LAW SOCIETY TRIBUNAL
HEARING DIVISION
Tribunal File No.: 26H-045
BETWEEN:
Law Society of Ontario
Applicant
- and -
Kimberley Ann Farrell
Respondent
Before: Teresa Donnelly (chair), Deborah Moriah, Michelle Richards
Heard: April 10, 2026, by videoconference
Appearances:
Ellisif Harris, for the applicant
Salvatore Pazzano, for the respondent
Summary:
FARRELL – Motion for Interlocutory Suspension or Practice Restriction – The Law Society received multiple complaints about the Paralegal including that she took money from clients and did not do work she was retained to do – She practised outside of the permitted scope of practice and retained an unlicensed person – The misconduct called the Paralegal’s honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness into question – The panel concluded that there were reasonable grounds for believing there was a significant risk of harm to members of the public or to the public interest in the administration of justice – The Paralegal’s licence was suspended on an interlocutory basis.
REASONS FOR DECISION ON A MOTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY SUSPENSION OR RESTRICTIONS
INTRODUCTION
1Teresa Donnelly (for the panel):– The Law Society sought an order imposing an interlocutory suspension or in the alternative restrictions on the paralegal licence of Kimberley Ann Farrell.
2Ms. Farrell received a P1 licence in Ontario in 2015 and provided legal services as a sole practitioner. Her practice focused primarily on landlord and tenant board matters, small claims court, and provincial offences. She was the sole source of income for her household.
3The order was sought under s 49.27(2) of the Law Society Act, RSO 1990, c L.8 (the Act) on the basis that Ms. Farrell’s conduct with nine complainants demonstrated that there are reasonable grounds to believe there is a significant risk of harm to members of the public, or to the public interest in the administration of justice, if an order is not made.
4Counsel for Ms. Farrell conceded that an order under s 49.27(2) was appropriate, but submitted that restrictions on Ms. Farrell’s licence, rather than a suspension, was the appropriate remedy.
5For the reasons that follow, we made an order under s 49.27(2) suspending Ms. Farrell’s licence.
Overview
6This motion arose from Law Society investigations of nine complaints. While one of the investigations has not been completed, the evidence at this stage raises serious concerns.
7While we have reached factual conclusions on the evidence before us, we recognize that the evidence at a subsequent conduct hearing may differ and lead to different factual conclusions, and we make no findings of professional misconduct.
8A summary of the evidence reveals the following:
Complainant A: Ms. Farrell received a retainer of $750 plus HST for Highway Traffic Act matters. She took no substantive steps, resulting in convictions. No appeal was filed.
Complainant B: Ms. Farrell received a retainer of $4,520 for two small claims court matters. She took no steps and the limitation periods expired.
Complainant C: Ms. Farrell received a retainer of $1,000. She failed to attend a settlement conference, resulting in a costs order against the client.
Complainant D: Ms. Farrell received a retainer of $565 for an urgent Landlord and Tenant Board matter. She failed to perform the work.
Complainant E: Ms. Farrell acted outside her permitted scope of practice in three matters, retained an unlicensed individual to perform legal work, and repeatedly failed to advance the matters.
Complainant F: Ms. Farrell received a retainer of $1,412.50 for a small claims court matter. She took no steps, and the matter was dismissed for delay.
Complainant G: Ms. Farrell received a retainer of $1,000 to file a private criminal information. No filing was made.
Complainant H: Ms. Farrell received a retainer of $1,130 to file an appeal under the Provincial Offences Act. No appeal was filed.
Complainant I: Ms. Farrell was paid $8,360.14 to have a lien discharged. The lien was not discharged.
9We have concluded that, absent an interlocutory order, there are reasonable grounds for believing that there is a significant risk of harm to members of the public, or to the public interest in the administration of justice.
10We have further concluded that Ms. Farrell’s integrity has been put in sufficient issue by the evidence before us that interlocutory restrictions are not sufficient. We have ordered an interlocutory suspension.
