United Steelworkers of America v. Royalguard Vinyl Co., 1994 CanLII 9815

Ontario Labour Relations Board

[1994] OLRB Rep. January 59

0702-93-U United Steelworkers of America, Applicant v. Royalguard Vinyl Co., A Division of Royplast Limited, Responding Party

BEFORE: Laura Trachuk, Vice-Chair, and Board Members J. A. Rundle and C. McDonald.

APPEARANCES: Mark Lewis and Brando Paris for the applicant; Joseph Liberman and Steve Cork for the responding party.

DECISION OF LAURA TRACHUK, VICE-CHAIR, AND BOARD MEMBER C. McDONALD; January 10, 1994

1. This is an application under section 91 of the Labour Relations Act alleging that the responding party (hereafter referred to as the "company") has violated sections 3, 65, 67, 71, 81 and 82 by installing video surveillance cameras in the workplace subsequent to a union application for certification. The applicant (hereafter referred to as the "union") filed an application for certi­fication in March 1993. That application was the subject of an extended hearing before this panel of the Board and has not yet been completed.

2. In a decision dated October 25, 1993 a majority of the Board found that the company had violated section 81(2) of the Labour Relations Act and made the following order and declara­tion:

…….The Board therefore:

(a) declares that the responding party Royalguard Vinyl Co., A Division of Royalplas Limited has violated section 81(2) of the Labour Relations Act; and

(b) orders that all video surveillance cameras in the workplace which were installed sub­sequent to the applicant's application for certification be removed forthwith.

The Board reserved its decision with respect to the alleged violations of sections 3, 65, 67, 71 and 81 of the Act. Following are the reasons for finding that the company had violated section 81(2), as well as the Board's decision with respect to the alleged violation of the other sections of the Act.

The Facts

3. The Board heard evidence from eight witnesses. However, there was little dispute about the most relevant facts. The company makes vinyl siding. On the evening of Sunday, April 25 at the weekly shift start-up, it was discovered that there were problems with the twin extruder machine on one of the lines. Problems continued with this machine until Tuesday, April 27, at which time it was taken apart. It was discovered that there was significant damage to the large screws inside the machine, as well as damage to its seals and gears. The twin extruder is the compa­ny's most expensive piece of machinery. It concluded that the damage was caused by a piece of metal being pushed through the vacuum vents in the machine~ probably while someone was clean­ing the vent holes. The purpose of the vacuum is to suck water and foreign materials out of the plastic that is going through the machine. The union did not seriously challenge that there was damage to the machine and that it was caused by a piece of metal having been inserted into it. It was the company's evidence that the machine operators knew that they were supposed to use plas­tic tubing to clean the vacuum vents to prevent this sort of accident. It was the union's evidence that some of the machine operators had not been so advised and did not know where to get the plastic tubes which were to be used for that purpose. Witnesses for both parties were in agreement that "Operator C's", that is, operators in training, may not know that they are supposed to use plastic to clean the vents.

4. Later in the week that the damage was discovered, a sign was posted in the workplace at the direction of the company's president indicating that if the company found that this or any other damage was intentional, employees would be subject to discipline up to and including dis­charge. The president and the controller then discussed putting in video surveillance cameras. They also discussed this option with presidents of other divisions of Royplast who have such cam­eras. A decision was made to install cameras and a company came in and selected sites for them in consultation with the company's management.

5. The cameras were actually installed on the weekend of May 22 and 23. Later that week the president posted a notice in the workplace advising employees that the cameras had been installed "to avoid recurrence of recent malicious damage caused to machinery and also for general production and safety reasons". The company's president Steven Cork testified that the damage to the machine was extremely costly for the company as the line was down for three weeks, there were four days of maintenance time, plus the cost of the screws, gears and seals. He advised that the controller estimated that the cost of the damage, taking into account all of these factors, was over one hundred thousand dollars.

