[1998] OLRB REP. NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 525
0966-98-U Abitibi-Consolidated Inc., Applicant v. Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada and its Locals 90, 92, 109, 132, 238 and 306, Responding Party
BEFORE: Timothy W Sargeant, Vice-Chair, and Board Members D. A. Patterson and J. Ronson.
APPEARANCES: Peter Thorup for the applicant; David McKee for the responding party.
DECISION OF TIMOTHY W. SARGEANT, VICE-CHAIR, AND BOARD MEMBER J. A. RONSON, August 24, 1998.
- This is an application under section 96 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 (the "Act") that
the responding parties have breached section 17 of the Act and not complied with section 79 of the Act.
The Board issued a bottom line decision on June 19, 1998, with reasons to follow.
This decision sets out the reasons for the Board's findings and orders in the June 19, 1998 decision.
The Board heard from six witnesses. There is really no dispute in the evidence on the issues in dispute. It is unnecessary for the purposes of this decision to review such evidence exhaustively.
In or about. May, 1997, Stone-Consolidated Corporation merged with Abitibi-Price Inc. to form Abitibi-Consolidated Inc. ("ACr'). ACI operates a total of 14 paper mills in Ontario, Quebec and Newfoundland. In Ontario, the paper mills are located at Fort Frances, Fort William, Iroquois Falls and Kenora. This decision only deals with the locations in Ontario.
The responding parties (C.E.P.) and its predecessors have bargained with some of the predecessors of ACI on a company wide basis since 1975.
There has been history of bargaining certain designated issues at a central table. Depending on the history of the mill (i.e. whether a former Stone-Consolidated Corporation mill or a former Abitibi-Price Inc. mill) the format of central bargaining had slight differences. For the purpose of this decision it is enough to know that some form of company-wide bargaining settled collective agreements at Abitibi-Price Inc. in 1984, 1987, 1990, 1993 and 1996. This would include the Fort William and Iroquois Falls locations. In relation to the locations at Fort Frances and Kenora (formerly owned by Ontario Minnesota Pulp and Paper Company, then Boise Cascade Canada and then by Stone-Consolidated Corporation prior to the merger) bargaining prior to 1996 had taken place on a company-wide, multi-union basis. That is, bargaining took place between the Company representing both mills on one side and ten local unions (including three CEP Locals) on the other. This changed in 1993 when bargaining took place between each mill and all of the local unions at each mill.
All of the collective agreements between ACI and the CEP expired on April 30, 1998.
For the 1998 round of negotiations ACI concluded that it no longer wished to participate in joint bargaining for any of the mills operated by ACI.
By letter dated December 18, 1997, Mr. Marcel Matteau, Senior Vice-President, Labour Relations informed Mr. Fred Pomeroy, President of CEP in part:
Our experience of recent years indicates that our negotiation process should be approached on a Mill by Mill basis.
Please note that we are preparing for the 1998 negotiations based on the above-mentioned approach.
Mr. Matteau, indicated that he wrote this letter in December 1997 as it would be prior to the CEP's Wage Policy Conference to be held in February. His understanding was that the CEP and its locals set its agenda at this conference and he wanted to notify the CEP in advance of ACI's position.
Prior to a Wage Policy Conference each Local is asked whether it wishes to "opt in" to central or main table negotiations. Once a local opts in, it cannot opt out except with the consent of all of the other locals who have opted in. For 1998 all the locals in Ontario opted in. In fact, except for one mill in Quebec, all the locals in the mills involved in Ontario, Quebec and Newfoundland opted in. The union then set its Agenda at the Wage-Policy Conference. Ultimately CEP's proposal to ACI on the process for negotiation was that:
local issues be bargained at each mill;
contract language common to all collective agreements in the Abitibi or Stone or Boise agreements would be negotiated with the locals and mills in that former corporate grouping; and
issues common to all locals and mills, primarily monetary, would be bargained on a company wide basis involving all locals and all ACI representatives.
The CEP clearly wished to bargain certain issues on a multi-unit/multi province-wide basis. This was made clear to ACI.
Both parties had understandable reasons for their difference in approach to how the process for negotiations should be conducted (hereinafter referred to as the "process").
