LAW SOCIETY TRIBUNAL

APPEAL DIVISION

Date: March 6, 2026

Tribunal File No.: 25A-013

BETWEEN:

Sergio Grillone

Appellant

• and -

Law Society of Ontario

Respondent in appeal

Before: Pam Hrick (chair), Annamaria Enenajor, Margaret Leighton, William McDowell, Eric Whist

Heard: November 20, 2025, by videoconference

Appearances:

Appellant, self-represented

Elaine Strosberg, for the respondent in appeal

Summary:

GRILLONE – Appeal – Fresh Evidence Motion – The appellant Lawyer appealed a decision finding that he had engaged in professional misconduct and revoking his licence to practise law ‒ The Lawyer brought a motion for the admission of fresh evidence, but this was quashed because the Lawyer did not provide a motion record as required, but the panel considered the evidence as it was substantively identical to evidence already in the record ‒ The panel rejected his request for an adjournment ‒ The Lawyer argued that evidence was suppressed by LSO discipline counsel, but the panel found that this evidence had been provided to his lawyer ‒ He also argued that there was improper submission of evidence, evidence tampering and prejudicial closing submissions by the LSO, but the panel found that these allegations were not established ‒ The appeal was dismissed and costs submissions were invited.

REASONS FOR DECISION

1Annamaria Enenajor (for the panel):– The appellant Lawyer, Sergio Grillone, appeals from a decision of the hearing panel dated April 7, 2025, finding that he had engaged in professional misconduct, and revoking his licence to practise law: Law Society of Ontario v Grillone, 2025 ONLSTH 48 (Revocation Decision).

2The issue before the hearing panel was not whether Mr. Grillone engaged in professional misconduct; he admitted this at the conduct hearing. The only issue for determination before the panel below was what penalty should be ordered.

3As part of his appeal, Mr. Grillone brought a motion for the admission of fresh evidence. We quashed the motion with reasons to follow, which are included in these reasons for decision.

4Mr. Grillone’s central ground of appeal was that the agreed statement of facts (ASF) that formed the basis for the Revocation Decision was misleading and was executed by him without fully informed consent. He also alleges misconduct on the part of the counsel for the Law Society of Ontario (LSO). He submits that, as a result, the Revocation Decision was unreasonable, procedurally unfair, and violated his rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter).

5For the following reasons, we dismiss the appeal.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

6On May 23, 2023, the LSO issued a notice of application (Conduct) against Mr. Grillone based on seven client complaints. Mr. Grillone did not contest the underlying facts in relation to these complaints against him. As a result, on September 5, 2023, Mr. Grillone, who was represented by counsel, and the LSO agreed to proceed with a conduct and penalty hearing by way of ASF. On August 21, 2024, Mr. Grillone and the LSO executed the ASF, and the matter proceeded to a hearing on March 5-7, 2025.

7In the ASF and before a panel of the Hearing Division, Mr. Grillone admitted to very serious misconduct spanning from 2013 to 2019, namely:

• lying about having filed originating documents with the court;
• lying about having secured settlements;
• failing to advise when cases had been dismissed for delay;
• lying about the ongoing status of matters;
• presenting fictitious documents;
• falsely advising clients that he was attending court;
• falsely advising that a client could rescind a settlement agreement;
• engaging in a conflict of interest;
• failing to honour an undertaking to repay a litigation loan from settlement proceeds;
• issuing a cheque that was not honoured by the bank;
• withdrawing funds from trust without delivering accounts;
• lying about having transferred funds to clients;
• failing to obtain settlement funds;
• making unauthorized use of settlement funds; and
• disregarding requests for accounts.

8Additionally, while there were seven complainant clients in respect of whom misconduct was alleged and admitted (Complainants A(1), A(2), B to G), Mr. Grillone’s evidence was that he engaged in similar misconduct with respect to other clients as well. The evidence demonstrated that Mr. Grillone’s clients suffered significant harm as a result of his actions.

9Because the allegations of misconduct were admitted, the only issue litigated below was the appropriate sanction. The LSO argued that Mr. Grillone’s actions attracted the principle of presumptive revocation. The Lawyer argued that the mental health problems that he was experiencing at the relevant times were sufficiently mitigating that a one-year suspension was the appropriate sanction.

