LAW SOCIETY TRIBUNAL
HEARING DIVISION
Tribunal File No.: 25H-049
BETWEEN:
Law Society of Ontario
Applicant
- and -
Antonio Caruso
Respondent
Before: Lubomir Poliacik
Heard: In writing
Appearances:
Alex Kens, for the applicant
Respondent, self-represented
Summary:
CARUSO – Motion to Quash Summons – In the context of two motions in a conduct proceeding, the Respondent Paralegal requested that the Tribunal issue six summonses ‒ The Law Society brought a motion to quash the summonses ‒ The panel found that the Paralegal did not meet his burden of showing that the witnesses were in a position to offer relevant evidence ‒ Issues of privilege impacted some of the information sought ‒ Some of the requests also appeared to be an attempt to use the summons process to circumvent the need for a disclosure motion to gain information from a third party ‒ The panel granted the motion to quash these summonses ‒ The parties were invited to make written submissions on costs.
REASONS FOR DECISION ON A MOTION TO QUASH SUMMONSES
1Lubomir Poliacik:– The Law Society brought a motion in writing for an order quashing summonses issued and served by Mr. Caruso on six witnesses for the hearing of two motions in this proceeding. On October 10, 2025, I made an order quashing the summonses, with reasons to follow. These are the reasons.
OVERVIEW
2In this conduct application Mr. Caruso, a paralegal, is alleged to have failed to communicate with civility with staff at Tribunals Ontario and the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.
3There were two motions (“the motions”) scheduled in this proceeding to be heard on October 15 and 16, 2025. Mr. Caruso brought a motion to have the conduct application dismissed without a hearing due to lack of procedural fairness, apprehension of bias, lack of jurisdiction, lack of reasonableness by the Law Society and as an abuse of process (“the motion to dismiss”). The Law Society brought a motion to have Mr. Caruso declared a vexatious litigant (“the vexatious litigant motion”).
4At the September 4, 2025 PMC in this matter, the Law Society advised of its intention to bring a motion for an order quashing the summonses issued by Mr. Caruso for the two motions. I directed that this motion be heard in writing.
THE MOTION TO DISMISS
5In his motion to dismiss the conduct application without a hearing, Mr. Caruso alleges lack of procedural fairness due to the NOA lacking sufficient particularity to enable him to prepare an adequate response.
6Mr. Caruso further alleges that the Law Society’s Proceedings Authorization Committee (PAC) was tainted due to an apprehension of bias in relation to two members of PAC, whom he had previously publicly criticized.
7Mr. Caruso alleges that the Law Society was improperly pursuing this conduct application despite the fact that he was acting in a capacity of “a private self-litigant at Superior Court.”
8Mr. Caruso further alleges that the complaint that gave rise to this conduct application is being advanced by a party with a personal interest in his Court of Appeal litigation concerning paralegal scope of practice in immigration.
9Mr. Caruso also alleges that the Law Society was unreasonable in ignoring the fact that his client’s urgent circumstances necessitated his “heightened resolute advocacy.”
10Finally, Mr. Caruso submits that the application should be dismissed as an abuse of process due to: (i) the Law Society having engaged in a pattern of procedural misconduct, including abusing the Tribunal process by relying on findings from unrelated proceedings to gain an unfair advantage and undermine his Charter right to make full answer and defence, (ii) the Law Society bringing meritless motions to increase his legal costs and obstruct his ability to respond effectively; (iii) acting in bad faith by misrepresenting unrelated matters as relevant, and (iv) engaging in sharp practices by refusing to make reasonable concessions in relation to decisions made by this Tribunal in a prior proceeding and by refusing to make concessions regarding decisions made by this Tribunal in prior proceedings.
THE VEXATIOUS LITIGANT MOTION
11In the vexatious litigant motion the Law Society seeks a ruling that Mr. Caruso is a vexatious litigant, and an order that he not be permitted to continue or initiate further proceedings without leave of the Tribunal.
12The Law Society alleges a pattern of conduct before this Tribunal, the Ontario Superior Court, and the Divisional Court, where Mr. Caruso has initiated proceedings found to be frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process, including:
Bringing forward motions which were confusing, supported by little to no evidence, or attempted to relitigate what had already been decided.
Showing contempt for the Law Society and the Tribunal, including on social media, by accusing staff and adjudicators of committing crimes, fabricating evidence, and acting in bad faith.