A meeting was held on March 25, 1998 between corporate representatives of ACI and executives of the CEP to see if agreement on process could be reached. No agreement was reached. A further meeting occurred on May 20, 1998 in which ACI proposed a compromise position. The executive members of the union present at that meeting felt they did not have the authority to accept such a proposal without approval of the various locals. It was clear from the testimony of Mr. Whitlom that the executives were not prepared to recommend such proposal to the locals. According to Mr. Whiflom the union was not prepared, in his view, to negotiate with itself and "dump" several items from the central table. The position of the union executives was that ACI should present their proposal to the locals. ACI felt the executive should take the proposal to the locals. As a result the proposal was never presented to the locals and the strike scheduled to begin on June 15, 1998 commenced.
At the conciliation meetings at the four locations, the format was basically similar in each case. The parties met face to face and the CEP representative asked for a written response to the union's proposals. The Company representatives at each conciliation meeting indicated they had no written response but orally stated that ACI was looking for a six year agreement, 365 days of running time, competitive wages and cost containment as opposed to expansion in relation to benefits. In each case, the Company indicated it would at some point give a written response. At this point, a "no board" report was requested by the local in question. As of the date of hearing, no written response has been given by ACI to any local in Ontario on what the CEP considers main agenda items. However, it was clear, from the testimony of the union's witnesses that no CEP representative would negotiate what it considered main agenda items at the local level.
The witnesses did agree that no negotiations have taken place on monetary items and that the strike occurred because of the impasse over process namely whether negotiations on certain items should proceed on a "mill by mill basis" or on a "multi-unit/multi province basis".
In relation to the strike votes held at each local in Ontario, the evidence established that though votes were held at the individual locals, the ballots themselves were sent to Montreal and pooled with all other ballots from all other locals in Quebec and Newfoundland. This, as union witnesses testified, was done so nobody could identify how any one individual local had voted. In the result, the vote count was overwhelmingly in favour of a strike.
While there was evidence on other matters, such evidence is not necessary to consider for purposes of the Board's findings and orders made on June 19, 1998.
It is to be noted that neither party questioned the bona fide of their respective positions. In regards to the section 96 application alleging a breach of section 17, the issue clearly was whether the CEP could take its position on process to impasse.
Having heard the witnesses, considered the agreed upon facts and listened to the submissions of the parties, the Board has no difficulty in concluding that the issue of process led to the current impasse and strike.
Concerning the section 17 allegation, counsel for ACI in essence submits that the Board's jurisprudence, which has been followed in other jurisdictions, supports the position that taking a demand for multi-unit/multi province bargaining to impasse is bargaining in bad faith. In counsel's submission, the leading case on this issue is Burns Meats Ltd., [1984] OLRB Rep. Aug. 1049.
Counsel for the CEP concedes that Burns Meats Ltd. is directly against his position that the demand of multi-unit/multi province bargaining may be bargained to impasse and may properly be a strike issue. In counsel's submission, the conclusions of the Board in Burns Meats Ltd., (supra) are wrong in law. Thus counsel submits that statements in the decision to the effect that to attempt to bargain beyond provincial jurisdiction is an attempt by the union "to bargain beyond the legal scope of their exclusive bargaining rights contrary to the scheme of the Act" are clearly wrong in law. Counsel argues that the lawful existence of a trade union does not depend on Statute law and further that a collective agreement has a lawful existence as a contract and does not depend on the Act for its existence. Thus in counsel's submission the Board has made a fundamental error in Bums Meats Ltd.
During the course of argument, counsel referred to the following cases among others in addition to Bums Meats Ltd.: T Eaton Company Limited, [1985] OLRB Rep. Mar. 491; Northwood Pulp and Timber Limited an unreported decision of the British Columbia Labour Relations Board dated July 15, 1994, Steelco Inc., 1990, 4 CLRBR (2nd) 305; Western Cablevision Ltd., 65 di 150, Radio Shack [1979] OLRB Rep. Dec. 1220, Molson Ontario Breweries Limited, [1985] OLRB Rep. Apr. 558, National Elevator and Escalator Association [1992] OLRB Rep. Mar. 345, Crafter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co. Ltd., 1942 AUED Volume 142; Canadian Industries Limited, [1976] OLRB Rep. May 199; Fotomat Canada Limited, [1980] OLRB Rep. Oct. 1397, and Re Canadian Union of Public Employees 1983 CanLII 162 (SCC), 1 DLR (4th) 1, and Commercial Graphics Limited, [1993] OLRB Rep. June 483.
In Burns Meats Ltd., the employer and the union had historically bargained a Master agreement for units in Alberta, Manitoba and Ontario. Such structure had been in place for more than 30 years. At the expiry of the most recent Master agreement, the employer informed the union that it no longer wished to bargain nationally for the Kitchener plant but wished to have local negotiations at this site. The Union persisted in demands for national bargaining. The employer brought a complaint to the Board alleging that the union had breached its duty to bargain in good faith.