BACKGROUND AND EVIDENCE
11In support of its application, the Law Society relied on two affidavits and the evidence of two Law Society investigators who commenced their investigations into Ms. Farrell’s conduct in 2024. However, the Law Society has been investigating Ms. Farrell in relation to some of these allegations since 2019.
12No explanation was provided by the Law Society for the delays in these investigations. Ms. Farrell has continued to provide legal services during the course of the investigations. The last complaint was received by the Law Society on February 25, 2025. This motion for an interlocutory order was filed on March 20, 2026 and heard on April 10, 2026.
13The evidence tendered on behalf of Ms. Farrell was her affidavit and she testified at the hearing.
14We will first address evidence regarding each of the complaints and then Ms. Farrell’s general response.
Complainant A
15On April 22, 2022, Complainant A paid $750 plus HST for Ms. Farell to assist with driving charges. Ms. Farrell did not do the work that she was retained to do. When Complainant A sought information about his case, Ms. Farrell refused to respond in a meaningful manner and at one point threatened to pursue criminal harassment charges against him.
16On December 1, 2023, Complainant A learned through Service Ontario that he had been convicted of the driving offences, and that his licence was suspended.
17On September 18, 2024, Complainant A filed a complaint with the Law Society alleging negligence, unprofessional conduct, and ongoing failures to perform professional obligations. He reported significant financial and emotional harm, stating that the failure to act had jeopardized his driving record, insurance and livelihood.
18On October 3, 2024, Complainant A emailed Ms. Farrell expressing serious concern about the lack of communication and the impacts on him because of his inability to drive. He urged her to take immediate action.
19Ms. Farrell responded the same day stating in part “Withdraw your complaint, I will send you $250 and provide you with your paperwork, ready to file.” Complainant A did not withdraw his complaint.
20On October 18, 2024, the Law Society commenced an investigation into allegations of failure to provide competent legal services, failure to communicate, and failure to act with honour and integrity. Subsequently, additional allegations of misappropriation and failure to account were authorized.
21In written submissions dated February 6, 2025, Ms. Farrell asserted that she acted in good faith, and sought to conclude the matter amicably. She also referenced ongoing challenges and anxiety stemming from prior Law Society complaints.
22On March 11, 2025, Ms. Farrell provided further written representations where she accepted responsibility for the communication breakdown and mishandling of the file. She acknowledged that she failed to communicate effectively, did not act with appropriate professionalism, and fell short of the diligence expected of a competent paralegal.
23Ms. Farrell indicated in her affidavit that she regretted sending the October 3, 2024 email suggesting that the Law Society complaint be withdrawn, describing it as a reaction made under frustration and pressure. She apologized for the wording, acknowledged it was inappropriate and inconsistent with her professional obligations, and stated that her concern was managing a perceived conflict while a complaint was ongoing.
24In her affidavit, Ms. Farrell also acknowledged that Complainant A’s funds were deposited into her general account rather than a trust account, stating that she did not have a trust account at the time. She deposed she did not understand that unearned retainer funds were required to be held in trust, acknowledged this was wrong, and admitted she had failed to issue an invoice or accounting before treating the funds as earned. She denied any dishonest intent, attributing the conduct to ignorance of By-Law 9 rather than misappropriation.
25The Law Society’s position is that Ms. Farrell did not refund any of the retainer to Complainant A and that an analysis of her general bank account statement demonstrates that the funds were used for personal expenditures.
Complainant B
26On July 4, 2019, Complainant B paid $4,520 for Ms. Farell’s representation in two small claims court matters. Ms. Farrell did not do the work that she was retained to do.
27On November 4, 2021, Complainant B filed a complaint to the Law Society alleging that Ms. Farrell had performed no work, allowed limitation periods to expire, and failed to respond to repeated attempts at communication. Complainant B sought reimbursement of the retainer having lost the opportunity to pursue both claims and any potential claim against Ms. Farrell.
