (Environment, Conservation and Parks), 2023 ONLT 54047, the Tribunal found that it did not have the grounds to grant the relief sought by the Appellant:

…the grounds and requests for relief set out in the Appellant’s Notice of Appeal lie outside the authority of the Tribunal to adjudicate or order, and as a result, the Appellant’s issues and requested relief under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms are beyond the authority of the Tribunal to address.

34Lovesick continued to argue that while the Tribunal has authority to hear constitutional questions, it does not have jurisdiction over matters outside of its statutory mandate. In the case of R. v. Conway, 2010 SCC 22, [2010] 1 SCR 765, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that specialized Tribunals have both the expertise and authority to decide questions of law and to hear constitutional questions related to their mandate. However, Lovesick reiterated that the OLT does not hold any federal power or mandates under s. 15 of the Charter. As such, Lovesick argued that the Tribunal does not have the jurisdiction to grant the relief being sought by KNFN.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS ON THE NCQ

35The Tribunal has reviewed the written and oral submissions of the Parties pertaining to the NCQ and the two clarifying questions that were put to the Parties by the Tribunal.

36The Tribunal notes that KNFN gave oral evidence at the Hearing event on August 21, 2025, that it had initially thought of bringing forward the NCQ prior to the April 23, 2025, Motion Hearing, however, chose to wait until after the original Motion Hearing to file the NCQ.

37The Tribunal notes that KNFN had enough time to file an NCQ between the first CMC event on March 5, 2025, and the Motion Hearing on April 23, 2025, and did not do so. As stated in Rule 11.1 of the Ontario Land Tribunal Rules of Practice and Procedure:

[a] notice of a constitutional question shall be served and filed on the other parties to the proceeding, the Attorney General of Canada and the Attorney General of Ontario with proof of service, as soon as the issues requiring notice are known and, in any event, at least 15 days before the question is argued. The notice referred to shall be in substantially the same form as required under the Rules of Civil Procedure for a notice of constitutional question.

38The Tribunal notes that KNFN presented oral evidence that it initially thought of asking the NCQ but decided to wait to submit it. The Tribunal finds that KNFN did not file the NCQ as soon as the issues were known. However, the Tribunal finds that this was a technical breach of the Rules of Practice and Procedure and the Parties, including the Attorney General, had notice and enough time to respond to the NCQ. Therefore, the Tribunal finds that sufficient notice was provided and that the NCQ was properly before it as per Rule 11.1 of the Ontario Land Tribunal Rules of Practice and Procedure.

39As for the relief being sought, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is set out under s. 8 of the OLTA:

Exclusive jurisdiction

(1) The Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction in respect of all matters in which jurisdiction is conferred on it by this or any other Act.

Same

(2) The Tribunal has authority to hear and determine all questions of law and fact with respect to all matters within its jurisdiction, unless limited by this or any other Act.

40The Tribunal agrees with KNFN that it has the authority to determine questions of law within its jurisdiction (emphasis added). However, KNFN is requesting that the Tribunal exercise its authority under s. 15 of the Charter to deem apart of the Act as “inoperable”. The Tribunal finds that it does not have the jurisdiction or authority to grant the requested relief. The Tribunal finds that the relief being sought can only be granted through an agency that has the authority to do so, which in this case, can only be a federal agency, not a provincial one. As such, the Tribunal finds that the NCQ should be dismissed as it does not have the authority to grant the relief.

41Even if the Tribunal were to find it had the authority to grant the relief, the Tribunal finds it could not use or substitute the term “Indigenous communities” to grant KNFN Appellant status as this term is not defined in the PPS nor in the Act. The Act has a clear and distinct statutory definition as to who qualifies as an Appellant. Using a more broadly used term such as “Indigenous communities” as somehow meeting the definition of a “public body” would be incorrect.

42Based on the findings listed above, the Tribunal finds that the NCQ should be dismissed as the Tribunal’s does not have the authority to grant the requested relief.

MOTION TO DISMISS

43As the Tribunal has ruled on the NCQ, it must now decide on the original Motion to Dismiss. It was the position of the Applicant that KNFN did not meet the requirements of an Appellant as defined under s. 34(19) of the Act, as KNFN is not:

1. The applicant.

2. A specified person who, before the by-law was passed, made oral submissions at a public meeting or written submissions to the council.

