Date: May 1, 2026

Tribunal File No.: 23H-052 & 24H-021

BETWEEN:

Law Society of Ontario

Applicant

and -

Antonino Agozzino

Respondent

Before: Barbara J. Murchie (chair), Ingrid Berkeley, Quinn Ross

Heard: December 16, 2025, by videoconference

Appearances:

Bernadette Saad and Tushar Pain, for the applicant

Respondent, self-represented

Summary:

AGOZZINO – Penalty and Costs – Knowing Assistance – The Lawyer was previously found to have engaged in professional misconduct by knowingly facilitating his client’s fraud, breaching trust account rules by accepting money into trust that was not for legal services and failing to serve a client – The Lawyer’s licence was revoked immediately and he was ordered to pay costs of $30,000 to the Law Society.

1Barbara J. Murchie (for the panel):– In two applications, heard together, we found Mr. Agozzino engaged in professional misconduct. We also dismissed his two motions, one for abuse of process for delay (the delay motion) and the other seeking a stay and other relief (the stay motion).

2In our decision on the merits of application 24H-021 (the 021 application),¹ we found that Mr. Agozzino knowingly facilitated Client C’s fraud (the fraud finding). That finding was based on the finding in a summary judgment motion in a Superior Court action (the SC action) against him.

3In our decision on the merits and the delay motion in application 23H-052 (the 052 application),² we found that Mr. Agozzino engaged in professional misconduct in failing to serve Client B. Although we found there was inordinate delay in the investigation, we dismissed the delay motion because the inordinate delay did not cause an abuse of process.

4In both applications we found that in accepting monies into trust for Clients A, B and C, Mr. Agozzino breached trust account rules, which, together with his failure to serve Client B, we refer to in this decision as “the other proven misconduct”.

5The Law Society seeks revocation based on our finding that Mr. Agozzino knowingly facilitated fraud. The Law Society also seeks revocation based on the other proven misconduct. It seeks costs of $75,000 on a bill of costs in the amount of $124,545.

6Mr. Agozzino submits that he should be suspended or allowed to surrender his licence. He submits there should be no or minimal costs.

7We have concluded that Mr. Agozzino’s licence should be revoked immediately and that he should pay costs of $30,000 to the Law Society.

THE FOUND MISCONDUCT

The fraud finding

8In the 021 application, the Law Society alleged that Mr. Agozzino knowingly facilitated fraud by Client C. The allegation of fraud was based on the finding in the undefended SC action, dated August 16, 2022,³ upheld by the Ontario Court of Appeal,⁴ in which the court found that Mr. Agozzino was a “knowing or at least a deliberately blind participant in [Client C’s fraud]” and awarded damages against him.

9Mr. Agozzino brought the stay motion which sought an order to stay the application pending final determination of Mr. Agozzino’s lawsuit against Michael Gayed, his lawyer in the SC action, for failure to defend. The stay motion also sought an order that the principle in Toronto (City) v CUPE Local 79, 2003 SCC 63 (CUPE), precluding relitigation of court findings in related litigation, was inapplicable in this proceeding.

10In our reasons dismissing the stay motion,⁵ we concluded that the 021 application should not be stayed and that it would not be unfair to preclude Mr. Agozzino from relitigating the fraud finding. In our decision on the merits in the 021 application, we concluded that the judicial fraud finding should be applied and found that Mr. Agozzino had knowingly facilitated Client C’s fraud as alleged.

The other proven misconduct

11The other proven misconduct included the finding that the legal services Mr. Agozzino provided to Clients A, B, and C were not related to the monies he deposited into his trust account on their behalf.. We also found that he failed to ascertain Client B’s purpose in retaining him; failed to serve Client B to the standard of a competent lawyer; charged fees to Client B that were not disclosed to her; and transferred those fees out of trust without delivering a bill to Client B.

12We concluded that Mr. Agozzino provided legal services to all three clients but that those services were unrelated to the monies he accepted and disbursed from trust. In relation to Client A we found that between February 1, 2016 and December 31, 2016, Mr. Agozzino used his trust account to receive and disburse more than $90 million for purposes unrelated to the practice of law.