10The hearing panel held that Mr. Grillone’s evidence failed to establish that he was experiencing mental health difficulties or substance use prior to 2017. It determined that, given the seriousness of Mr. Grillone’s misconduct, maintaining public confidence in the legal profession weighed heavily in determining the appropriate penalty. The panel ultimately concluded that revocation was the appropriate penalty in the circumstances.

RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY

11Following the revocation of his licence, Mr. Grillone asked the Hearing Division to set aside the decision (the Set Aside Motion). For reasons released on August 19, 2025, Mr. Grillone’s motion to set aside the revocation decision was dismissed: Law Society of Ontario v Grillone, 2025 ONLSTH 110.

12The Lawyer also brought a second motion, this time before the Appeal Division, seeking a stay of the Hearing Division’s revocation order pending his appeal (the Stay and Recusal Motion). In the same motion, Mr. Grillone sought the removal of the LSO’s discipline counsel (which would have precluded her from acting further in the appeal), citing serious, but ultimately unfounded, allegations of partiality, misrepresentation, and evidence tampering. Some of those allegations were advanced again before us. In support of the motion, Mr. Grillone filed an affidavit dated May 30, 2025 (May 30 Affidavit). I will return to the significance of the May 30 Affidavit in my discussion of the appellant’s fresh evidence motion before us.

13The Stay and Recusal Motion was heard on September 29, 2025. For reasons dated October 23, 2025, a panel of the Appeal Division dismissed Mr. Grillone’s motion. It found that Mr. Grillone had not met the test for a stay pending appeal and that his arguments in support of removing the LSO’s discipline counsel were frivolous and not based in evidence: Law Society of Ontario v Grillone, 2025 ONLSTA 23.

ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL

14At the outset of the hearing, the parties advised of three preliminary issues. We dealt with those issues summarily, with reasons to follow. Those reasons are provided below.

Fresh evidence motion

15The first preliminary issue concerned Mr. Grillone’s fresh evidence motion. In support of this motion, Mr. Grillone filed a motion record containing a notice of motion as well as the May 30 Affidavit. He did not serve or file a factum in relation to this motion. As a result, the LSO did not respond to his motion materials. At the outset of the hearing, counsel for the LSO asked us to quash the appellant’s fresh evidence motion on the basis that it had not been perfected. We heard submissions from both Mr. Grillone and counsel for the Law Society; following brief deliberations, we granted the LSO’s motion to quash.

16The record before us shows that Mr. Grillone was repeatedly reminded of his obligation to produce a factum in support of his fresh evidence motion. With the appeal date approaching, a case conference was held on November 17, 2025, during which Mr. Grillone took the position that he should be permitted to argue his fresh evidence motion in the absence of a factum. At that case conference, he was directed to produce case law that would support his ability to argue his fresh evidence motion without a factum.

17The Lawyer did not comply with the November 17 direction. He appeared before us without a factum and without any authority to support his position that the fresh evidence motion could proceed in the absence of one. Instead, he argued that the motion record itself was sufficient for the LSO and us to understand the issues. He submitted that the case law on fresh evidence had been unchanged for decades, and that we had the discretion to waive the requirement for a factum in an area where the legal test was settled.

18Counsel for the LSO objected to us hearing the fresh evidence motion on the basis that the absence of a factum was prejudicial to the LSO. We agree.

19Rule 8.2(2) of the Law Society Tribunal Rules of Practice and Procedure (the Tribunal Rules) requires that a moving party serve and file a motion record, together with a factum, at least 10 days before the hearing of a motion. The language in that section is mandatory. The Lawyer provided us with no authority for the proposition that he advanced, namely that the Tribunal possessed inherent authority that would allow it to disregard this mandatory statutory requirement.

20This is not to say that departure from mandatory factum requirement may not, on occasion, be appropriate. Rather, we find that Mr. Grillone has not established any exceptions to the mandatory factum requirement before us. The absence of a factum created procedural unfairness and clear prejudice to the LSO while making the task of adjudicating the issue more difficult for us. The Lawyer had previously represented that a factum for the motion would be filed in accordance with the Tribunal Rules. Given this representation, it would have been reasonable for the LSO to wait to receive his materials before filing a response. This is especially so given that the issues on this motion are both complex and contentious and would require the application of multi-pronged legal tests to a set of events that involved significant factual detail. In such circumstances, written submissions are especially necessary for clarity and efficient adjudication.