2.1 A public body that, before the by-law was passed, made oral submissions at a public meeting or written submissions to the council.

2.2 The registered owner of any land to which the by-law would apply, if, before the by-law was passed, the owner made oral submissions at a public meeting or written submissions to the council.

3. The Minister. 2006, c. 23, s. 15 (10); 2017, c. 23, Sched. 3, s. 10 (4); 2019, c. 9, Sched. 12, s. 6 (4); 2021, c. 4, Sched. 6, s. 80 (1); 2024, c. 16, Sched. 12, s. 5 (7).

44The Applicant argued that the only way KNFN could be an actual Appellant would be if they met one of the criteria in sub-s. 2.1 or 2.2 of s. 34(19).

45The Applicant argued that the KNFN did not provide submissions in the consultation process prior to the planning instrument being passed, and that it does not meet the definition of a “specified person” or a “public body” as required under s. 34(19) of the Act.

46It was the position of KNFN that during the application process, the Applicant nor the Township did not attempt any consultations with the KNFN about the Applications. KNFN argued that the Applicant did not meet its Duty to Consult obligations prior to the passing of the planning instrument and that this should have been done.

47KNFN argued that it was in attendance at the public meeting through it’s representative, Mr. Nodin Webb, who brought forth the concerns of the KNFN at the public meeting. KNFN confirmed that this was the only submission made during the application process that involved the Applicant, the Township, and the County.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

48The Tribunal is left to analyze if the KNFN meet any of the statutory requirements of an Appellant as listed under s. 34(19) of the Act.

49The Tribunal acknowledges that the minutes of the public meeting have demonstrated that Mr. Webb represented the KNFN at the public meeting. Therefore, the Tribunal must now analyze the criteria of an Appellant under s. 34(19) of the Act.

50The Tribunal notes that KNFN is not the Applicant or the Minister. KNFN is not the owner of the Subject Lands as presented in the Applicant’s materials. Therefore, KNFN could only be qualified as an Appellant under sub-s. 2.1 or 2.2 under s. 34(19) of the Act.

51Under sub-s. 2.1, the meaning of a “public body” in the Act:

“public body” means a municipality, a local board, a hospital as defined in section 1 of the Public Hospitals Act, a ministry, department, board, commission, agency or official of a provincial or federal government or a First Nation; (“organisme public”)

52Under sub-s. 2.2., the meaning of “specified person” in the Act:

“Specified person” means,

(a) a corporation operating an electric utility in the local municipality or planning area to which the relevant planning matter would apply,

(b) Ontario Power Generation Inc.,

(c) Hydro One Inc.,

(d) a company operating a natural gas utility in the local municipality or planning area to which the relevant planning matter would apply,

(e) a company operating an oil or natural gas pipeline in the local municipality or planning area to which the relevant planning matter would apply,

(f) a person required to prepare a risk and safety management plan in respect of an operation under Ontario Regulation 211/01 (Propane Storage and Handling) made under the Technical Standards and Safety Act, 2000, if any part of the distance established as the hazard distance applicable to the operation and referenced in the risk and safety management plan is within the area to which the relevant planning matter would apply,

(g) a company operating a railway line any part of which is located within 300 metres of any part of the area to which the relevant planning matter would apply,

(h) a company operating as a telecommunication infrastructure provider in the area to which the relevant planning matter would apply; (“personne précisée”)

(i) NAV Canada,

(j) the owner or operator of an airport as defined in subsection 3 (1) of the Aeronautics Act (Canada) if a zoning regulation under section 5.4 of that Act has been made with respect to lands adjacent to or in the vicinity of the airport and if any part of those lands is within the area to which the relevant planning matter would apply,

(k) a licensee or permittee in respect of a site, as those terms are defined in subsection 1 (1) of the Aggregate Resources Act, if any part of the site is within 300 metres of any part of the area to which the relevant planning matter would apply,

