Ontario Land Tribunal

Tribunal ontarien de l’aménagement du territoire

ISSUE DATE: September 25, 2024

CASE NO(S).: OLT-23-001261 OLT-24-000347

PROCEEDING COMMENCED UNDER subsection 17(4) of the Ontario Underground Infrastructure Notification System Act, 2012, S.O. 2012, c. 4.

Claimant: Capital Paving Inc. Respondent: Enbridge Gas, Enbridge Gas Distribution, and Enbridge Gas Inc. Subject: Claim for Compensation Municipality: Region of Waterloo OLT Case No.: OLT-23-001261 OLT Lead Case No.: OLT-23-001261 OLT Case Name: Capital Paving Inc. v. Enbridge Gas, Enbridge Gas Distribution, and Enbridge Gas Inc. (Enbridge Gas)

PROCEEDING COMMENCED UNDER subsection 17(4) of the Ontario Underground Infrastructure Notification System Act, 2012, S.O. 2012, c. 4.

Claimant: Capital Paving Inc. Respondent: Enova Power Corporation et. al. Subject: Claim for Compensation Municipality: Region of Waterloo OLT Case No.: OLT-24-000347 OLT Lead Case No.: OLT-24-000347 OLT Case Name: Capital Paving Inc. v. Enova Power Corporation et. al.

Heard: August 21, 2024 by Written Hearing

APPEARANCES:

Parties	Counsel
Capital Paving Inc.	Darcia Perry
Enbridge Gas, Enbridge Gas Distribution and Enbridge Gas Inc.	Justin Martin
Enova Power Corporation	Justin Martin
Hydro One Networks Inc.	Raman Dhillon Tamar Klein
Bell Canada	Keri Bedeau

DECISION DELIVERED BY W. DANIEL BEST AND ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL

INTRODUCTION

1On August 21, 2024, the Tribunal considered submissions by the Parties on a Motion initiated by the Tribunal pursuant to Rule 10.11 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Practice and Procedure (“Rules”) to inquire into its jurisdiction to hear a claim for compensation of an excavator for late locates, following the repeal of section 17(1)(c) of the Ontario Underground Infrastructure Notification System Act, 2012, S.O. 2012, c. 4 (“OUINS Act”) on May 1, 2024.

BACKGROUND

2On or about November 30, 2023, Capital Paving Inc. (“Capital” or “Claimant”) served a Claim for Compensation (“Claim”) dated November 30, 2023 against Enbridge Gas, Enbridge Gas Distribution, and Enbridge Gas Inc. (“Enbridge”) pursuant to s. 17(4) of the OUINS Act.

3The Claimant was seeking compensation for lost revenue, unrecovered overhead costs, lost profit, underutilization of equipment, and labour, as well as any related costs for the period Monday, May 9, 2022 to Monday, June 13, 2022, due to delays caused by Enbridge’s failure to provide locates within five business days in accordance with s. 6(3) of the OUINS Act.

4On March 1, 2024, Enbridge delivered a Reply to the Claim, in which Enbridge stated that other utility providers, including Enova Power Corp., formerly known as Waterloo North Hydro Inc. (collectively, “Enova”), Hydro One Networks Inc., Hydro One Limited, Hydro One Inc. (collectively, “Hydro One”) and Bell Canada (“Bell”), also failed to provide locates within five business days, contrary to the OUINS Act.

5On March 6, 2024, the Building Infrastructure Safely Act, 2024 S.O. 2024, c. 1 (“BIS Act”) received Royal Assent. The passing of the BIS Act made several changes to the OUINS Act, including amending s. 17 to remove the requirement for a One Call Member (“member”) to compensate an excavator for a loss or expense incurred because the member failed to provide a locate in accordance with the time limit applicable under s. 6 of the OUINS Act.

6The matters currently before this Tribunal are specific to paragraph 5 above and specifically to s. 17(1)(c) of the OUINS Act (“s. 17(1)(c)”), which was repealed on May 1, 2024.

7On March 22, 2024, the Tribunal conducted a first Case Management Conference (“CMC”) for Capital’s claim filed against Enbridge. At this CMC, it was determined that there may be additional members to be served for Claims for Compensation and that the additional claims (“Claims”) could be served by April 30, 2024. Both Parties were aware of the upcoming changes to the OUINS Act effective May 1, 2024.

