Law Society of Ontario v. Achampong, 2026 ONLSTH 83

LAW SOCIETY TRIBUNAL

HEARING DIVISION

Date: April 28, 2026

Tribunal File No.: 24H-147

BETWEEN:

Law Society of Ontario

Applicant

• and -

Rocco Kusi Achampong

Respondent

Before: Paul Aterman (chair), Michelle Richards, Mark Surchin

Heard: March 20, 2026, by videoconference

Appearances:

Tomilayo Ojuile, for the applicant

Respondent, self-represented

Summary:

ACHAMPONG – Penalty – Costs – The panel found the Lawyer’s misconduct to be serious, albeit only involving a single dispute with a single client – The panel concluded a two-months suspension was appropriate – It also ordered reimbursement to the Compensation Fund, if necessary, and costs of $6,000 to be paid to the Law Society.

REASONS FOR DECISION ON PENALTY AND COSTS

1Paul Aterman (for the panel):– In our earlier reasons for decision in this case, we determined that Rocco Achampong (the respondent) engaged in professional misconduct.¹

2Specifically, we found that the respondent:

• failed to be transparent about the work he did for his client, MR, and the fees that he earned;

• failed to account to MR; and

• failed to pay a judgment of the Superior Court after an assessment officer set the value of his fees to MR at zero dollars.

3Despite the assessment officer’s determination that the value of the respondent’s fee was zero, we rejected the Law Society’s allegation that the fees the respondent charged MR were unfair and unreasonable. The assessment officer set the value of his fees at zero and entered judgment against the respondent in the amount of $15,000 because the respondent did not participate in the assessment hearing. Judgment was entered in default.

4By contrast, the respondent participated in the misconduct hearing. We found that he developed arguments on a novel issue under time constraints, and presented them in Superior Court on MR’s behalf. Accordingly, we determined that the amount he earned from the retainer was reasonably proportionate to the task he performed.

5The appropriate penalty for the respondent’s misconduct is a suspension of two months. In addition, the respondent is liable to pay the Law Society’s Compensation Fund up to a maximum of $15,000 in relation to any claim by MR.

6Although the Law Society is seeking costs in the amount of $11,792, we award costs of $6,000 payable over two years. Our reasons explain these conclusions on penalty and costs.

a two-month suspension is appropriate

7A penalty for professional misconduct is imposed to advance the objectives of specific and general deterrence, rehabilitation, and the protection of both the public interest and the reputation of the professions.²

8A decision on the right penalty is an exercise of discretion. It involves a balancing of relevant factors. The decision in Law Society of Upper Canada v Aguirre³ is a useful guide, because it sets out a series of factors that commonly arise in penalty decisions. The factors in Aguirre are not exhaustive. We now examine the ones relevant to this case.

9Here, the respondent accepted a $15,000 deposit from MR and undertook to bill at an hourly rate. But after the Superior Court hearing, he treated the deposit as a block fee and simply kept it. In doing so, he withdrew money from his trust account before billing for it. Thereafter he failed to account to MR for his services and ignored multiple requests from MR for an accounting.

10As we note above, when MR pursued the fees issue by obtaining an assessment of the Superior Court, the respondent ignored the process. This resulted in a default judgment. While MR has expended further money on counsel in order to collect this debt, the respondent has made no attempt to pay the judgment.

11The Law Society argues that a suspension of six months is appropriate. It maintains that the misconduct is serious.

12However, the decisions that it cites in support of its position on penalty are not helpful. The facts in Walton involve extensive exploitation of unsophisticated clients, and the appeal panel revoked the lawyer’s licence.⁴ In Mazinani, a six-month suspension was imposed for a broad range of misconduct involving multiple clients, dishonesty to the court and opposing counsel, and a failure to act with integrity.⁵ In Mundulai, the panel imposed a six-month suspension where the lawyer ignored a court order and repeatedly breached his bail conditions.⁶ In Reynolds, a 12-month suspension was imposed for a broad range of misconduct that occurred over a long period of time. The lawyer had a prior discipline history.⁷

13While we consider the respondent’s misconduct to be serious, it is not comparable to the various examples of misconduct that the Law Society cites above. Those all involve more serious instances of misconduct and a level of defiance of ethical norms that are not present on the facts we are dealing with.

14The respondent’s misconduct is serious because he deliberately ignored the terms of his retainer with MR, and deliberately evaded responsibility for facing his client and explaining himself. Similarly, his decision to boycott the assessment proceedings, and then to ignore his obligation to pay the judgment against him, are conscious and deliberate.

15However, the cases cited by the Law Society involve patterns of misconduct over time, often affecting multiple clients. Cases of that kind point to a more pervasive indifference to ethical norms. Unlike those cases, the misconduct here involves a single dispute with a single client.

16The Law Society maintains that the respondent has a prior disciplinary record. There are two decisions of the Tribunal that find the respondent failed to co‑operate with a Law Society investigation and failed to maintain books and records. In each case, the Tribunal imposed an indefinite licence suspension pending compliance, followed by a one-month suspension.⁸

17However, the facts in this case took place before the facts that gave rise to the two decisions above. So, in looking at the respondent’s past conduct, we do not consider these two decisions. The purpose of this factor in the Aguirre analysis is to see whether a licensee has learned a lesson from past misconduct when deciding what penalty to impose. But this principle does not apply, because the respondent had not committed any misconduct at the time the facts in our case took place.

