642762 Ontario Inc. v. Ontario (Environment, Conservation and Parks), 2023 CanLII 66863

Ontario Land Tribunal

Tribunal ontarien de l’aménagement du territoire

ISSUE DATE: July 21, 2023

CASE NO(S).: OLT-23-000103

PROCEEDING COMMENCED UNDER subsection 140(1) of the Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.19, as amended

Appellant: 642762 Ontario Inc. (File No. 007974)

Respondent: Director, Ministry of the Environment, Conservations and Parks

Subject of appeal: Order to perform work to prevent, decrease or eliminate an adverse effect that may result from the presence or discharge of a contaminant

Reference No.: 1-139396623

Property Address/Description: 10 Kingsmill Avenue

Municipality/Upper Tier: City of Guelph, County of Wellington

OLT Case No.: OLT-23-000103

OLT Case Name: 642762 Ontario Inc. v. Ontario (Environment, Conservation and Parks)

Heard: in writing

APPEARANCES:

Parties

Counsel

Director, Ministry of the Environment, Conservation and Parks

Nadine Harris Madeline Ritchie

642762 Ontario Inc.

John Georgakopoulos Joanna Vince

DECISION DELIVERED BY JENNIFER CAMPBELL AND ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL

Link to Final Order

INTRODUCTION

1This Decision arises from a written motion (the “Stay Motion”) brought before the Ontario Land Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) regarding an appeal by 642762 Ontario Inc. (the “Appellant”) concerning Director’s Order No. 1-139396623 (the “Order”) issued by the Ministry of the Environment, Conservation and Parks (“MECP”) prescribing certain actions to prevent, decrease or eliminate an adverse effect that may result from the presence or discharge of a contaminant in, on or under the site (the “Site”) located at 10 Kingsmill Avenue, in the City of Guelph (the “City”).

2The Order provides for seven (7) action items as follows:

Item No. 1 Compliance Due Date: 12/07/2022

By December 7, 2022, the Orderees shall retain the services of a Qualified Person, satisfactory to the Provincial Officer, to do the work specified in this Order.

Item No. 2 Compliance Due Date: 12/07/2022

By December 7, 2022, the Orderees shall inform the Provincial Officer of the name of the Qualified Person retained as required by Item No. 1 with details as to the qualifications and experience of the Qualified Person retained and confirm that a copy of this Order has been given to the Qualified Person.

Item No. 3 Compliance Due Date: 03/03/2023

By March 3, 2023, the Orderees shall have the Qualified Person retained pursuant to Item No. 1 submit to the Director, for acceptance, a Work Plan with timeliness to address Recommendation No. 2.

Item No. 4 Within 30 days of receipt of written notice of acceptance of the Work Plan from the Director, the Orderees shall implement the Work Plan.

Item No. 5 Upon implementation of the Work Plan, the Orderees shall submit to the Provincial Officer a monthly written Progress Report prepared by the Qualified Person documenting the progress of work.

Item No. 6 The Progress Report shall be submitted to the Provincial Officer within 15 days of the end of the calendar month being reported upon.

Item No. 7 Within 60 days of completion of the Work Plan, the Orderees shall submit to the Director a Final Report prepared by the Qualified Person that documents the work completed as required by the accepted Work Plan.

3The Appellant and MECP agree that Items 1 and 2 of the Order have been completed. At a prior case management conference (“CMC”) held on February 27, 2023, the Tribunal granted an interim stay of Item 3 pending the outcome of this Stay Motion, as the date for completion of Item 3 was imminent. The Tribunal found that a separate interim stay respecting Items 4 through 7 of the Order was unnecessary at the time as the requirement for completion of such Items was only triggered following the completion of Item 3.

4The Appellant has now brought the Stay Motion to stay Items 3 to 7 of the Order (the “Stay”), pending the outcome of a hearing on the merits. The Stay Motion is opposed by the MECP.

LEGISLATION

5The principle legislation to be considered in connection with this matter is contained in s. 140(1) and s. 143(1) to (3) of the Environmental Protection Act (“EPA”), which read as follows:

Appeal of order

140 (1) A person to whom an order of the Director is directed may, by written notice served upon the Director and the Tribunal within fifteen days after service upon the person of a copy of the order, require a hearing by the Tribunal.