13Client A was a money services business (MSB) that was licensed and regulated to transfer monies from overseas countries to Canada and vice versa. Until February 2016, when more stringent money laundering legislation was introduced and banks were no longer willing to take the risk, Client A operated through licensed banking institutions in Canada. In early 2016, Client A consulted its lawyer, Mr. Agozzino.

14After conducting research to ensure Client A operated a legitimate business that was compliant with relevant regulations for a MSB and conducting other due diligence, Mr. Agozzino concluded he could receive and disburse the monies. We accepted Mr. Agozzino’s research and opinion constituted legal services. We rejected his submission that the transfers he accepted and disbursed were for purposes related to that opinion and/or required his legal skill and judgment on an individual basis. We found that, in accepting and disbursing the transfers, he breached Rule 3.2-7.3. Based on the evidence before us, we found that the transfers were not illegal or fraudulent.

15The misconduct related to Client B occurred between May 1 and September 30, 2014. After agreeing to invest $200,000 with AM, Client B consulted Mr. Agozzino about transferring and refinancing her house to raise money for the investment. Mr. Agozzino did some research and gave his opinion to Client B, but she went to another lawyer. Once she had raised $200,000, she returned to Mr. Agozzino to record her investment with AM and to disburse it to AM. We rejected Mr. Agozzino’s submission that the payment of her investment monies into trust was related to his earlier advice on refinancing her house.

16In concluding that Mr. Agozzino failed to serve Client B, we reviewed their retainer and concluded that the purpose was to memorialize her investment with AM. We found that Client B instructed Mr. Agozzino to prepare a Direction, pursuant to which she authorized him to deposit $180,000 into his trust account and pay the money to AM.

17Both parties agree that Mr. Agozzino warned Client B against signing the Direction. He told her that by signing, she was giving AM authority to do whatever he wanted with her money. He could give it to the birds. She decided to proceed. Later, when her investment did not pay the big and fast returns she had been promised, Client B asked for her money back. She testified she received some but not all of it but could not identify the amount that was not repaid. She complained to the LSO.

18We found the Law Society had not proven its allegation that the investment arrangement was a fraud and that Mr. Agozzino knowingly assisted AM in defrauding Client B.

19Client C was in the business of owning and operating cannabis grow-ops. Mr. Agozzino was his lawyer. He incorporated companies and provided shareholder agreements and acted on the purchase of real estate both for the business and Client C personally. Mr. Agozzino was not involved in the substance of Client C’s endeavours and had no contact with his business associates. He testified that he had a general retainer for the business.

20In the matter before us, a third party was lending Client C $300,000 for the purchase of a specified property for a grow-op. Mr. Agozzino did not negotiate or document the loan. His retainer on this matter required that he accept the $300,000 into trust and disburse it as instructed. We rejected Mr. Agozzino’s submission that the receipt and disbursement of the funds was pursuant to his ongoing retainer to provide legal services to Client C and his various companies. As noted, we concluded that Mr. Agozzino was complicit in Client C’s fraud.

EVIDENCE ON PENALTY

21Mr. Agozzino testified that he been a lawyer for 43 years and had no complaints until the incidents before us. He pointed to our finding of inordinate delay in the delay motion alleging abuse of process⁶ on account of the six-year LSO investigation as mitigating in his favour.

22In the delay motion, we accepted that the investigation and the length of the investigation caused Mr. Agozzino significant stress. We rejected his submission that the stress constituted significant prejudice that was manifestly unfair to him or otherwise brought the administration of justice into disrepute. We did not have evidence that investigative delay caused the default judgment.

23Mr. Agozzino testified that LSO investigation delay impacted his health, that it contributed to his seizure/stroke and that it impacted his judgment in the undefended SC action. He said he believes the default judgment in the SC action happened because he was distracted by the investigation.

