Mabelle Developments Limited v. Toronto (City), 2025 CanLII 103397

Ontario Land Tribunal

Tribunal ontarien de l’aménagement du territoire

ISSUE DATE: October 07, 2025

CASE NO(S).: OLT-25-000259

PROCEEDING COMMENCED UNDER subsection 114(15) of the City of Toronto Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 11, Sched. A

Applicant/Appellant: Mabelle Developments Limited

Subject: Site Plan – failed to make a decision.

Description: To facilitate site plan application which will provide 580 residential units.

Reference Number: 22 206826 WET 03 SA

Property Address: 25 Mabelle Avenue

Municipality/UT: Toronto/Toronto

OLT Case No.: OLT-25-000259

OLT Case Name: Mabelle Developments Limited v. Toronto (City)

PROCEEDING COMMENCED UNDER subsection 9(1) of the Ontario Land Tribunal Act, 2021, S.O. 2021, c. 4, Sched. 6

Request by: Mabelle Developments Limited

Request for: Directions

Heard: September 4, 2025 by Video Hearing

APPEARANCES:

Parties

Counsel

Mabelle Developments Limited

M. Foderick R. Poon J. Nehmetallah (in absentia)

Mabelle SPE and 1583617 Ontario Limited et al.

P. DeMelo

City of Toronto

M. Mahoney J. Braun

DECISION DELIVERED BY C. HARDY AND ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1This Decision arises from a Motion for Directions (“Motion”) filed by Mabelle Developments Limited (“Appellant”) relating to its appeal filed pursuant to s. 114(15) of the City of Toronto Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 11, Sched. A (“Act”). The Appellant filed a Site Plan Approval application (“Site Plan”) with the City of Toronto (“City”) for lands owned by other entities as described below. The City failed to render a decision on the Site Plan within the statutory timelines and the Appellant appealed to the Tribunal. At the CMC for the appeal, a question arose leading to the present Motion.

2The timeline leading up to the Motion is relevant and provides important contextual information. To be clear, the Tribunal is solely tasked with deciding the Motion and any decision on land ownership is outside of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction on this Motion and on the related appeal.

3The Appellant is jointly owned by a Greybrook Acquisitions Inc. affiliate (“Greybrook”) and a Marlin Spring Developments affiliate (“Marlin Springs”). On March 11, 2022, Greybrook entered into a Purchase Agreement for the undeveloped portion of 25 Mabelle Avenue, which would become 35 Mabelle Avenue pursuant to the finalization of a severance set out in paragraph [6] below, which was being sold collectively by B.A.S.R. Ltd., 1583617 Ontario Limited, Hereditary Holdings Limited, Myriad Holding Corporation Limited, and Brownstone Developments Limited (together the “Vendors”). Of note, one of the Vendors, 1583617 Ontario Limited, is a Respondent in the herein Motion. The closing of the purchase by Greybrook was to occur within 160 days following the finalization of the consent application to create the severed parcel. Subsequently, a number of amending agreements were entered into between the Parties (the Purchase Agreement and amending agreements are collectively referred to as the “Purchase Agreement”) to adjust the closing date of the Purchase Agreement to reflect the severance application that was proceeding before the City.

4The Site Plan was filed in or around September 2022 and listed the applicant as Tribute (Mabelle) Limited (“Tribute”), in care of Mark Iogna. On or around January 19, 2023, a revised Site Plan was submitted which amended the applicant’s name to the Appellant in care of Alyssa Trivelli. Mr. Iogna wrote a letter to the City on January 31, 2023, confirming the name change of the applicant, which the City confirmed.

5On April 10, 2023, a Notice of Assignment was entered into, assigning Greybrook’s interest in the Purchase Agreement to the Appellant.

6Of note, a severance had been applied for and was approved by the City in May 2023. As a result of the severance, 35 Mabelle Avenue was created and went into the name of Mabelle SPE (“SPE”) while 25 Mabelle Avenue remained in the name of the Vendors. It is the severed portion, being 35 Mabelle Avenue, which is the subject of the Purchase Agreement.

7In November 2023, the Vendors delivered various forms to the City authorizing Kian Manesh, of Marlin Springs (the Appellant’s development principal), to act as agent.