On this issue, the Board stated at paragraphs 27 through 29:
The scheme of the Act is that collective bargaining shall take place with respect to employees for whom a trade union has the exclusive representational rights in collective bargaining. In order to be in a position to bargain for employees, a trade union must hold bargaining rights under a collective agreement within the meaning of section 1(1 )(c) of the Act, a certificate issued to it under the Act or voluntary recognition as contemplated by the Act. It is possible that the International, by one or more of these means, holds bargaining rights for all six of the employer's plants covered by the Agreement. As noted above, it is unnecessary for the purpose of this complaint and the Board's jurisdiction for the Board to determine whether in fact that is the case. Even if the International has the exclusive rights to represent in collective bargaining all of the employer's employees in those plants. the legal limit of those rights with respect to this complaint and the Board's jurisdiction is the Province of Ontario, and hence in this fact situation, the employer's Kitchener plant. What the respondents are seeking to do with their demand that there be a single set of nation-wide negotiations and a single national collective agreement executed respecting all plants which traditionally have been covered by the Agreement, is bargain beyond the legal limits of the exclusive rights attaching to the Kitchener plant. For the respondents to pursue that objective to impasse is inconsistent with the scheme of the Act that bargaining shall be in respect of a bargaining unit of employees for which a trade union has exclusive bargaining rights. In the Board's decision in United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, [1978] OLRB Rep. 776, particularly paragraph 18 on page 784. it was because the Board found it inconsistent with the scheme of the Act for the United Brotherhood to pursue to impasse the objective of expanding its exclusive bargaining rights by voluntary recognition on a province-wide basis that the Board found the United Brotherhood in breach of section 15 of the Act. While the specific objectives of the respondents and the United Brotherhood differ, the result is the same; an attempt to bargain beyond the legal scope of their exclusive bargaining rights contrary to the scheme of the Act. In this respect, see also the Board's decision in Northwest Merchants Ltd. Canada, [1983] OLRB Rep. July 1138 at paragraph 29. For these reasons, it is inconsistent with the scheme of the Act and unlawful for the respondents to take to impasse their bargaining objective of a single nation-wide set of negotiations and a single national collective agreement.
It may well be that the respondents have pursued their impugned course of conduct for the objective of preserving for the Kitchener Plant employees the uniform wages and working conditions which they have in common with employees in the other plants covered by the Agreement. While that objective is not itself illegal, for the reasons set forth above, the means by which the respondents are attempting to achieve it are contrary to the Act. It is not unlawful for a union to bargain for wages and working conditions paralleling those at other plants operated by the employer. The Board's approach to enforcing the section 15 duty has allowed parties to collective bargaining broad freedom to determine the subjects about which they will bargain and the contents of their collective agreements. See United Brotherhood of Carpenters, supra, paragraph 9, and the authorities referred to therein. That freedom flows from the premise that "... the parties are best able to fashion the law which is to govern the workplace and that the terms of an agreement are most acceptable when the parties who live under them have played the primary role in their enactment." De Vilbiss (Canada) Ltd., [1976] OLRB Rep. Mar. 49. The freedom of parties to fashion the terms of agreements is not without limits, however. For example, it does not extend to being able with impunity to insist upon a demand which would give rise to an illegality (T Barlisen & Sons, [1960] OLRB Rep. May 80); to resort to economic sanctions in pursuit of unlawful or illegal demands (Croven Limited, [1977] OLRB Rep. Mar. 162); or to press to impasse a demand inconsistent with the scheme of the Act (United Brotherhood of Carpenters, supra). It is not possible to delineate in the abstract the totality of the limits on that freedom. Any further delineation of the limits must be on a case by case basis in the context of an actual fact situation.
It is clear from the facts respecting the meetings between the employer and the respondents on April 18th, May 24th and July 3rd, 1984. the rejection of the employer's last offer and the circumstances surrounding the strike which commenced on June 17th, that a major factor in the strike is the respondents' demand that there be a single set of nation-wide negotiations and a single national collective agreement executed respecting all plants which had been traditionally covered by the Agreement. Thus the respondents have already pursued to impasse a bargaining objective which can be raised and discussed but, for the reasons set forth above, cannot legally be pressed to impasse in the exercise of the exclusive bargaining rights with respect to the Kitchener Plant.