No automatic stay on appeal

143 (1) The commencement of a proceeding before the Tribunal under this Part does not stay the operation of a decision or order made under this Act, other than,

(a) an order to pay costs and expenses under section 99.1;

(b) an order to pay the costs of work made under section 150;

(c) an order to pay an environmental penalty; or

(d) an order to pay an administrative penalty.

Tribunal may grant stay

(2) The Tribunal may, on the application of a party to a proceeding before it, stay the operation of a decision or order, other than,

(a) an order to monitor, record and report; or

(b) an order issued under section 168.8, 168.14 or 168.20. 2001, c. 17, s. 2 (20).

When stay may not be granted

(3) The Tribunal shall not stay the operation of a decision or order if doing so would result in,

(a) danger to the health or safety of any person;

(b) impairment or serious risk of impairment of the quality of the natural environment for any use that can be made of it; or

(c) injury or damage or serious risk of injury or damage to any property or to any plant or animal life.

The powers of the Tribunal to grant relief of this nature are contained in s. 10 of the Ontario Land Tribunal’s Rules of Practice and Procedure (with s. 10.3 specifically permitting motions to be held in writing in accordance with the terms thereof), and s. 8 and s. 9 of the Ontario Land Tribunal Act, which grant the Tribunal (i) the authority to hear and determine all questions of law and fact with respect to all matters within its jurisdiction, subject to any limitations in applicable legislation; and (ii) to make such orders as are necessary or incidental to the exercise of its powers.

6In the event that the Tribunal determines that it has the authority to grant the Stay pursuant to s. 143 of the EPA, it must then consider whether the Stay should be granted based upon the test (“MacDonald test”) for granting a stay, as established by the Supreme Court of Canada, in RJR-MacDonald v Canada (Attorney General) 1994 CanLII 117 (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311 (“MacDonald”), which requires the moving party to establish each of the following:

(i) there is a serious issue to be decided at the hearing;

(ii) the moving party will suffer irreparable harm if the stay is not granted; and

(iii) the balance of convenience favours the granting of the stay pending the outcome of a hearing on the merits.

Issues

7Accordingly, the issues to be determined by the Tribunal with respect to this Stay Motion are as follows:

(i) whether the Tribunal has the authority to grant the Stay pursuant to Section 143 of the EPA; and

(ii) if the answer to the first issue is in the affirmative, whether the Stay should be granted based upon the MacDonald test, in consideration of the following factors:

(a) is there a serious issue to be decided at the hearing in respect of this matter;

(b) will the Appellant suffer irreparable harm if the Stay is not granted; and

(c) whether the balance of convenience favours the granting of the Stay pending the outcome of a hearing on the merits.

Submissions

8With regard to the first issue, the Appellant and the MECP concurred in their submissions that the Tribunal is authorized to grant a stay of the Order pursuant to s. 143(2) of the EPA, on the basis that (i) the Order is not of the nature set forth in s. 143(2)(a) or (b) of the EPA, and (ii) the granting of a stay in these circumstances would not result in (a) danger to the health or safety of any person; (b) impairment or serious risk of impairment of the quality of the natural environment for any use that can be made of it; or (c) injury or damage or serious risk of injury or damage to any property or to any plant or animal life, in each case contrary to s. 143(3) of the EPA.

9The Appellant has submitted that the contamination at the Site has migrated from a neighbouring property owned by the City located at 200 Beverly Street (the “City of Guelph Site”), in respect of which the MECP has recently issued a Certificate of Property Use (the “CPU”). The Appellant is appealing the grant of the CPU in a separate proceeding (the “CPU Appeal”). In its submissions, the Appellant noted that although the City appears to have been aware of possible contamination at the Site since 1994, no work has been ordered by the MECP in respect of the Site in almost 30 years (prior to the issuance of the Order and a preceding Provincial Officer’s Order), and there are not currently any active operations at either the Site or the City of Guelph Site which could result in any new contamination. Accordingly, the Appellant submitted that the contamination is historic and slow moving, and the matter cannot reasonably be considered sufficiently urgent such that s. 143(3) of the EPA would prohibit the Stay. Further, the Appellant referenced the issuance by the MECP of the CPU without any requirements to halt any potential flow of contamination from the City of Guelph Site, as further evidence that the criteria set forth in s. 143(3) of the EPA has not been met.