8On or about April 2, 2024, Capital submitted a second Claim to the Tribunal against Enova, Hydro One and Bell for failing to provide locates within five business days, contrary to the OUINS Act.

9On May 28, 2024, the Tribunal convened the second CMC (“second CMC”) for the Claim against Enbridge. Additionally, the Tribunal conducted the first CMC for the Claim against Enova, Hydro One and Bell pursuant to s. 17(4) of the OUINS Act. At this CMC, the Tribunal received a status update from the Parties, as well as a draft Procedural Order and Issues List as directed at the first CMC.

10At the second CMC, it was anticipated that a Hearing of the Merits could be set. However, it was determined that the matter of jurisdiction would need to be addressed before proceeding.

11To avoid duplication and to ensure efficiencies, the Claims are being heard together in accordance with Rule 16.3 of the Rules.

12Enbridge, Enova, Hydro One, and Bell will hereafter be referred to collectively as the “Respondents”.

13At the second CMC, Counsel for the Claimant argued that the Claimant holds a Legislative right to come before the Tribunal on these matters as all Claims were presented to the Respondents in advance of Tuesday, April 30, 2024. Counsel for the Respondents agreed that, with the repeal of s. 17(1)(c) on May 1, 2024, the Tribunal does not have the jurisdiction to award compensation to an excavator for a loss or expense incurred because a member failed to provide a locate in accordance with the time limit applicable under s. 6 of the OUINS Act.

14The following materials were identified as Exhibits in response to this Motion:

a. Exhibit 1 − Motion Record of the Claimant b. Exhibit 2 − Response Record of the Respondents c. Exhibit 3 − Correspondence of Bell re: Adopting the Legal Argument of Enbridge on Jurisdiction d. Exhibit 4 − Correspondence of Hydro One Networks Adopting the Legal Argument of Enbridge on Jurisdiction

THE ISSUES

15At the second CMC, the Tribunal determined that the matter of jurisdiction must be addressed and, in accordance with Rule 10.11, the Tribunal initiated a Motion to inquire into its jurisdiction to hear the matter and directed that a written Hearing would be the most efficient manner to proceed in accordance with Rule 21.1 of the Rules.

16It is, in the Tribunal’s view, important to clarify at the outset that in hearing this Motion the Tribunal is not required to, nor will the Tribunal, make any findings or determinations relating to the merits of the claim. The Parties in their materials have touched upon such matters but these are properly the issues to be addressed upon a Hearing of the Merits. The question of where the Parties go from there to resolve the dispute will then remain.

17Instead, the Tribunal is required only to determine whether it has the jurisdiction to consider the Claims brought under the OUINS Act. If the answer is yes, the proceeding can proceed to a Hearing on the Merits. If the answer is no, the proceeding may be dismissed under s. 19(1) of the Ontario Land Tribunal Act and s. 4.6(1)(b) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act.

THE POSITION OF THE PARTIES

The Position of the Claimant

18The Claimant argued that unless the BIS Act expressly stated that the repeal of section 17(1)(c) is to be applied retroactively, there continues to be a vested right to claim compensation for late locates, and that the changes effective May 1, 2024 should not be applied retroactively.

19The Claimant submitted that the Claims were commenced and were served while section 17(1)(c) was in force.

20The Claimant argued that the Tribunal acknowledged receipt of, and assigned case numbers to, the Claims while section 17(1)(c) was in force.

21The Claimant reasoned that there is no suggestion in s. 12 of the BIS Act, the provision repealing section 17(1)(c), that substantive rights already crystallized are to be rescinded.

22Counsel for the Clamant submits that the Tribunal continues to have jurisdiction to hear the matter and continues to have the ability to award compensation to the Claimant following the repeal of section 17(1)(c).

The Position of the Respondents

23The Respondents’ position is that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear the Claims.

24The Respondents argued that the repeal of s. 17(1)(c) was intended to clearly eliminate the ability of excavators to pursue claims for compensation before the Tribunal because a member failed to meet the five-day deadline. The Respondents argued further that the Legislature’s intention for doing this was to empower Ontario One Call to issue Administrative Monetary Penalties (“AMPs”) as a more effective remedy in promoting compliance with statutory time limits.

