2839-00-U Lewis R. Reed, Applicant v. United Steelworkers of America, Responding Party v Initial Security Services, Rentokil Initial Canada Limited, Intervenor.
BEFORE: Patrick Kelly, Vice-Chair.
APPEARANCES: Lewis R. Reed on his own behalf; Robert Champagne, Tony DePaulo, Oise (Joe) Bonsu and Horace Legendre appeared on behalf of the responding party; Sharon Chilcott and Todd Martin appeared on behalf of the intervenor.
DECISION OF THE BOARD; June 19, 2001
1The style of cause is hereby amended to reflect the correct name of the responding party: “United Steelworkers of America”).
2This is an application filed pursuant to section 96 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, S.O. 1995, c.1 (“the Act”) as amended alleging a violation of section 74 of the Act.
3Section 74 provides as follows:
- A trade union or council of trade unions, so long as it continues to be entitled to represent employees in a bargaining unit, shall not act in a manner that is arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith in the representation of any of the employees in the unit, whether or not members of the trade union or of any constituent union of the council of trade unions, as the case may be.
4A consultation was scheduled on June 5, 2001. The applicant was not represented by legal counsel. I informed the applicant that he was welcome and entitled to participate in the consultation without legal counsel, but that this was a legal proceeding which could have consequences in respect of the rights, interests and obligations of the parties involved.
5The applicant, Mr. Reed, is a security guard employed by the intervenor and a member of the bargaining unit for which the responding party is the bargaining agent. The intervenor provides security services to third parties. Employees of the intervenor, such as Mr. Reed, carry out their duties at the work sites of the third parties. Mr. Reed had been employed as a security guard by Chrysler Daimler (“Chrylser”) at its Brampton plant until Chrysler contracted the work to an entity known as Group 4CPS, which, in turn, became Mr. Reed’s employer. In 1998, the intervenor replaced Group 4CPS as the provider of security services to Chrysler, and became Mr. Reed’s employer. As a result, Mr. Reed and others became members of the intervenor’s bargaining unit for which the union had bargaining rights, and subject to the collective agreement between the intervenor and the union. Apparently, this change in circumstances had a negative impact upon Mr. Reed (and others) in that some of the terms and conditions of his employment with Group 4CPS were not maintained in the employment relationship with the intervenor. Mr. Reed became concerned about preserving the more favourable terms and conditions enjoyed with his previous employer. At some point, he acquired a role in the union which he referred to as “chairperson” and which the union described as “steward”. In any event, once he obtained his union role, he filed a number of grievances on his behalf and on behalf of others.
6The application filed in this matter was unclear as to the material facts which the applicant says give rise to a violation by the responding party (“the union”) of section 74. Indeed, the union and the intervenor contended that the application was so unparticularized as to warrant dismissal on that ground alone.
7Notwithstanding the inadequate substance of the application, it emerged following a review of the union’s response and the Board’s questions of the applicant, that this complaint covered four main events. The first of these involved the filing by the applicant of between six and nine grievances in February 2000, a number (perhaps all) of which related to the change in the terms and conditions of employment as a result of the intervenor becoming Mr. Reed’s employer. A majority of these were resolved through mediation and minutes of settlement to which the applicant was a signatory. The mediator expressed outright doubt about the merits of a group grievance which the applicant had filed, and therefore the union decided to withdraw it. The applicant was aware of the views of the mediator, but states that he was never informed that the grievance was withdrawn until the union filed its response in this matter. The union contends that Mr. Reed was verbally informed at the time the union made its decision to withdraw.
8The second part of the application deals with the applicant’s failed aspirations to become the local president of the union. Mr. Reed apparently feels that other candidates for the presidency were provided advantages by the union that he was not.
9The third aspect of the application is in reference to the applicant’s demands to be paid for his work as a union representative in the investigation of a sexual harassment case at the Chrysler work site. Mr. Reed looked to both the employer and the union for satisfaction of his claims in this regard. He wrote to the union, setting out his concern, but he appears to have done nothing to see that his claims were formally dealt with under the collective agreement.