10In its submissions, the MECP confirmed that although it does have concerns with regard to potential contamination at the Site, those concerns do not rise to the thresholds set forth in s. 143(3) of the EPA and accordingly, it is in agreement that the Tribunal is authorized to grant a stay pursuant to s. 143(2) of the EPA.

11With regard to the first prong of the MacDonald test regarding whether there is a serious issue to be adjudicated at a hearing, the Appellant submitted that there are four serious issues to be adjudicated in this matter, specifically: (i) the jurisdiction of the MECP to issue the Order; (ii) the fact that the work prescribed by the Order has already been completed; (iii) whether the Order is an abuse of the MECP’s regulatory authority; and (iv) whether the Order is the equivalent of a strategic lawsuit against public participation (“SLAPP”). The MECP did not contest the Appellant’s submissions in this regard.

12Concerning the second prong of the MacDonald test, regarding whether the moving party will suffer irreparable harm, the Appellant submitted that it will suffer irreparable harm if the Stay is not granted as it will be required to incur “unnecessary and unreasonable costs” to comply with the Order. The Appellant claims these costs would be duplicative of investigative work which it has already conducted at a cost of approximately $180,000, although no estimation of the future costs to be incurred in compliance with the Order was provided. The Appellant also argued that (i) it will suffer irreparable harm as a result of the divergence of its time, funds and resources away from the CPU Appeal if it is required to comply with the Order; and (ii) the Appellant’s right to appeal the Order would be rendered moot in the absence of the Stay, as all or substantially all of the work set forth in the Order will have needed to be completed before a hearing can be held to determine the validity of the Order. In addition, the Appellant argued that it expects to be unable to comply with the Order in a timely fashion at this stage, which would result in irreparable harm due to potential prosecution for non-compliance. The Appellant also submitted that the absence of a Stay, in these circumstances, will unfairly benefit the MECP in the context of the CPU Appeal by providing it with additional information concerning contamination at the Site (and by extension, the City of Guelph Site) at the sole expense of the Appellant, to which the MECP would not otherwise have access within the confines of the CPU Appeal alone. Lastly, the Appellants argued that the issuance of the Order amounts to an abuse of regulatory process by the MECP which would generate an air of disrepute for both the MECP and the Tribunal in the absence of the Stay.

13The MECP disputed each of the Appellant’s contentions and submitted that they did not establish an adequate basis for establishing irreparable harm. Specifically, the MECP referenced several civil lawsuits being pursued by the Appellant which may result in recovery of the costs it would incur in compliance with the Order. These lawsuits specifically seek indemnification of the Appellant for any government orders associated with contamination at the Site. The MECP also argued that the risk of prosecution of the Appellant for failure to comply with the Order in a timely manner is hypothetical, and the remaining arguments raised by the Appellant do not amount to “irreparable harm”.

14In connection with the third prong of the MacDonald test, the Appellant submitted that due to the costs it would incur in complying with the Order, coupled with its risk of prosecution for lack of timely compliance, it would suffer greater harm if the Stay is not granted than the harm which the public interest would suffer in the event that the Stay is granted. In support of its submissions, the Appellant reiterated its contention that the contamination at the Site is historical and slow-moving, the contamination has not been treated with any urgency by the MECP prior to the issuance of the Order, and that there exists no evidence that the contamination will change in any material way between the present time and the date of the hearing on the merits.

15The MECP disagreed with the Appellant’s submissions regarding the balance of convenience test. The MECP noted that, as set forth in MacDonald, the Tribunal is required to consider the impact of the Stay not just on the MECP directly, but also on the public interest in general. In this regard, the MECP argued that the granting of the Stay would substantially prejudice the public interest. As background, the MECP submitted that it was notified by the City of trichloroethylene (“TCE”) contamination in the soil and groundwater at locations south of the Site in 2019. Since such time, multiple homeowners downgradient of the Site have expressed concern, and the MECP has been required to carry out multiple rounds of indoor air monitoring for TCE vapour intrusion in the neighbouring community. The MECP further noted that TCE is a known carcinogen, is highly volatile, and can evaporate from soil and groundwater and migrate into buildings. As set out in the Affidavit of Jennifer Volpato, the MECP has conducted four rounds of indoor air testing in surrounding homes between 2020 and 2022, which found that TCE was present in the indoor air of several of the homes in the area. The Wellington-Dufferin-Guelph Public Health Unit (“Public Health”) concluded that, based on available data, the known health risks from the presence of TCE in the indoor air were low at this time. However, further monitoring and assessment remain ongoing. The source of the TCE is currently unknown, and in order to determine the source, and thereby better assess and mitigate health risks, the MECP argues that it requires fulsome investigations of properties which are upgradient from the residential community in question, which have a known history of commercial use of TCE and where TCE has been observed in soil and groundwater. The Site is one such property. Accordingly, the MECP has argued that the work to be undertaken by the Order is critical in minimizing any delays in identifying the source of the TCE contamination, which will in turn directly impact the ability of the MECP to further assess and properly address the contamination in the downgradient community.

