LAW SOCIETY TRIBUNAL
HEARING DIVISION
Date: June 12, 2026 Tribunal File No.: 25H-168
BETWEEN:
Law Society of Ontario Applicant
- and -
Michael Ezekiel Solomon Respondent
Before: Margaret Leighton (chair), Gisele Chretien, Deborah Moriah
Heard: February 27, March 31, and April 21, 2026, by videoconference
Appearances: Kristina MacDonald, for the applicant Jillian Siskind and Mohadeseh Bkhtiari, for the respondent
Summary: SOLOMON – Interlocutory Suspension – The Law Society brought this motion on the grounds that the Paralegal misappropriated trust funds and that there were reasonable grounds to believe there was risk of harm to the public if an order was not made – The Paralegal opposed the motion – The panel agreed that although there was no definitive proof of misappropriation, the Law Society was able to establish that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the Paralegal may have misappropriated or misapplied monies held in trust – The panel ordered an immediate interlocutory suspension.
REASONS FOR DECISION ON A MOTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY SUSPENSION OR RESTRICTIONS
1Margaret Leighton (for the panel):– The Law Society (LSO) seeks an interlocutory suspension of the licence of Michael Ezekiel Solomon, the respondent paralegal, pursuant to s 49.27 of the Law Society Act, RSO 1990, c L.8 (the Act), and Rules 2, 5, 8, and 12 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Practice and Procedure.
2Mr. Solomon opposes the motion. He denies any misappropriation or breach of integrity.
DECISION
3For the reasons which follow we have concluded that the respondent poses a significant risk of harm to members of the public and to the public interest in the administration of justice. Suspension of Mr. Solomon’s licence to provide legal services is necessary to address that risk of harm.
4This was an unusually protracted suspension motion. We briefly discuss the reasons for this and then go on to address and, we hope, allay the respondent’s concerns about the fairness of the proceeding. Next, we summarize the relevant evidence. Our factual findings are limited to those required to determine whether we have the authority to order a suspension and whether we should do so. We are not judging the ultimate merits of the allegations still being investigated. We then apply the test for making a s 49.27 order and explain why we decided that an order is required.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
5The LSO’s notice of motion was filed November 20, 2025. The hearing was scheduled for December 1, 2025, but was adjourned on the condition that Mr. Solomon deliver an undertaking not to provide legal services. He did so on November 25, 2025. His licence is in non-practising status until a final order is made in this file. The hearing was re-scheduled for January 26, 2026.
6The January date was also adjourned: Law Society of Ontario v Solomon, 2026 ONLSTH 24. The LSO had served the respondent with a supplementary affidavit on January 23, 2026, containing over 4,000 pages and new allegations. The LSO is not to be faulted for this. The investigation was ongoing throughout the intervening period, and the investigator was responding to Mr. Solomon’s lengthy affidavit filed in mid-January. Although a continuation date was available the following week, we accepted the respondent’s submissions that more time was necessary to properly respond.
7While convinced this was the only fair solution in the circumstances, the next mutually available date was not until the end of February. We were now well beyond the four-week period from the motion’s filing date which the Tribunal has identified as appropriate in interlocutory suspension proceedings: Law Society of Upper Canada v Cengarle, 2017 ONLSTH 129 at para 5.
8We also declined the LSO’s request that we order an interim interlocutory suspension. Mr. Solomon remained subject to his undertaking and there was no evidence of any breach of its terms. As a result, we concluded there was no evidence of any ongoing risk to clients or other members of the public. Further, through our public reasons and the public hearing, we were satisfied that the public would be aware and assured that the LSO was carrying out its regulatory responsibilities to protect the public and the public’s confidence in the administration of justice.
9The investigator’s evidence was not completed on February 27. The earliest continuation date was March 31. The LSO completed its case that day and we set April 21, the earliest available date, to hear Mr. Solomon’s evidence and receive final submissions.
10Less than a week before the April hearing, the respondent’s counsel advised that Mr. Solomon no longer intended to testify and that he was prepared to proceed to final submissions. The LSO’s representative raised a number of concerns. The hearing had proceeded on the expectation he would testify to his three affidavits. The affidavits had been made exhibits and had been referred to extensively during the investigator’s cross-examination.
11Respondent’s counsel asked that we disregard the affidavits but declined to bring a motion to have them struck. Therefore, they remain on the record. As the LSO was unable to cross-examine Mr. Solomon on his affidavits, where the evidence contained in them conflicts with or contradicts Ms. Skilton’s evidence we can give it no weight. The hearing concluded on April 21.
Fairness of the interlocutory process
12Motions for an interlocutory suspension are different from conduct hearings. They are expected to proceed quickly. Parties may rely on any relevant evidence, including hearsay evidence. Often the investigation is still ongoing and, as occurred in here, the evidence is continuing to evolve. The decision is temporary pending a full investigation and adjudication of the merits of the allegations. The focus is on assessment of risk rather than proving misconduct. At the same time, the hearing must be fair to the licensee given the significance of the decision to their livelihood and reputation: Law Society of Upper Canada v Cengarle, 2017 ONLSTH 129.