8The Appellant did not close on the Purchase Agreement within 160 days of the finalization of the consent application, which was finalized in May 2023. On May 6, 2024, the Appellant commenced litigation before the Superior Court of Justice (“Court”) relating to the Purchase Agreement (“court proceedings”).

9On March 25, 2025, SPE emailed the City, advising that Marlin Springs was no longer authorized to act as its agent and requested that the City no longer communicate with Marlin Springs on the Site Plan.

10On March 26, 2025, the Appellant filed the Site Plan appeal with the Tribunal and the Tribunal held a Case Management Conference on July 4, 2025 (“CMC”) to organize the appeal. At the CMC, counsel for SPE and 1583617 Ontario Limited et al. (together the “Respondent”) attended seeking Party status as the owner of 35 Mabelle Avenue and having an ownership interest in 25 Mabelle Avenue. At the CMC, the Respondent sought an order from the Tribunal that the appeal be held in abeyance pending the outcome of the court proceedings related to the Purchase Agreement. The Appellant was unsupportive of the Party status request and the request to hold the appeal in abeyance. The Tribunal granted the Respondent Party status and scheduled the herein Motion. At the CMC, the Appellant agreed to be the Moving Party of a three-part motion to determine the following:

a. Is the Appellant an agent of Mabelle? Or is it revoked?

b. Pursuant to s. 114(15) of the City of Toronto Act, is this a valid appeal?

c. Should the matter be held in abeyance pending the outcome of the civil litigation?

MOTION

11In its Motion Record, the Appellant requested the following three forms of relief from the Tribunal:

a. An Order of the Tribunal declaring that the Appellant, Mabelle Developments Limited, is the owner of the site plan control application in question.

b. An Order from the Tribunal declaring that, pursuant to s. 114(15) of the City of Toronto Act, this SPA appeal, due to a non-decision from the City, of Toronto is a valid appeal.

c. An Order from the Tribunal declaring that this site plan control matter should not be held in abeyance in light of parallel civil litigation.

12Despite the requested relief set out in its Motion Record, during reply submissions made at the conclusion of the Motion Hearing, counsel for the Appellant requested that the Tribunal answer the three questions discussed at the CMC and set out in the CMC Decision issued on July 22, 2025. Counsel for the Appellant submitted that there is no difference between ownership and agency, and therefore, there is no discernable difference between question a. in paragraphs [10] and [11] above. The Respondent and the City disagreed, as did the Tribunal.

13The Appellant’s Motion Record included agency arguments, and as such, all Parties addressed the question of agency in their submissions. That said, it was only during reply submissions that it was made clear that the Appellant was requesting a determination by the Tribunal regarding whether an agency relationship existed or had been revoked. Unfortunately, this clarity was provided by the Appellant after the Respondent and City had completed their cases. In an effort to cure any prejudice to the Respondent and City, who had filed written materials and presented viva voce submissions and evidence based on the questions set out in the Appellant’s Motion Record, the Tribunal granted the right of sur-reply. To be clear, the Tribunal rarely grants a right of sur-reply to parties, however, in this circumstance it was necessary to ensure a fair, just, and efficient process. As such, the Tribunal will not address the ownership of the Site Plan, but rather, whether an agency relationship existed between the Appellant and the Respondent.

14The Respondent opposes the Motion and requests that the Tribunal dismiss the Motion brought by the Appellant in its entirety and determine that the appeal be held in abeyance in light of the court proceedings.

15The City opposes the Motion and requests that the Tribunal deny the relief requested by the Appellant and adjourn the hearing sine die pending resolution of the court proceedings.

16The materials before the Tribunal on the Motion include the following:

a. Exhibit 1: Motion Record of Mabelle Developments Limited dated August 20, 2025, including the Affidavit of Pedro Lopes sworn August 20, 2025 together with accompanying exhibits;

b. Exhibit 2: Responding Motion Record of Mabelle SPE 1583617 Ontario Limited et al. dated August 28, 2025;

c. Exhibit 3: Responding Motion Record of the City of Toronto dated August 27, 2025;

d. Exhibit 4: Reply to Response dated September 2, 2025; and

e. Exhibit 5: Email dated June 24, 2025 from Olivia Rasekhi to the Tribunal Case Coordinator.