Commencing (or threatening to commence) legal proceedings against staff and individuals associated with the Law Society and the Tribunal.
Sending email messages, often copying senior politicians, in which he attacked individuals and made demands.
Making unfounded complaints to the Law Society about participants in the justice system, or other legal professionals with whom he has grievances.
Serving summonses on witnesses who had no relevant evidence to provide, including Law Society staff, opposing representatives, politicians, and adjudicators before whom he appeared.
Demonstrating a disregard for the limited resources of the Tribunal and the Law Society by causing resources to be disproportionately expended on him.
Attempting to intervene, through another entity, in Tribunal proceedings in which he is not a party and pursued an appeal without any standing to do so.
MATERIALS ON THIS MOTION
13The Law Society filed a motion record, factum, and a book of authorities and Mr. Caruso filed a factum and a book of authorities in response.
14Neither party filed any affidavits in this motion. The only evidence before me were the summonses issued and served by Mr. Caruso and the various Tribunal endorsements and decisions pertaining to Mr. Caruso’s matters and the materials and affidavits filed in the two motions referred to above, namely, Mr. Caruso’s motion to dismiss and the Law Society’s vexatious litigant motion.
SUMMONSES
15For the hearing of his motion to dismiss, Mr. Caruso issued and served summonses to witness to Tom Dingwall, the Law Society’s investigator; to Sean Weir, Executive Chair, Tribunals Ontario and LTB member and Chair; and to Eli Fellman, the Complainant in this conduct application and Legal Counsel, Tribunals Ontario.
16Mr. Caruso also issued and served, for both motions, summonses to witness to Kristina MacDonald, Discipline Paralegal with carriage of the Law Society’s vexatious litigant motion; Glenn Stuart, Executive Director, Professional Regulation at the Law Society; and William Holder, Senior Manager, Litigation Services, Ms. MacDonald’s supervisor.
JURISPRUDENCE
17The applicable test for quashing of summonses in the context of a motion was reviewed in the reasons for decision in Law Society of Ontario v Caruso, 2024 ONLSTH 85:
Quashing summonses
[19] There is no apparent issue between the parties as to the test to be applied in a motion to quash a summons. In Airport Taxicab (Pearson Airport) Association v. Toronto (City), 2009 CanLII 25973 (ON SC) at paras. 26-30, Justice Perell articulated the following principles (citations omitted):
[26] There is a prima facie right to examine a witness for a pending application, but the party seeking to conduct the examination must show on a reasonable evidentiary basis that the examination would be conducted on an issue relevant to the application and that the proposed witness is in a position to offer relevant evidence.
[27] An opposing party may move to quash a summons to examine a witness on the grounds that the evidence sought is not relevant to the application or that the examination or the underlying proceeding would amount to an abuse of process.
[28] If the party seeking the examination cannot satisfy the relevancy and evidentiary screening, then the summons is regarded as a fishing expedition and an abuse of process.
[29] In considering whether to strike a summons to a witness, the court will consider the nature and grounds for the motion, application, or action to determine what are the issues for which the examination is in aid.
[30] Once the party seeking to conduct the examination shows that the proposed examination is about an issue relevant to the pending motion or proceeding and that the party to be examined is in a position to offer possibly relevant evidence, it is not necessary for the party to go further and show that the proposed examination will yield evidence helpful to that party's cause.
[20] The Tribunal Appeal Division has affirmed and applied these principles in several cases including Law Society of Ontario v. Isaac, 2021 ONLSTA 21, and Law Society of Ontario v. Hutton, 2021 ONLSTA 23.
[21] The question is not whether the evidence of the witnesses may be relevant at a merits hearing. The question of relevance is to be examined in the context of Mr. Caruso’s current motion.
(Emphasis added)
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
The grounds for the motions
18In accordance with these principles, I begin the analysis by considering the relevance of the evidence sought to the grounds for the two motions for which the summonses have been issued.
19There is no evidence or any submission in Mr. Caruso’s materials that any of the summonsed witnesses have any evidence relevant to several of the grounds of his motion to dismiss:
that the NOA lacks sufficient particularity to enable him to prepare an adequate response;
that PAC was tainted due to an apprehension of bias in relation to two members of PAC, whom he had previously publicly criticized;
that the Law Society was improperly pursuing this conduct application despite the fact that he was acting in a capacity of “a private self-litigant at Superior Court”; and
that the Law Society was unreasonable in ignoring the fact that his client’s urgent circumstances necessitated his “heightened resolute advocacy.”