21With no factum from Mr. Grillone, it is no surprise that the LSO did not respond to his motion materials. We accept that without a written summary of his legal arguments and supporting authorities, the LSO was unable to provide a meaningful response. Furthermore, we did not have the benefit of a focused and accessible roadmap to assess the issues. Mr. Grillone was afforded considerable opportunity to comply with the tribunal’s directions and with the Tribunal Rules. His failure to do so is not excused by the explanations provided.

22For these reasons, and to ensure that the proceeding was conducted fairly and in accordance with the Tribunal Rules and the expectations of the parties before us, the motion to adduce fresh evidence was quashed.

23As the proceedings progressed, however, it became apparent to the parties and to us that the affidavit Mr. Grillone sought to introduce as fresh evidence was substantively identical to the May 30 Affidavit that he had previously filed in support of his Stay and Recusal Motion. That affidavit already formed part of the record below and was therefore properly before us on the appeal.

24The practical effect of this realization is that the relief sought by Mr. Grillone through that motion was, in substance, already achieved. With the consent of both parties, we agreed to consider the contents of the May 30 Affidavit in our deliberations. For greater certainty, this means that the entirety of the evidence Mr. Grillone characterizes as “fresh” was already before us and was properly and fully considered in determining the outcome of the main appeal.

Adjournment of the appeal hearing

25The second preliminary issue before us was Mr. Grillone’s request to revisit his motion to adjourn the appeal, which was heard by a differently constituted panel on November 17, 2025. At that time, his adjournment request was denied because it did not provide sufficient evidence of exceptional circumstances.

26He renewed his request for an adjournment before us. While no materials were filed in support of this motion, Mr. Grillone explained that an adjournment was necessary because he anticipated receiving evidence from the LSO that may be relevant to the present appeal. Mr. Grillone explained that he was seeking judicial review to the Divisional Court of an interlocutory decision below, quashing a summons Mr. Grillone had caused to be issued to Jim Varro, Acting Corporate Secretary of the Law Society. He advised that, in response to the judicial review, the LSO sought to bring a vexatious litigant motion, with its motion materials due December 18, 2025. The Lawyer argued that the LSO’s vexatious litigant motion would necessarily involve new evidence and that this evidence might be relevant to issues in the present appeal. Therefore, he argued, it would be procedurally unfair to determine this appeal before he has had an opportunity to review this new evidence and to determine whether it might be relevant to the issues before us.

27We carefully considered Mr. Grillone’s renewed request for an adjournment and determined that it should be denied. Under the Tribunal’s strict adjournment policy, parties are expected to be ready to proceed on the date set: Rule 6.3.

28Adjournments require exceptional circumstances, which are not present in this case. Mr. Grillone had ample notice of both the date and the issues of this appeal. A previous adjournment request had been considered and denied, and there is no indication that circumstances have materially changed since those prior determinations.

29Mr. Grillone’s principal ground for requesting an adjournment was the anticipated disclosure of new evidence in the LSO’s pending vexatious litigant motion in another proceeding. However, this appeal is confined to a review of the record below. Any evidence to be filed by the LSO in the vexatious litigant motion would be collateral to this appeal. The Lawyer failed to establish how as-yet-unknown evidence that could be submitted in a future court proceeding would be relevant to the issues in this appeal.

30A full day had been set aside for this appeal. Allowing a last-minute adjournment absent clear justification would delay resolution, waste resources, and prejudice the orderly administration of justice. The request for adjournment was denied.

Panel constitution

31Finally, Mr. Grillone sought to probe how our panel seized with his appeal was constituted. Specifically, Mr. Grillone requested information on why Ms Donnelly was replaced on the panel by Ms Leighton.

32On November 19, 2025, the Tribunal advised the parties by email that the composition of the panel was being changed due to a change of availability of panel members. At the hearing, our panel chair advised the parties that there was no further information to provide in respect of this change. The Lawyer’s probing went no further, and the matter was dropped.

THE LAWYER’S APPEAL

Issues on appeal

33The Lawyer argued that the hearing panel’s decision to revoke his licence to practise law was fundamentally undermined by breaches of natural justice and procedural fairness. His central allegation is that discipline counsel (1) supressed evidence that was material to his decision to proceed with his hearing by way of ASF, and (2) misrepresented facts to the hearing panel. As a result, he argues, he executed the ASF without fully informed consent, and the hearing panel’s decision had been based on incomplete and misleading facts.