Analysis

Tribunal’s Authority to Grant Stay

16Evidence presented to the Tribunal supports the contention that the contamination at the Site is both historic and slow moving in nature and that there are no current operations at either the Site or City of Guelph Site which would generate additional contamination at the present time. Further, although TCE has been found to be present in the indoor air of homes in the region, Public Health has concluded that the known health risks associated with such findings are currently low. Accordingly, the Tribunal accepts the submissions of the Appellant and the MECP that the contamination at the Site does not presently rise to the threshold of posing danger to the health or safety of any person, as contemplated in s. 143(3)(a) of the EPA.

17No evidence was submitted to the Tribunal which indicates that the grant of the Stay would result in either (i) impairment or serious risk of impairment of the quality of the natural environment for any use that can be made of it; or (ii) injury or damage or serious risk of injury or damage to any property or to any plant or animal life, contrary to either s. 143(3)(b) or s. 143(3)(c) of the EPA.

18Accordingly, the Tribunal finds that it is authorized to grant the Stay pursuant to s. 143(2) of the EPA on the basis that: (i) the Order is not of the nature set forth in s. 143(2)(a) or (b) of the EPA; and (ii) the grant of the Stay, in these circumstances, would not result in (a) danger to the health or safety of any person; (b) impairment or serious risk of impairment of the quality of the natural environment for any use that can be made of it; or (c) injury or damage or serious risk of injury or damage to any property or to any plant or animal life, in each case contrary to s. 143(3) of the EPA.

MacDonald Test

19As the Tribunal has determined that it has the authority to grant the Stay pursuant to s. 143 of the EPA, it must now be considered whether the Stay should be granted based on the three-prong test set forth in MacDonald. The onus is on the Appellant to establish that each element of this test has been met.

20The first prong of the MacDonald test requires an analysis of whether there is a serious issue to be adjudicated at a hearing. The Supreme Court in MacDonald stated that this determination should be made on the basis of an extremely limited review of the case on the merits and that, as a general rule, the analysis will advance to the second and third prongs of the test unless the case on the merits is “frivolous or vexatious” or the constitutionality of the matter is purely a question of law. Thus, the threshold to be applied in determining whether a serious issue is to be adjudicated at a hearing is very low. In this regard, the Appellant denoted several serious matters which it is seeking to adjudicate at a hearing, which were not contested by the MECP. The Tribunal is not of the view that these issues raised by the Appellant are frivolous or vexatious in nature, and accordingly, the Tribunal finds that there are serious issues to be determined at the hearing, in satisfaction of the first prong of the MacDonald test.

21The Supreme Court of Canada in MacDonald held that the second stage of the test, concerning whether the moving party would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a stay, requires determination as to “whether a refusal to grant relief could so adversely affect the applicants' own interests that the harm could not be remedied if an eventual decision on the merits does not accord with the result of the interlocutory application”. The Court further held that the term “irreparable” refers to the nature of the harm suffered, rather than its magnitude, and consists of harm that either cannot be quantified monetarily or cannot be cured, normally because one party cannot collect damages from another.