24Mr. Agozzino testified that his lawsuit against his former lawyer, Mr. Gayed, continues. There was a delay relating to insurance, but affidavits have now been filed and the matter is proceeding. He has not paid any damages awarded in the SC action. His intention in pursuing the lawsuit is to clear his name. Throughout these proceedings, he maintained that he was not a knowing participant in Client C’s fraud.

PENALTY

25The purposes of a penalty are four-fold: specific deterrence to the licensee; general deterrence to the professions; rehabilitation and restitution; and, most importantly, maintaining public confidence in legal professions.⁷

Legal principles

26It is well-settled that, absent exceptional circumstances, the only penalty that will both deter the licensee and the profession from knowing participation in fraud such as occurred here and maintain public confidence in the trustworthiness of the legal profession, is revocation of the lawyer’s licence to practise law.⁸

27For the other proven misconduct, penalty is determined within the framework of its purpose, discussed above, after consideration of the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors including those set out in Aguirre:⁹

The extent and duration of the misconduct.
The existence of a prior disciplinary record.
Whether the member has since complied with his obligations or otherwise co‑operated with the Law Society and whether he has admitted misconduct and obviated the necessity of its proof.
The potential impact of the member’s misconduct on others.
Whether there are extenuating circumstances.
Whether the misconduct is out of character or, conversely, likely to occur.

Seriousness and impact of misconduct

28In knowingly facilitating fraud, Mr. Agozzino’s misconduct is most significant. It goes to the heart of a lawyer’s duty to serve the public with unquestionable honesty and integrity. The potential impact on others is extensive.

29Lawyers who use their trust accounts for purposes unrelated to legal services also engage in very serious misconduct. Trust accounts are sacrosanct. They are protected from public scrutiny and federal money-laundering legislation by solicitor-client privilege. Lawyers and paralegals must be scrupulously honest in accepting, documenting, and disbursing client monies from trust. When lawyers breach the trust account rules requiring that use be directly connected to client services, they risk facilitating money-laundering or client fraud.

Trust account rules

30Rule 3.2-7.3 states, “A lawyer shall not use their trust account for purposes not related to the provision of legal services.”

31Section 18 of By-Law 9 requires that every licensee is required to maintain financial records, including a book of original entry that identifies the purpose for which trust money is received.

32These rules were adopted in 2011 to address two principal concerns:

The use of lawyers’ trust accounts to shield unsavory financial dealings from scrutiny.
The use of trust accounts to lend legitimacy to dubious or fraudulent investment schemes.¹⁰

33Trust account rules exist not only to protect client monies but to protect the public from clients who use lawyers and their trust accounts to shield unsavory or dishonest activities. The legal professions must be vigilant in protecting their trust accounts from misuse. As said in Gordon:¹¹

… the importance of using a trust account only for purposes related to the practice of law should not be understated. The rule helps avoid facilitation of money laundering by misuse of lawyer’s trust accounts. Lawyers must be vigilant in ensuring that their trust accounts are not used for nefarious purposes such as money laundering. This is important in the public interest and assists in keeping the government from interfering in the solicitor-client relationship.

34Any breach of the rule requiring lawyers to accept only monies related to legal services into trust is most serious. Even if the breach was innocent, as we found for Clients A and B, the potential harm is immense. For example, Mr. Agozzino accepted and disbursed $90 million on behalf of Client A. If those transfers had been illegal, Mr. Agozzino would have used his trust account to facilitate money-laundering. In the case of Client C, he used his trust account to facilitate fraud.

35Penalties for breach of trust account rules reflect the seriousness of the misconduct. The Law Society submits that in accepting monies into trust that were unrelated to legal services and in failing to serve Client B, Mr. Agozzino did not just make mistakes, he was reckless, in the sense of being inexcusably careless. In the case of Client A, he acknowledged that he failed to consider whether the monies were related to legal services before accepting them. In the case of Client B, he knew the Direction was unfair and failed to probe his client sufficiently.