Is the Appellant an Agent of Mabelle? Or is it Revoked?

17The Appellant submitted that there is no evidence before the Tribunal demonstrating the existence of an agency relationship between the Appellant and the Respondent.

18The Appellant relied on Minto Communities Inc. v Toronto (City), 2021 CanLII 41853 (ON LPAT) (“Minto”), where the Tribunal found that the applicant/appellant in Minto, Minto Communities Inc. (“MCI”), controlled the application even though they were not the fee simple owner of the property to which the application applied. In Minto, the Tribunal did not consider the City-required authorization form as a form of agency. Pursuant to the Tribunal’s finding in Minto, the Appellant argued that the owner of an application can be different from the owner in fee simple of land and the Tribunal could look at underlying documents to determine the actual relationship between the parties.

19The Appellant referred to the Purchase Agreement, which it argued demonstrated that it was making applications to develop the property on its own behalf and not as an agent. In particular, the Appellant set out in its Motion materials Section 6 of Schedule L to the Purchase Agreement which requires the Vendor’s cooperation in facilitating the development of the property through execution of any necessary agreements, including a site plan agreement.

20With respect to agency, the Respondent argued that a number of documents included in the Appellant’s Motion materials demonstrate an agency relationship. For example, the original Development Approval Application identified Tribute as the applicant/agent and this interest was transferred to the Appellant, who filed an updated Development Approval Application with the City. The Respondent argued that the Appellant can only be proceeding under the authority that they took by way of assignment from Tribute, and this authority was acting as agent. The Respondent revoked any agency that the Appellant had, and when that occurred, the Respondent argued that the Appellant’s role ended.

21The Respondent disagreed with the Appellant’s interpretation of Section 6 of Schedule L of the Purchase Agreement. The Respondent emphasized that the Section clearly states that the Respondent will cooperate with the Appellant to facilitate the development of the property. It argued that cooperation in no way authorizes the Appellant to proceed without the consent of the Respondent.

22In contrast to the Appellant’s submissions, the Respondent argued that the only evidence before the Tribunal is that the Appellant was acting as agent of the Respondent. Further, the agency relationship was revoked by the Respondent prior to the Site Plan appeal being filed with the Tribunal.

23The Tribunal cannot accept the Appellant’s argument that there was no evidence demonstrating an agency relationship. Rather, the Tribunal agrees with the Respondent that there were several documents included in the materials confirming the existence of an agency relationship. For example, the 2022 Development Approval Application includes the authorization of each of the Vendors for Mark Iogna to act as an agent (emphasis added). Subsequently, the Appellant wrote to the City advising of the change in applicant from Mr. Iogna to the Appellant c/o Alyssa Trivelli. In its letter to the City, the Appellant attached a revised 2022 Development Approval Application which included the authorization of each of the Vendors for the Appellant c/o Alyssa Trivelli to act as agent (emphasis added) regarding the Site Plan. In this case the Tribunal considered the authorization forms included with the Development Approval Applications as a form of agency and clear evidence that an agency relationship existed.

24The Tribunal cannot agree with the Appellant’s assertion that the Section in the Purchase Agreement demonstrated that the Appellant was acting on its own behalf and not as agent. Unlike Minto, where the purchase agreement specifically enabled MCI to proceed with planning applications without the consent of the vendor (emphasis added), the Purchase Agreement in this case requires co-operation (emphasis added) to facilitate development of the property. The inclusion of the word “co-operate” is pivotal as it prevents the Appellant from furthering any development applications on the property of its own volition. This negates the Appellant’s argument that it was acting on its own behalf. Both Minto and the case at hand are very fact specific, and in this motion the facts have led the Tribunal to a finding that an agency relationship did exist with the Appellant acting as agent.

25The Tribunal next must determine if the agency relationship was revoked. Based on the evidence, the Tribunal finds that agency was revoked by the Respondent. On March 25, 2025, correspondence to the City from the Respondent advised that Marlin Springs was no longer acting as agent on the Site Plan. As set out in the opening paragraphs of this Decision, the Appellant is owned in part by Marlin Springs, and having determined that an agency relationship existed, the Tribunal finds that this email makes it clear that the agency was revoked by the Respondent

Is the Site Plan Appeal a Valid Appeal Under s. 114(15) of the Act?