25The Respondents contended that if the Tribunal were to accept the position of the Claimant, the Tribunal would be determining the exact type of claim that the Legislature sought to avoid through the repeal of s. 17(1)(c) because it is an ineffective remedy enacted without proper consultation of the industry’s key stakeholders, and with the intention of lessening the burden on the Tribunal by not obligating it to hear such claims.

SUMMARY OF SUBMISSIONS

26The Tribunal has considered the evidence provided on this Motion and the submissions of the Parties and has reviewed all the authorities submitted in support of the respective positions. It is the Tribunal’s conclusion that the Tribunal does have jurisdiction to hear the merits of this particular compensation Claim for late locates under the OUINS Act, despite the repeal of section 17(1)(c) on May 1, 2024, for the reasons that follow.

27Ms. Perry, Counsel for the Claimant, argued that the remedies that were in existence prior to May 1, 2024 may be continued and enforced as if s. 17(1)(c) had never been repealed in accordance with the Legislation Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 21, Sched. F (“Legislation Act”) pursuant to sections 51, 52(2), 52(3) and 58.

28Ms. Perry submitted that there is no suggestion in s. 12 of the BIS Act that claims for compensation for late locates are invalidated under the OUINS Act nor does it state that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is to be eliminated to exclude cases that arose before the repeal of s. 17(1)(c).

29Ms. Perry stated and proffered supporting case law that s. 51(1)(a) of the Legislation Act provides that the repeal of an Act does not affect the previous operation of the repealed Act (Greenpeace Canada [2471256 Canada Inc.] v. Ontario [Minister of the Environment, Conservation and Parks], 2021 ONSC 60).

30Ms. Perry argued that, under s. 51 of the Legislation Act, Capital’s vested substantive rights are protected, and specifically that Capital may continue to seek their claim for compensation. To support this position, Ms. Perry cited Sisulak v. Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services), 2011 ONSC 1486 (“Sisulak”), which states:

Section 51 of the Legislation Act, 2006 clearly protects vested substantive rights. Specifically, it states that the repeal of an Act or the revocation of a Regulation does not “affect a right, privilege, obligation, or liability that came into existence under the repealed or revoked Act or regulation”. In this case, the employer had the vested right to dismiss an employee without challenge by the employee, unless the employee had twelve months’ service with the Crown.

31Ms. Perry contended that Sisulak confirmed that the usual method of construction is that new statutory provisions that are procedural in nature have retrospective effect, while those that change substantive rights do not:

[38] The usual canon of construction is to the effect that new statutory or regulatory provisions that are procedural in nature have retrospective effect, while those that change substantive rights do not.

[39] A matter involving jurisdiction is substantive, and not procedural. This is made clear by the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Royal Bank of Canada v. Concrete Column Clamps (1961) Ltd., 1971 CanLII 148 (SCC), [1971] S.C.R. 1038. In that case, the provisions of the Supreme Court Act had been amended to confer jurisdiction on the Supreme Court of Canada to grant leave to appeal in a per saltum appeal, rather than on the Court of Appeal as had formerly been the case. The Court held that the amendment was substantive in nature, and thus did not apply to matters that arose before the amendment took effect.

32Ms. Perry referenced s. 51(2) of the Legislation Act, which states that an investigation, proceeding, or remedy may be commenced, continued, and enforced as if the Act had not been repealed, in respect of a right, privilege, obligation or liability that came into existence under the repealed Act.

33Ms. Perry identified that, in s. 58 of the Legislation Act, references to the repeal of an entire Act in the Legislation Act also applies to the repeal of individual provisions of an Act (and not only the repeal of a complete act/statute). This concept is reinforced in ONA v. North Simcoe Muskoka Local Health Integration Network, 2019 ON LRB 19.

34Ms. Perry noted that the Tribunal continues to have jurisdiction to hear certain matters under the May 1, 2024 version of the OUINS Act under s. 17(4).

35For the purpose of this motion, Mr. Martin, Counsel for Enbridge and for Enova, made arguments on behalf of all of the Respondents.

36Mr. Martin reasoned that when the Legislature enacted the BIS Act, it was to eliminate the ability of excavators to pursue claims for compensation before the Tribunal because a member had failed to meet what he described as the “arbitrary” five-day deadline. He continued, stating that the Legislature’s intent was to ensure that safety objectives of the OUINS Act were not compromised. Mr. Martin argued that permitting excavators to claim for compensation in such circumstances was inconsistent with the member’s obligation of ensuring that all buried infrastructure was accurately located.