13Throughout the proceeding and again in final argument Mr. Solomon’s counsel raised concerns about fairness. Counsel argued that the motion was brought prematurely, in the middle of the investigation and before the expiry of the investigator’s deadline for submission of additional documents which, in her view, were exculpatory. She appears to believe that the investigator was in some way responsible for the decision to bring the motion despite being informed that this was not correct. The Proceedings Authorisation Committee decides when and if a motion will be filed.
14She was highly critical of the investigator’s conduct, suggesting it displayed a “confirmation bias”. She argued the investigator failed to adequately investigate the complainants’ motives for making their complaints; refused to even consider the respondent’s position that the complainants had real time access to all invoices, which obviated any concerns about their delivery; and gave little or no consideration to the involvement of another licensee in managing the complainants’ files.
15We agree that flaws in an investigation may ground an abuse of process motion or can be used to refute allegations in a conduct proceeding: Watson v Law Society of Ontario, 2023 ONSC 1154. But we are not there yet. As the investigator explained more than once, she has yet to finish her investigation. She intends to conduct further interviews. She has not made her investigation report. What counsel considers missing or unconsidered may yet be addressed. If it is not, and the LSO brings a conduct application, the respondent may take full advantage of any vulnerabilities in the LSO’s case. For now, we have taken these arguments into consideration in evaluating whether the LSO has established reasonable grounds for believing there is a significant risk of harm to the public and the administration of justice.
16Counsel was also concerned that the notice of motion contained only a single particular – misappropriation of nearly $800,000 of funds held in trust; yet, during the course of the hearing, the LSO had raised new allegations of misconduct involving other clients and the characterisation of the alleged misconduct (double dipping, fraud, integrity breaches) changed. In counsel’s words, this “constant shifting” denied Mr. Solomon his right to full answer and defence and to know the case he was required to meet. She argued we should have no regard to any of the other allegations; the only issue for us to determine was whether the Law Society met the statutory threshold to obtain an order in respect of the misappropriation as alleged in the notice of motion.
17We were alive to these concerns, which is why we allowed counsel’s adjournment request and scheduled continuation dates as we did. The investigator’s detailed affidavits provided ample notice of the LSO’s allegations and evolving analysis. An interlocutory suspension proceeding is, or can be, a dynamic process where the investigation remains ongoing. The notice of motion explicitly anticipates this. The notice sets out the grounds for this motion and concludes: “Such further and other grounds as counsel may advise and the Hearing Division permit.”
18Finally, counsel asserted the motion was unnecessary. The complaint is founded on incidents which occurred years ago, between 2022 and 2024. Mr. Solomon has sold his practice and closed all his trust accounts. That is all true. But it is also true that, but for the undertaking given in this proceeding, Mr. Solomon could resume providing legal services and open a trust account tomorrow. The LSO contends that if he did so the public would be at risk and the motion is necessary. If the LSO is correct about risk the motion is necessary.
FACTS
Background
19Mr. Solomon became a licensed paralegal in Ontario in 2017. At all material times he was one of two partners of Solomon Jones LLP. His practice was primarily in the small claims court. In his representations to the investigator, Mr. Solomon explained that his firm’s clients are creditors who are owed money by individual debtors. His clients can either be (a) the original creditor – the company that sold the good or service to the debtor; or (b) a company that bought the debt from the original creditor to collect the debt.
20In September 2021 Solomon Jones was retained by a credit corporation, CHICC, to collect debts on its behalf. Mr. Solomon and CHICC’s director, AA, entered into a legal services agreement for this purpose. They agreed that Solomon Jones would receive a 25% contingency fee of funds collected.
21In his first affidavit1, Mr. Solomon confirmed that:
The Firm’s professional relationship with CHICC was governed by a written Master Legal Services Agreement executed in or about September 2021 (the “Agreement”), pursuant to which the Firm was retained to provide collection-related legal services on CHICC’s behalf.
22In addition to the 25% fee, the legal services agreement provided:
3.3 The Firm shall, upon clearance of any cheque or deposit into the Firm’s trust account, make payable the said funds to the Plaintiff, within seven (7) business days, once weekly on each Friday or the following business day if it is a statutory holiday. …
3.5 The Firm may, upon consultation and approval of the Client (or Plaintiff) by way of the Client, be given authority to pursue legal action to effect the collection of outstanding debts. The Firm must receive Permission to Sue (PTS) from the Client (or Plaintiff). … The Client shall reimburse the Firm for its reasonable expenses incurred during the course of any action. The fee schedule is annexed hereto as Schedule B….
3.5 (sic) The Firm shall receive an authorisation to settle accounts from the Client on Behalf of the Client (or Plaintiff) for a percentage of the total balance (inclusive of the principal amount, interest and court costs) only upon approval from the Client. The Firm will not settle any account unless authorized to do so.