26For ease of reference, s. 114(15) of the Act reads as follows:

Appeal to Tribunal re approval of plans or drawings

114(15) If the City fails to approve the plans or drawings referred to in subsection (5) within 60 days after they are received by the City, the owner may appeal the failure to approve the plans or drawings to the Ontario Land Tribunal by filing with the city clerk a notice of appeal accompanied by the fee charged by the Tribunal.

27To determine the question of “owner”, as referenced in s. 114(15) of the Act, the Appellant took the Tribunal to Mastercraft Development Corporation v. Vaughan (Town) (No. 2), 1982 CarswellOnt 1978 (“Mastercraft”), where the Tribunal’s predecessor, the Ontario Municipal Board, found that prospective owners pursuant to an Agreement of Purchase and Sale are considered owners under the Planning Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.13, (“Planning Act”). The Appellant asserted that is it common for a developer to purchase land and make applications to develop land prior to a purchase closing. In both Mastercraft and AAF-Ltd. v. Etobicoke (Borough) Committee of Adjustment, 1976 CarswellOnt 808 (“AAF”) a liberal approach in interpreting the meaning of “owner” was adopted. The Appellant urged the Tribunal to do the same in this case and avoid a strict interpretation of the word “owner”, which it asserted could lead to establishing a precedent that would hinder developments to proceed expeditiously.

28The Appellant submitted that it is requesting the Tribunal to determine who is the owner of the Site Plan, while the Court will determine who is the owner of the land. The Appellant emphasized that these are two distinct requests.

29The Respondent submitted that the issue of ownership of the Site Plan falls squarely in the court proceeding process, which was initiated by the Appellant. The Appellant has asked the Court for a remedy that relates to the Purchase Agreement and such remedy can only arise if the Appellant is deemed to be the owner of the Site Plan. The Respondent argued that the same question cannot be simultaneously asked of the Tribunal and that no prejudice would be suffered by any Party, including the Appellant, if the Tribunal held the appeal in abeyance pending the outcome of the court proceedings.

30Further with respect to “ownership”, the Respondent distinguished Minto, which was a zoning by-law amendment (“ZBA”) appeal filed under the Planning Act. The Planning Act uses the word “owner” for site plan appeals, whereas it uses the word “applicant” for ZBA and official plan (“OP”) appeals. The Respondent argued that the Appellant is reading in “applicant” where s. 114(15) of the Act specifically uses the word “owner” and the meaning of “owner” and “applicant” are distinct. The Legislature intentionally used different terms for site plan appeals than were used for ZBA and OP appeals, and therefore, the Respondent submitted that if one is not the owner of the land, then one must identify the authorization being relied upon to permit the bringing of a site plan application. In this case, the Respondent argued that the Appellant identified themselves as the agent of the Respondent.

31The City agreed with the Respondent’s interpretation of “owner” reflecting the intention of the Act. The City briefly added to the Respondent’s submissions, arguing that the use of the term “owner” in the Act goes to the notion of who can enforce site plan conditions, noting that many site plan conditions can only be fulfilled by an owner of a property. A site plan agreement cannot be enforced by the City against a non-owner and many site plan conditions cannot be fulfilled by a non-owner. In both cases, the City argued that this highlights the intention of the Act and why the word “owner”, as opposed to “applicant”, was intentionally used by the Legislature.

32The Tribunal notes that words are chosen very carefully when legislation is drafted. The meaning of the chosen words matters and the words included in legislation are to be read in their entire context. The word “owner” was specifically used when site plan provisions of both the Act and the Planning Act were drafted. This is significant. The Appellant is urging the Tribunal to take a liberal approach in interpreting the word “owner” and the Tribunal recognizes that the Tribunal’s Rules of Practice and Procedure (“Rules”) and the Tribunal’s mandate allow it to be less stringent in some circumstances. In this circumstance, the Tribunal finds that a stricter interpretation of the word “owner”, as it is used in s. 114(15) of the Act, is the appropriate approach primarily due to the fact that the Appellant’s liberal interpretation of the word “owner” could lead to an absurd result. For example, if a non-owner could apply for a site plan of its own volition, and not as an agent of the owner, then the owner of land could have a site plan impacting its property in ways that it does not want and was not involved in. In addition, as argued by the City, an agreement entered into with a non-owner could be unenforceable, and further, make the clearing of some site plan conditions impossible for a non-owner to carry out. The Tribunal finds that a liberal interpretation of “owner” would not attain the object of the Act and cannot reflect the intent of the Province.