20The relevance of the potential evidence of each of the summonsed witnesses to the remaining abuse of process motion grounds and the vexatious litigant motion is examined below.
The summonses
Kristina MacDonald
21Kristina MacDonald is Senior Discipline Paralegal and has carriage of the vexatious litigant motion, scheduled to be heard on October 15-16, 2025. Ms. MacDonald also had carriage of two separate proceedings in which the Paralegal, as president of the Canadian Paralegal Alliance (CPA), sought intervenor status in respect of two Law Society applications involving licensees.
22In his materials for his motion to dismiss, Mr. Caruso makes no mention of Ms. MacDonald. Mr. Caruso proposes, on the face of the summons, that Ms. MacDonald attend the hearing to provide testimony about her “involvement and knowledge of the facts in question.” This is vague and reveals nothing about what possible relevant evidence Ms. MacDonald might provide.
23The summons also directs Ms. MacDonald to attend the hearing to testify about her role as a member of the Ontario Paralegal Association (OPA) before she was employed by the Law Society. Mr. Caruso submits in his factum that Ms. MacDonald was involved in a decision to remove him as Director of the OPA and the summons suggests that she deleted messages in the Ontario Paralegal Central community chat. These claims are made without any evidence and Mr. Caruso does not say how these allegations are relevant to the issues in the motions.
24Mr. Caruso submits that Ms. MacDonald acted improperly in her role as prosecutor, including “being overly aggressive and hostile” in her correspondence and was acting in bad faith. Ms. MacDonald’s emails included in Mr. Caruso’s vexatious litigant motion responding materials do not support this allegation. In support of his allegation that Ms. MacDonald has been acting in bad faith, Mr. Caruso submits that she improperly sought costs against the OPA and took positions on behalf of the Law Society that he deems improper. The materials before me disclose no evidence of improper conduct by Ms. MacDonald, or any other Law Society staff member associated with this file.
25As stated above, Ms. MacDonald is the Law Society’s counsel in the vexatious litigant motion. Mr. Caruso is attempting to summons counsel for the opposing party. This is an extraordinary request and as the Ontario Court of Appeal stated in R. v Elliott, 2003 CanLII 24447, should only be permitted in exceptional circumstances:
[114] It is only in exceptional circumstances that Crown or defence counsel will be permitted to call opposing counsel as a witness. It is not sufficient that the counsel may have material evidence to give. The party seeking to call opposing counsel must lay an evidentiary foundation for showing that the counsel's evidence is likely to be relevant and necessary. This stringent test applies whether it is defence counsel seeking to call Crown counsel or Crown counsel seeking to call defence counsel. This rule has been laid down in many decisions of the Superior Court.
26This stringent test has been applied and followed in respect of discipline counsel in Tribunal proceedings.1 Nothing in the materials before me shows that Ms. MacDonald’s evidence is likely to be relevant and necessary.
27Whether a proposed witness is in a position to offer relevant evidence must also be considered in the context of privilege.2
28Ms. MacDonald is in a solicitor-client relationship with the Law Society and any evidence she would give would be subject to solicitor-client privilege and litigation privilege. Through the summons of Ms. MacDonald, Mr. Caruso seeks to pierce the veil of solicitor-client and litigation privilege. He has not submitted any legal basis for being allowed to do so.
29Consequently, I am not satisfied that Ms. MacDonald is in a position to offer possibly relevant evidence on the motions.
Bill Holder
30Bill Holder is Senior Manager, Litigation Services and is Ms. MacDonald’s supervisor. Mr. Holder provides legal advice to all staff within Litigation Services regarding any matters before the Tribunal and he has provided legal advice to staff regarding this conduct application against Mr. Caruso.