10Finally, and perhaps most significantly from the applicant’s point of view, Mr. Reed complains about the union’s actions in respect of his removal from the Chrysler plant around May 2000. Chrysler became concerned about certain safety issues relating to truck drivers driving in and out its plant, and apparently requested the intervenor and its staff to monitor the situation and report safety infractions. Apparently, Mr. Reed raised certain objections about Chrylser’s request, which, without here detailing the incident any further, led to a three-day suspension of the applicant by the intervenor, and his removal from the Chrysler site at the request of Chrysler. Removal from a work site at the request of a client of the intervenor is contemplated by the collective agreement between the intervenor and the union, but any such removal must be for just cause. The union grieved the matter, which ultimately was referred to arbitration. Prior to the arbitration, the union and the intervenor entered into settlement discussion, with the result that the intervenor offered to remove the suspension from the applicant’s employment file, reimburse Mr. Reed for lost wages arising from the suspension, provide him with work at another work site with no loss of seniority, at the same wage rate and with the same hours of work as previously enjoyed while at the Chrysler location. In addition, the intervenor agreed to pay Mr. Reed $500.00. The applicant declined the offer, but the union decided that it was unlikely to achieve any better result at arbitration, and entered into the settlement without Mr. Reed’s consent. Mr. Reed returned the intervenor’s cheque for $500.00.
11A number of other grievances were filed by Mr. Reed subsequently concerning his new assignments, as well as one grievance contending that he had been constructively dismissed pursuant to his removal from the Chrysler site. That grievance remains outstanding, but in any event, the intervenor wrote to the applicant and advised him that he remained employed. The applicant has been off sick for some time. His last assignment was to the City of Brampton, at a location directly across from the Chrysler plant. Apparently, Mr. Reed has worked only one or perhaps three days since the events of May 2000, because of health reasons. There was no evidence that Mr. Reed has, as a result of his removal from the Chrysler site, suffered any monetary losses that were not restored by the settlement of his suspension grievance.
12In terms of the remedy sought by Mr. Reed in this matter, nothing short of being returned to the Chrysler site will satisfy him, notwithstanding his acknowledgement that Chrysler is not a party to the collective agreement. In his view that should make no difference.
13Following the submissions of the parties concerning this matter, I issued the following oral decision dismissing the application:
After considering the submissions of all the parties in this matter I am of the view that the applicant’s assertions of fact do not make out a case of a violation of section 74 of the Act, nor do they, even if taken at their highest level, warrant the remedy the applicant is seeking, which is to be placed in his former position at the site of the employer’s client, Chrysler-Daimler. That client is not a party to the collective agreement, and there appears to be no dispute that that client refuses to allow the applicant to work at its site.
I am satisfied that the union pursued Mr. Reed’s interests in respect of his removal from the Chrysler-Daimler site, and concluded that the settlement of his grievance in connection therewith was the best solution in the circumstances for Mr. Reed and the union. In the absence of discrimination, arbitrariness or bad faith, the fact that the union ultimately entered into that settlement unilaterally does not constitute a breach of the Act.
With respect to the applicant’s claim that he had not been informed of the withdrawal of group grievance ILR00-003, if that were proven to be true, and the union denies it – it would be regrettable. However, it is not disputed that the matter was taken seriously by the union, that it was the subject of the mediation by a well-lineman arbitrator, and that the mediator indicated to all concerned, including Mr. Reed, that the group grievance had no merit. I heard no specifics from Mr. Reed concerning his attempts to learn what the union intended to do given the mediator’s clear view of the matter. In these circumstances, and given that the remedy sought at the consultation relates to an entirely different matter, I decline to inquire further into this portion of the complaint.
With regard to the part of the complaint respecting Mr. Reed’s desire to become the local president, I am of the view that that is purely an internal union matter and has nothing to do with the quality of the union’s representations of Mr. Reed vis-à-vis the employer, as contemplated by section 74.
Finally regarding the hours of pay for his part in the investigation of the sexual harassment complaint, the most that can be said is that Mr. Reed wrote to the union expressing dissatisfaction. He did not request that the matter be formally pursued through the grievance procedure, notwithstanding his knowledge of that process as a union representative of the responding party.
For all these reasons, I am dismissing the application. This oral ruling will be incorporated into a written decision which may include further reasons.
14In my view, it is unnecessary to add any further reasons to those given in the oral ruling.
15The application is dismissed.
“Patrick Kelly”
for the Board