LAW SOCIETY TRIBUNAL

HEARING DIVISION

Date: February 20, 2026

Tribunal File No.: 23H-068; 25H-049

BETWEEN:

Law Society of Ontario Applicant

• and -

Antonio Caruso Respondent

Before: Lubomir Poliacik

Heard: October 1, 2025, by videoconference

Appearances:

Alex Kens, for the applicant

Respondent, self-represented

CARUSO – Recusal Motion – The Paralegal brought a motion to recuse the panelist – The Paralegal denied the accuracy of the panelist’s endorsement – Unfavourable decisions are not grounds for recusal – While the Paralegal argues that benchers should not be members of the Tribunal, the Law Society Act requires it – Having served on a committee of Convocation with a complainant in another matter does not establish a reasonable apprehension of bias – The panel found there were no grounds for the order sought by the Paralegal and the motion was dismissed.

REASONS FOR DECISION ON A MOTION FOR RECUSAL

1Lubomir Poliacik:– Mr. Caruso brought a motion for my recusal from his matters before the Tribunal on the basis of a reasonable apprehension of bias. In addition, the notice of motion also seeks the following order:

1. The Tribunal endorsement dated September 4, 2025 be corrected to remove the sentence recording that “In his submissions today Mr. Caruso stated that he would not object to postponing the merits hearing until January 2026” and be replaced with language recording that the Moving Party expressly stated he did not consent to any adjournment and requested that his matters proceed as soon as possible as agreed with the Law Society.

2. The Tribunal produce forthwith any audio and/or video recording and any transcript of the September 4, 2025 appearance and provide a copy to the Moving Party at the Tribunal’s expense.

3. The Tribunal set aside the endorsement and Member Lubomir Poliacik and that he be recused/disqualified from further participation in scheduling or substantive matters in these proceedings; any directions taken on September 4, 2025 shall be vacated.

4. A declaration that the Tribunal is unable to provide a fair hearing after five (5) adjudicators (involving the Moving Party) and now a sixth without causing reasonable grounds to claim apprehension of bias.

5. The Moving Party have liberty to apply for further relief, including directions as to costs, as well as for other relief.

2Mr. Caruso delivered a motion record, factum and a book of authorities. He additionally filed, without objection from the Law Society, an LSO convocation committees’ membership list from the period when I was a bencher.

3The Law Society filed a responding factum and book of authorities.

4After reading the materials filed and hearing the submissions of the parties on October 1, 2025, I declined to recuse myself and dismissed the motion, with reasons to follow. These are the reasons.

THE BACKGROUND

5The notice of application in 25H-049 was issued on May 2, 2025. Mr. Caruso is alleged to have failed to communicate with civility with staff at Tribunals Ontario and the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.

6A week after the issuance of the notice of application, on May 9, 2025, Mr. Caruso demanded that the Chair of the Law Society Tribunal, Malcolm M. Mercer, not become involved in proceeding management conferences (PMCs) regarding Mr. Caruso. Mr. Caruso filed a recusal motion on May 16, 2025, alleging bias on the part of Mr. Mercer. Mr. Mercer had not yet had any involvement with 25H-049 at this time.

7The Mr. Caruso’s recusal motion regarding Mr. Mercer was heard on June 19, 2025, and decided on July 9. In the reasons for decision, Law Society v Caruso, 2025 ONLSTH 87, the respondent’s recusal motion was dismissed, with costs.

8Shortly after the release of the recusal decision on July 9, 2025, Mr. Caruso again alleged bias and a conflict of interest on the part of Mr. Mercer. These allegations were addressed by Mr. Mercer in the endorsement of July 11, 2025. Mr. Mercer found there was no reasonable apprehension of bias and stated that Mr. Caruso may bring a recusal motion should he so wished.

9I presided at the next two PMCs, on July 23 and September 4, 2025.

10Mr. Caruso then alleged bias on my part and has brought this motion for my recusal.

