Ontario Labour Relations Board
1755-01-U Susan Marie Hinchey, Applicant v. Local 222 of the National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation & General Workers Union of Canada (CAW-Canada), Responding Party v. General Motors of Canada Limited, Intervenor.
BEFORE: Marilyn Silverman, Vice-Chair.
DECISION OF THE BOARD; October 29, 2001
Decision
1This is an application filed under section 96 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 (the "Act") alleging a violation of section 74 of the Act.
2This case deals with the applicant's allegations that she was dealt with contrary to the Act by the responding union in respect of her relations with the employer.
3The facts giving rise to this matter occurred in March and April 1997 and related to allegations regarding safety information in respect of the use of certain oils. Some of the issues related to the manner in which she chose to file her grievance; that is that she brought her grievance to the national office of the responding union and not the local office.
4The applicant did not return to work as a result of the dispute and was terminated in August 1997.
5The intervenor ("the employer") requests that the Board exercise its discretion not to inquire further into this application on the basis of delay.
6The matters giving rise to this application began in March and April 1997. The applicant filed a grievance in 1997 with the national office of the union as she had difficulties in earlier dealings with the local office. There is some dispute as to whether the union actually received a grievance but no grievance was processed and in June 1999 the applicant filed an initial section 74 application with the Board based on these facts. That application was dismissed by decision dated July 21, 1999 as lacking in particularity. Even at that time the application was significantly delayed beyond the time when it was reasonable for the applicant to have filed it. The applicant then sought the advice of counsel. Counsel communicated with the employer and the union and purported to file a grievance on her behalf in November 2000. The instant application was filed with the Board on September 24, 2001.
7The Board need not inquire into any particular application under section 96 of the Act and I have discretion pursuant to subsection 96(4) of the Act to dismiss this application should I determine that it is inappropriate to inquire into it. It is well-established that the Board will, generally, not inquire into applications which are brought after a reasonable period of time has elapsed from the events complained about. The principles applicable to dismissal on the basis of delay are well-known (see, for example, The Corporation of the City of Mississauga, [1982] OLRB Rep. Mar. 420, at paras. 20-22), and I do not propose to deal with them at any length in this decision. In deciding whether or not an application should be dismissed on the ground of delay, the Board will consider the length of the delay, the explanation for the delay, the relief sought, and the relative prejudice to the parties should the application be permitted to proceed, or be dismissed. The Board recognizes that in cases of extreme delay the party or parties required to respond are at a disadvantage because witnesses disappear, memories fade, and documents are no longer available to allow a party to defend itself properly.
8Having considered all of the circumstances of this case, I have determined that the length of time that has passed significantly prejudices the responding party and the intervenor and there is no reasonable explanation for a delay such as this where the events giving rise to the application occurred over four (4) years ago.
9For all of the above reasons, the Board has determined not to inquire further into this application. The application is dismissed.
"Marilyn Silverman"
for the Board