33The Tribunal does not agree with the Appellant’s assertion that the Tribunal’s interpretation of “owner” in paragraph [32] above could lead to establishing a precedent that would hinder developments to proceed expeditiously. The circumstances in this case are unique. The Parties had been acting cooperatively, however, this relationship broke down, and the agency status of the Appellant was revoked by the Respondent. This is an important nuance because the concerns outlined by the Respondent and the City would be alleviated if the agency relationship continued to exist between the Appellant and the Respondent. However, this is not the case, which has led to the legitimate concerns being raised by the Respondent and the City.

34The Tribunal was persuaded by the submissions of the Respondent and the City that the terms “owner” and “applicant” are not interchangeable, and neither is the case law interpreting these terms. The Respondent argued that the use of different words in each section of the Act is intentional and significant, and the Tribunal agrees.

Is there Need to Adjourn the Site Plan with the Existence of Parallel Litigation?

35The Appellant submitted that this issue is the crux of the dispute, and the two issues set out above are merely “noise”. The Appellant urged the Tribunal to find that it is an appellant in its own right, and not as an agent of the Respondent, and as such, the appeal should not be held in abeyance. The Appellant argued that it will be financially prejudiced by holding the appeal in abeyance if the Appellant is determined to be the owner through the court proceedings and it has not been permitted to advance its development applications through the Tribunal process. The Appellant submitted that the Tribunal’s mandate is to consider planning matters expeditiously, including site plan appeals. Civil litigation can be a lengthy process and if the Court determined that the Appellant is not the owner pursuant to the Purchase Agreement, then this determination would change the facts in these proceedings. If that occurs, the Appellant submitted that the Tribunal and the Parties could “cross that bridge when we come to it”. The Appellant acknowledged that if the Court determined that it was not an owner, then the Tribunal proceeding could not continue as it would no longer have status as an appellant. However, the Appellant emphasized that, as of today, it is a legitimate appellant and there is a valid Purchase Agreement.

36The Respondent argued that it is not just, fair, nor expeditious for the Tribunal to determine the Site Plan appeal when that issue is currently before the Court and urged the Tribunal to hold the appeal in abeyance until the court proceedings conclude. The Respondent submitted that, if it is determined through the court proceedings that the Appellant is the owner, then they can proceed with the Site Plan appeal. However, if the Appellant is determined not to be the owner, then it has no interest in the appeal before the Tribunal. The Respondent argued that there was no rationale provided to justify incurring the cost and time of proceeding with the Site Plan appeal, which may become moot depending on the outcome of the court proceedings.

37The City submitted that allowing the Site Plan appeal to proceed would not contribute to a fair, just, expeditious, or cost-effective process as required by the Rules. The City described itself as a “third wheel”, as it was not participating in the court proceedings. Despite this, the City argued that it would be unfair to the City, the Tribunal, and the other Parties to continue with the time and expense of the appeal before the Tribunal which may become moot.

38The City agreed with the Respondent’s submissions and noted that all of the case law relied upon by the Appellant were factually distinct as none of the case examples had a land ownership dispute taking place parallel with the Tribunal process. For example, the City noted that Mastercraft had cooperative owners working together, therefore making it logical to treat them as owners in the planning process. Further, in AAF, the party had a unilateral option to obtain ownership of property, which the City argued was ownership-like. However, the fact distinguishing all of these cases from the appeal before the Tribunal is that no parallel court proceedings deciding ownership existed, and this distinction is significant.