18The respondent did not contest some of the facts in the Law Society’s request to admit. To that extent, he co-operated with the hearing process. However, the basis for disputing some aspects of his misconduct was weak. For example, his claim that MR had agreed to a block fee was simply not credible. So too were his reasons for not responding to MR’s requests for an accounting. The respondent’s approach to the hearing reflected a lack of acceptance of responsibility for his treatment of MR as a client.

19The respondent referred to mental health challenges, the burden of family responsibilities arising from separation from his spouse, and considerable financial difficulties. These feature in the other decisions of the Tribunal involving the respondent, yet he provided us with no evidence of extenuating circumstances.

20We admitted an unsolicited letter of support for the respondent into evidence. However, the author of the letter was not called to give evidence or cross-examined. As a result, we place little weight on this letter.

21The respondent requested a reprimand as a penalty, but provided no argument to support why this would be an appropriate sanction. It would be inappropriate to simply issue a reprimand, given the respondent’s deliberate disrespect of his client’s interests.

22A number of decisions of the Tribunal involving somewhat similar facts suggest that a suspension of between two and four months would be appropriate:

• In Tran, following a joint submission, the panel imposed a four-month suspension for failing to account to clients, mishandling trust funds, and failing to serve clients to the standard of a reasonably competent lawyer.⁹

• In von Achten, the panel imposed a four-month suspension for improper dealing with client monies.¹⁰

• In Sheikh, a joint submission resulted in the panel imposing a two-month suspension for acting in a conflict of interest, failing to render accounts, and rendering unreasonable fees.¹¹

• In Abbadi, the respondent failed to account to the client and failed to deposit client retainer money into a trust account. The panel accepted a joint submission and imposed a two-month suspension.¹²

23The facts in no two cases are identical, and this is true when comparing the above cases to the one before us. However, there are sufficient similarities for us to conclude that these cases provide some guidance.

24In this case, we also bear in mind that the respondent has to serve two suspensions of a month each once he has complied with the Law Society’s investigation of his books and records. In these circumstances, we consider that a suspension of two months in this case is appropriate. This suspension will take effect after the end of the two disciplinary suspensions we mention above.

25The Law Society also requests that we order the respondent to pay the Law Society’s Compensation Fund up to a maximum of $15,000 in relation to a claim for recovery from the Fund by MR. If the respondent had participated in the process to assess his bill, he might not be facing a Superior Court judgment of $15,000. However, he chose to ignore the process. Accordingly, we order the respondent to pay the Compensation Fund an amount equal to the amount awarded to MR by the Compensation Fund, up to a maximum of $15,000.

COSTS: the law society is partially successful

26The Law Society submits a bill of costs that totals $11,792. However, the bill does not reflect that the Law Society failed to prove its allegation that the respondent’s fee was unfair and unreasonable.

27This was a central allegation, in that much of the hearing focused on the nature of the issues that MR retained the respondent to argue, the time spent on the litigation, and the time pressure to prepare a novel argument for an emergency hearing in the Superior Court.

28These are considerations that play into the factors established in McLennan when determining an appropriate costs award.¹³ The Law Society’s lack of success on this allegation justifies a reduction in the costs award.

29In other respects, the respondent’s conduct of the litigation was reasonable, did not involve unnecessary steps, and was not obstructive. He maintains that he is suffering financial hardship, but has not produced anything beyond his assertions to support this claim.

30We conclude that it is appropriate to reduce the bill of costs to $6,000. Costs are payable in two equal instalments of $3,000. The first is payable on April 28, 2027. The second is payable on April 28, 2028. Interest shall accrue on any unpaid part of those costs at a rate of 4% per year.

ORDER

31We make the following order:

1. The respondent’s licence is suspended for two months, to take effect at the completion of the two one-month suspensions in relation to failure to co-operate with a Law Society’s investigation and failure to maintain books and records.

2. The respondent shall fully comply with the Law Society’s Guidelines for Lawyers Who Are Suspended or Who Have Given an Undertaking Not to Practise while suspended under this order.

3. The respondent will pay the Compensation Fund an amount equal to the amount awarded to MR by the Compensation Fund up to a maximum of $15,000.

4. The respondent will pay $6,000 in costs to the Law Society in two equal instalments of $3,000.

a. The first is payable on April 28, 2027.

b. The second is payable on April 28, 2028.

5. Interest shall accrue on any unpaid part of those costs at a rate of 4% per year.

Footnotes

1. 1Law Society of Ontario v Achampong, 2026 ONLSTH 18.
2. 2Law Society of Upper Canada v Strug, 2008 ONLSHP 88.
3. 32007 ONLSHP 46.
4. 4Law Society of Upper Canada v Walton, 2015 ONLSTA 8.
5. 5Law Society of Ontario v Mazinani, 2021 ONLSTH 72.
6. 6Law Society of Upper Canada v Mundulai, 2011 ONLSHP 98.
7. 7Law Society of Ontario v Reynolds, 2021 ONLSTH 137.
8. 8Law Society of Ontario v Achampong, 2025 ONLSTH 94, and Law Society of Ontario v Achampong, 2025 ONLSTH 167.
9. 9Law Society of Upper Canada v Tran, 2015 ONLSTH 218.
10. 10Law Society of Ontario v von Achten, 2022 ONLSTH 117.
11. 11Law Society of Ontario v Sheikh, 2020 ONLSTH 83.
12. 12Law Society of Ontario v Abbadi, 2023 ONLSTH 121.
13. 13Law Society of Ontario v McLennan, 2024 ONLSTA 17.