28On November 15, 2021, the Law Society commenced an investigation into allegations that Ms. Farrell failed to serve, failed to deliver the client file and return client property, failed to communicate, and failed to account.
29In written representations dated February 14, 2022, Ms. Farrell acknowledged that the claims were not filed. She took the position that nothing could be filed during the pandemic and then she must have forgotten about the file.
30In an interview on September 30, 2024, Ms. Farrell confirmed she took no steps on the file after the courts reopened.
Complainant C
31In January 2019, Complainant C retained Ms. Farrell and paid $1,000 for representation in a small claims court matter. Ms. Farrell did not do the work she was retained to do.
32On March 26, 2019, Ms. Farrell failed to attend a scheduled settlement conference and instead sent an agent who had no instructions or information on how to proceed. As a result, costs of $200 were ordered against Complainant C. Ms. Farrell paid the costs and then sought reimbursement from Complainant C.
33On July 15, 2019, Complainant C made a complaint to the Law Society alleging negligence, lack of professionalism, and a failure to follow through. Complainant C stated that Ms. Farrell’s conduct caused significant stress, harmed her reputation before the court, and resulted in unnecessary delays. Complainant C further stated she was required to retain a lawyer at greater cost, and she had not received any accounting for the funds paid to Ms. Farrell.
34On July 30, 2019, the Law Society authorized an investigation into allegations of failure to serve, failure to follow client instructions, failure to account, and possible misappropriation or mishandling of client funds.
35In written representations dated December 9, 2021, Ms. Farrell stated she paid the cost award as she recognized it was her mistake, but she was not able to explain why she later asked Complainant C to reimburse her.
36In an interview on September 30, 2024, when asked why she billed for a settlement conference that she did not attend, Ms. Farrell stated it was a flat fee retainer, and she had conducted preparation for it despite her non-attendance.
Complainant D
37In August 2022, Complainant D retained Ms. Farrell to assist in an urgent Landlord and Tenant Board matter. Complainant D paid a $565 retainer in September. Ms. Farrell did not do the work she was retained to do.
38On September 23, 2022, Complainant D terminated the retainer and requested a refund. Ms. Farrell did not respond. On October 6, 2022, Complainant D filed a complaint with the Law Society.
39On October 20, 2022, the Law Society authorized an investigation into allegations of failure to serve, failure to communicate, and failure to account.
40Complainant D consulted a law firm which sent a demand letter dated November 1, 2022, seeking repayment of the $565 retainer. Ms. Farrell did not respond.
41On February 21, 2023, Ms. Farrell provided written representations to the Law Society, asserting that she had communicated to the best of her ability and performed work on the matter, although she did not produce a final document. She further stated that her services were terminated, and any work product constituted her intellectual property.
42On September 30, 2024, during the Law Society interview, Ms. Farrell stated that she was not prepared to begin drafting submissions without being paid and that she did not contemplate returning the retainer funds.
Complainant E
43In 2020 and 2021 Complainant E retained Ms. Farrell to assist with a Superior Court of Justice matter and to amend two wills. This work was outside of Ms. Farrell’s permitted scope of practice as a paralegal. Ms. Farrell retained Jonathan Payne, an unlicensed person, to assist with drafting materials.1 Ms. Farrell failed to complete the work for which she was retained.
44On May 2, 2022, Complainant E filed a complaint with the Law Society alleging failures to serve and communicate.
45On June 2, 2022, the Law Society authorized an investigation into allegations of provision of legal services outside the permitted scope of practice and facilitation of the unauthorized provision of legal services.
46On August 14, 2024, Ms. Farrell produced documents to the Law Society relating to the Superior Court application, including materials she asserted were prepared by Mr. Payne.
47During a Law Society interview on September 30, 2024, Ms. Farrell confirmed she acted outside her scope of practice and acknowledged retaining Mr. Payne to prepare materials without confirming that he was licensed.
