William Stevenson et al. v. Local 222 CAW
File No.: 0929-94-U Date: January 24, 2000
William Stevenson et al., Applicant v. Local 222 CAW (John Caines, Chairperson, John Kovacs, President), Responding Party v. General Motors of Canada Limited, Intervenor.
BEFORE: Pamela Chapman, Vice-Chair.
DECISION OF THE BOARD
1By letter dated April 20, 1999, the applicants have requested that the Board reconsider its decision dated February 18, 1999.
2Pursuant to section 114(1) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 (the "Act") the Board has the discretion to reconsider any decision it has made. Section 114(1) states:
- (1) The Board has exclusive jurisdiction to exercise the powers conferred upon it by or under this Act and to determine all questions of fact or law that arise in any matter before it, and the action or decision of the Board thereon is final and conclusive for all purposes, but nevertheless the Board may at any time, if it considers it advisable to do so, reconsider any decision, order, direction, declaration or ruling made by it and vary or revoke any such decision, order, direction, declaration or ruling.
3The principles which the Board applies in an application for reconsideration have been detailed in numerous decisions, including K-Mart Canada Limited (Peterborough), [1991] OLRB Rep. Feb. 185 and John Entwhistle Construction Limited, [1979] OLRB Rep. Nov. 1096. Generally, the Board has said that it will not reconsider its decisions unless a party proposes to adduce new evidence which would be practically conclusive of the matter, which could not previously have been obtained through the exercise of due diligence, or a party desires to make representations not previously considered by the Board which it had no prior opportunity to raise. The Board may also reconsider a decision if the request raises significant and important issues of Board policy not considered in the decision.
4The grounds for reconsideration offered by counsel for the applicants in the present matter is that the Board "erred in its interpretation of some facts and the conclusions which followed".
5One particular erroneous statement is identified by the applicants as having been made in paragraph 19 of the decision, which is reproduced here for ease of reference:
- When the application was filed, it was asserted that the applicants were in fact eligible for the $35,000 retirement allowance, having regard to the terms of the collective agreement, and thus it was a part of the complaint against the union that it had failed to take this position with the employer. By the time the consultation was held, counsel for the applicants advised the Board that the ineligibility of the applicants was conceded. The applicants were not permitted to apply for the incentive because their layoffs occurred after September 14, 1993, contrary to the language of the 1993 agreement.
6There is a misstatement in this paragraph, as the fact which was significant in interpreting the application of the $35,000.00 plan to the applicants was that they were, in fact, all laid off prior to September 14, 1993, which fact is confirmed by counsel for the applicants in his correspondence seeking reconsideration. In the 1993 amendment to Document 12 which constituted the agreement between the parties concerning the lump sum payment plan the following statement defines employee eligibility for the incentive:
Accordingly, for layoffs occurring after September 14, 1993, any employee who is retirement eligible under the provisions of Document 12 on the date of the plant closure or permanent job loss, will be given the option of taking a Retirement Allowance of $35,000.
(emphasis added)
7On a strict reading of these provisions, then, the applicants were not eligible to apply for the new incentive plan, as they had all transferred into the department created to facilitate their layoff out of seniority, and indeed had commenced their layoffs and were receiving EI and SUB benefits, prior to September 14, 1993. As such, they were not considered to have been actively employed, and as discussed in the decision, they were not permitted to return to work in order to be in a position to apply for the lump sum payment.
8This error in the statement of the facts had absolutely no impact on the outcome of the application, as the point was that the applicants were not eligible to apply, which had previously been disputed. Whether or not counsel for the applicants conceded this point at the consultation, and my notes suggest that he did, I find, based upon the material filed with the Board, that the applicants were not eligible for the benefit according to the language of the 1993 amendment to Document 12 which established the conditions for entitlement.
9The issue pursuant to section 74, then, was whether or not the union should have assisted the applicants in their attempts to be put into a position to apply (ie. by returning to work) and/or taken the position with the employer that they were eligible despite the language of the agreement, as well as the issues relating to the bargaining of the incentive plan, the alleged discriminatory treatment of employees on eligibility questions, and the alleged misrepresentations made by the union to the applicants. All of these issues were reviewed in the decision and do not relate to the fact set out in paragraph 19 with which the applicants take issue.
10The remainder of the request for reconsideration is a reiteration of the arguments made in the numerous and lengthy materials filed with the Board, and at the consultation. The Board gave careful consideration to all of this material before reaching its decision, and has attempted in its reasons to analyse the very complex issues raised by the applicants concerning this chain of events. Nothing in the request for reconsideration raises any facts, or issues, which could not and indeed were not raised by the parties and considered by the Board in reaching its earlier decision. The Board analysed a variety of complex collective agreement provisions, and gave careful consideration to the competing interests identified in the decision, before reaching the conclusion that the union had not breached section 74 of the Act. We are satisfied that the applicants have not raised any grounds which would merit a reconsideration of that decision, and the request for reconsideration is therefore denied.
DISPOSITION
11The request for reconsideration of the Board's decision dated February 18, 1999 is hereby denied.
"Pamela Chapman" for the Board