Ontario Labour Relations Board
File No.: 3833-00-U Morris Aubertin, Applicant v. Algoma Steel Inc., Responding Party.
BEFORE: M. A. Nairn, Vice-Chair
DECISION OF THE BOARD; May 22, 2001
Decision
1This is an application filed pursuant to section 96 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, (the “Act”) alleging a violation of section 56 of that Act. The response asserts that the matter ought to be dismissed without a hearing. This decision deals with that issue.
2Section 56 of the Act provides:
- A collective agreement is, subject to and for the purposes of this Act, binding upon the employer and upon the trade union that is a party to the agreement whether or not the trade union is certified and upon the employees in the bargaining unit defined in the agreement.
3That provision states simply, that a collective agreement is binding on the employer, the trade union and the employees subject to that collective agreement. It does not establish a right under the Act in the same manner as, for example, the unfair labour practice provisions of the Act.
4The applicant asserts that he ought to be returned to a particular job; that he be compensated for lost income and seniority; and that certain disciplinary action be removed from his employment record. He appears to assert that he was unfairly disciplined and was not guilty of the offence the employer alleged against him.
5Matters of appropriate discipline form the subject matters of a grievance brought pursuant to the terms of the collective agreement. Such a grievance, if not resolved in the grievance procedure, would typically proceed to arbitration. The Board has no jurisdiction to enforce the specific terms of a collective agreement (such as a just cause clause). That is the primary jurisdiction of an arbitrator pursuant to section 48 of the Act and to the specific terms of the collective agreement between the parties.
6Even assuming the facts as pleaded to be true, there is nothing pleaded in the application that would support an allegation brought before the Board of a violation of section 56 of the Act. In fact, there is nothing pleaded that would support an allegation of a violation of any section of the Act. To the extent the applicant seeks to challenge discipline imposed under the terms of a collective agreement, that is a matter for an arbitrator, not the Board.
7Having regard to the above, the application is hereby dismissed for want of a prima facie case.
“M. A. Nairn”
for the Board