GROUNDS FOR THE MOTION

The September 4, 2025 endorsement

11Mr. Caruso submits that my written endorsement for the September 4, 2025 PMC materially misstates his oral submissions when I wrote, “In his submissions today Mr. Caruso stated that he would not object to postponing the merits hearing until January 2026”. Mr. Caruso submits that this statement is false, and that “the misstatement is material to proper and fair scheduling; and to the Moving Party’s right to fair adjudicative process.”

12In the September 4, 2025 endorsement I directed the parties to advise by September 8, 2025, in writing, of their position on whether the merits hearing and/or a previously scheduled motion hearing should be adjourned pending the delivery of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Caruso v Law Society of Ontario, a decision with direct bearing on a related Tribunal hearing involving Mr. Caruso.

13On September 5, 2025, the day following the issuance of the endorsement, Mr. Caruso sent an email to the Tribunal objecting to the PMC endorsement as incorrect. I issued a further endorsement on September 8, 2025 where I noted the fact that Mr. Caruso “categorically denies” agreeing to adjourn.

14In any event, because both parties agreed (as noted in my September 8 endorsement) to proceed as scheduled on the November dates, no adjournment was ordered and the matter was heard as scheduled on those dates.

Functus officio

15Mr. Caruso includes as a ground for his motion an allegation that the Hearing Division is functus officio (with no further authority) with regard to notice of application 23H-068 and that his functus argument should not have been referred to the panel hearing his abuse of process motion. There is no explanation how referring his functus officio submissions to another panel, so that his concerns can be considered and adjudicated on a full record, rather than being decided at a pre-hearing conference, constitute evidence of bias.

Requirement to seek leave to issue summonses

16Mr. Caruso submits that my direction that he be required to seek leave of the Tribunal to issue summonses for the hearing of his abuse of process motion in the 23H-049 matter constitutes evidence of bias on my part. I made that direction due to Mr. Caruso’s history of using the summonsing process of the Tribunal in a way that inconveniences witnesses and causes excessive, and unnecessary, litigation at the Tribunal.

17Mr. Caruso’s manner of operating is to file multiple motions and, in the context of each of the motions, to email summonses to force dozens of people (including opposing counsel, Tribunal adjudicators, benchers, Treasurers past and present, and politicians at various levels of government) to attend before him to answer his questions. Further motions are then required to quash the summonses.

18The Tribunal has the inherent power to control its own process and to prevent the abuse of that process by the indiscriminate issuance of summonses by a party.

Being a bencher at the same time as Ms. Corsetti

19Mr. Caruso entered into evidence committee members lists of the Law Society of Ontario’s Convocation, which show that between 2019 and 2023 I served, as a bencher, on two committees of which Ms. Corsetti was also a member. Ms. Corsetti is a complainant in the 23H-049 matter. Mr. Caruso submits that this means that I have or had a “business relationship” with Ms. Corsetti and therefore raises a reasonable apprehension of bias.

20Mr. Caruso submits that the Tribunal should be independent and that benchers should not be members of the Tribunal. Mr. Caruso alleges that as a former bencher I am “a part of the Law Society”. While Mr. Caruso acknowledged that the Law Society Act and the regulations require benchers to be part of Tribunal panels, he stated that he believes the Act will be amended.

The test for reasonable apprehension of bias

21The test for reasonable apprehension of bias was set out in Law Society v Caruso, 2025 ONLSTH 87, as follows:

4The test for reasonable apprehension of bias is well established and is not in dispute. As recently stated in Ly Innovative Group Inc. v Facilitate Settlement Corporation, 2025 ONCA 194 at para 54:

The test for finding a reasonable apprehension of bias is an objective one applied against the backdrop of a strong presumption of judicial impartiality: Aroma Franchise Company, Inc. v. Aroma Espresso Bar Canada Inc., 2024 ONCA 839, at para. 133. A reasonable person, before concluding that a reasonable apprehension of bias existed in relation to a judge, would require clear evidence that the judge was not approaching the matter with an open mind fair to all parties: R. v. S. (R.D.), 1997 CanLII 324 (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484, at para. 49.