34In his factum and during oral submissions, Mr. Grillone also raised a number of ancillary grounds of appeal. Namely, he alleged that discipline counsel for the LSO misrepresented and tampered with evidence and gave a prejudicial and inflammatory closing submission to the hearing panel. He also argued that the hearing panel improperly admitted evidence outside of the agreed upon evidentiary record by relying on documents contained in the agreed statement of facts document book (ASFDB). He argues that due to these errors, he was denied a fair hearing. While these grounds were not identified in Mr. Grillone’s notice of appeal, they were sufficiently addressed by both parties and, therefore, considered by us.

35The allegation that Mr. Grillone’s consent to proceeding by way of ASF was invalid hinges on the fact that Mr. Grillone claims that he personally did not become aware of the following facts until after the Revocation Decision:

• Complainant A(2) had died two years before the notice of application was issued;
• Complainants B and C had withdrawn their complaints in the fall of 2022; and
• Complainant D had become un-co-operative.

36The Lawyer alleges that these facts were kept from him by LSO discipline counsel, going so far as to assert that they were intentionally supressed.

Standard of review

37As an administrative tribunal, the Law Society Tribunal is required to observe the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness in the conduct of its hearings: Law Society of Ontario v McLennan, 2024 ONLSTA 10 at para 16. Thus, when an appeal is based on a denial of procedural fairness, the standard of review is correctness: Law Society of Saskatchewan v Abrametz, 2022 SCC 29 at paras 29 and 113; McLaughlin v Law Society of Ontario, 2026 ONSC 263 at para 29; Law Society of Ontario v Barnwell, 2025 ONSC 1825 at para 38.

38This standard requires the Appeal Division to assess the procedures and safeguards required by the particular situation, and to determine if the decision-making procedure was fair having regard to all the circumstances of the case: Afolabi v Law Society of Ontario, 2025 ONCA 257 at para 60; Amendola v Law Society of Ontario, 2023 ONSC 4123 at paras 47 and 72.

Analysis

39Before addressing the allegation of suppression of evidence, it is important to note that, with the exception of his motion to set aside the revocation decision, at all material times in the proceedings before the hearing panel Mr. Grillone was represented by experienced and senior counsel, to whom full disclosure was made 14 months before Mr. Grillone signed the ASF.

40Also relevant is the fact that Mr. Grillone does not contest the truth of any of the facts set out in the ASF with respect to his conduct. His appeal does not allege any errors of fact or law in the hearing panel’s reasons. He continues to admit that he engaged in the conduct described in the ASF, which reveals a lengthy pattern of lying to and misleading clients, as well as creating false documents to cover up his lies. His misconduct was described in the Revocation Decision at para 141 as “utterly incompatible with the lawyer-client relationship” and “highly corrosive of public confidence.”

Allegations of suppression of evidence

41The lawyer’s primary ground of appeal is that the LSO’s discipline counsel withheld from him the fact that Complainant A(2) had died two years before the notice of application was issued, that Complainants B and C had withdrawn their complaints in the fall of 2022, and that Complainant D had become un-co‑operative. We do not give effect to this ground of appeal.

42First, the fatal flaw in Mr. Grillone’s position is that he does not explain how this information could be considered suppressed given that the facts above relating to Complainants A(2) and B, C and D were disclosed to his counsel well in advance of the conduct hearing. The evidence below, confirmed by Mr. Grillone’s May 30 affidavit, establishes that the LSO’s disclosure was provided to his counsel in June 2023. That disclosure included the investigator’s report, an obituary confirming Complainant A(2)’s death, as well as information concerning the status of the other complainants. The Lawyer does not dispute that his counsel received this disclosure in June 2023. Rather, his position is that he personally did not know these facts until much later. His argument rests on the assertion that the LSO had a duty not only to disclose the documents to his counsel, but also to draw his personal attention to specific facts disclosed therein.

