LAW SOCIETY TRIBUNAL

HEARING DIVISION

Date: May 5, 2026 Tribunal File No.: 25H-160

BETWEEN:

Law Society of Ontario Applicant

• and -

Michael Stephen Puskas Respondent

Before: Brigitte Pilon (chair), Edward Choi, Randi Druzin Heard: March 3, 2026, by videoconference

Appearances: Misha Feldmann, for the applicant Respondent, self-represented

PUSKAS – Failure to Comply With Tribunal Order – The Lawyer was suspended in August 2025 for failing to respond to the Law Society’s requests related to a spot audit – He did not file the report required under the Guidelines and By-Law 7.1 – The Lawyer had complied with his obligations prior to the hearing – The panel determined that the one month suspension should not be applied retroactively because the conduct between the two hearings was separate – The Lawyer was suspended for one month and he was ordered to pay $3,889 to the Law Society in costs.

REASONS FOR DECISION

1Brigitte Pilon (for the panel):– Pursuant to an amended notice of application (NOA), the Law Society of Ontario (the LSO) alleges that Michael Stephen Puskas failed to comply with the August 22, 2025, order of the Tribunal Hearing Division including by failing to provide a compliance report for suspended lawyers.

BACKGROUND

2Mr. Puskas was called to the bar of Ontario in 1996. In 2024, Mr. Puskas was practising criminal law in Hamilton.

3In June 2024, he was randomly selected for a spot audit to review his books and records.

4Between February 5 and May 12, 2025, the auditor, investigator, and Law Society staff made 15 attempts to contact Mr. Puskas to obtain information and schedule the audit. On April 23, 2025, they also attended his law office and three other locations in attempts to connect with him, but were unsuccessful.

5On April 30, 2025, Mr. Puskas responded to the auditor’s February 7, 2025, email. He sought and was granted an extension to May 5, 2025, to respond and provide all documentation that had been requested. In his letter granting the extension, the auditor gave Mr. Puskas the information necessary for him to complete his pre-audit questionnaire. Mr. Puskas did not respond, nor did he provide the required documentation.

6On August 22, 2025, the Tribunal found that Mr. Puskas had engaged in professional misconduct by failing to respond to LSO requests related to a spot audit.

7On the same date, the Tribunal ordered, in part (the Tribunal order):

• The immediate suspension of Mr. Puskas’ licence to provide legal services until he provided a complete response to the Law Society’s spot audit and related investigation (the “indefinite suspension period”).

• Mr. Puskas’ licence to provide legal services was to be (further) suspended for a period of one month, to follow immediately upon the latter of:

a. the end of the indefinite suspension period; and

b. the end of all current or already pending suspensions of the respondent’s licence.

8The Tribunal also ordered that Mr. Puskas comply fully with the terms of the Law Society’s Guidelines for Lawyers Who Are Suspended or Who Have Given an Undertaking Not to Practise (Guidelines) while suspended pursuant to the Tribunal order.

9Pursuant to the Guidelines and By-Law 7.1, Mr. Puskas was required to file his Practice Disposition Information Report by September 22, 2025.

10Despite many attempts by the Law Society to remind Mr. Puskas of his obligations, the Law Society received no response.

11On November 3, 2025, the NOA alleging that Mr. Puskas in default of the requirements of the Guidelines was filed.

12At the time of the current hearing, the Law Society counsel confirmed that as of February 5, 2026, Mr. Puskas had complied with his obligations arising from the Tribunal order (the spot audit) as well as his obligations under the Guidelines.

13We were advised that on August 25, 2025, Mr. Puskas had also been suspended administratively for non-payment of fees. It was not clear whether the additional one-month suspension in the Tribunal order which was due to commence immediately once compliance had been fulfilled had, in fact, commenced.

FINDINGS

14Prior to the hearing, we received and reviewed written submissions from Law Society counsel and Mr. Puskas with respect to the merits of the allegations, penalty and costs.

15Mr. Puskas’ submissions contained admissions of the facts set out in the affidavit of Tanya Munro dated December 12, 2025. He acknowledged that he had failed to comply fully with the Guidelines and the corresponding requirements outlined in Part II of By-Law 7.1 and Part II.1 of By-Law 9, including by failing to provide a compliance report for suspended lawyers.

16Based on the undisputed evidence contained in the written submissions and the oral submissions presented at the hearing by the parties, we found that Mr. Puskas engaged in professional misconduct, as particularized in the NOA.

17With respect to the issues of penalty and costs, Mr. Puskas and the Law Society submitted that a one-month suspension should be ordered as well as costs of $3,889.

18Mr. Puskas invited us to consider two additional issues. First, that a period of 12 months be granted to satisfy the costs award. Second, that the period of suspension for non-compliance with the Guidelines be deemed to have run at the same time as the one-month suspension imposed by the previous Tribunal order. He argued that proceeding in this fashion would respect the principle of totality. In particular, he argued that the imposition of an additional one-month suspension would be excessive in these circumstances.

19Following the hearing, we deliberated and accepted the joint position of the parties with respect to the quantum of the suspension and the amount of the costs. We agreed with the parties’ joint submission that a one-month suspension and costs of $3,889 were appropriate in the circumstances.

20We then reviewed the submissions from the parties on issues of the timing of the suspension and the time requested to satisfy the costs award. We made our order as set out below.

21These are our reasons.

Timing of the suspension

22There are four principal purposes to consider in assessing the suitability of a penalty for professional misconduct: specific deterrence, general deterrence, rehabilitation, and the maintenance of public confidence in the legal professions: Law Society of Upper Canada v Strug, 2008 ONLSHP 88, Law Society of Ontario v Kamal, 2019 ONLSTA 20, and Law Society of Ontario v Manilla, 2021 ONLSTA 25.