(l) the holder of an environmental compliance approval to engage in an activity mentioned in subsection 9 (1) of the Environmental Protection Act if any of the lands on which the activity is undertaken are within an area of employment and are within 300 metres of any part of the area to which the relevant planning matter would apply, but only if the holder of the approval intends to appeal the relevant decision or conditions, as the case may be, on the basis of inconsistency with land use compatibility policies in any policy statements issued under section 3 of this Act,

(m) a person who has registered an activity on the Environmental Activity and Sector Registry that would, but for being prescribed for the purposes of subsection 20.21 (1) of the Environmental Protection Act, require an environmental compliance approval in accordance with subsection 9 (1) of that Act if any of the lands on which the activity is undertaken are within an area of employment and are within 300 metres of any part of the area to which the relevant planning matter would apply, but only if the person intends to appeal the relevant decision or conditions, as the case may be, on the basis of inconsistency with land use compatibility policies in any policy statements issued under section 3 of this Act, or

(n) the owner of any land described in clause (k), (l) or (m);

53The Tribunal finds that KNFN does not meet any of the criteria listed under a “specified person”, however, the criteria listed under a “public body” must be analyzed more thoroughly.

54Under the meaning of a “public body” a reference is made to a “First Nation”. Under the Act, the definition of a “First Nation” is a band, as defined in the Indian Act (Canada). KNFN did not provide any evidence to substantiate their claim that they meet the requirements of a band under the Government of Canada’s Indian Act.

55The Tribunal acknowledges that the KNFN may have entered into agreements with other Government of Ontario agencies or ministries. However, this does not demonstrate to the Tribunal that KNFN meets the criteria of an Appellant under the Act. The Tribunal acknowledges that while any entity, group, or person(s) may come into agreements with the province’s agencies or ministries, these agreements with between KNFN other provincial agencies do not demonstrate to the Tribunal that this meets any statutory requirements of being an appellant under the Act.

56Pertaining to the “Duty to Consult”, the Tribunal finds that the Duty to Consult is not the responsibility of the Applicant; in fact, the term “Duty to Consult” is the responsibility of the Crown – which in this particular matter would be the Province, but only if the Province was an actual Party to the matter. As the Province is not a Party to this matter, the Tribunal finds that the “Duty to Consult” is not a requirement that needs to be met.

57Based on the previous analysis and findings under the Notice of Constitutional Question and the authority of the Tribunal under the Act, the Tribunal finds that KNFN has not met any of the criteria of an Appellant as per s. 34(19) of the Act. Specifically, KNFN has not met the definition of a “public body” as KNFN does not meet the criteria of a “First Nation” as KNFN is not recognized as a band, as defined in the Indian Act (Canada). Therefore, the Tribunal finds that the Motion to Dismiss should be granted and the Appeal by KNFN should be dismissed.

REQUESTED COSTS

58In Lovesick’s submissions, it made a request for costs to be determined for the expense of the original Motion to Dismiss and the NCQ matter. The Tribunal finds that KNFN has not demonstrated any type of unreasonable, frivolous, or vexatious behaviour that would meet the Tribunal’s high bar for awarding of costs for this matter.

59As this was the first appearance before the Tribunal for both KNFN and Lovesick, the Tribunal gave a wide birth to both Parties to fulfill the obligations of the Tribunal. As such, the Tribunal finds that the laws of natural justice have been maintained and the Parties are held to be responsible for their own costs for this matter.

ORDER

60THE TRIBUNAL ORDERS THAT the Notice of Constitutional Question brought forth by Kawartha Nishnawbe First Nations (“KNFN”) is hereby dismissed.

61THE TRIBUNAL ORDERS THAT the Motion brought forth by Lovesick Lake Beach Resort Ltd. is granted, and the appeal by the KNFN is hereby dismissed.

62THE TRIBUNAL FURTHER ORDERS THAT no costs shall be awarded for this matter.

“S. deBoer”

S. deBOER

MEMBER

Ontario Land Tribunal

Website: olt.gov.on.ca Telephone: 416-212-6349 Toll Free: 1-866-448-2248

The Conservation Review Board, the Environmental Review Tribunal, the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal and the Mining and Lands Tribunal are amalgamated and continued as the Ontario Land Tribunal (“Tribunal”). Any reference to the preceding tribunals or the former Ontario Municipal Board is deemed to be a reference to the Tribunal.