Complainant E’s son
48Between 2021 and 2022, Ms. Farrell acted for Complainant E’s son in a criminal matter, including a charge of assault with choking/strangulation, which was outside Ms. Farrell’s permitted scope of criminal practice: By-Law 4(6) and Rule 3.02(3) of the Paralegal Rules of Practice.
49In an interview with the Law Society on September 30, 2024, Ms. Farrell initially stated that a named lawyer conducted the bail hearing. When presented with the court transcript during the interview, she acknowledged she represented Complainant E’s son at the bail hearing.
Complainant F
50In May 2019, Complainant F retained Ms. Farrell to assist with a small claims court matter which was later dismissed for delay. Complainant F paid retainer funds totalling $1,412.50. Ms. Farrell did not do the work she was retained to do. She charged for a disbursement that she did not incur.
51On May 20, 2023, Complainant F filed a complaint with the Law Society alleging difficulty communicating with Ms. Farrell, a lack of professionalism, failure to complete work, and failure to return funds. Complainant F sought reimbursement of retainer funds.
52On June 2, 2023, the Law Society authorized an investigation into allegations of failure to provide competent legal services, failure to communicate, failure to account, and failure to deliver client property.
53During a Law Society interview on October 11, 2024, Ms. Farrell stated that at the time she was not familiar with the Small Claims Court Rules. When asked why she charged a disbursement for an expense that was never incurred, she said it was likely billed in anticipation. With respect to the court order dismissing the action for delay, Ms. Farrell stated that she received it by mail but did not notify Complainant F or take steps to be removed as representative of record.
Complainant G
54In June 2022, Complainant G retained Ms. Farrell at a cost of $1,000 to file a private criminal information. Ms. Farrell did not to do the work for which she was paid and did not render an account.
55On October 24, 2023, Complainant G filed a complaint with the Law Society alleging that Ms. Farrell accepted the retainer, performed no work, failed to respond to communications.
56On December 13, 2023, the Law Society authorized an investigation into allegations of failure to serve, failure to communicate, and failure to account.
57In written representations dated September 27, 2024, Ms. Farrell asserted that she did not file the private criminal information because Complainant G failed to follow a payment schedule. She acknowledged that her communications were deficient, that her trust reconciliations were not completed, and admitted she was unfamiliar with trust ledger requirements.
58During a Law Society interview on October 11, 2024, Ms. Farrell acknowledged that she did not provide Complainant G with an invoice or any confirmation of fees charged. She stated that she was unaware of the requirement to deliver an invoice before withdrawing funds.
59In her affidavit filed in this proceeding, Ms. Farrell acknowledged that she withdrew $1,000 from trust on November 29, 2022, without first delivering an invoice, contrary to s 9 of By-Law 9, and admitted that this conduct was improper.
Complainant H
60In September 2021, Complainant H retained Ms. Farrell for a highway traffic matter and paid a retainer of $1,300. She did not do the work for which she was paid and did not render an account.
61On January 26, 2023, Ms. Farrell advised Complainant H that her assistant had been tasked with completing the appeal but had failed to do so.
62On August 9, 2023, Complainant H filed a complaint with the Law Society alleging that the appeal had not been filed after nearly two years and that Ms. Farrell had failed to communicate, stating that numerous calls, texts, and emails had gone unanswered.
63On March 4, 2024, the Law Society authorized an investigation into allegations of failure to serve, failure to communicate, failure to co-operate with the Law Society, and failure to assume professional responsibility for her practice. Ms. Farrell ultimately co-operated with the investigation, and the allegation of failure to co-operate was not pursued.
64In written representations dated October 28, 2024, Ms. Farrell admitted that she failed to complete the appeal, acknowledged that it was her responsibility to ensure the work was done, and admitted that she failed to adequately communicate with and keep Complainant H informed.
Complainant I
65In June 2021, Complainant I paid $8,360.14 to Ms. Farrell in trust for the discharge of a lien registered by Ms. Farrell’s client. Despite taking the money, the lien was not discharged.