23Mr. Puskas submitted that the one-month suspension to be imposed should be retroactive and run concurrently with the suspension he was already serving as a result of the Tribunal order. He argued that the case law he had provided supported the position that the use of retroactive suspensions was not limited to cases where an interlocutory suspension was in place but also applied where a licensee had surrendered his licence.

24He further argued that we should consider what he referred to as “fairness.” He argued that specific deterrence had already been achieved in this case since he had not been working for more than five months, resulting in a significant economic impact. He submitted that allowing the current suspension to run retroactively with the suspension imposed by the Tribunal order would address both punitive and rehabilitative concerns. In support of this position, he relied on the cases of Law Society of Ontario v Gupta, 2022 ONLSTH 14, and Law Society of Ontario v Cengarle, 2022 ONLSTH 114. We found those cases to be distinguishable on their facts and of marginal relevance to the issue to be decided in this case.

25Law Society counsel argued that the suspension should be imposed prospectively, beginning at the end of the suspension period Mr. Puskas was currently subject to. He argued that the cases of Gupta and Cengarle were not applicable to the facts of this case and did not support the imposition of a retroactive penalty here. Counsel for the Law Society argued that in this case, a time served disposition was not available to Mr. Puskas. He argued that the goal was not to punish Mr. Puskas but a need to make him compliant with Tribunal orders. He argued that Mr. Puskas was becoming close to ungovernable and that a penalty order must send a message to the licensee and the legal community that these orders were important, and a time served or retroactive penalty did not serve this purpose.

26We considered the applicability of Gupta and Cengarle to the fact situation of this case.

27The licensee in Gupta had entered into an undertaking not to practise shortly after the Law Society had begun its investigation. The undertaking remained in place for over 19 months. In its reasons at para 74, the panel considered the issue of retroactive vs prospective suspension:

Whatever the length, the question arises whether a prior period of suspension or undertaking not to practise "counts" and should be considered in awarding the ultimate penalty. In criminal law parlance, should "time served" prior to conviction be deducted from the ultimate sentence, such that the new penalty is given retroactive effect.

28The panel further stated at para 88:

… the weight of the authorities is that an interlocutory suspension, or an undertaking not to practise, that is in respect of the same conduct that ultimately results in a penalty suspension should ordinarily be counted against the penalty suspension, giving that new suspension retroactive effect. This makes practical sense, and it is difficult to understand why a licensee who cannot practise because of conduct that results in a penalty suspension should be worse off than a licensee who has engaged in the same misconduct in the same circumstances, but who was not subject to an interlocutory suspension or undertaking not to practise.

29The panel concluded that the two-month suspension should be entirely retroactive because the interlocutory suspension was in respect of the same proven misconduct giving rise to the penalty.

30The panel in Cengarle cited Gupta with approval at paras 80-81 of its reasons.

31Mr. Puskas faced a different situation. His current suspension related to a finding of professional misconduct for failing to respond to and communicate with the Law Society regarding a request for a spot audit. He was not subject to an interlocutory suspension, nor had he surrendered his licence to practise in advance of a hearing on the merits of the misconduct alleged.

32The suspension which Mr. Puskas was currently serving arose from a finding of professional misconduct made in August 2025. The Tribunal order for that suspension was imposed after consideration of the substantive merits of that specific allegation of misconduct. The events which gave rise to the current hearing occurred after the August 2025 order. This was a new and distinct disciplinary hearing.

33When an interlocutory suspension is ordered, the panel has not yet made a finding of misconduct. The panel is only concerned with ensuring that the alleged misconduct of the licensee not put the public or the public interest in the administration of justice in jeopardy pending the outcome of the hearing on the merits of the alleged misconduct. For the period of the interlocutory suspension, the licensee is prohibited from practising while awaiting the hearing on their conduct because of concerns about their alleged misconduct and the significant risk of harm that they pose to the public or to the public interest in the administration of justice.

34We will not order a retroactive suspension in this case. The discipline hearing which culminated in the earlier Tribunal order was distinct from the current discipline hearing. The conduct was separate from the conduct giving rise to the current request for suspension. It merits a separate penalty.

35Law Society counsel confirmed that Mr. Puskas had become compliant with the filing requirements from the spot audit and the fulfilment of his obligations pursuant to the Guidelines on February 5, 2026. This date was not disputed. At that time, he still had to serve a one-month suspension for his professional misconduct for failing to respond to and communicate with the Law Society regarding a request for a spot audit.

36We order that Mr. Puskas will serve an additional one-month suspension beginning March 31, 2026.

COSTS

37Mr. Puskas advised us that we were to consider the amount of the costs asked by the Law Society as a joint submission.

38The Law Society submitted that an appropriate amount for costs be assessed in the amount of $3,889. We accepted this submission as being appropriate considering the Law Society submission and a review of the bill of costs.

39Law Society counsel requested costs be paid in full within one month.

40Mr. Puskas asked for a year to pay the costs due to his not working being able to get remunerative work as a lawyer while suspended. We granted this request which is ordinarily granted.

ORDER

41For these reasons, we order:

1. Effective as of March 31, 2026, the respondent’s licence to practise law is suspended for a period of one month.

2. The respondent shall fully comply with the Law Society’s Guidelines for Lawyers Who Are Suspended or Who Have Given an Undertaking Not to Practise while suspended under this order.

3. The respondent shall have until March 3, 2027, to pay costs to the Law Society in the amount of $3,889. Interest will accrue on any overdue amount at the rate of 4% per year.