43He provides no authority for this proposition because such a standard does not exist in law. Indeed, there is an abundance of authorities making it clear that, outside of the criminal or quasi-criminal context, a client is deemed to have actual knowledge of material facts that are known to his solicitor: Re National Trust Co and Bouckhuyt et al, 1987 CanLII 4098 (ON CA); Bank of British North America v Saint John & Quebec R. Co., 1920 CanLII 376 (NB CA), affirmed 1921 CanLII 574 (SCC); Dominion Readers' Service Ltd v Brant, 1982 CanLII 1771 (ON CA); and Stoimenov v Stoimenov et al., 1985 CanLII 2166 (ON CA).

44The Lawyer is correct that a prosecutor has a duty to disclose relevant material facts to a licensee pursuant to R. v Stinchcombe, 1991 CanLII 45 (SCC): e.g. Law Society of Upper Canada v James, 2014 ONLSTH 41 at para 22. But where a licensee is represented by counsel, the prosecutor is not required to proactively highlight specific facts contained within disclosure directly for the licensee. Indeed, such conduct would be entirely inappropriate given that Rule 7.2‑6 of the Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits lawyers from communicating with a person who is represented by another lawyer in a matter.

45The Lawyer advises that the fact that Complainant A(2) had died was disclosed to him for the first time during the March 5, 2025 hearing date when counsel for the LSO was addressing the panel. The transcript of this hearing date confirms that that upon hearing this fact, neither Mr. Grillone nor his counsel sought to object, resile from the ASF, or adjourn the hearing in the face of this “new” information. Indeed, the hearing proceeded without addressing this information for two more days.

46We conclude that the information that Mr. Grillone alleges that the LSO suppressed was, in fact, available in the materials disclosed to his counsel in 2023. There is no evidence before us to suggest that it was not easily discoverable with diligence by counsel or by Mr. Grillone himself. Mr. Grillone’s evidence does not address why he did not become aware of this information that had been disclosed to his lawyer until years later. Consequently, the record before us does not allow any basis to conclude that discipline counsel for the LSO failed in her disclosure obligations in any way, let alone intentionally supressed evidence.

47Second, Mr. Grillone asserts that the facts in relation to Complainant A(2) constitute a fundamental change to the complaints against him resulting in procedural unfairness. Before us, Mr. Grillone repeatedly characterized the death of Complainant A(2) as a material change to the complaint and as fundamentally altering the factual landscape of the case against him. We do not see it that way.

48The fact of Complainant A(2)’s death does not alter in any way the facts in relation to Mr. Grillone’s misconduct, to which he readily admits. Rather, they go only to witness availability and the tactical advantage Mr. Grillone lost in choosing to proceed by way of ASF. We accept that Mr. Grillone might not have entered into the ASF had he known of Complainant A(2)’s passing and the withdrawal or reluctance of the other complainants. As he stated in the May 30 Affidavit, given that Complainant A(2) had passed away, “there would be no witness statement from her and obviously no viva voce evidence at the hearing.” While this may be true, this argument does not advance his position on appeal.

49With the benefit of experienced counsel to whom full disclosure was provided early in the proceeding, Mr. Grillone made a tactical decision from the first pre-hearing conference to focus on resolving the matter. The record before us shows that he was involved in this resolution, and that the ASF went through various iterations from September 5, 2023, when the first conference was held, until it was signed on August 21, 2024.

50Given this factual context, this ground of appeal amounts to little more than a retrospective regret of Mr. Grillone’s decision to proceed by way of ASF. His complaint is not that the findings of misconduct were wrong, but that he was deprived of the opportunity to take advantage of the death and unavailability of witnesses. Given the strong interest in regulatory finality, this is not a basis upon which the ASF can be impugned, the fairness of the proceedings called into question, or the finality of the proceedings disturbed: Law Society of Ontario v Moubarak, 2024 ONLSTH 116 at para 111.

The improper admission of evidence outside the agreed evidentiary record

51Mr. Grillone also takes issue with LSO discipline counsel’s opening statement, in which she stated that Complainant A(2) had died. He complains that this fact was not part of the ASF and, therefore, should not have been disclosed to the panel.

52This ground is without merit. Discipline counsel was simply adding a fact that was included in the disclosure after concluding her read-ins from the ASF, for the panel’s benefit. There is nothing improper about this. She was not representing that this fact – Complainant A(2)’s death – was in the ASF. It is unclear how this statement could possibly amount to a misrepresentation of material facts.

