Timothy S. Bonner v. United Steelworkers of America
File No.: 0608-99-U Date: May 5, 2000
Applicant: Timothy S. Bonner Responding Party: United Steelworkers of America Intervenor: Olson Technology Inc.
Before: Patrick Kelly, Vice-Chair
Appearances: Tim Bonner and Tim Quinn appearing on behalf of the applicant; Cathy Braker, Bill Steep, Mark McClany, Don Holcombe and Mark Sweet appearing on behalf of the responding party; Andrew P. Reko appearing on behalf of the intervenor.
Decision of the Board
1This consultation regarding the applicant’s section 74 complaint against the responding party (“the union”) continued on May 1, 2000. The proceedings had been adjourned previously to enable the parties to produce certain documents, provide particulars and prepare evidence regarding certain factual disputes.
2At the outset, the intervenor made a motion to dismiss the application. The intervenor referred to my decision of March 3, 2000 in which I directed it to produce and deliver to the union medical documentation relating to the applicant. The intervenor subsequently wrote to the Board, copying the other parties, stating that it felt compelled not to release the applicant’s medical documentation without his written consent, otherwise the intervenor considered itself liable under the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act for unauthorized disclosure. The intervenor stated that as of May 1, 2000, the applicant had not provided his written consent to the disclosure of this information to the union. The intervenor therefore requested the dismissal of the application.
3The union joined in the intervenor’s motion, and also asked that the application be dismissed.
4The applicant did not dispute that he had been asked by the intervenor to provide his consent, nor did he dispute that he has not provided his consent. He claimed that the union already had sufficient and full relevant medical information with respect to his employment with the intervenor. He stated further that the documentation the intervenor wished to send to the union contained information relating to an alleged injury that appears to have been suffered while employed with another employer. He stated that such information was not relevant to this application, although he did not provide any reasons for that position.
5The Board stood down to consider the submissions of the parties concerning the intervenor’s motion, and returned to deliver the following oral ruling:
After considering the submissions of the parties regarding the production of medical documentation, I am exercising my discretion not to inquire further into this matter. Without deciding the merits of the company’s argument that it is prevented from releasing workers’ compensation information to the union, it appears that Mr. Bonner could have facilitated the release of that information but chose not to do so. He is perfectly entitled to guard his privacy and not consent to the dissemination of sensitive medical information. However, when he brings an application against the union and then, in effect, prevents the union from assessing information that might enable it to either build a defence or, possibly, decide to re-consider its position in this matter, he prejudices the union if the Board were to proceed further. It is not up to Mr. Bonner in these proceedings to decide what documentation is relevant or not relevant, or whether evidence relating to his work history with another employer should be made known to the union. As I have said, he is perfectly entitled in his personal capacity to refuse to reveal sensitive information. But he cannot by so doing deprive a party of critical information and expect his application to proceed.
I will issue a written decision incorporating these and possibly other reasons. This matter is dismissed.
6The Board’s above-noted ruling left it open to provide further reasons for the Board’s decision not to inquire further into this matter. Those further reasons are as follows. First, the applicant had more than adequate notice of the intervenor’s concerns regarding the disclosure issue. Rather than respond in writing to the Board and to the parties in this matter, the applicant waited until the date of the resumption of the consultation to explain his refusal to give his consent to the intervenor. The explanation is not satisfactory, but at the very least, it could have been offered and dealt with long before the continuation of the consultation. Second, it bears noting that during the ultimate grievance meeting between the applicant, the union and the intervenor, the applicant refused to allow the intervenor to disclose medical documentation to the union, which documentation the union claimed it needed in order to assess the intervenor’s position regarding the applicant’s grievances. The applicant maintained at the first day of consultation on December 22, 1999 that the reason for his refusal was that the intervenor would not permit him to see the documents prior to their disclosure. Both the union and the intervenor adamantly denied that the applicant asked to see the documents, or was rebuffed by the intervenor in any way during this meeting. In any event, even assuming, without deciding, that the applicant’s version of the grievance meeting is true, it appeared at the consultation on May 1, 2000 that the applicant was changing his reasons for refusing to give his consent. I draw a negative inference from the applicant’s changed position in this regard, and conclude that his real objective was to deprive the union of potential grounds for a defense of the application. The net result is that the union remains deprived of what may be critical information.
7For all of the reasons herein set out, the application is dismissed.
“Patrick Kelly”
for the Board