31Mr. Caruso’s motion to dismiss materials make no reference to Mr. Holder. The only reference to Mr. Holder in Mr. Caruso’s vexatious litigant motion materials is an email exchange between Mr. Holder and Mr. Caruso. In his affidavit filed in the vexatious litigant motion, Mr. Caruso describes the emails as follows:
- On April 3, 2025, the Director of Litigation Services, William Holder, sent me an email voicing his concerns about the application I brought to Divisional Court concerning the vacating of the decisions of 23H-068 and the Law Society's conduct up to date. Mr. Holder also voiced concerns that I was expending a large number of resources dealing with matters involving myself. Being that I considered this to be hypocritical due to the Law Society's conduct with other licensees, Benchers and in lieu (sic) of the O'Connor report, I criticized the Law Society's position of the expense of resources in particular, in a reply email.
32In his factum delivered in this motion before me, Mr. Caruso describes the email exchange, in part, as follows:
Following the filing and service of a Notice of Application for Judicial Review at the Divisional Court, Mr. Holder wrote to the Respondent requesting disclosure of the authorities upon which the Respondent relied in asserting that remedies were available on judicial review. This communication constituted an improper attempt to induce prejudice by compelling disclosure of litigation privilege and strategy outside of the rules of court.
[Mr. Holder’s] language amounted to improper manipulation and gaslighting, designed to distract from the substantive grounds for litigation and to cast the Respondent in a negative light, thereby demonstrating bad faith.
33I find nothing in the email exchange relied on by Mr. Caruso, dealing with a separate Divisional Court matter, that indicates that Mr. Holder’s evidence would be relevant to the issues raised in the two motions.
34In the summons to Mr. Holder, Mr. Caruso seeks to obtain wide-ranging disclosure from the Law Society, including “financial records, invoices, billing summaries, and support documents”. What Mr. Caruso is seeking, through the means of the summons to Mr. Holder, is to obtain further documentary disclosure without bringing a motion for disclosure, where he would be required to demonstrate why he is entitled to the disclosure of the documents sought. His materials in these motions do not show why he is entitled to the production of the documents listed in the summons.
35The summons also directs Mr. Holder to attend the hearing to provide information and documentation that is not relevant to the two motions. Mr. Caruso seeks information and documentation about other court and Tribunal proceedings, including an appeal of a decision regarding another licensee, a Divisional Court matter (referred to above) and materials pertaining to Mr. Caruso’s Small Claims Court action against Ellwood Evidence Inc.
36Mr. Caruso fails to provide any evidence or rationale how Mr. Holder’s evidence regarding these unrelated proceedings would be relevant to the two motions.
37Mr. Holder is part of the same litigation team as Ms. MacDonald. He has provided and presumably continues to provide legal advice to Ms. MacDonald on the vexatious litigant motion. The stringent test set out in R. v Elliott, cited above, applies to compelling Mr. Holder’s evidence.
38Similarly, just as Ms. MacDonald, Mr. Holder is in a solicitor-client relationship with the Law Society and any evidence he would give would be subject to solicitor-client privilege and litigation privilege. No rationale or evidence was submitted by Mr. Caruso as to why Mr. Holder’s potential evidence would not be protected by privilege.
39I am not satisfied that Mr. Holder is in a position to offer possibly relevant evidence on the motions.
40Additionally, at the July 23, 2025 PMC in this matter I directed Mr. Caruso to serve all of his summonses to witness by August 8, 2025. Mr. Holder’s summons was served outside of that deadline, on August 27, 2025.
Glenn Stuart
41Glenn Stuart is the Executive Director of Professional Regulation at the Law Society.
42In the Summons, Mr. Caruso requires Mr. Stuart “to provide an explanation to your email sent to Antonio Caruso on August 21st 2024” and to “Respond to questions posed during the proceedings relating to your involvement and knowledge of the facts in question”.
43Mr. Caruso does not identify “the facts in question”. Mr. Caruso did not include the email from Mr. Stuart on August 21, 2024, in his motion materials.
44The only information about the content of the August 21, 2024 email is the reference to it in Mr. Caruso’s factum:
- On or about September 2024, Mr. Glenn Stuart, Director of Professional Regulation, wrote to the licensee confirming that the complaint involving the Landlord and Tenant Board (“LTB”) matter would be concluded by that time, either through referral forward or formal termination.
45It is not clear why, if as the recipient of this email Mr. Caruso wanted an explanation from Mr. Stuart, he did not Mr. Stuart directly for an explanation of the email by responding to that email, rather than summoning Mr. Stuart to testify at a hearing over a year after the email was sent.