66Ms. Farrell prepared a statement of account for the funds received, which included the lien amount, accrued interest, her fees and disbursements, the registration cost, and a $750 fee to discharge the lien. In February 2025, Complainant I was advised by his bank that the lien remained on title. He reached out to Ms. Farrell about it.
67On February 15, 2025, Ms. Farrell responded, stating that the matter was not her concern as she was not the person who placed the lien on the property and was not the person “to remove it.”
68Counsel for Complainant I contacted Ms. Farrell by email on February 21, 2025, summarizing the circumstances of the lien payout and urging Ms. Farrell to fulfill her professional obligations and have the lien discharged. Ms. Farrell did not have the lien discharged.
69On February 25, 2025, Complainant I filed a complaint with the Law Society.
70On November 6, 2025, the Law Society authorized an investigation into allegations of misappropriation, mishandling or misapplication of trust funds, and failure to communicate and co-operate with the Law Society.
71On March 1, 2026, Ms. Farrell provided written representations denying any responsibility for the discharge of the lien and stating that she had requested confirmation from her client that the lien had been removed.
72In her affidavit filed in this proceeding, Ms. Farrell deposed:
I deny any involvement in the removal of the lien from the Complainant’s property, which was my client’s obligation to discharge. I am not the party who placed the lien, and I am not the party responsible for removing it. I forwarded all relevant correspondence to my client and requested confirmation that the lien had been removed.
73The investigation into this matter has not yet been completed by the Law Society, although it hopes to complete the investigation in May 2026. The Law Society says it is awaiting further information from Ms. Farrell. Ms. Farrell’s position is that she has provided all the documentation in her possession.
EVIDENCE OF MS. FARRELL
74In her evidence at this proceeding, Ms. Farrell acknowledged that her ability to provide legal services was impaired during the relevant timeframe. She agreed that trust accounting deficiencies are serious, admitted that she did not understand her obligations under By-Law 9, and acknowledged that her trust accounting practices were seriously deficient. She maintained that she did not misappropriate any client funds and stated that these deficiencies arose from ignorance and poor practice management rather than dishonesty.
75Ms. Farrell further admitted that there were systemic service failures affecting multiple clients, including inadequate communication, failure to complete work, and allowing matters to “slip through the cracks.” She acknowledged facilitating unauthorized practice, practising outside her permitted scope, and failing to act on client instructions.
76She further acknowledged that she was bound by the Paralegal Rules of Conduct and Law Society By‑Laws, understood that they applied to her, and accepted that ignorance of those obligations does not excuse non‑compliance.
77In her affidavit, Ms. Farrell provided context for her conduct, not as an excuse but as background. She stated that she has managed episodic anxiety since 2006, requiring intermittent medication through 2020. She further indicated that, in relation to menopause, she experienced cognitive and attentional symptoms affecting memory, concentration, and organization. She states that she is not currently on medication for those issues as she has addressed them through lifestyle changes. She also reported being significantly impacted during the COVID‑19 pandemic, during which she suffered the loss of several close friends and family members, resulting in grief, depression, and heightened anxiety while she attempted to maintain her practice amid office closures and multiple Law Society investigations.
78Ms. Farrell stated that the cumulative impact of these circumstances left her overwhelmed and “significantly impaired my ability to manage my practice with the professionalism and diligence my clients deserved.” She accepted full responsibility for the resulting harm and emphasized that she was not asking the Tribunal to excuse her conduct, but rather to understand the context in which it occurred.
79Ms. Farrell stated that she is prepared to accept a supervision arrangement as proposed by her counsel, which would require her to provide legal services exclusively as an employee under the direct supervision of a Law Society licensee and to refrain from personally handling client trust funds.
80Ms. Farrell also stated that she co-operated with the Law Society’s investigations by attending interviews on December 9, 2021, and September 30 and October 11, 2024; providing written responses on October 8, 2019, February 14 and October 11, 2022, February 21 and August 31, 2023, September 27 and October 28, 2024, February 6 and March 11, 2025, and March 1, 2026; and producing all requested materials in her possession. She stated that this co-operation demonstrates that she is not ungovernable, but she recognizes she should have sought assistance sooner.