6. Seven cameras were installed in the production area of the plant. The cameras are only on while employees are working in the plant and they record onto video tape. The tapes are reviewed periodically by the company president to ensure the cameras are working because they tend to get knocked out of focus. It was his testimony that that is his sole purpose in reviewing the tapes at this time. He testified that if there was damage to a machine in future, he would review the tapes to see if there was improper action", or a lack of training, and whether the damage was intentional or whether it was an accident. It did not appear that there was any intention to review the tapes regularly to determine whether or not employees are using metal to clean the vents in the machines and thereby prevent damage from occurring in advance. The president also testified that part of the reason he put in the cameras was to be able to reassure the owner of the company that he had taken action in view of the cost of the damage.

7. Five of the cameras focus on the actual production lines. One camera focuses on "the crating area" where crates are assembled, that camera also, until recently, recorded the door and the window of the quality control lab. It was the company's evidence that a camera was focused on the crating area because it was concerned about nails from that area getting into the machines. We heard evidence that windows were installed in the door of the lab, as well as the other doors in the plant around May, 1993. A sign was also placed on the quality control lab door saying "authorized personnel only". A number of the union organizers work in the quality control lab and we heard evidence in the certification application hearing that at least one card was signed there. One cam­era also faces the time clock. The president's explanation for having a camera on the time clock was that it would enable him to identify an employee who may have been photographed on one of the other tapes but is not recognizable.

8. Each operator must fill out a report at the end of each shift so the company always knows who has worked on which line. However, no one in management spoke to any operator who had been working on the damaged line to investigate what had occurred. The president testified that he did not do so because approaching an employee would be "picking on him" and "ac­cusing him", and that he was not accusing anyone of anything. In fact, the company's position throughout the hearing was that it was not claiming that the damage to the machine was intentional or malicious. The president testified that he did and still does trust his employees.

9. An operator had dropped his screwdriver into the vacuum vent hole of a different machine three years previously and it did a similar type of damage, although at that time it actually stopped the machine. That operator was suspended for three days. It was after that incident that the company instituted the requirement to use a plastic tube to clean the machine.

10. The company had installed video surveillance cameras on two previous occasions. Approximately three years ago two cameras were installed in the parking lot after cars had been vandalized. Those cameras were removed one year later because they did not really work. They had actually been installed on the building of a different company of the parent organization which was across the parking lot from the responding party's building, but both companies had cooper­ated in installing them. The employees of both companies share the same parking lot. When the cameras were removed from the parking lot, one of them was installed in the company's lunch­room to prevent vandalism to the vending machines. There had been ongoing vandalism and theft from the vending machines which the company had tried to stop through posting notices and warn­ing employees. The vending machine owner finally threatened to remove the machines and as a result the company promised to put in a surveillance camera. That camera was removed in or about May or June of 1993 as it was incompatible with the new surveillance system. The company has recently had it replaced.

Argument

11. The relevant sections of the Labour Relations Act are as follows:

12. No employer or employers' organization and no person acting on behalf of an employer or employers' organization shall participate in or interfere with the formation, selection or adminis­tration of a trade union or the representation of employees by a trade union or contribute finan­cial or other support to a trade union, but nothing in this section shall be deemed to deprive an employer of the employer's freedom to express views so long as the employer does not use coer­cion, intimidation, threats, promises or undue influence.

13. No employer, employers' organization or person acting on behalf of an employer or an employers' organization,

(a) shall refuse to employ or to continue to employ a person, or discriminate against a person in regard to employment or any term or condition of employment because the person was or is a member of a trade union or was or is exercising any other rights under this Act;

(b) shall impose any condition in a contract of employment or propose the imposition of any condition in a contract of employment that seeks to restrain an employee or a person seeking employment from becoming a member of a trade union or exercising any other rights under this Act; or

(c) shall seek by threat of dismissal, or by any other kind of threat, or by the imposition of a pecuniary or other penalty, or by any other means to com­pel an employee to become or refrain from becoming or to continue to be or to cease to be a member or officer or representative of a trade union or to cease to exercise any other rights under this Act.