46I am unable to discern what Mr. Stuart stated in that email. Certainly, Mr. Caruso does not indicate how anything Mr. Stuart communicated in the email is relevant to the issues in the motions.
47I am not satisfied that Mr. Stuart is in a position to offer possibly relevant evidence on the motions.
Tom Dingwall
48Tom Dingwall is Law Society investigator in the underlying investigation into the complaints regarding Mr. Caruso’s alleged uncivil communications.
49The items listed on the summons to Mr. Dingwall are broad and vague. For example, Mr. Caruso seeks “the names of all staff members involved or with knowledge of the matters in issue.” He wants Mr. Dingwall to testify about his “involvement and knowledge of the facts in question.”
50Mr. Caruso also makes claims in the summons, which are not supported by evidence, including:
“you were on my personal Facebook Page, instagram account and Linkdin [sic] profile.”
“You were directed by Glen [sic] Stuart to provide reasons of the LTB matter by September 30, 2024 and you failed to do so.”
51Mr. Caruso does not demonstrate how these facts would be relevant to issues in the motions.
52Mr. Caruso also appears to make the claim, in the text of the summons, that Mr. Dingwall had a “business relationship” with Leon Presner, the Paralegal’s former representative. In his factum Mr. Caruso alleges that “Mr. Dingwall created a direct and prejudicial conflict of interest. During the course of his investigation, he retained Mr. Leon Presner — who was at that very time acting as the licensee’s legal representative in other matters against the Law Society”.
53No evidence in support of this claim is provided by Mr. Caruso in his materials and it amounts to a bare allegation.
54The summons to Mr. Dingwall seeks copies of replies sent by the LTB to the Ontario Ombudsman with respect to 21 LTB files relating to complaints made by Mr. Caruso. In his factum, Mr. Caruso states:
- Mr. Dingwall is also being asked to account for systemic concerns surrounding the Landlord and Tenant Board (“LTB”). The licensee raises 21 separate complaints to the Ontario Ombudsman against the LTB, all of which were upheld. If the LTB were operating properly, why would so many Ombudsman complaints be sustained? Moreover, the LTB has been subject to a class action lawsuit for its misconduct. These facts directly rebut the Law Society’s characterization of the licensee’s conduct as “incivility.”
55Mr. Dingwall was not a party to these confidential complaints to the Ombudsman, and there is no evidence that he is in possession of the materials sought.
56While these issues raised in the ombudsman complaints may be relevant to the merits hearing, Mr. Caruso has not demonstrated how they are relevant to the motions.
57What is more, the summons appears to be an attempt by Mr. Caruso to obtain disclosure from a third party, Tribunals Ontario, through the summons process, without first bringing a disclosure motion justifying his entitlement to the disclosure and without Tribunals Ontario being given an opportunity to make submissions on the matter.
58Mr. Caruso has filed a human rights complaint against Mr. Dingwall, in which he is seeking $50,000 from Mr. Dingwall in “monetary compensation.” The Law Society submits that “the summons to Mr. Dingwall appears to seek information that Mr. Caruso may intend to use in the human rights complaint.” While a copy of the human rights complaint is included in the Law Society’s materials, there is no evidence before me to support the Law Society’s allegation and I do not rely on it for my decision.
59Considering the above, I am not satisfied that Mr. Dingwall is in a position to offer possibly relevant evidence on the motion to dismiss.
60I am also concerned that ad hoc privilege protects some of the information sought in the summons.3 The summons is very broad, seeking Mr. Dingwall’s testimony about his “involvement and knowledge of the facts in question”. To the extent that the information sought by Mr. Caruso in the summons includes communications between Mr. Dingwall and other Law Society staff, it may be confidential information protected under s 49.12(1) of the Law Society Act, RSO 1990, c L.8 (the Act):
49.12(1) A bencher, officer, employee, agent or representative of the Society shall not disclose any information that comes to his or her knowledge in relation to an audit, investigation, review, search, seizure or proceeding, or potential audit, investigation, review or proceeding, under this Part.
61Confidentiality is practically important for effective professional regulation and s 49.12(1) of the Act generally imposes confidentiality as a matter of law.4
62As stated in Mazo at para. 79, “Confidentiality is imposed by the Act and only the fruits of the investigation are ordinarily disclosed while the investigative and prosecutorial decision-making is not.” Whether privilege attaches to Mr. Dingwall’s testimony cannot be determined by examining the summons to witness due to the vague and broad nature of the information listed in the summons. A fully documented disclosure motion, in which the documents and information sought are properly identified and the basis of their relevance is identified, is the appropriate route, rather than the shortcut Mr. Caruso has chosen, a summons to witness.