POSITION OF THE PARTIES
81The Law Society submits that the statutory threshold for an order under s 49.27(2) is low and does not require proof of proven misconduct or a high degree of risk. It states that there are credible allegations that Ms. Farrell provided legal services beyond the permitted scope of a paralegal, facilitated the provision of unauthorized legal services, failed to provide competent legal services, failed to complete services for which she was retained, failed to communicate with her clients, failed to follow client instructions, failed to assume complete professional responsibility for her practice, failed to act with honour and integrity, failed to account, improperly withdrew money from trust, and failed to communicate and/or co-operate with the Law Society.
82It argues that Ms. Farrell’s conduct demonstrates a lack of integrity and trustworthiness, and shows that she cannot be relied upon to comply with restrictions. It states that there is credible and compelling evidence that Ms. Farrell misappropriated funds and that is a ground for presumptive revocation.
83In the Law Society’s submission, only a suspension will adequately address the ongoing regulatory risk as Ms. Farrell’s conduct reflects a sustained and persistent pattern of serious misconduct spanning several years.
84Ms. Farrell concedes that the threshold for an order under s 49.27(2) has been met, but submits that practice restrictions, rather than a suspension, are the appropriate measure. She argues that the length of time taken to bring this motion demonstrates a lack of urgency by the Law Society and that her continued practice during years of investigation undermines the assertion that she poses an immediate risk to the public or public interest.
85She further submits that the alleged misconduct does not involve integrity-based breaches or conduct that undermines confidence in the administration of justice. She characterizes the misconduct as primarily service-related failures arising from ignorance, lack of knowledge, and poor practice management, rather than intentional dishonesty, fraud, or deliberate misappropriation. She emphasizes her co-operation throughout the investigative process, including attending multiple interviews, providing extensive written submissions, and admitting mistakes, which she submits demonstrates candour and amenability to Law Society oversight. She submits that the misconduct occurred during a period in which she was overwhelmed by professional and personal pressures. She maintains her conduct is capable of remediation through structured supervision and regulatory oversight. She argues that enhanced supervision and education would address the root causes of her conduct, that proper invoicing and trust compliance would prevent recurrence, and that practice restrictions would protect the public while allowing her to continue practising. In her submission, a suspension would be disproportionate.
86In reply, the Law Society submits that delay is not a factor in the statutory test. It emphasizes that s 49.27(2) is forward‑looking and protective rather than procedural. The Law Society argues that regulatory risk may emerge gradually over time, as it did in this case. The Law Society maintains that education, supervision, or practice restrictions are inadequate where the conduct raises concerns about trustworthiness and integrity.
THE LAW
87Section 49.27(2) of the Act permits an order of an interlocutory suspension or restriction on Ms. Farrell’s ability to provide legal services if “there are reasonable grounds for believing that there is a significant risk of harm to members of the public, or to the public interest in the administration of justice, if the order is not made.”
88This requires us to consider whether we are entitled to make the order sought, and if so, whether an order should be made. Our role is not to determine if Ms. Farrell engaged in professional misconduct. We are mindful that the least restrictive order should be made to address risk to members of the public, or to the public interest in the administration of justice: Law Society of Upper Canada v Borkovich, 2015 ONLSTH 36 at para 26.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
89We agree with counsel for both parties that the statutory threshold under s 49.27(2) is met and that we have the authority to make, and ought to make, an interlocutory order. On the evidence before us, there are reasonable grounds to believe that, if no order is made, there would be a significant risk of harm to members of the public and a significant risk of harm to the public interest in the administration of justice. We therefore conclude that an order is not only authorized but necessary.
90The remaining question is whether that order should take the form of practice restrictions or a suspension.