71. No person, trade union or employers' organization shall seek by intimidation or coercion to compel any person to become or refrain from becoming or to continue to be or to cease to be a member of a trade union or of an employers' organization or to refrain from exercising any other rights under this Act or from performing any obligations under this Act.

81.-(2) Where a trade union has applied for certification and notice thereof from the Board has been received by the employer, the employer shall not, except with the consent of the trade union, alter the rates of wages or any other term or condition of employment or any right, privi­lege or duty of the employer or the employees until,

(a) the trade union has given notice under section 14, in which case subsection (1) applies; or

(b) the application for certification by the trade union is dismissed or termi­nated by the Board or withdrawn by the trade union.

82.-(1) No employer, employers' organization or person acting on behalf of an employer or employers' organization shall,

(a) refuse to employ or continue to employ a person;

(b) threaten dismissal or otherwise threaten a person;

(c) discriminate against a person in regard to employment or a term or condi­tion of employment; or

(d) intimidate or coerce or impose a pecuniary, or other penalty on a person,

because of a belief that the person may testify in a proceeding under this Act or because the per­son has made or is about to make a disclosure that may be required in a proceeding under this Act or because the person has made an application or filed a complaint under this Act or has participated in or is about to participate in a proceeding under this Act.

(2) No trade union, council of trade unions or person acting on behalf of a trade union or coun­cil of trade unions shall,

(a) discriminate against a person in regard to employment or a term or condi­tion of employment; or

(b) intimidate or coerce or impose a pecuniary, or other penalty on a person.

because of its belief that the person may testify in a proceeding under this Act or because the person has made or is about to make a disclosure that may be required in a proceeding under this Act or because the person has made an application or filed a complaint under this Act or has participated in or is about to participate in a proceeding under this Act.

12. The company argued that there was no evidence, nor had the union pleaded any facts, that would substantiate a violation of sections 65, 67, 71 and 82 of the Act. The installation of the surveillance cameras themselves was not a violation of those sections. It submitted that the cam­eras were not installed for any anti-union reason and that the evidence clearly established that their installation was motivated by business concerns.

13. With respect to section 81(2), commonly referred to as the "statutory freeze", the company argued first that there was no breach of the Act because no working condition had been breached. Working with or without surveillance cameras was not a working condition in this work­place because there was no "fixed" condition since the security and protection of machines had always resided with management at Royalguard. We were referred to Re Toronto Transit Commis­sion and Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 113 (1989) 1989 CanLII 9370 (ON LA), 5 L.A.C. (4th) 156 which provides a defi­nition of working condition that we were urged to adopt. The arbitrator in that decision wrote, in part, as follows:

There are three elements in this definition [of working condition]. Firstly, the matter must be "a mainstream aspect" of the parties' relationship. Secondly, the state of things must have been "fixed in fact for a meaningful period of time". And, thirdly, "the parties themselves have regarded those matters as fixed and not within unilateral management control"

14. In the alternative, the company claimed that section 81(2) had not been breached because the employer's actions are consistent with business as usual and with employee expecta­tions. It was argued that in this case the employer is following a pattern which it had established in the past because when property damage had occurred in the parking lot and in the lunchroom, it had installed video cameras. The installation of cameras in the present circumstances, therefore, constitutes business as usual and would be the result employees would expect in the circumstances. We were referred to the following decisions of the Board: K-Mart Canada Limited (Peterborough), [1981] OLRB Rep. Jan. 60; Spar Aerospace Products Limited, [1978] OLRB Rep. Sept. 859; Simpsons Limited, [1985] OLRB Rep. Apr. 594; Coca-Cola Ltd., [1989] OLRB Rep. May 427; Mohawk Hospital Services Inc., [1993] OLRB Rep. Sept. 873. The Board was asked to dismiss the application.

