1767-00-U Yinong Cui, Applicant v. United Steelworkers of America, Responding Party v. Walbar Engine Components, Intervenor.
BEFORE: Bram Herlich, Vice-Chair.
DECISION OF THE BOARD; November 23, 2000
This is an application filed pursuant to section 96 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 alleging that the responding party trade union (the “union”) has violated section 74 of the Act.
The applicant, in an extremely brief description of the relevant facts, explains that he began working for Walbar Engine Components on July 24, 2000 and was discharged on September 12, 2000. He briefly describes a dispute with his employer about the quality of his work. In the only portion of his description of the events which relates to the union he asserts that the union took money from him (presumably dues) every week and that he should not be fired without fault and that the union should help him.
The applicant asks, by way of relief, that the Board arbitrate his case.
Both the union and the employer (which has filed an intervention) have asked that this complaint be dismissed without a hearing.
I have determined for the reasons which follow, that this is an appropriate case in which to exercise the Board’s discretion to not inquire into the matter any further and to therefore dismiss the application.
First, the applicant must understand that an application of this sort is not one by which the Board will “arbitrate” the discharge of a bargaining unit employee.
The issue in a case such as this is whether the union has acted in a fashion which is either arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith.
There is nothing in the application which even if accepted as true could lead to such a conclusion. Indeed, there is simply nothing in the application to indicate that the union was ever asked (let alone refused – in an arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith fashion) to assist the applicant.
Further, the response and intervention both point to the terms of the collective agreement. And although there may be some differences in the facts asserted by the union (who claims the applicant was laid off) and the employer (who claims he was “terminated”), it is clear that in either event the applicant, as a probationary employee, would have enjoyed extremely limited, if any, rights to challenge his termination or lay off.
There is certainly nothing in the applicant’s complaint to demonstrate on what terms (or standard) his discharge might have been challenged under the terms of the relevant collective agreement.
In view of the fact that the application seeks a remedy which is, on its face, inappropriate; fails to disclose any substantive basis on which the discharge might have been challenged; fails to establish or describe the circumstances in which the union was ever requested to assist; and fails to identify what conduct of the union is alleged to be unlawful, I am satisfied that the application fails to make out an arguable case for the remedy requested.
This application is dismissed.
“Bram Herlich”
for the Board