91The evidence reflects the repeated acceptance of retainers without performing the work she was retained to do. It also reveals chronic failures to communicate; failures to provide competent legal services; failure to follow client instructions; failures to account; improper handling of client funds; deflection of responsibility; an attempt to negotiate the withdrawal of a Law Society complaint upon payment of money to the complainant; practising outside the permitted scope; facilitation of unauthorized legal services; and a failure to supervise delegated work. This conduct occurred over a number of years and affected multiple unrelated clients. Multiple files were left dormant for extended periods, resulting in convictions, dismissed claims, expired limitation periods, and unresolved legal issues.
92Common to all complainants is Ms. Farrell’s repeated failure to respond to emails, telephone calls, and status inquiries over months or years. Clients were left without updates, explanations, or confirmation about whether any work had been done.
93When clients were able to connect with Ms. Farrell requesting updates or explanations, her responses frequently involved silence, avoidance, or deflection of responsibility; for example, blaming her assistant, the pandemic, clients’ alleged non-payment, perceived conflicts arising from Law Society complaints, or third parties.
94Clients suffered significant harm and adverse consequences as a result of Ms. Farrell’s inaction, including a Highway Traffic Act conviction and a licence suspension, loss of insurance, dismissal of court actions for delay, expired limitation periods, a costs award, an unresolved lien, and the need to retain new legal counsel at additional expense. Several complainants described significant emotional distress and disruption to their livelihoods.
95Clients retained Ms. Farrell and paid her fees because they trusted her to advance their legal matters. Repeatedly she failed to do so. By retaining client funds without delivering the promised services, and without meaningful accounting or reimbursement, she effectively deprived clients of both their money and the legal assistance they sought.
96These concerns are not minor. They engage core professional obligations of integrity, competence, diligence, communication, and financial accountability. They are more than service failures. They involve the repeated acceptance of client funds followed by a failure to perform any meaningful work and a failure to account. This conduct directly engages Ms. Farrell’s honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness.
97Accepting fees on the promise of providing legal services that are never delivered — whether due to indifference, being overwhelmed, or chronic mismanagement — is misleading. It induces clients to place trust in a licensee to meet their legal needs while nothing is done in return.
98While the alleged misconduct is serious, the record also reflects mitigating and other considerations relevant to the appropriate interlocutory order. Ms. Farrell has no prior disciplinary history. In written submissions, interviews, and her affidavit, she acknowledged many of her failures, including deficiencies in communication, competence, diligence, and professionalism; acting outside her permitted scope of practice; retaining an unlicensed individual; and mishandling trust funds. She also acknowledged that her communication with Complainant A asking for the withdrawal of a Law Society complaint was inappropriate.
99Although there were delays in responding by Ms. Farrell in some investigations, including one matter in which production obligations are alleged to remain outstanding, Ms. Farrell ultimately co-operated with the Law Society’s investigative process, participating in multiple interviews, producing documents, and providing written representations.
100While not mitigating, we also consider the personal and practice circumstances that Ms. Farrell says contributed to her conduct during the relevant period. These circumstances, together with her admissions, are relevant to assessing the degree of regulatory risk and whether that risk can be addressed through restrictions on practice or whether a suspension is necessary.
101In keeping with Borkovich, the least restrictive order should be made bearing in mind what the eventual outcome may be if the allegations are proven. The revocation of licence involves significant consequences for a licensee and is ordinarily reserved for cases involving serious integrity failures, misappropriation, or ungovernability: Law Society of Ontario v Vinton, 2024 ONLSTH 93 at para 133, and Law Society of Ontario v Wilkins, 2021 ONLSTA 15 at para 104.
102In relation to integrity concerns, we adopt the statements in Law Society of Ontario v Hertzberger, 2024 ONLSTH 121 at para 40 that a lawyer’s lack of integrity creates a serious risk of harm to the public and undermines confidence in the legal professions. Because such licensees cannot ordinarily be relied on to follow restrictions, a suspension is often necessary. In cases involving integrity issues, losing one’s licence is a realistic possibility, so imposing an interim suspension is generally not inherently excessive.
