3116-99-U Tony Sorrenti, Applicant v. CAW Local 1285, Responding Party v. DaimlerChrysler Canada Inc., Intervenor.
BEFORE: T. W. Sargeant, Vice-Chair.
DECISION OF THE BOARD; March 29, 2000
1This is an application brought pursuant to section 96 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 (the “Act”) alleging that the responding party has breached section 74 of the Act.
2The application was filed on January 20, 2000. The application seems to involve a concern that the applicant has regarding a right to bid on a tow motor mechanic job. In part the application states “I have waited twelve years to get into this department and by awarding this job to these other people it denies me the opportunity to bid on the job, even though I have more seniority”. Apparently a grievance was filed on his behalf dated March 21, 1997 protesting the action of the Company. The grievance was denied by the company and the company’s response was accepted by the union on June 23, 1997. The union alleges that the applicant was notified “of the union’s position and did not challenge the union’s position at that time”.
3On February 23, 2000 the Board issued the following decision:
The responding party has filed a response which requests that the Board dismiss the application without a hearing because the applicant waited too long to file his application.
The applicant is directed to file a reply to the applicant’s position regarding delay. The applicant’s reply should indicate which, if any, of the facts set out in the response he disagrees with. The applicant’s reply must be filed with the Board and delivered to the other parties no later than March 17, 2000.
4The applicant did not reply to the applicant’s position regarding delay as directed in the decision of February 23, 2000.
5It is well established that the Board will not generally inquire into an application which is brought after a reasonable period of time has elapsed from the events complained about. In cases of extreme delay the Board is prepared to presume that the other parties have been prejudiced by the passage of time. In deciding whether an application should be dismissed on the ground of delay, the Board will consider the length of delay, the explanation for the delay, the relief sought and the relative prejudice to the parties should the application be permitted to proceed, or be dismissed.
6In this instance there is no explanation given for the delay in filing this application even though such explanation was directed by the Board to be filed. Further there is no specific relief requested as required in Form A-29.
7Moreover, given the facts as pleaded there is nothing pleaded which would lead the Board to conclude the applicant has a reasonable chance of success. The pleadings just do not establish that the union has acted arbitrarily, discriminatorily or in bad faith as those terms have been interpreted by the Board in considering section 74.
8The Board has a discretion under section 96 as to whether to consider an application and as to whether it proceeds to hearing. The Act specifically relieves the Board of the requirement to hold a hearing where it is alleged that section 74 of the Act has been breached.
9Accordingly, and for all the above reasons the Board exercises its discretion and dismisses this application.
“Timothy W. Sargeant”
for the Board