Fraud on the hearing panel and evidence tampering

53The Lawyer additionally alleges that LSO discipline counsel materially misrepresented facts to the hearing panel and tampered with evidence. These are serious allegations, for which no evidence was provided.

54The ASF upon which the hearing panel’s decision was based included a statement that Complainant A(2) and Mr. Grillone exchanged 1,808 text messages from 2017 to 2019, which revealed the extent of his misrepresentations to her. Before us, Mr. Grillone submitted that the LSO was never in possession of these text messages in their original format, but rather only had a spreadsheet with the content of the 1,808 text messages. He alleged that counsel for the LSO intentionally misled him and the panel by suggesting that the LSO was in possession of these text messages.

55These allegations against LSO counsel are frivolous and unfounded. Indeed, they were dismissed as such by the panel of the appeal division that heard the Stay and Recusal Motion: 2025 ONLSTA 23 at para 48.

56On the record before us, neither the ASF nor the submissions of discipline counsel suggest that the LSO was ever in possession of original text messages. Rather, they assert the existence of such messages. Notably, Mr. Grillone has not asserted that the content of the spreadsheet does not accurately reflect the content of the 1,808 messages. The format in which the LSO had the text messages, whether it was screenshots of the complainant’s phone, a spreadsheet, or a PDF, does not matter. The 1,808 messages exist and that is all that the ASF asserts. Consequently, we do not give effect to this ground of appeal.

57Finally, Mr. Grillone asserted in his factum that the spreadsheet containing the 1,808 text messages was not reliable since it was created by someone other than Complainant A(2) and was tampered with by discipline counsel, as revealed by his interpretation of its metadata. The sole basis for this allegation was that the metadata of the version of the spreadsheet provided to him shows that it was created by someone named Lorraine Garnham and indicates that it was last modified by discipline counsel on August 15, 2024. This allegation was already dealt with and dismissed as unfounded following the Stay and Recusal motion. I can do no better than the reproduce that panel’s reasoning here:

45Given Complainant A(2)’s advanced age and apparent illness, it is logical to infer she had someone assist her in preparing this document. Absent any evidence that the content is unreliable, nothing turns on the fact that someone other than Complainant A(2) created the spreadsheet.

46As for the fact that Discipline Counsel is indicated as having “modified” the spreadsheet, I have no evidence as to what this implies. For example, it is possible that by saving the document on her own computer, the metadata shows her as having “modified” the spreadsheet. I am speculating, but the point is, I have no basis for concluding the metadata is evidence of anything nefarious. Mr. Grillone did not take us to any discrepancies between the disclosure version of the spreadsheet, last modified by Lorraine Garnham on September 16, 2019, and the version filed at the hearing, last modified by Discipline Counsel on August 15, 2024. He did not point me to any purported modifications in the spreadsheet.

58We do not give effect to this ground of appeal.

The improper reliance on the ASFDB

59While not raised in his notice of appeal, Mr. Grillone argued before us that the hearing panel improperly relied on the ASFDB that accompanied the ASF. He alleged that (1) the ASFDB was tendered by the panel chair, (2) there was no explicit colloquy specifying the purpose for which each document was admitted, and (3) he did not personally agree to the truth of its contents. As a result of these deficiencies, he argues, the ASFDB should not have been relied on by the LSO in submissions or the hearing panel. For the reasons below, this ground of appeal must also fail.

60First, when a panel chair marks an exhibit, this does not mean the chair is giving evidence of the contents contained therein. According to the transcript of the hearing, LSO counsel indicated at the outset of the hearing an intention to take the panel to the ASF and the panel chair then marked the ASF as Exhibit 1 and the ASFDB as Exhibit 2. This is a routine administrative step by a trier of fact in many tribunal settings. Marking an exhibit is not “tendering” evidence; it is a way of recording the evidence that the parties have tendered and the chair has received on behalf of the tribunal.

61Second, the ASFDB was entered into evidence in the presence of, and without objection from, Mr. Grillone’s counsel. In an adversarial tribunal process, where a represented party agrees to a document and does not object to its admission, the ordinary and reasonable inference is that the documents are admitted as part of the evidentiary record and that absent a specific limitation or objection, they may be relied on for the truth of their contents to the extent that they are relevant.