39The City further argued that the Court’s determination of ownership will inform the Issues List in this appeal, and as such, the appeal should be adjourned sine die to avoid the potential of duplicating the effort and time involved in progressing the appeal. Ownership of the property is fundamental to the Issues List in terms of understanding what can be done on the ground to clear conditions of site plan. The City raised the example of entering into a site plan agreement and being unable to enforce the terms of the agreement against the Appellant who is a non-registered owner. The City surmised that such an agreement could work if the non-registered owner is acting as an agent of the owner, however, in this case, the agency relationship is in dispute and as such, the City would have no recourse against the Appellant as the site plan applicant.

40Finally, the City argued that it is not fair nor just to expend significant public resources on a process that may become moot depending on the outcome of the court proceedings. Further, if following the court proceedings the Appellant no longer has standing in the Tribunal appeal the City may have to engage in the same appeal process with the Respondent, which would not be fair, just, nor cost effective. The City argued that there is no prejudice to any of the Parties to wait until the completion of the court proceedings.

41The Appellant submitted that the crux of the dispute on the Motion was whether to hold the appeal in abeyance pending the outcome of the court proceeding. The Appellant’s own argument in this regard supports the finding of the Tribunal that it is efficient and cost effective to hold the appeal in abeyance pending the outcome of the court proceeding. The determination in the court proceeding could render the appeal before the Tribunal moot and the Appellant itself submitted that the Parties can “cross that bridge” because it may no longer have standing in this appeal. The Tribunal finds that it would be unfair to the Respondent and the City to continue to proceed towards a merit hearing on the appeal when it may become moot if the Appellant loses its status to continue the appeal.

42The Tribunal was persuaded by the arguments of the City that the outcome of the court proceeding will inform the Issues List in the appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal finds it would be inefficient to continue with the appeal process when there is a likelihood that significant changes will need to be made once the Court has rendered its decision. Further, the Tribunal agrees with the City that it would be unfair for the City and the Tribunal to expend public resources in continuing with the appeal when the evidence presented indicates that significant changes will be required, including the potential that the appeal will become moot.

43The prejudice to the Respondent and the City far outweighs the potential prejudice to the Appellant in holding the appeal in abeyance while the court proceedings unfold. As the Tribunal was advised, a hearing before the Court is scheduled to proceed in February 2026, and while a decision from that hearing event may take months to be issued, the Tribunal finds that that the potential financial prejudice to the Appellant, if any, is minor.

SUMMARY

44To summarize the findings that have been made throughout this Decision, the Tribunal concludes as follows:

a. The documentary evidence and viva voce submissions make it clear to the Tribunal that an agency relationship existed between the Appellant and the Respondent;

b. The correspondence from the Respondent to the City clearly revoked the agency relationship between the Appellant and the Respondent;

c. The Tribunal was persuaded by the Respondent and the City that a strict interpretation of “owner” as it is used in s. 114(15) of the Act is appropriate in this case to avoid absurd results which surely could not have been the intent of the Province when drafting s. 114(15) of the Act; and

d. The evidence presented, including that of the Appellant, persuaded the Tribunal that holding the appeal in abeyance pending the outcome of the court proceedings is the most fair, just and efficient way to proceed.

ORDER

45THE TRIBUNAL ORDERS THAT the Motion for Directions by Mabelle Developments Limited is dismissed in its entirety.

46THE TRIBUNAL FURTHER ORDERS THAT the request by Mabelle SPE Inc. and 1583617 Ontario Limited et al. and the City of Toronto to adjourn the appeal sine die pending the outcome of the parallel civil litigation is granted.

47The Tribunal directs the Parties to provide a status update to the Tribunal within 30 days of the issuance of the decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice with suggested next steps with respect to the Site Plan Approval application appeal before the Tribunal.

“C. Hardy”

C. HARDY

VICE-CHAIR

Ontario Land Tribunal

Website: www.olt.gov.on.ca Telephone: 416-212-6349 Toll Free: 1-866-448-2248

The Conservation Review Board, the Environmental Review Tribunal, the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal and the Mining and Lands Tribunal are amalgamated and continued as the Ontario Land Tribunal (“Tribunal”). Any reference to the preceding tribunals or the former Ontario Municipal Board is deemed to be a reference to the Tribunal.