36As said in Albaum,¹² there are more and less serious breaches of Rule 3.2-7.3 depending on the context. The panel discussed the range of circumstances spanning from an innocent breach to facilitate contributions to a neighbourhood event to accepting monies into trust with actual or constructive knowledge that use of the trust account was dishonest.

37In para 33, the panel concluded that misconduct was more serious in circumstances where the lawyer had grounds to be concerned about misuse.

Rule 3.2-7 is designed to guard against the risk of misuse of trust accounts. It follows that a failure to make a reasonable inquiry as to the purpose of the use makes the breach more serious both because the risk of misuse is greater, absent inquiry, and because of the By-Law 9 requirement that the purpose be recorded. It further follows that allowing use for a suspicious purpose is more serious because there is a greater risk of misuse. In other words, the misconduct of a lawyer who allows a use where there are grounds to be concerned about misuse is more serious.

38In the case of Client A, Mr. Agozzino understood he was taking a risk and conducted due diligence on the legality of the transaction before proceeding. His misconduct was not extremely careless or reckless such as to increase the seriousness. In the case of Client B, we agree with the Law Society that Mr. Agozzino knew the Direction was unfair to his client. Although he warned her not to sign, his failure to take additional steps to probe what she wanted from a suspicious investment and advise her on steps she could take to protect it, elevate the seriousness of the misuse of his trust account.

39In the case of Client C, we accept that Mr. Agozzino’s breach of the trust rules was most serious as it facilitated fraud. The penalty analysis on breach of Rule 3.2-7 (trust account infraction) is subsumed by breach of Rule 3.2-7.3 (prohibiting fraud). As said in Albaum,¹³ the improper use of a trust account is not the central misconduct for penalty purposes when knowing assistance in dishonest is found”.

40In Albaum, the panel ordered Mr. Albaum’s licence be suspended for nine months for using his trust account to accept and disburse monies from two clients, without providing legal services, in the hope that there would be future legal services. It was neither alleged nor found that the uses of the trust account were dishonest nor that the client activities were fraudulent.

41However, the panel found that Mr. Albaum had, in effect, been inexcusably careless or reckless when it found that: a reasonable lawyer would not have taken the retainer or found the client credible and would have acted only with substantial due diligence and not expected any future legal work.

42In Nesker,¹⁴ the panel accepted the joint submission that Mr. Nesker be permitted to surrender his licence after finding that he used his trust account to accept and disburse a series of transfers like those for Client A, totaling $150 million, for purposes unrelated to the practice of law.

Mitigating factors

43To his credit, Mr. Agozzino has no discipline history and, despite the inordinate delay, he co-operated with the Law Society throughout the investigation and these proceedings. In our decision on the 052 application (para 138) we noted that it is rare that we see better co-operation from licensees than in his responses to the Law Society. Given his clean record and his ongoing attempts to clear his name, we cannot conclude his misconduct is likely to recur.

44Mr. Agozzino cited his May 20, 2020 seizure/stroke as exceptional circumstances that should mitigate his penalty. Extenuating circumstances, differently defined, are a consideration in both presumptive revocation matters and in those where penalty is analysed in accordance with the Aguirre factors.

45In the context of presumptive revocation, exceptional circumstances must “rise to the level where it would be obvious to other members of the profession, and to the public, that the underlying circumstances of the individual clearly obviated the need to provide reassurance to them of the integrity of the profession.”¹⁵ However, in the Aguirre context, circumstances such as medical, family-related or others qualify as exceptional if they might explain, in whole or in part, the misconduct.”¹⁶

46Mr. Agozzino’s stroke/seizure undoubtedly impacted his life and his practice but, in our view, his illness does not rise to the level that would obviate concerns about his integrity. Neither does it explain the misconduct.

47Mr. Agozzino submits that the inordinate investigative delay caused his seizure/stroke and that caused or contributed to his failure to defend the SC action. The evidence does not support his submission.

48The stroke/seizure occurred in May 2020, well after the misconduct in all three cases:

Client A - between February 1 and December 31, 2016.
Client B - between May 1 and September 30, 2014.
Client C - between April 1 and July 31, 2019.