103While a hearing panel may ultimately determine that Ms. Farrell’s conduct constitutes an abdication of responsibility, serious integrity failures, or misappropriation, our role at this stage is to determine the least restrictive order that will address Ms. Farrell’s significant risk to members of the public, or to the public interest in the administration of justice.
104Although her counsel did not advance this position, we considered whether Ms. Farrell should be permitted to continue practising as a sole practitioner subject to supervision. We also considered the alternative proposed by Ms. Farrell’s counsel, namely a restriction requiring her to practise only as an employee of another licensee under direct supervision. An employment relationship can provide more sustained oversight than supervision of a sole practitioner, including regular review of files and greater visibility into client communications.
105Ultimately, we concluded that restrictions either through supervision or an employment arrangement would not address the significant risk Ms. Farrell poses, as the effectiveness of any restriction depends on being able to reasonably rely on the licensee to be honest, forthcoming, and compliant with the restrictions. This is required because a supervisor cannot observe every interaction, verify every representation made to clients, or prevent harm if information is withheld or misrepresented. Where the evidence raises serious concerns about integrity, candour, and trustworthiness, the risk is not only that misconduct may occur, but that it may not be disclosed promptly, thereby reducing the protective value of the restriction.
106These concerns are illustrated not only by the allegations detailed in these reasons but also by Ms. Farrell’s response to Complainant I in relation to the discharge of a lien. Complainant I provided Ms. Farrell with a statement of account issued on her firm letterhead confirming that, in June 2021, he paid a total of $8,331.10, which included the lien amount, accrued interest, legal fees, registration disbursements, and a $750 fee expressly identified for discharging the lien.
107Despite having invoiced for and received funds specifically for that purpose, when Complainant I reached out to her in 2025, Ms. Farrell repeatedly denied responsibility for the lien, asserting that it was “in no way” her concern and it was not her “doing.” These statements are difficult to reconcile with the documentary evidence.
108These concerns are further illustrated by Ms. Farrell’s email communication with Complainant A proposing that his Law Society complaint be withdrawn in exchange for a monetary payment. The email was sent on October 3, 2024, four days after Ms. Farrell attended a Law Society interview concerning other complaints. It was also sent six days after she submitted written materials relating to a different complaint, and one week before a further Law Society interview involving additional complaints. This sequence provides a context that is relevant in assessing the nature and seriousness of the proposal made to Complainant A.
109These examples are not relied on as findings of misconduct at this stage, rather they further demonstrate serious concerns about Ms. Farrell’s integrity, honesty, candour, trustworthiness, and willingness to acknowledge and discharge fundamental obligations. Those qualities are essential to the effectiveness of any interlocutory order short of suspension. In turn, those concerns undermine confidence that supervision or an employment arrangement would be effective. We are not satisfied that Ms. Farrell can be relied upon to comply with such an order so as to adequately mitigate the significant risk of harm to the public and to the public interest in the administration of justice.
110In our view, having considered the nature of the alleged misconduct, the number of allegations, the duration of the alleged misconduct, Ms. Farrell’s admissions, the absence of a prior discipline history, her co-operation with the investigation, the impact of an order on her, and the range of likely penalties, we find that there are reasonable grounds for believing that there is a significant risk of harm to members of the public, or to the public interest in the administration of justice, if an interlocutory suspension order is not made.
ORDER
111For these reasons we ordered that:
Commencing immediately, the respondent’s licence is suspended on an interlocutory basis.
The respondent shall comply fully with the terms of the Law Society’s Guidelines for Paralegals Who Are Suspended or Who Have Given an Undertaking Not to Provide Legal Services while suspended pursuant to this order.
The costs of this motion are reserved to the panel that makes a final order in the conduct proceeding to which this motion relates.
Footnotes
- In 2014, the Divisional Court upheld a Law Society Tribunal decision dismissing Mr. Payne’s application for a paralegal licence on the basis that he was not of good character: Payne v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2014 ONSC 1083.