3.6 The Firm may, at its sole discretion and to protect its financial interests, deduct any amount owing to it from the amount received from the Client in connection with the Client (or Plaintiff). For example, Client A has $2,000 in their trust account and owes a balance of $102 for filing fees. The Firm will deduct the amount of $102 from its balance and remit the difference thereof in accordance with paragraph 3.3.
22.1 This Agreement and the terms hereof constitute and express the entire Agreement of the Parties hereto with respect to all matters herein and supersedes any and all previous agreements, communications, representations or understandings, whether oral or written. No modification or amendment shall be effective unless it is in writing and signed by the Parties hereto.
23In March 2024 CHICC and Solomon Jones agreed that the firm would also pursue collections in the small claims court. No retainer would be paid for this work and Solomon Jones LLP’s commission would be 35% of the amount collected.
24On June 25, 2024, AA emailed Mr. Solomon, directing the firm to stop acting on any matters relating to CHICC. On October 11, 2024, AA wrote again because he had become aware that the firm was continuing to act on its file. He stated again that the agreement had been terminated on June 25.
25Mr. Solomon responded on October 15, 2024, acknowledging receipt of the June 25, 2024, email and advising that he was not aware that any collection activities had continued after that date. He confirmed that CHICC’s dedicated trust account would be closed as of October 31, 2024, and that funds had been sent to CHICC’s bank account.
26On January 17, 2025, CHICC’s counsel wrote to Mr. Solomon to advised that, on reviewing the firm’s bank ledger, it appeared that Solomon Jones had collected $1,794,540.11 rather than the $1,010,092.25 previously claimed.
27On January 22, 2025, the LSO received a complaint from AA alleging that in some instances Mr. Solomon withheld a portion of funds collected on CHICC’s behalf and in others he failed to remit any of the funds collected. AA alleged that Mr. Solomon owed CHICC $784,447.86.
28An investigation into AA’s complaint was instructed on January 27, 2025. Yvonne Skilton (the investigator), a forensic auditor, was assigned to conduct the investigation.
29In September 2025 the LSO received information about a civil proceeding commenced in May 2024 by ACRM, a former client of the firm, against both Mr. Solomon and Solomon Jones LLP for the amount of $600,000. The lawsuit alleges mishandling and/or misappropriation of trust funds.
30ACRM did not initiate a complaint to the LSO. The complaint was made by Mr. Solomon’s former partner, Sherwin Shams. Mr. Shams had been responsible for the day-to-day management of the CHICC files during his tenure at Solomon Jones.
31On October 28, 2025, the investigator advised the respondent that she would be reviewing his other accounts to determine whether they disclosed concerns.
32On November 20, 2025, the Law Society filed this notice of motion for interlocutory suspension or restrictions.
33On December 8, 2025, Mr. Solomon was notified that the LSO was investigating the ACRM allegations together with the CHICC complaint. As the ACRM investigation was not instructed until December, most investigative time was focused on the CHICC matter. As a result of her broader investigation into the respondent’s records, the investigator identified patterns of conduct similar to the ACRM and CHICC files in respect of the firm's handling of its Ontario Green Savings (OGS) files.
34Through her affidavits and oral evidence, the investigator described the evolution of her investigation. She prepared and relied on very detailed charts to support her analysis of the respondent’s books and records produced in response to her requests concerning the CHICC and ACRM complaints as well as the OGS file. These charts track the movement of funds by file number, invoice number, and bank transfer number from their deposit into trust through transfers into the firm’s general account and payout to the clients.
35The investigator testified that she anticipated the investigation would be completed in the next few months, at which point she will interview Mr. Solomon and then prepare her report. She expected to be finished by summer.
The Investigation
CHICC
36The investigator testified that the investigation had evolved in response to her ongoing analysis of the documents and Mr. Solomon’s explanations. Initially, she thought the issue might be a billing dispute but, after reviewing the respondent’s books and records, her focus turned to unexplained transfers from trust to the respondent’s general account.
37In July 2025, she requested and was provided with the designated CHICC trust account bank statements, general account bank statements, CHICC client trust ledgers, and invoices/bills to CHICC. The investigator’s initial review of those records revealed that:
- The respondent maintained one main client trust ledger for CHICC. He also maintained approximately 302 sub-client trust ledgers, one for each of the individuals he was to collect debts on CHICC’s behalf. Between August 2022 and November 2024, he collected funds on approximately 109 of the 302 files.
- From August 2022 to July 2024, the respondent collected $1,779,687.67 on behalf of CHICC. These amounts collected were not sent directly to CHICC. The investigator interpreted the agreement between the firm and CHICC as requiring Mr. Solomon to remit the funds collected to CHICC with an invoice for the firm’s commission and any disbursements.
- Instead, it appeared to the investigator that the respondent took a random percentage of the amounts collected and transferred it from the trust account to his general account. This amounted to $631,729.07. The remaining amount, except for funds collected after June 17, 2024, which we calculate as just under $240,000, was then sent to CHICC along with invoices as agreed.