Sean Weir
63Sean Weir is the Executive Chair, Tribunals Ontario and LTB member and Chair.
64Some of Mr. Caruso’s alleged uncivil communications were sent to Mr. Weir.
65The summons to Mr. Weir, as the other summonses, is very broad and vague. Mr. Weir is asked to testify about his “involvement and knowledge of the facts in question.” Mr. Caruso seeks to ask Mr. Weir, “why you failed to return emails of complaints that were sent to you.” Mr. Caruso’s materials do not include the emails or complaints, and he has not specified the instances in which Mr. Weir “failed to return emails.”
66Mr. Caruso seeks copies of “memorandum or other written authorization provided to Eli Fellman granting authority to file a complaint.” As discussed below, Mr. Fellman is Legal Counsel for Tribunals Ontario (which includes the LTB) and provides legal advice to Mr. Weir, as its Chair. Mr. Caruso has not shown how such documents would be relevant to the motions. These documents would likely be confidential and may be subject to solicitor-client privilege.
67Mr. Caruso also seeks copies of replies sent by the LTB to the Ontario Ombudsman with respect to 21 LTB files relating to complaints made by the Mr. Caruso. The documents pertaining to Mr. Caruso’s LTB complaints and investigations are presumably confidential, and have no apparent connection to the motion to dismiss.
68And again, as in the case of the summons to Mr. Dingwall, the summons to Mr. Weir appears to be an attempt by Mr. Caruso to obtain disclosure from a third party, Tribunals Ontario, through the summons process, without first bringing a disclosure motion justifying his entitlement to the disclosure and without Tribunals Ontario being given an opportunity to make submissions on the matter.
69Mr. Caruso suggests in the text of the summons that Mr. Weir had a personal or business relationship with the Chair of this Tribunal, Malcolm Mercer. He seeks to ask Mr. Weir about this relationship and “which appointments you gave him.” The relationship between Mr. Weir and Mr. Mercer is not addressed in Mr. Caruso’s factum or anywhere in his materials and there is no evidence regarding this alleged relationship in the record before me. This is a bare allegation, wholly unsupported by any evidence.
70Mr. Caruso also appears to seek to examine Mr. Weir about his grievances with Tribunals Ontario and the LTB. The summons includes the following questions that he proposes asking Mr. Weir:
“why Mr. Caruso had to wait 3 years to finally receive access to the Portal and why the LTB ignored this issue.”
“why, under his leadership, a class action lawsuit was commenced against the LTB which raised concerns about adjudicator independence.”
“why did you wait over 5 years to file a complaint.”
There is no indication in Mr. Caruso’s materials as to how the potential answers to these questions relate to the issues in the motion to dismiss.
71I am not satisfied that Mr. Weir is in a position to offer possibly relevant evidence on Mr. Caruso’s motion to dismiss this proceeding.
72The Law Society submits in its factum that the summons to Mr. Weir ought to be quashed as he is a non-compellable witness, pursuant to s 175 of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, SO 2006, c 17 (RTA):
Members, mediators not compellable
- No member of the Board or person employed as a mediator by the Board shall be compelled to give testimony or produce documents in a civil proceeding with respect to matters that come to his or her knowledge in the course of exercising his or her duties under this Act.
73Mr. Caruso opposes the Law Society’s interpretation of s 175 and its application to Mr. Weir’s testimony before this Tribunal.
74It appears that s 175 of the RTA and its predecessors have not been the subject of judicial interpretation. In view of my finding that Mr. Weir is not in a position to offer possibly relevant evidence on the motion, it is not necessary for me to determine whether s 175 of the RTA applies to Mr. Weir’s testimony before this Tribunal and I leave this issue to a future panel.
Eli Fellman
75Eli Fellman is, as stated above, Senior Legal Counsel at Tribunals Ontario. He filed the complaint on behalf of Tribunals Ontario with respect to the conduct of Mr. Caruso in regard to Mr. Caruso’s communications with various members, staff and OIC appointees of the Landlord and Tenant Board and Tribunals Ontario.