49In our reasons on the 052 merits and delay motion decision (paras 112-118), we accepted that Mr. Agozzino had significant health issues from May 2020 until July 16, 2021, when Dr. DiNardo described him as substantially recovered and fit to practise law.

50As the timeline of events (stay motion reasons paras 7-12) leading to the August 16, 2022 SC finding of fraud indicate, Mr. Agozzino was substantially recovered in plenty of time to prevent default judgment.

January 2020, the plaintiffs issued a statement of claim.
On February 11, 2020, Mr. Agozzino and the other defendants retained Mr. Gayed to represent them.
November 25, 2020, the plaintiffs noted the defendants in default.
May 7, 2021, plaintiffs’ counsel served a motion for summary judgment.
May 10, 2022, the summary judgment motion proceeded.
On August 16, 2022, the fraud finding was made.

51There is one other consideration for penalty analysis. Mr. Agozzino relies on our finding of inordinate delay to reduce the penalty. The investigation took six years. The first investigator did not pursue the investigation with diligence. He sought more and more information, only a fraction of which was relevant. He demanded bank documents some two years after they had been supplied. He lost Mr. Agozzino’s due diligence binder on Client A. After his employment was terminated, it was discovered that his notes and notebooks related to the investigation and other documents were missing. Finally, the third investigator was able to review the voluminous material, conduct necessary research and further investigation, and simplify and cogently organize the materials into a concise investigation report, all within eight months.

52In Abrametz,¹⁷ the Supreme Court of Canada noted that numerous tribunals and courts have taken delay (including not amounting to abuse of process) into account as an attenuating factor in deciding appropriate sanction. It noted that the threshold for reduction would be particularly high when presumptive penalty is licence revocation, citing Abbott. In Abbott, the Tribunal Hearing Division had revoked the lawyer’s licence for knowing participation in mortgage fraud. Based on lengthy delay in the proceedings, the Appeal Division reversed and substituted a two-year suspension. The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal but the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reinstated revocation of licence.

Conclusion

53We conclude that Mr. Agozzino’s licence ust be revoked for knowingly facilitating Client C’s fraud. There is no lesser penalty that can maintain the confidence of the public in the profession. There are no extenuating circumstances that could excuse his misconduct nor can our finding of inordinate delay ameliorate the sanction. As said in Abrametz,¹⁸ “given Given the gravity of the misconduct generally required for such a penalty [licence revocation] to be imposed, setting it aside might imperil public confidence in the administration of justice rather than enhance it.”

54We reject the Law Society’s submission that revocation is the appropriate penalty for the other misconduct on its own. Like in Albaum, where the penalty was a nine-month suspension, Mr. Agozzino “failed to address the purpose of the use of his trust account despite clearly being on notice of highly suspicious circumstances”. Unlike Mr. Nesker, who was allowed to surrender his licence, Mr. Agozzino conducted due diligence before accepting Client A’s transfers. The same cannot be said for Client B. He knew she was investing money without any security or protection for her capital, but proceeded nonetheless.

55In our view, like in Albaum, the other misconduct warrants a significant penalty, albeit tempered by a reduction for inordinate delay. In Wachtler v College of Physicians and Surgeons of the Province of Alberta,¹⁹ referred to in Abrametz, the Alberta Court of Appeal reduced the licensee’s penalty by 2/3 from a three-month to a one-month suspension and set aside the costs award on account of delay not amounting to abuse of process.

56In this case, given the seriousness of the other misconduct and the sanctity of a lawyer’s trust account, we conclude that a penalty of a one-year suspension with a reduction by 1/3 for inordinate delay, for a total suspension of eight months, is appropriate.

COSTS

57The Law Society seeks costs of $75,000 on a bill of costs of almost $125,000 on account of mixed success.