Unexplained transfers and missing invoices
38The investigator’s initial review of the respondent’s records disclosed a number of questionable or unidentified transfers between the trust and the respondent’s general account. Invoices appeared to be missing. On July 28, 2025, the investigator requested copies of these invoices and asked to be advised whether they were sent to CHICC explaining that she needed to confirm they were sent because “… if you don't send the invoices, and there's amounts missing, then it looks like the money is skimmed from the top.”
39Mr. Solomon produced 91 invoices in response. His counsel advised that the invoices had been emailed to CHICC through Cosmolex, a practice management and accounting software system. Many of the invoices included fees for legal services. Cosmolex records were provided to confirm delivery.
40The investigator reviewed the Cosmolex records. The August 18, 2025 Cosmolex email report for most of the 91 invoices showed a “not sent” email status. However, their status in the September 30, 2025 Cosmolex report was “emailed” or “viewed”.
41The investigator contacted Cosmolex and confirmed that the system does not permit email status to be changed manually. Consequently, she concluded the respondent had emailed the missing invoices between August 18 and September 30, 2025. This led her to suspect that the invoices had been sent to an unrelated email address following her request for proof of their delivery. AA confirmed that he had not received 90 of the 91 invoices, that some contained an incorrect email address for CHICC, and that CHICC had never had an outstanding balance with Solomon Jones.
42The investigator asked the respondent to explain this discrepancy. On October 10, 2025, his counsel advised that the September 30, 2025, email report was sent in error. The August 18, 2025 report was correct version and some invoices were “manually sent” by email directly to employees at CHICC outside the Cosmolex system.
43In response, the investigator requested that, among other things, Mr. Solomon provide evidence as to how all emails, sent through Cosmolex or manually, were sent to CHICC. This generated a flurry of communications between the investigator and respondent’s counsel concerning the format and accessibility of these records. We do not consider the back and forth between the investigator and counsel material to our assessment of risk and harm where there is no allegation of failure to co-operate.
44The investigator testified that she has yet to receive evidence that the majority of the 91 invoices were emailed as Mr. Solomon claimed in August 2025. She was vigorously cross-examined on this point. Counsel put to her that it was the respondent’s position that all the invoices were available to CHICC in real time on Cosmolex or through Collect, another software system to which CHICC had been given access. Counsel noted the investigator’s failure to question AA about this. The investigator testified that there would be no reason to make that inquiry in the face of Mr. Solomon’s position the invoices had been emailed. He maintained that position until filing his January 21, 2026 affidavit, where he conceded that some invoices had not been emailed as he believed but that all were available on Cosmolex and Collect.
45In her chart analysing the respondent’s records the investigator found that the invoices which CHICC states it did not receive totalled $33,223.85. These invoices were associated with funds identified in her chart as “Funds Transferred to CHICC General Ledger (21-127780) Ledger from Column D.” They totalled $132,790.18 less $8,694.40 which was sent to CHICC on October 15, 2024. Rather than send the funds in this column to CHICC, as the respondent had done before, the respondent allocated them among several sub client ledgers and then ultimately transferred the funds to his general bank account.
46Following the February hearing date, and in response to Mr. Solomon’s January 21, 2026 affidavit, the investigator made further inquiries of CHICC. She was unable to provide the results of these inquiries in an affidavit because she remained subject to cross-examination between the February and March hearing dates. However, in re-examination on March 31 she testified that:
Q. And we heard you mention a number of times that there has been during the month gap between the February 27th appearance and today, that you have done additional investigative work. Could you give us a summary of what that additional work has been, please?
A. Partly with CHICC, and it was in relation to what Mr. Solomon had provided in his affidavit. So, I needed to understand what CHICC's representations were to Mr. Solomon's affidavit.
Q. Okay, and what specific questions did you ask them?
A. His access to Collect! and CosmoLex.
Q. And what response did you receive?
A. So, he advised that he didn't have access to the invoices that are at issue here, that that was in his words, "a lie." He did not have access to the invoices.
47The respondent’s evidence concerning the delivery of invoices has changed more than once. However, his counsel argues adamantly that whether and how invoices were emailed is effectively a non-issue because CHICC had access to all the firm’s invoices through Cosmolex and Collect.
48The investigator provided a detailed chart of her analysis of the respondent’s CHICC records to his counsel on October 28, 2025. In a lengthy cover email explaining the chart she identified the following issues:
Regarding the funds that were transferred from the CHICC designated trust account to Mr. Solomon's general account, which amount to $631,861.20, for which Mr. Solomon provided invoices but has yet to provide evidence the invoices were sent to CHICC, CHICC did not receive these invoices. Once again, in the Cosmolex recording of invoices, the invoices CHICC did receive there is an envelope icon beside them. The invoices CHICC did not receive there is no envelope icon beside them. I have attached screenshots of the Cosmolex recording of invoices for your reference.