76Mr. Fellman made the Law Society complaint on Mr. Weir’s instructions about the Paralegal’s uncivil conduct relating to his communications with the LTB. Mr. Caruso sent his allegedly abusive and uncivil communications to the LTB, Sean Weir, the Ministry of the Attorney General (MAG), Premier Ford, the Ontario Ombudsman, and others. Mr. Fellman’s role was to consolidate and summarize emails between Mr. Caruso and the LTB.
77As is the case with the summonses to the other witnesses, the summons to Mr. Fellman is broad in scope and vague, seeking “the names of all staff members with knowledge of the matters in issue” and that Mr. Fellman attend to explain why he had a “hard time” naming staff members during an interview with the investigator. He seeks to have Mr. Fellman testify about his “involvement and knowledge of the facts in question.”
78Mr. Caruso, once again, seeks copies of replies sent by the LTB to the Ontario Ombudsman with respect to the 21 LTB files relating to the complaints made by Mr. Caruso and seeks to examine Mr. Fellman about his grievances with Tribunals Ontario and the LTB. The summons includes the question to Mr. Fellman: “…why Mr. Caruso had to wait 3 years to finally receive access to the Portal and why the LTB ignored this issues and emails of concerns.” It is difficult to conceive how Mr. Caruso’s use (or non-use) of the LTB portal is relevant to the issues in his motion to dismiss these proceedings.
79The summons directs Mr. Fellman to bring to the hearing copies of “confirmation of current or past employment status with the Immigration College of Canada.”
80Mr. Caruso includes in his motion to dismiss materials a copy of Mr. Fellman’s LinkedIn page which indicates that Mr. Fellman sits as a part-time adjudicator on the Discipline Committee of the College of Immigration and Citizenship Consultants.
81The only other reference to Mr. Fellman’s role with the College of Immigration and Citizenship Consultants is in Mr. Caruso’s factum:
- Serious concerns also arise regarding potential bias. The licensee currently has a scope-of-practice case before the Court of Appeal involving immigration law. The College of Immigration has opposed the licensee’s position in that matter. Mr. Felman simultaneously acts as an adjudicator for the College of Immigration’s disciplinary tribunal. This overlap creates at minimum a reasonable apprehension of bias, if not an actual conflict of interest, when assessed through the lens of the informed and reasonable observer.
82The fact that Mr. Fellman is an adjudicator on the Discipline Committee of the College of Immigration and Citizenship Consultants is not evidence of any bias and does not give rise a reasonable apprehension of bias or a conflict of interest.
83In any case, Mr. Fellman’s role in this matter is limited and clear. As counsel for Tribunals Ontario, on the instructions of the Chair of Tribunals of Ontario, he filed a complaint against Mr. Caruso with the Law Society regarding the allegedly uncivil communications received from Mr. Caruso by Tribunals Ontario. Whatever the motivations of the complainant, it is up to the Law Society to determine whether, on the facts provided, a misconduct investigation should be undertaken.
84As is the case with the summons to Mr. Weir, the summons to Mr. Fellman is an attempt by Mr. Caruso to use the summons process to circumvent the need for a disclosure motion and to gain information and documentation from a third party, Tribunals Ontario, without giving an opportunity to Tribunals Ontario to oppose his request.
85And again, Mr. Caruso seeks information and documents which are potentially confidential and subject to solicitor-client privilege, including copies of the memorandum or written authorization from Sean Weir granting authority to file the complaint with the Law Society.
86I am not satisfied that Mr. Fellman is in a position to offer possibly relevant evidence on his motion to dismiss this proceeding.
ORDER
87The summonses issued by Mr. Caruso to the six witnesses, namely, to Kristina MacDonald, Glenn Stuart, William Holder, Tom Dingwall, Sean Weir and to Eli Fellman for the hearing of the motions scheduled for October 15 and 16, 2025, are quashed.
88The Law Society may make written costs submissions in respect of this motion by March 9, 2026. Mr. Caruso may make written reply submissions by March 23, 2026.
Footnotes
- Law Society of Ontario v Caruso, 2024 ONLSTH 85 at para 30.
- This issue in the context of an abuse of process motion was canvassed in Law Society of Ontario v Mazo, 2024 ONLSTH 59.
- Law Society of Ontario v Mazo, above.
- Mazo, paras 64-65.