58It is well-accepted that the cost of proceeding against a licensee for professional misconduct should be borne by the licensee and not the professions through payment of their fees. In determining the amount of costs to be paid, we are directed by Perelli²⁰ to:

Find an appropriate general range, considering key litigation steps including pre-hearings, the length of the hearing and the work product of Law Society representative(s).
Determine a place within the range by taking into account:

a. the complexity of the case;

b. any conduct of the parties during the Tribunal process that lengthened the proceedings;

c. any financial hardship that affects the ability of the licensee to pay; and

d. any other factors particular to the case.

59There were two applications, with a total of seven allegations, and two motions heard over eight days. The Law Society was successful on allegations 1, 5(a), (b), (c), and (f) in the 052 application and allegation 1 and 2 on the 021 application. It was completely successful on the stay motion and partially successful on the delay motion. The allegations were not complex but were factually dense. Mr. Agozzino was generally co-operative. The parties signed an agreed statement of facts and a request to admit.

60We accept that the range of costs for a five- to six-day hearing is $50,000 to $75,000.²¹

61Mr. Agozzino relies on our finding of inordinate delay to reduce costs. In Abrametz,²² the Court stated that courts can exercise their discretion to reduce costs or award costs against the agency “even where inordinate delay does not amount to abuse of process”.

62Mr. Agozzino also relies on impecuniosity. He testified that he had no ability to pay a costs award. He had mortgaged his house to pay legal fees and then sold it, with the closing in March. The proceeds of about $60,000 are all spoken for. He does not have any savings or RRSP or investment properties. He has retired and he and his wife are living on their old age pensions with assistance from their four children. After their house is sold, they will live with one of their children.

63Considering Mr. Agozzino’s inability to pay a costs award and allowing a credit for inordinate delay, we find that a costs award of $30,000 over three years is appropriate.

ORDER

64We order:

The respondent’s licence shall be revoked, effective immediately.
The respondent shall pay costs to the Law Society in the amount of $30,000 by May 1, 2029. Starting the day following the deadline for the payment of costs, interest shall accrue on any unpaid part of those costs at a rate of 4% per year.

Footnotes

Law Society of Ontario v Agozzino, 2025 ONLSTH 101 (the 021 merits decision).
Law Society of Ontario v Agozzino, 2025 ONLSTH 11 (the 052 merits and delay motion decision).
10720143 Canada Corp. v 2698874 Ontario Inc., 2022 ONSC 4732.
10720143 Canada Corp. v 2698874 Ontario Inc., 2023 ONCA 463.
Law Society of Ontario v Agozzino, 2025 ONLSTH 4 (stay motion reasons).
Agozzino v Law Society of Ontario, 2025 ONLSTH 11 (021 merits decision).
Law Society of Upper Canada v Strug, 2008 ONLSHP 88 at paras 3-7.
Law Society of Upper Canada v Mucha, 2008 ONLSAP 5 at paras 19-26, Bishop v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2014 ONSC 5057 paras 26-31, Law Society of Upper Canada v Abbott, 2017 ONCA 525 at para 78.
Law Society of Upper Canada v Aguirre, 2007 ONLSHP 46.
Law Society of Ontario v Albaum, 2023 ONLSTH 156 at para 19 (Albaum).
Law Society of Ontario v Gordon, 2021 ONLSTH 109 at para 44.
At paras 26-33.
At para 67.
Law Society of Ontario v Nesker, 2022 ONLSTH 152 at paras 25-30.
Bishop at para 31.
Aguirre at para 12(g).
Law Society of Saskatchewan v Abrametz, 2022 SCC 29 at paras 92-95.
2009 ABCA 130.
Law Society of Ontario v Perrelli, 2018 ONLSTH 80.
Law Society of Ontario v Corcoran, 2025 ONLSTH 5, Law Society of Ontario v Hamza, 2024 ONLSTH 50, Law Society of Ontario v Harris, 2023 ONLSTH 55, Law Society of Ontario v Meisels, 2023 ONLSTH 5, Law Society of Ontario v McLean, 2019 ONLSTH 62, Law Society of Ontario v Paskar, 2015 ONLSTH 177.
At para 99.

Law Society of Ontario v. Antonino Agozzino, 2026 ONLSTH 86

Case Summary