After Mr. Solomon was terminated, he continued to collect funds on behalf of CHICC, which amounted to $213,561.03. This amount was not sent to CHICC. Mr. Solomon transferred $80,670.85 (this amount is included in the $631,861.20) of this amount to his general account. The remaining amount of $132,790.18, less $8,694.40 (sent to CHICC on October 15, 2024), he calculated his contingency fee and prepared invoices 4710, 4745, 4752, 4789, 4841, and 4991. CHICC did not receive these invoices. In the Cosmolex recording of invoices, there is no envelope icon beside any of these invoices. Mr. Solomon took the funds and internally transferred the amount among 200+ CHICC sub client ledgers and then ultimately transferred the funds to his general account. My Portal Message titled More Missing Invoices, are some the invoices of these transfers. CHICC did not receive these invoices either despite there being an envelope icon beside these invoices in the Cosmolex recording of invoices.
Noting the flow of funds above in both CIBC and RBC accounts, it appears Mr. Solomon was “skimming” from receipted amounts he received on behalf of CHICC and sending the remaining amounts to them. Without evidence from Mr. Solomon that he sent invoices for the “skimmed” amounts to CHICC, it appears he misappropriated $673,548.85 ($41,687.65 + $631,861.20).
Furthermore, without evidence Mr. Solomon sent invoices 4710, 4745, 4752, 4789, 4841, and 4991 to CHICC, it also appears he misappropriated an additional $132,790.18.
49At the hearing the investigator took us through the chart to explain it and the series of transactions recorded in it. She testified that the chart listed:
a. funds disbursed to the firm’s general account from the trust account used for monies received for CHICC; b. the numbers of the invoices to CHICC which Mr. Solomon says support the disbursement from the trust account to the firm’s general account; c. whether CHICC agrees that it received the invoices which Mr. Solomon says support the disbursement to the firm’s general account; and d. the invoices that are at issue; namely, the ones that Mr. Solomon says he sent to CHICC, and the ones that CHICC says it didn't receive.
50By way of example, the investigator referred to a trust receipt of $30,801.63 on May 6, 2024 of which (i) $20,683.64 was disbursed from trust to the firm’s general account and only (ii) $10,117.99 was reflected in the main trust ledger for CHICC.
51The investigator then referred to the invoice dated May 6, 2024 produced by Mr. Solomon for $20,683.64. The total amount of $20,683.64 was comprised of $14,737.74 for a commission on interest, legal fees of $3,000, a statement fee of $500 and a wire fee of $75.00.
52The investigator described the $20,683.64 as having been “skimmed” from the $30,801.63 before $10,117.99 was transferred to the main trust ledger for CHICC.
Legal Fees
53We were told that Mr. Solomon would testify that the transfers identified in the investigator’s chart as “unexplained” related to legal fees charged to the debtors and that they were supported in the payout statements. The respondent relied on Article 3.6 of the Legal Services Agreement (above at para 21) to support these charges.
54In cross-examination the investigator explained that she interpreted Article 3.6 as only permitting deductions from funds received from the client (CHICC). The debtor could not be the considered the client. CHICC could only provide the firm with funds subject to an Article 3.6 deduction by paying a retainer. That CHICC did not pay a retainer was undisputed.
55The investigator agreed that the respondent placed the monies collected from the debtor into trust and that the firm was entitled to deduct its commission from that amount. However, she did not agree that the legal services agreement allowed fees for legal services to be added on top of the commission. She reasoned that, having already collected their commission for performing the legal services contemplated by the agreement, it did not make sense to permit the firm to add another charge for legal services to its invoice.
56In support the investigator noted two instances where CHICC identified and questioned the charge for legal services. In both cases the firm responded that the charge was an error.
57The respondent argued that the firm was entitled to charge legal fees directly to the debtors and to deduct them from the amounts collected on CHICC’s behalf because it was acting as CHICC’s agent. The respondent relied on Article 12 of CHICC’s agreement with debtors in support. It states that, in the event of default:
(c) we may require you to pay immediately on demand damages suffered by us as a result of the termination of this Agreement. These damages will be, as a genuine pre-estimate of liquidated damages for loss of a bargain and not as a penalty, equal to the aggregate of (i) any outstanding Monthly Payments owing as at the date of Default, (ii) the remaining Monthly Payments due under this Agreement for the balance of the Term following the date of the Default, and (iii) all costs incurred by us, our assignees or agents in enforcing the terms of this Agreement.
58Counsel advised that Mr. Solomon would provide evidence to supporting this position but as noted, he did not testify.
59A review of payout statements signed by Mr. Solomon and contained in two of the sample client files attached to the investigator’s supplementary affidavit shows that the firm charged the individual debtors $3,390 toward “our legal account herein” and then invoiced CHICC $3,000 for legal fees on the same file. The investigator considered this evidence that the respondent was “double dipping.”