37Mr. Martin contended that the Legislature intended to ensure compliance with the five-day time limit by empowering Ontario One Call to issue AMPS as opposed to allowing excavators to commence claims for compensation through the Tribunal when locates were not completed in time.

38Mr. Martin advised that the Respondents acknowledge that the BIS Act does not expressly state that the repeal of clause 17(1)(c) is intended to have retrospective effect, and that this is not surprising as the understanding of the Legislature when the BIS Act was being debated was that no claims under this specific clause had occurred. Mr. Martin continued that, at the third reading for Bill 153, the then Minister commented:

[…] and I want to address this point clearly again, the bill would remove the ability for excavators to seek compensation through the OLT […] for delivery of locates past the legislated time limit. Now, this takes away an appeal route, but at the same time, we have balanced with that the [AMPs] as a tool of last resort and other compliance tools in between. At the same time, the reality is, was this a regularly used, or used at all, appeal route? My understanding is it wasn’t. So it’s a redundant remedy and is being replaced by, I submit, a more effective remedy, with the expanded powers of Ontario One Call and the ability, as a last resort, to impose [AMPs]–as a tool of last resort–and to ensure compliance with this legislation […] (Ontario Legislative Assembly, Hansard, 43rd Parl, 1st Sess, No. 123A [21 Feb 2024])

39Mr. Martin argued that s. 52 of the Legislation Act only applies where an Act or regulation is repealed/revoked “and replaced” or if an Act or regulation is amended. He continued that s. 17(1)(c) was only repealed and not replaced or amended.

40Mr. Martin further argued that, although s. 52 of the Legislation Act does not apply, the Legislature’s choice of language is relevant and should be contrasted against the language used in subsection 51(2). In subsection 52(3) of the Legislation Act, mandatory language was used, whereas Mr. Martin argued that s. 51(2) uses language that is permissive.

41Mr. Martin, in contrast to the arguments of Ms. Perry, cites sections 47 and 50 of the Legislation Act as being relevant to this matter. Mr. Martin argued that, while s. 46 states that every provision of Part IV (including the sections cited by Ms. Perry) applies to every Act and regulation, section 47 is clear that this presumption is rebuttable, and it holds that s. 46 and Part IV can be rebutted where a contrary intention is indicated, or the context requires otherwise.

42Mr. Martin reasoned that s. 50 also holds that the interpretation and definition provisions in every Act and Regulation are subject to the exceptions contained in s. 47 of the Legislation Act. It is his view that applying section 46, and by extension section 51 of the Legislation Act (so that section 12 of the BIS Act does not have a retrospective effect) is contrary to the Legislature’s intention, which was in his view to eliminate the ability of excavators to commence claims for compensation for losses or expenses incurred as a result of late locates.

43Mr. Martin contended that applying s. 51 of the Legislation Act to allow these Claims for Compensation to continue would be inconsistent with the context in which clause 17(1)(c) was repealed. Mr. Martin referenced Parliamentary debates to demonstrate the Legislature’s intent to repeal clause 17(1)(c) for reasons including: “(1) it was inconsistent with the safety objectives of the Act; (2) it was an ineffective remedy; (3) the legislature did not want to further overburden the Tribunal by requiring it to consider such claims; (4) the intention was for the AMPs regime under Ontario One Call to promote compliance with the Act; and (5) the Legislature was clearly of the belief that no one had availed itself of this ineffective remedy and it clearly intended that no one be allowed to pursue such relief.”

44Mr. Martin cited Thomas v. Aviva, 2022 ONSC 1738 (“Thomas v. Aviva”) [44] to support his position that if s. 47 of the Legislation Act rebuts the presumption that Part IV applies, the Tribunal must then resort to the common law principles of statutory interpretation.

45Mr. Martin acknowledged that at common law there is a presumption that repealed Legislation does not have retrospective application. He contended that the Supreme Court of Canada has held that the presumption against retrospective or retroactive application can be rebutted either “expressly or by necessary implication”.

46Mr. Martin expanded this concept by citing Ruth Sullivan (Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes (5th Ed)):

All that is required to [rebut the presumption] is some sufficient indication that the legislation is meant to change the law for the past as well as the future.