22Although no estimate of the costs to be incurred in compliance with the Order was provided by the Appellant, the Tribunal accepts that some cost will obviously be incurred as the Order requires the retention of an expert “Qualified Person” and ongoing testing and reporting by such expert. Further, the quantum of costs is not particularly relevant given the finding in MacDonald that “irreparable harm” will be based on the nature of the harm in question, rather than its magnitude. Accordingly, the matter to be determined in this case is whether the costs to be incurred by the Appellant are capable of being cured in the event that it is ultimately successful in its hearing on the merits. In its submissions, the Appellant relied upon the fact that it would be unable to recover any of its costs against the MECP. While this may be true, and although it will often be the case that costs will be recoverable from an opposing party, there is no requirement that the “cure” rest with the opposing party alone. To the contrary, any potential third-party liability for the damages to be incurred would be a reasonable consideration in determining whether the harm in question is indeed “irreparable”. In this regard, the MECP has made various submissions regarding civil litigation which has been undertaken by the Appellant in order to recover damages associated with contamination at the Site. This litigation specifically includes, amongst other matters, claims for indemnification of the Appellant for any governmental orders issued in respect of the contamination at the Site. These claims remain ongoing and no determination has yet been made as to the nature or extent of any potential recovery by the Appellant. However, the Tribunal does not find that the uncertainty associated with the recovery process precludes the determination that the harm in this case is not irreparable. In this vein, the Supreme Court held in MacDonald as follows “The fact that one party may be impecunious does not automatically determine the application in favour of the other party who will not ultimately be able to collect damages, although it may be a relevant consideration.”

23Accordingly, the Tribunal finds that the prospect of recovery raised by the multiple ongoing civil lawsuits brought by the Appellant to specifically recover costs associated with the Order have the effect of undermining its argument that such costs are “irreparable”, notwithstanding the potential uncertainty at the present time as to the nature or extent of such recovery. In making this determination, the Tribunal recognizes the challenge faced by a moving party in striking a balance between (i) taking the position that the harm it has suffered is irreparable, and (ii) taking whatever steps may be available to it in order to recover even a portion of its damages. Thus, the Tribunal emphasizes the taking of steps by a moving party to seek recovery will not always be a bar to a finding of irreparable harm, and the determination must always be made on a case by case basis.

24The Appellant also argued that it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a Stay due to the divergence of its time, attention and financial resources away from its CPU Appeal. However, the Appellant did not provide any specific details regarding these matters, such as the nature of its overall financial situation or the potential costs associated with compliance with the Order or the CPU Appeal. In the absence of this additional information, the Tribunal is unable to ascertain whether compliance with the Order would in fact result in irreparable harm to the Appellant due to the divergence of its time and resources away from the CPU Appeal.

25The Appellant further submitted that it would suffer irreparable harm as a result of its anticipated failure to comply with the Order in a timely fashion in the absence of a Stay, and the potential prosecution as a result. However, as the MECP has noted, any such failure to comply and/or potential prosecution or other consequences flowing from delayed compliance are entirely theoretical at this stage. The extent of a delay in complying by the Appellant, if any, is unclear, and there are no assurances that any prosecution or other consequences would come to pass as a result. Accordingly, the Tribunal does not find that the Appellant has suffered irreparable harm as a result of its potential delay in complying with the Order.

26The Tribunal acknowledges the additional submissions of the Appellant regarding (i) the rendering of its right to appeal the Order as “moot” if it is required to comply with such Order in the interim period; (ii) the additional information that may become available to opposing parties in the CPU Appeal as a result of the environmental work to be undertaken pursuant to the Order; and (iii) the Appellant’s arguments as to abuse of process by the MECP. Respectfully, these submissions do not speak to irreparable harm or otherwise advance the analysis of the Tribunal under the three-prongs of the MacDonald test. With regard to the rendering of the appeal as “moot”, if the Order must be complied with pending a hearing on the merits, the Tribunal recognizes that this is occasionally the unfortunate practicality of an appeals process, however it does not speak to any specific irreparable harm which the Appellant will suffer over and above its costs to be incurred, which has already been addressed above. Regarding the argument that additional information may become available to the Parties in the CPU Appeal as a result of compliance with the Order, the Tribunal notes that it is not yet possible to determine the nature or extent of any such information or to whose benefit it may be – and, in fact, depending on the results of the work to be undertaken, such information may ultimately benefit the Appellant in the CPU Appeal. Lastly, the Tribunal was not provided with any specific evidence as to how the Appellant would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a Stay based on its arguments relating to abuse of process by the MECP.