62If Mr. Grillone wished to limit the use of particular documents contained in the ASFDB, it was incumbent on his counsel to either object to their admission or seek an express ruling restricting the purpose for which they could be used. The transcript reveals no contemporaneous objection of that kind. His counsel raised one targeted objection to the LSO reading direct quotes from a document contained within the ASFDB, on the grounds that it constituted hearsay, but quickly acknowledged that the document was, indeed, from the ASFDB, which had been admitted in the proceeding. For greater certainty, the panel chair reminded counsel for Mr. Grillone, “I would think that given it’s in the agreed document book, your client is on notice that this was evidence sought to be relied on.” Counsel for Mr. Grillone did not press the issue and there was no broader challenge to the admissibility or use of the documents contained in the ASFDB.

63Where a represented party does not object to an agreed book of documents going into evidence, the panel is entitled to assume its authenticity and treat it as properly admitted. The Court of Appeal cases cited by Mr. Grillone, Bruno v Dacosta, 2020 ONCA 602, and Girao v Cunningham, 2020 ONCA 260, do not assist him. These cases concern how document books are to be used in cases where documents are disputed or where there is ambiguity as to their status. Those cases do not displace the basic proposition that parties may, through counsel, agree to a book of documents, and that an administrative tribunal may rely on that agreed record absent objection. They also do not support the proposition that each page in an agreed book must be individually tendered, purpose-limited and ruled upon before it can be relied on. Imposing such a standard would be inconsistent with the expeditious conduct expected of administrative proceedings.

64Finally, even on Mr. Grillone’s own theory, the revocation of his licence was grounded in the facts contained in the ASF, which he expressly admitted with the assistance of counsel. The ASFDB was properly admitted as Exhibit 2, without objection and in accordance with ordinary Tribunal practice. He has not identified any specific document in it that was relied on for a disputed factual finding that made a material difference to the result of the proceedings. The panel was entitled to rely on the ASFDB and Mr. Grillone has not shown how its admission affected the validity of either the findings of misconduct or the penalty imposed.

Prejudicial and inflammatory closing submissions

65In his factum, Mr. Grillone alleged that the proceedings were rendered unfair by the language used by LSO counsel in her closing submissions. Specifically, he argues that counsel improperly employed inflammatory language by stating that his conduct “gutted” Complainant A(2) and by referring to her age, widowhood, and the fact that she was diagnosed with stage-4 cancer. He submits that these facts were irrelevant to the truthfulness of Complainant A(2)’s allegations and to whether he committed the misconduct.

66This submission misconceives the issue before the hearing panel. The only issue before that panel was the appropriate penalty. Having admitted the misconduct, Mr. Grillone is correct that these facts in relation to Complainant A(2) were not relevant to its proof. They were, however, highly relevant to the impact of the misconduct and to the vulnerability of the complainant, considerations that are properly engaged at the penalty phase. In any event, the hearing panel make no reference to these facts in its penalty analysis.

67The Lawyer also takes issue with LSO counsel’s characterization of the complainants’ circumstances as “heartbreaking.” However, in our view, this opinion expressed does not rise to the level of being inflammatory or prejudicial, given his admitted conduct.

68It also bears noting that at no time during closing submissions did the Appellant’s counsel object to the language now complained of, or request that the panel disregard the impugned characterizations. While the absence of an objection is not determinative, it is a relevant contextual factor in assessing whether the submissions were, at the time, understood to have crossed the line into unfairness: e.g. R v Huard, 2013 ONCA 650 at para 74.

Charter breaches

69Finally, although Mr. Grillone referenced breaches of his Charter rights in his notice of appeal, he ultimately did not identify which specific rights were violated and made no submissions in respect of this ground. Therefore, we give no effect to this ground of appeal.

CONCLUSION

70For all of these reasons, we dismiss the appeal.

71It warrants emphasis that allegations of serious misconduct against another licensee, such as those advanced by Mr. Grillone in this case, must not be made lightly before the Tribunal. Allegations of this gravity will not succeed without a compelling evidentiary foundation. Advancing accusations as serious as the suppression of evidence, fraud on the Tribunal, and evidence tampering in the absence of such any proof is inappropriate.

72In its factum, the LSO indicated that it would be seeing costs. To do so, it must serve and file brief written materials on this issue within 21 days of release of the order in this matter. The Appellant must serve and file, should he choose to respond, brief written materials within 21 days of his receipt of the Society’s materials.