This decision was rendered in 1984. Since that time it has been quoted with approval in the Northwood Pulp and Timber Limited decision (supra) and the Stelco Inc. decision (supra). Also relevant are statements to the same effect in the T Eaton decision (supra see statements at page 502 paragraph 37), and the Western Cablevision Ltd. decision (supra - see statements at pages 155 to 159).
The Board has carefully considered the argument of counsel for the union but does not agree that Burns Meats Limited is fundamentally flawed. The Burns Meats Limited decision in our view does not deal with the issue of whether a collective agreement is enforceable beyond its boundaries or not, but rather considers the jurisdiction of the Board in relation to a bargaining unit certified under the Labour Relations Act. In that consideration, the Board found at paragraph 27 that in relation to multi/province bargaining, "for the respondent to pursue that objective to impasse is inconsistent with the scheme of the Act that bargaining shall be in respect of a bargaining unit for which a trade union has exclusive bargaining rights" (emphasis added).
The Board therefore concurs with the decision of Burns Meats Limited and thus found in its decision of June 19, 1998, that "the responding parties had breached section 17 of the Act by talking to impasse the issue that certain issues be bargained on a multi-unit/multi-province basis".
On the issue of whether the responding parties had or had not complied with section 79 in conducting strike votes at the individual bargaining units at Fort Frances, Fort Williams, Iroquois Falls and Kenora sites, counsel for ACI submits that by pooling the ballots the responding parties had not complied with the procedures required under section 79. Counsel for the responding parties submits that the process followed by the CEP in this instance did comply with the provisions of section 79. In counsel for CEP's submission the strike votes were taken in the relevant time period. Further, each local prior to the vote being taken had agreed to the process of how the vote would be conducted and agreed to one count (i.e. pooling).
During the course of argument on this issue the parties referred to the following cases: J. Franze Concrete Ltd., [1995] OLRB Rep. June 813, Elgin Construction, [1995] OLRB Rep. June 783 and J. P. Fogal [1976] OLRB Rep. Aug. 428.
Section 79(1) 79(7) and 79(8), 79(9) of the Act provide as follows:
(1) Where a collective agreement is in operation, no employee bound by the agreement shall strike and no employer bound by the agreement shall lock out such an employee.
(7) A strike vote or a vote to ratify a proposed collective agreement or memorandum of settlement taken by a trade union shall be by ballots cast in such a manner that persons expressing their choice cannot be identified with the choice expressed.
(8) All employees in a bargaining unit, whether or not the employees are members of the trade union or of any constituent union of a council of trade unions, shall be entitled to participate in a strike vote or a vote to ratify a proposed collective agreement or memorandum of settlement.
(9) Any vote mentioned in subsection (7) shall be conducted in such a manner that those entitled to vote have ample opportunity to cast their ballots. If the vote taken is otherwise than by mail, the time and place for voting must be reasonably convenient.
Section 79(8) provides that all employees in a bargaining unit shall participate in a strike vote. The issue is whether a pooled vote would satisfy the requirements of section 79(8). The concern is obviously that in a pooled vote, it is not known whether an individual bargaining unit voted for or against a strike.
Though there is no Board decision directly on point certainly there is an indication from the Board in decisions such as Elgin Construction and J. Franze Concrete Ltd. in considering in part language similar to section 79(8) (then section 74(5)), that a strike vote will only be considered valid if it is counted from the ballots of those employees in the individual bargaining unit concerned.
For example in Elgin Construction in considering section 74(5) of Bill 40, the Board stated at paragraph 43:
The Legislature obviously did not intend subsection [74(5)] to give non-member employees in every bargaining unit represented by a trade union the right to vote in any strike or representation vote that union might choose to conduct.
- As a further example in the J. Franze Concrete Ltd. decision another case under Bill 40, the Board in considering what was then 74(5) of the Act (similar to what is now section 79(8)) stated (paragraph 49):
We do not accept the union's submission that the use of the term "a bargaining unit", as opposed to "the bargaining unit", in subsection 74(5) means that the bargaining unit description for the purposes of a strike vote can differ from an existing bargaining unit, provided it is an appropriate one. In our view, the expression "a bargaining unit" in section 74(5) refers to the bargaining unit as described in the Board certificate or voluntary recognition agreement by which the trade union acquired bargaining rights, or as amended in a collective agreement entered into between the parties, and does not indicate that some other bargaining unit can, provided it is appropriate, be adopted for the purposes of the strike vote.