60The investigator did not accept that the agreement between CHICC and the debtors established that Solomon Jones’s authority to act as CHICC’s agent. Mr. Solomon was not a signatory to the agreement. The Legal Services Agreement did not expressly authorise Solomon Jones to collect legal fees from debtors or to include them in the payout statement. In her view charging the debtors who were not the firm’s clients for legal services amounted to fraud. In cross-examination she explained:
Q. And you referenced Exhibit R in your affidavit, and this explains … that in this letter it explains the legal fees were not charged to CHICC, right?
A. Right, but then I have to ask myself then who gets charged the legal fees 'cause it certainly couldn't be the debtor.
Q. And Ms. Bakhtiari though explained that it was charged to the debtor as part of the collections process 'cause Solomon Jones was acting as the agent to enforce the contract, right?
A. Yes, but the contract said, may. The contract doesn't have Mr. Solomon's signature on it; it has CHICC, and I didn't see any evidence of CHICC authorizing Solomon Jones to add legal fees to the payout statement. And lastly, you actually have to provide legal services if you're going to add legal fees to a payout statement. And then, you have to remit or render the invoice for those legal services to someone.
61The investigator requested and reviewed the complete debtor files in order to substantiate whether legal work was done on them. She found nothing more than the single line reference to legal services on the invoice. She concluded there were no dockets or other documentation to support the amounts claimed. Counsel did not challenge the investigator on this point.
62Our review of the files attached as exhibits to the investigator’s affidavits confirms that they do not contain dockets or documents to substantiate charges post-March 2024 files subject to the revised commission arrangement for matters requiring small claims court enforcement.
Form 9As
63Form 9As are signed confirmations required by s 12 of By-Law 9 for the electronic transfer of trust funds.
64As part of her initial request for information in the CHICC complaint, the investigator requested Form 9As for all e-transfers made from the firms’ trust accounts. These were provided on September 30, 2025. There were no confirmations attached. Many were not signed, as required by By-Law 9, s 12. The investigator asked the respondent to obtain copies of the complete Form 9As from his bank. She expected the Form 9A would provide information “which drives the disbursement” and would have a source document such as an invoice to support the transfer.
65Her review of the over 200 complete Form 9As later showed that Mr. Solomon was responsible for both requisitioning and authorising the vast majority of the transfers on the CHICC file. While there is no dispute Mr. Shams had day to day responsibility for the CHICC work, the Form 9As provide abundant evidence that Mr. Solomon was integrally involved in managing the financial aspects of the CHICC file and in authorizing transfers from trust to general.
66The investigator confirmed that she had not questioned Mr. Shams about what, if anything, he advised Mr. Solomon concerning the CHICC transfers. She considered it unnecessary because Mr. Solomon had initiated the vast majority of the requisitions and then also authorised the transfer.
67The Form 9As also confirm that Mr. Solomon continued to receive funds and make transfers on CHICC matters after June 25, 2025 when the agreement was terminated. Multiple transfers are requisitions and authorised on June 26 and 27, 2025 with no corresponding payouts to CHICC. The same thing happened on July 2 and 3 and continues throughout July.
ACRM
Unexplained transfers and missing invoices
68After reviewing the records relating to the ACRM files the investigator identified a number of invoices and unexplained transfers. On February 4, 2026, she emailed 31 invoices to ACRM’s director of finance and asked whether ACRM had received them. He responded on February 6 to confirming that none of the 31 invoices had been received.
69The respondent argues that ACRM also had real time access to all invoices through Cosmolex and Connect.
70Based on the investigator’s chart, the missing invoices represent $84,248.04 in unexplained transfers. ACRM’s director of finance agreed that this figure was accurate.
Form 9As
71As in the CHICC file, the investigator’s review of these Form 9As confirms that Mr. Solomon was responsible for the majority of requisitions and authorisations of transfers from trust to general in respect of the ACRM files.
OGS
72The investigator reviewed the OGS account activity between September 2022 and December 2023. During that period the firm received a total of $1,406,198.27. Of that amount $943,307.90 was posted to the OGS trust ledger and $454,646.62 was transferred to the Solomon Jones general account. The investigator did not elaborate further.
Summary
73In closing submissions, the LSO’s representative confirmed that, as of March 31, 2026:
- There are approximately 90 invoices the respondent asserts it issued to support transfers from trust which CHICC claims it did not receive. Initially the investigator identified over $600,000 in unexplained transfers. The investigator calculated the value of the transfers connected with the missing invoices as just over $33,000.
- There are 31 invoices the respondent asserts it issued to support transfers from trust which ACRM claims it did not receive. ACRM has confirmed the investigator’s calculation that the missing invoices represent over $80,000.
- Of the invoices produced in response to the ACRM complaint, only five provide support for the transfers of funds from trust to general account.
- There is no documentation to substantiate legal work charged by the respondent’s firm on the CHICC files.
- The firm was charging legal fees to CHICC and ACRM’s clients (the debtors) and, at the same time, charging legal fees to CHICC and ACRM.