47Mr. Martin argued that the presumption against retrospectivity does not apply if the consequence at issue is designed to protect the public rather than as a punishment for a prior event as set out in Grimstead v. Ontario College of Teachers, 2023 ONSC 39 (“Grimstead”). Mr. Martin advised that the public protection exemption was elaborated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Tran v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2017 SCC 50 (“Tran”).

48Mr. Martin reasoned that, if the Tribunal accepted that it must determine these Claims for Compensation notwithstanding the repeal of 17(1)(c), then the Tribunal would be determining the exact type of claim that the Legislature sought to avoid through the repeal because it is an ineffective remedy that was enacted without proper consultation of the industry’s key stakeholders and it is also contrary to the Legislature’s clear intention to lessen the burden on the OLT by not forcing it to hear such claims.

49Mr. Martin argued that it is intent of the Legislature in moving forward with the repeal of s. 17(1)(c) that forms the basis of jurisdiction to hear the Claims for Compensation.

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

50All Parties have acknowledged that the presumption is that Legislative changes do not apply retroactively, and the Tribunal is not satisfied that the Respondents have demonstrated that an exception applies in this case. The Tribunal agrees with the Claimant and relies on Sisulak in finding that the Claimant has a substantive right to bring their claim to the Tribunal and that the repeal of 17(1)(c) does not apply retroactively.

51The Tribunal found the facts of the Sisulak case to be relevant and most similar to the case at hand, given that it also addressed an administrative board's jurisdiction to hear a matter, also following the repeal of legislation.

52Sisulak stated that the “usual canon of construction is to the effect that that new statutory or regulatory provisions that are procedural in nature have retrospective effect, while those that change substantive rights do not” (Sisulak v. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario, 2011 ONSC 38).

53The Tribunal notes and adopts the premise identified in Sisulak that a matter involving jurisdiction is substantive and not procedural, as cited in Sisulak, paragraph 39:

All the authorities we have been referred to in support of this contention merely tend to show that the principle that statutes do not operate retrospectively is not applicable to rules of procedure. However, it is well established that jurisdiction is not a procedural matter, and no reason has been shown for holding that it becomes a procedural matter when a transfer of powers, rather than an increase or a decrease, is involved.

The Tribunal has jurisdiction in this instance to determine the claim because the Claimant's rights cannot be affected retroactively. The Tribunal notes that all of the Claims for Compensation were commenced prior to May 1, 2024 and the first CMC took place on March 22, 2024. The setting of the second CMC was based on the availability of the Tribunal Calendar and also on the ability to commence additional claims prior to May 1, 2024.

54Both Parties referenced the Legislation Act in their submissions. The Claimant argued that vested substantive rights are protected as outlined in s. 51 of the Legislation Act. The Respondents in contrast look to s. 47, which cites that every provision of Part VI applies unless a contrary intention appears or its application would give to a term or provision a meaning that is inconsistent with the context.

55To support the argument that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction in this matter, key arguments put forth by the Respondents were intent and context. In his Reply Submission, Mr. Martin relies on the debates and statements in the Legislative Assembly through the Hansard to support his argument on intent and context. In this instance, the Tribunal does not find the Hansard to be of assistance, particularly when the Legislative Assembly was apparently under the impression that no claims had been made under s. 17(1)(c).

56The Tribunal does not agree with Mr. Martin’s conclusion that applying s. 51 of the Legislation Act would be inconsistent with the intent and context in which s. 17(1)(c) was repealed. Mr. Martin stated that the 17(1)(c) was an ineffective remedy and it clearly intended that no one be allowed to pursue such relief. The shortfall of the argument is a lack of evidence that the 17(1)(c) was an ineffective remedy or that no one should be able to pursue such relief. Mr. Martin contended at paragraph 36 of the Responding Submission that:

If the OLT were to accept Capital Paving’s position that it must determine these Claims for Compensation notwithstanding the repeal of clause 17(1)(c), then the OLT would be determining the exact type of claim that the legislature sought to avoid through the repeal because it is an ineffective remedy that was enacted without proper consultation of the industry’s key stakeholders, including members of Ontario One Call. It is also contrary to the legislature’s clear intention to lessen the burden on the OLT by not forcing it to hear such claims.