In this instance, the Board is similarly of the view that the Legislature cannot have intended that ballots from bargaining units in Quebec and Newfoundland be included in a count authorizing a strike in an individual bargaining unit in Ontario. Employees in each bargaining unit should have the opportunity to determine whether that unit wishes to authorize a strike.
The Board thus found in its decision of June 19, 1998 "that the responding parties have not complied with section 79 in conducting strike votes for the individual bargaining units at the Fort Frances, Fort William, Iroquois Falls and Kenora sites" and that therefore employees in such bargaining units were engaging in an unlawful strike.
DECISION OF BOARD MEMBER D. A. PATTERSON: August 24, 1998
The following is my detailed dissent from this panel's oral ruling of June 19/98.
I agree with my colleagues on the evidence before the Board. However, I depart from the majority's findings in their decision because based on the evidence before the Board. I have drawn different conclusions.
I do not dispute either party's right to table proposals for a new collective agreement which in fact could lead to and culminate in the parties being deadlocked and facing a potential cessation of work based on strike action or a lockout by the employer. Every renewal for a new collective agreement poses that potential when bargaining commences.
I also do not dispute, within the scheme of the Ontario Labour Relations Act, the bargaining structure entered into by the parties is of a voluntary nature. In the instant case, the dispute between the parties arose when the applicant gave notice to the respondent that it no longer wished to participate in the established bargaining process which matured over the last 20 plus years.
The applicant has relied heavily on the Board's jurisprudence, in particular, Burns Meats Ltd. (1984) OLRB Rep. August 1049, a leading case. The facts in Burns Meats Ltd., supra are very similar to the facts in the instant case. However, upon closer examination of the Burns case I am of the opinion that the instant case is distinguishable from Bums. In the Burns case the applicant in that case gave specific reasons for its withdrawal from coordinated, industry wide chain bargaining. The following comments in Burns Meats Ltd., (1984) OLRB Rep. Aug. 1049 in paragraph 15:
The reason contended by the employer for wanting to bargain on a local bases is that its Kitchener plant competes in a local or a regional market and several of its competitors enjoy lower rates of wages and benefits. Three of those competitors are represented by the International and are not part of any national bargaining format.
These reasons in my opinion put the applicant in Burns at a competitive disadvantage, beyond the control of the applicant. At the same time the applicant could have addressed those very issues in bargaining with the union. In the instant case the applicant's letter to the union is short on explanation or reasoning, citing as its only reason being the process 'should be approached on a Mill by Mill basis'. The majority in their reasons either chose not to mention the evidence the Board heard from the applicant, why it had taken the position it did on national bargaining. Or in the alternative did not believe this evidence relevant. I, however, would have concluded that the Board must consider the reasoning behind a party's decision to opt/in or out of a voluntary process where there is a proven historical bargaining relationship, as in the instant case.
In the evaluation of those reasons given, the Board must evaluate the relevance of such assertions and weigh their impact on the labour relations, that in my opinion is the Board's responsibility. We are to regulate the relationship between employer and employee union's.
- I believe its our sole responsibility to act in the interests of sound labour relations practices which in the final analysis enhances the labour relations climate within the jurisdiction of the province of Ontario. In the instant case historically there have only been 2 strikes, 1975 and 1980, both of which were the result of the desire for industry wide coordinated bargaining. Since those two strikes the parties have bargained successive collective agreements without any labour unrest or strike activity. That very success is exactly what this Board is continually striving to achieve in its adjudication of any dispute which comes before the Board.
The Board in Commercial Graphic Limited (1993) OLRB Rep. June 483 commented in paragraph 25 of that decision:
25 …..Where parties have voluntarily organized their bargaining structures in rational ways, such as pattern bargaining in a particular industry, the Board will be reluctant to undermine such procedures by allowing one party, at the end of bargaining, to renounce the negotiating format and obtain a singular advantage for itself through invoking the Board's processes.
It also went further in the same paragraph in stating:
……However, the Board will exercise its discretion to fashion appropriate remedies in ways which will enhance the process of collective bargaining rather than to provide any part with a "tactical windfall" which will ultimately undermine negotiations and the parties' collective agreement relationship.
As my esteemed Brother stated in his minority dissent in the Burns Meats Ltd. (1984) OLRB Reg Aug. 1049 at paragraph 1 of his dissent:
- ….whatever gains the complainant may have achieved in the short term by destroying a natural bargaining structure must be measured against the long term effect of fragmenting collective bargaining with its employees and attempting to weaken the union's bargaining position.