- The firm was charging legal fees to debtors who were not clients of the respondent’s firm.
74This is the context in which the investigator’s candid answers on cross-examination as to whether she had identified misappropriation must be understood.
Q. And you've been conducting this investigation since at least the end of July of last year, yeah?
A. No, it's – yes.
Q. And you still do not have evidence of actual misappropriation, do you?
A. No, I have evidence of fraud now.
Q. Your belief of misappropriation has not actually been confirmed by the evidence; is that fair?
A. No, it hasn't.
75In considering this evidence, we start with the obvious. A legal representative who collects amounts owing to a creditor from a debtor does so on behalf of the creditor. Where the amount owing is pursuant to an agreement, the agreement may provide that the debtor is obligated to pay collection costs as well as principal and interest. Such agreements make practical sense because the creditor would otherwise be out-of-pocket for costs of collecting the amount to which it is entitled from the debtor.
76Where a legal representative receives money on account of the costs of collection as well as on account of principal and interest, the legal representative does so on behalf of its creditor client.
77Solomon Jones’ entitlement to payment was pursuant the legal services agreement. Any collection on account of costs from debtors could only have been for the benefit of the client to defray fees paid. The firm had no legal relationship with debtors and no rights other that to collect what was owed to the client.
78The investigator appears to be of the view that Solomon Jones obtained funds from debtors that the debtors did not owe. On this basis, it makes practical sense to see this as fraudulent recovery rather than misappropriation on the basis that the client was never entitled to the money.
79However, it is not clear that the client was not entitled to payment from its debtors on account of collection costs. That may or may not be the case. If Solomon Jones improperly collected monies, then there is a problem.
80But whether Solomon Jones properly collected monies or not on account of collection costs, there is no apparent reason to conclude that Solomon Jones was entitled to those monies. Whether Solomon Jones improperly received such monies or not, it does not appear that there was any basis for Solomon Jones to both be paid amounts to which it was entitled under the legal services agreement and to keep collection costs recouped from debtors.
81Whether or not Solomon Jones was entitled to collect these amounts, there is no apparent reason to conclude that it was entitled to keep what it received from its client.
TEST FOR AN INTERLOCUTORY SUSPENSION
82Section 49.27 of the Act authorizes the Hearing Division to make an interlocutory order suspending or restricting a licensee’s licence in the following circumstances:
49.27(2) The Hearing Division may only make an interlocutory order suspending a licensee’s licence or restricting the manner in which a licensee may practise law or provide legal services if there are reasonable grounds for believing that there is a significant risk of harm to members of the public, or to the public interest in the administration of justice, if the order is not made.
83This requires a two-step analysis. First, we must consider whether the provisions of s 49.27(2) are met. If they are not, the motion is dismissed. If they are, we move to the second step.
84The LSO is not required to prove Mr. Solomon engaged in professional misconduct in order to succeed on the motion. That will be the task of a future panel of the Hearing Division if and when the LSO files a conduct application. Our role is to decide whether the evidence provided by the LSO demonstrates “more than mere suspicion” that permitting the licensee to continue to provide legal services would pose a significant risk of harm to members of the public or to the public interest in the administration of justice: Law Society of Upper Canada v Weisdorf, 2015 ONLSTH 39. The LSO need not demonstrate that harm will likely or will probably occur. The question is whether there is a serious risk it will occur: Law Society of Upper Canada v Ejidike, 2016 ONLSTH 69 at para 53, aff’d: 2016 ONLSTA 18.
85At the second step of the analysis we must consider whether to make an interlocutory order and what kind of an order will adequately protect the public and the public interest. Anything that harms public confidence in the administration of justice, including the regulatory role that the Law Society fulfils in protecting the public, will tend to harm the public interest in the administration of justice: Law Society of Upper Canada v McGee, 2011 ONLSHP 70 at paras 42-45. Where we are satisfied that a less restrictive order will provide protection from harm, the less restrictive order should be made.
ANALYSIS
86We agree that there is, as yet, no definitive proof of misappropriation. However, we are satisfied that the Law Society has established reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Solomon may have misappropriated or misapplied monies held in trust. There are at least 90 CHICC invoices and 31 ACRM invoices in dispute. In total they represent well over $100,000.
87Mr. Solomon now says invoices for all transfers were always available to the clients to review in both Cosmolex and Connect. Mr. Solomon was not cross-examined on this point and, given the number of times he changed his position on how invoices were delivered to CHICC, we can give his explanation little weight. It is inconsistent with the investigator’s findings. It is disputed by both CHICC and ACRM.
88The respondent says CHICC’s claims must be discounted because CHICC is the respondent to multiple civil actions and the subject of a class action proceeding. Counsel argues that its complaint and its responses to the investigation must be understood in the context of an entity desperate to deflect liability.