27Given that the Tribunal has found that the Appellant has failed to discharge its onus to establish irreparable harm under the second prong of the MacDonald test, it is not necessary to render a finding with respect to the third and final prong of the test concerning the balance of convenience. However, for the purpose of providing a complete analysis, the Tribunal has also set forth its findings on the third prong of the test below.

28The third prong of the MacDonald test requires consideration of the “public interest” in the context of the harm suffered by the MECP, as further explained by the Supreme Court as follows:

In the case of a public authority, the onus of demonstrating irreparable harm to the public interest is less than that of a private applicant. This is partly a function of the nature of the public authority and partly a function of the action sought to be enjoined. The test will nearly always be satisfied simply upon proof that the authority is charged with the duty of promoting or protecting the public interest and upon some indication that the impugned legislation, regulation, or activity was undertaken pursuant to that responsibility. Once these minimal requirements have been met, the court should in most cases assume that irreparable harm to the public interest would result from the restraint of that action.

In this case, it is clear that the MECP is charged with the duty of promoting or protecting the public interest, and the Order has apparently been issued pursuant to that responsibility. Accordingly, in considering the balance of convenience test involving the MECP, consideration must be given to whether the grant of a stay would cause more harm to the public interest than the failure to grant such a stay would cause to the moving party. In this regard, the Tribunal accepts the submissions of the MECP that TCE is a highly volatile and known carcinogen, and that the identification of the source of the TCE in the neighbourhood downgradient from the Site is critical to the MECP and Public Health being able to assess and properly address any consequent risks to the community. The Appellant submitted that the findings and recommendations of MECP expert Ms. Volpato regarding the presence of TCE should be accorded less or no weight on the basis that (i) Ms. Volpato failed to review and critically evaluate all relevant and available reports in preparing her assessment, including with respect to certain previously drilled boreholes which may duplicate some of the work required by the Order; and (ii) there is no urgency to identify the source of the TCE as the MECP has known about the contamination for several years without taking action with respect to either the Site or certain neighbouring properties. The Tribunal has considered these submissions and reviewed the cross-examination of Ms. Volpato. The Tribunal finds that Ms. Volpato is a well-qualified and credible expert witness and there was insufficient evidence presented to undermine her conclusions. In addition, no technical evidence was presented to the Tribunal to support the Appellant’s submission that the previously drilled boreholes sufficiently discharged all or any substantial part of the work required by the Order. Finally, although the Tribunal agrees that the MECP has been aware of contamination in the area for several years, Ms. Volpato stated that it was not until August 2022 that the MECP (in consultation with Public Health) concluded that TCE soil vapour intrusion from upgradient contaminated properties such as the Site could not be ruled out in the downgradient residential community. Accordingly, the Tribunal does not agree that past inaction or delayed action on the part of the MECP prior to August 2022 is indicative of the urgency of the work now required by the Order, based upon currently available information.

29While the available evidence does not currently identify the Site as the conclusive source of the TCE vapours in neighbouring homes, thereby triggering s. 143(3)(a) of the EPA, the matter is still concerning and, on a balance of convenience, favours the taking of such actions as will assist in identifying the source and extent of the TCE contamination as soon as practicable. Further, the Appellant has not provided any submissions as to the costs it would incur in complying with the Order or the extent of harm it would suffer as a result based on its overall financial position. Accordingly, the Tribunal has no means by which to measure whether the harm the Appellant would suffer is greater than the harm to the public interest. Thus, although the Tribunal has already found that the Appellant has not discharged its onus to establish irreparable harm pursuant to the second prong of the MacDonald test, even if such irreparable harm is assumed, the Tribunal is of the view that the Appellant has not discharged its onus of establishing that the failure to grant the Stay would cause more harm to the Appellant than the harm that would be caused to the public interest in the event the Stay is granted, as considered on a balance of convenience.

ORDER

30The Tribunal orders that the Stay Motion be denied.

31This Member is not seized.

“Jennifer Campbell”

JENNIFER CAMPBELL

MEMBER

Ontario Land Tribunal

Website: www.olt.gov.on.ca Telephone: 416-212-6349 Toll Free: 1-866-448-2248

The Conservation Review Board, the Environmental Review Tribunal, the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal and the Mining and Lands Tribunal are amalgamated and continued as the Ontario Land Tribunal (“Tribunal”). Any reference to the preceding tribunals or the former Ontario Municipal Board is deemed to be a reference to the Tribunal.