The Act and the Board should not be the sword or the shield in attaining bargaining objectives. The applicant in the instant case was well aware of two key factors in making its determination in filing this application. First, the union and its members have struck on this very issue in two other occasions. Secondly the local unions of the National Union have the right to opt in/out of the central bargaining structure and the demands for that bargaining structure are debated and decided by convention vote at the CEP's Wage Policy Conference.
The applicant in my opinion cannot use the Act to destroy a labour relations mechanism or process which is highly successful in its own longevity. The applicant's reasoning for its change in approach to bargaining was not based on a National premise or from a competitive edge. Its reasoning as explained during its evidence was based on cost containment, a long term (5 years) agreement and 365 days running time of its operation. All of which I maintain could be dealt with at the central bargaining table. It was not the applicant's position these proposals were externally driven. There was evidence of the industry's approach in the United States and British Columbia in terms of bargaining. Those circumstances were not alleged to be the applicant's reason for opting out of the established bargaining structure.
- I believe other events substantiate my dissent in that the respondent was not in breach of the Act. The union and its representatives did meet the employer, local by local and did table the only document which was endorsed by the participating local unions at the CEP National Wage Policy Conference albeit, the proposal tabled was the same, they could also be characterized as the same proposals the applicant would have received if the bargaining protocol would have been agreed to. It was the applicant, in fact who would not or chose not to table a written proposal for the union's consideration. The applicant rather chose to give its position verbally.
By virtue of the union's attempt to table its proposals for settlement, should be sufficient intent to show its good faith. The resulting aftermath could be characterized as 'hard bargaining' or the union's resolve to negotiate similar terms and conditions at all of its Ontario based plants where it enjoyed bargaining rights.
A similar type of case between the University of Toronto and the Educational Workers was taken to arbitration. J.D. O'Shea, Q.C, (Ontario) arbitrated the grievance between Governing Council of University of Toronto and Canadian Union of Educational Workers, Local 2, July 29, 1983 reported in II LAC (3rd) Page 358. On page 368 O'Shea stated:
……Had the university refused to consider the union's proposals and had the university refused to meet with the union in response to its request to bargain, I might have reached a different conclusion.
The same interpretation can be extended to the instant case. If the respondent would have refused to meet the applicant in conciliation and tabled its position then the applicant's argument would be more persuasive.
- I would have added my opinion to that of the majority if in the majority's ruling they would have ordered the parties back to the bargaining table. I would not have found a breach of the Act.
I am not convinced from what I heard from either party in this proceeding that there was conduct of animus or bad faith. Both have strong views on their interpretation of bargaining strategies. The resulting outcome in this case as a environment of 'hard bargaining'. The Board has long held 'hard bargaining' is not a breach of the Act. Each party must be able to press their demands, especially in bargaining situations where there is a mature historical bargaining relationship, unfettered by the Board.
I believe the bargaining protocol could have been resolved. The final resolve might not be in the same form as either party started out with but if the parties want to conclude a collective agreement, both will have to focus on the challenge both face in the situation.
I make the following comments about the concept of industry wide bargaining and coordinated bargaining from the view that it is one of the success stories of labour relations. Its' own history in the construction industry as well as the industrial and health care, service industry speaks volumes for the system and how it works. In this case before the board the parties have developed a very sophisticated structure which is comprised of rules of reference for participating locals and their respective elected representatives. It is driven by a highly democratic structure which lends itself to efficient and smooth functioning of a mechanism which at the best of times can be bargaining puzzle for the uninitiated observer. When we the board see such structures we should be loathe to undue what both these parties have mutually come to terms with over the last number of decades. I can only ask the question which the entire community of labour relations practitioners will ask when they read the majority decision. Is this the direction the board wants the construction industry, auto industry, mining industry, steel industry, health care industry, service industry and others to follow. I can only surmise the net outcome is complete chaos and labour relations upheaval. This kind of jungle mentality is not in the best interests of this province nor its citizens.
In the instant case the applicant is a major player in the wood industry and the respondent is also a major player. Entire communities depend on the industry for their livelihood and well being. This is not a situation where the parties don't know each other. Both readily admit to their own successes over the last number of decades. These parties will set the pattern of bargaining for the industry, I do not buy into the assertion that either British Columbia or the United States will set the pattern for this group, it is much too large and influential for external parties to impact on these negotiations.
- I think the majority erred in law and in judgement in their decision.