This paragraph appears to refer to arguments raised in the Hansard related more to whether claims under 17(1)(c) was the preferred compliance tool. This is reflected by Minister McCarthy’s statement that the removal of 17(1)(c) was proposed to address the raising of a concern by members of Ontario One Call that the OLT did not have the ability to exercise discretion when awarding cost compensation, as well as his statement that the 17(1)(c) remedy would be redundant with the expanded powers of Ontario One Call. While the Respondents have proffered evidence supporting the rationale for the repeal generally, there does not appear to be any evidence of Legislative intent that the repeal be applied retroactively.

57The Respondents argued that retrospectivity and vested rights was rebutted, and that the Tribunal would be required to resort to common law principles of statutory principles. Mr. Martin argues that this was reflected in Thomas v. Aviva [44], which states:

Since the interpretation tools under Part VI of the Legislation Act are rebutted by reading the transition provision in context, the court must resort back to the common law principles of statutory interpretation. At common law, the court has held that regulations may be useful interpretative tools where the regulations are closely intertwined with a statute or were enacted contemporaneously with a statute under review by the court.

58The Tribunal finds that Thomas v. Aviva is distinguishable with respect to this Motion as the Court in Thomas v. Aviva relies on a transition provision that does not exist in this case.

59The Respondents argued that the presumption of retrospectivity does not apply if the protection of the public was at risk. Mr. Martin cites Grimstead and Tran to support this assertion. Although Mr. Martin states that s. 17(1)(c) was inconsistent with the safety objectives of the OUINS Act, he provides no persuasive evidence to support this conclusion. The Tribunal notes the speculative nature of the comments in the Hansard and that, given there is unlikely to be any future claims under s. 17(1)(c), it is not clear how permitting the hearing of this Claim would impact any motivation to prioritize safety.

60The Tribunal relies on the Supreme Court’s guidance in Tran that the public safety exemption would only be triggered when the design of the penalty signals that Parliament has weighed the benefits of retrospectivity against its potential for unfairness (Tran v. Canada [Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness], 2017 SCC 46-50). The Respondents have not demonstrated that the Legislature did weigh the benefits of retrospectivity in this matter with the potential for unfairness. The Tribunal finds that to not allow the appeal to proceed to a Hearing of the Merits would create unfairness for the Claimant and have no impact on public safety.

61The Tribunal finds that the Respondent has not demonstrated that for the purpose of this Motion the exceptions set out in s. 47 of the Legislation Act have been met or should apply.

62The Tribunal prefers the Submissions of the Claimant for the purpose of this Motion and accepts that under s. 51 of the Legislation Act the Claimant does retain vested and substantive rights.

63The Tribunal finds the Claimants’ arguments respecting the Legislation Act more persuasive. The Tribunal finds that proceeding to a Hearing of the Merits on this Claim for Compensation would not be contrary to the intention of the OUINS Act or the BIS Act, particularly as the Tribunal continues to have jurisdiction to hear related claims under s. 17(4) of the OUINS Act.

CONCLUSION

64For the reasons stated above, the Tribunal finds that it does have the jurisdiction to hear these Applications.

65The Tribunal reaffirms that, by hearing this Motion, the Tribunal is not required to, nor will, make any findings or determinations relating to the merits of the claim. These matters can be better addressed upon a Hearing of the Merits.

66This Decision of this motion does not predetermine the merits of the appeal nor preclude the Respondents from bringing a Motion to Dismiss in accordance with the Rules.

ORDER

UPON A MOTION initiated by the Tribunal pursuant to Rule 10.11 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Practice and Procedure:

67THE TRIBUNAL ORDERS THAT within thirty days of the receipt of this Decision, the Parties will contact the Case Coordinator to schedule a Case Management Conference to review the Procedural Order and Issues List on consent, and to schedule a Hearing of the Merits.

68The Member is not seized and may be spoken to through the Tribunal’s Case Coordinator should there be any issues with respect to the implementation of this Order.

“W. Daniel Best”

W. DANIEL BEST MEMBER Ontario Land Tribunal

Website: www.olt.gov.on.ca Telephone: 416-212-6349 Toll Free: 1-866-448-2248

The Conservation Review Board, the Environmental Review Tribunal, the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal and the Mining and Lands Tribunal are amalgamated and continued as the Ontario Land Tribunal (“Tribunal”). Any reference to the preceding tribunals or the former Ontario Municipal Board is deemed to be a reference to the Tribunal.