22The aforementioned decision also refers to the Appeal Division decision in the James case, for legal principles that apply to recusal motions in which reasonable apprehension of bias is alleged:

5In the Tribunal, the leading authority is James v Law Society of Ontario, 2018 ONLSTA 6 (James), which stated at para 9:

The legal principles applicable to motions for recusal on the basis of a reasonable apprehension of bias are well established. They can be summarized as follows:

1. The test for a reasonable apprehension of bias is what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically – and having thought the matter through – conclude. Would that person think that it is more likely than not that the decision maker, whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly?

2. There is a strong presumption of judicial impartiality that is not easily displaced.

3. The onus of demonstrating real or perceived bias is on the party alleging bias. This burden is a high one, and it requires cogent evidence.

4. The specific issues raised by the applicant in support of his recusal motion are to be construed in light of the entire proceedings – regard must be had to the cumulative effect of all of the relevant factors.

5. The fact that an adjudicator has ruled adversely on an interlocutory motion or in a previous case on the credibility of either a defence witness or the accused does not necessarily result in a reasonable apprehension of bias. Something more is required showing a predisposition by the adjudicator with respect to the accused’s credibility, such as to amount to a pre-judgement of the result of the second hearing.

6. Adjudicators should not accede too readily to allegations of actual or perceived bias. Although it is important that justice be seen to be done, it is equally important that adjudicators discharge their duty to sit and do not, by acceding too readily to the applicant’s suggestions, encourage parties to believe that, by seeking the disqualification of an adjudicator, they will have their case tried by someone thought to be more likely to decide the case in their favour.

CONCLUSION

23In his Notice of Motion, at para 3, Mr. Caruso states:

3. Given that the Tribunal refuses to correct the endorsement and didn’t reply to the email dated on September 5, 2025 to correct the endorsement, the Tribunal is to set aside the endorsement including all decisions made by Member Lubomir Poliacik and disqualify/recuse Member Lubomir Poliacik (and any panel member who relied on the tainted endorsement), from further participation in scheduling or substantive matters in these proceedings.

24Mr. Caruso alleges that his position, at the PMC on September 4, 2025, was not stated correctly in my endorsement. Mr. Caruso has not tendered evidence to demonstrate that his position was misstated. He has not filed a transcript, as was open him on this motion, of the September 4, 2025 PMC proceeding which would have constituted the best evidence of what his position actually was and whether it was misstated.

25In any case, nothing at all turns on Mr. Caruso’s claim that, on the adjournment question, his position was misstated. Four days later in the endorsement dated September 8, 2025, I put his position that he categorically denies agreeing to adjourn on the record. Mr. Caruso has not been prejudiced in any way by the alleged misstatement in the September 4 endorsement. As stated above, at the request of both parties, the matter was not adjourned.

26Furthermore, the fact that I have made rulings or directions adverse to Mr. Caruso does not necessarily result in a reasonable apprehension of bias. Something more is required.

27Similarly, the fact that some years ago I served on two Convocation committees at the same time as a complainant in another of Mr. Caruso’s matters and the fact that I was formerly a bencher does not establish reasonable apprehension of bias.

28An informed, reasonable and right-minded person, viewing the matter realistically and practically, and having thought the matter through, would not conclude that it was more likely than not that I would not decide fairly, whether consciously or unconsciously.

29As for the other relief sought by Mr. Caruso in this motion, the Tribunal does not have the jurisdiction to make declaratory orders. Even if it did, I would not make the declaratory order sought by Mr. Caruso, that “the Tribunal is unable to provide a fair hearing”, as no evidence was submitted to support that sweeping allegation.

30As stated above, Mr. Caruso’s submission that benchers or former benchers serving as Tribunal adjudicators undermines the Tribunal’s independence ignores the current statutory requirements.

31There were no grounds provided for an order that the Tribunal provide Mr. Caruso with a transcript of the September 4, 2025 PMC at the Tribunal’s expense. As stated above, it was always open for Mr. Caruso to order the transcript himself, at his expense.

ORDER

32The request for recusal and the additional relief set out in the notice of motion is dismissed.

33If the Law Society seeks costs, it should deliver its written submissions by March 6, 2026 and Mr. Caruso may deliver his responding submissions by March 20, 2026.

Lubomir Poliacik