89We accept that a complainant’s motive may be relevant to assessment of the sincerity of its accusations. However, CHICC is not the only complainant. While ACRM has commenced a lawsuit against the respondent and his firm arising out of their business relationship, it did not initiate the complaint to the LSO and is not defending itself in multiple legal proceedings. Moreover, the investigator independently found similar patterns of concern in the OGS files.
90The respondent also posits that because Mr. Shams was the licensee responsible for the day-to-day operation of the relevant accounts it is more likely that he is responsible for any misconduct than Mr. Solomon. We do not accept this argument for two reasons. The Form 9As establish that Mr. Solomon was almost wholly responsible for all transfers of funds between trust and general account. He signed all or almost all invoices. He negotiated the original agreement with CHICC. He did not just manage these funds, he controlled them.
91We are also satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe the respondent improperly charged for legal services. It may be that a panel hearing a conduct application accepts the respondent’s interpretation of the legal agreement and accepts that the firm was acting as an agent for CHICC. At this point however, we find there is a reasonable doubt as to the validity of these charges.
92Further, the respondent’s position fails entirely to address the fact that there are no dockets or documents which support charging for legal services. The firm charged a commission, either 25% or 35%, for its work in negotiating and collecting debts owed to CHICC. The commission is payment for its legal services. We do not know what the additional charge for legal services on top of the commission fees relates to. There are no dockets or any justification for claiming the additional fee. This raises a reasonable doubt that the additional charges for legal services were unwarranted.
93Finally, the respondent was retained to collect amounts owed to his client under contract. To the extent that these contractual entitlements were in respect of costs, it appears to us that the respondent was not collecting for his own account but rather was collecting amounts for his client to compensate his client for the cost of collecting the debts from the debtors. It appears that the respondent took money for himself to which his client was entitled.
94With respect to collections on account of interest, the evidence in support of the claim that Solomon Jones was entitled to keep 100% of amounts collected on account of interest is weak at best. It is difficult to understand why such an agreement would have been reached and it is difficult to accept that it was.
95Effectively, the respondent claims that Solomon Jones was entitled to a percentage of the recovery on account of principal as well as 100% of amounts recovered on account of interest and collection costs. This is the apparent explanation for what the investigator saw as being “skimming”. While it is not for us to reach a final conclusion, it appears to us that there was no legitimate entitlement to these amounts and that it would have been far from obvious that these amounts were being taken.
CONCLUSION
96We conclude that the statutory requirements have been met for an interlocutory order to be made. The LSO’s evidence provides reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has misappropriated funds held in trust and to question his integrity. If these allegations are proven in a conduct proceeding the presumptive penalty is revocation. This is not a case where an interlocutory suspension would be more onerous than the likely penalty order.
97Nonetheless, a suspension does not automatically follow from these conclusions even where the alleged misconduct is serious: Law Society of Upper Canada v Marusic, 2015 ONLSTH 81 at para 62. We must consider whether the identified risks of harm to the public and to the public interest can be mitigated by the implementation of measures other than a full interlocutory suspension: Law Society of Upper Canada v Borkovich, 2015 ONLSTH 36 at para 26.
98We do not have a full evidentiary record before us and the respondent adamantly contests the Law Society’s allegations. Although much of this case turns on the financial records, a hearing panel will nonetheless have to weigh the credibility of his denials against the evidence of the complainants and others concerning access to invoices and the firm’s authority to act as agent for CHICC. That is a factor in our analysis: Ejidike, 2016 ONLSTH 69 at para 69.
99The respondent has closed his firm and all his trust accounts. Mr. Solomon’s undisputed compliance with his November 2025 undertaking was critical to our analysis of risk and harm when declining to issue an interim interlocutory suspension. However, the undertaking will expire on conclusion of these proceedings.
100There is more than a mere suspicion the respondent has engaged in misappropriation and breach of integrity. If these allegations are proven at a hearing the presumptive penalty is revocation. This is not a case in which an interlocutory suspension would be more serious than the likely penalty order.
101We acknowledge Mr. Solomon’s compliance with his undertaking which weighs in favour of ordering restrictions. But, where genuine and serious integrity issues are present we do not have sufficient confidence restrictions on practice and access to trust funds will be complied with to make a restrictions order: Law Society of Ontario v Harrison, 2024 ONLSTH 24. An interlocutory suspension is necessary in these circumstances.
ORDER
102We order that:
- The respondent’s licence is immediately suspended on an interlocutory basis.
- The respondent shall comply fully with the terms of the Law Society’s Guidelines for Paralegals Who Are Suspended or Who Have Given an Undertaking Not to Provide Legal Services while suspended pursuant to this order.
- The costs of this motion are reserved to the panel presiding at the hearing of any application to which the motion relates. If no application is brought by June 14, 2027, the respondent may bring a motion for his costs.
Footnotes
- As mentioned below, Mr. Solomon subsequently claimed that this agreement was varied to provide that the firm would be entitled to “100% of the commission of the interest portion of the recoveries”. There is no written amendment of the legal services agreement to this effect. The evidence of amendment is hearsay.