15. The union responded that the installation of the video cameras was a change in the working conditions of the employees. In any case, section 8 1(2) refers to changes to privileges, and according to the union, working free from video surveillance is at least a privilege. It was noted that no one at the plant had previously been required to work under video surveillance, as the prior cameras were in the parking lot and lunchroom where employees did not spend most of their working day. The installation of video cameras in these circumstances would not be within the expectation of the employees, nor was it business as usual for this company. Counsel submitted that the installation of these cameras represents a dramatic difference in the kind, type and pur­pose of the cameras that had been installed on the two previous occasions and, as a result, cannot be seen as following a pattern set by the employer. Business as usual, in this case, would be the same response as when there was damage to a machine three years before; employees would be trained with respect to how to properly clean the machine, the proper tools would be distributed, an investigation would occur and discipline would possibly follow.

16. The union argued that the employer had violated the other sections of the Act cited in the application because installing the surveillance cameras was an extreme reaction to the incident that allegedly precipitated it. The Board should therefore find that there must have been anti-union motivation for the installation. It was argued that surveillance of this kind is, by its very nature, intimidatory to employees and is a direct violation of the Act. We were referred to the fol­lowing decisions: K-Mart, supra; Simpsons Limited, supra; Re Puretex Knitting Co. Ltd. and Cana­dian Textile and Chemical Union (1979) 1979 CanLII 4023 (ON LA), 23 L.A.C. (2d) 14; Re Thibodeau-Finch Express Inc. and Teamsters Union, Local 880, (1988) 1988 CanLII 9166 (CA LA), 32 L.A.C. (3d) 271; and Anderson's City Farm Valu-Mart, [1987] OLRB Rep. Jan. 1.

Decision

17. Both parties referred us to paragraphs 32 and 33 of the Simpsons Limited decision which they suggested outlined the Board's current approach in cases where a violation of section 81(2) is alleged. Those paragraphs read as follows:

18. Reasonable expectations language has appeared in a number of decisions dealing with the freeze section. See, for example, Corporation of the Town of Petrolia, supra; Scarborough Cen­tenary Hospital, supra; Oshawa General Hospital, York-Finch Hospital, supra; St. Mary's Hospital, 119791 OLRB Rep. Aug. 795 (Decision omitted from [1979] OLRB Rep. March); AES Data Limited [1979] OLRB Rep. May 368. In the latter case, for example, the Board found that the employer was entitled to re-assign job functions since the employees could not reasonably expect to continue performing their jobs in exactly the same way despite changes in the mode of production and market conditions. Thus, in the Board's view, the reasonable expectations of employees as the appropriate measure of the employees' privileges which are protected by the freeze is a common thread running through the earlier decisions. In the instant case, the Board is expressly articulating the test.

19. The reasonable expectations approach clearly incorporates the practice of the employer in managing the operation. The standard is an objective one: what would a reasonable employee expect to constitute his or her privileges (or, benefits, to use a term often found in the jurispru­dence) in the specific circumstances of that employer. The reasonable expectations test, though, must not be unduly narrow or mechanical given that some types of management decision (e.g., contracting out, workforce reorganization) would not be expected to occur every day. Thus, where a pattern of contracting out is found, it is sensible to infer that an employee would rea­sonably expect such an occurrence during the freeze. The Board in Simpsons, supra, although the cleaning was contracted out before the company itself took over that operation, did not con­clude there was such a pattern.

20. It was suggested that the "reasonable expectations" approach modified the Board's "business as usual" or "business as before" approach. The reasonable expectations of employees would be considered in assisting the Board to understand what constituted the employer's "busi­ness as before, or vice versa. The "business as before" approach was described in Spar Aerospace Products Limited, supra, at paragraph 23:

21. The "business as before" approach does not mean that an employer cannot continue to man­age its operation. What it does mean is simply that an employer must Continue to run the opera­tion according to the pattern established before the circumstances giving rise to the freeze have occurred, providing a clearly identifiable point of departure for bargaining and eliminating the chilling effect that a withdrawal of expected benefits would have upon the representation of the employees by a trade union. The right to manage is maintained, qualified only by the condition that the operation be managed as before. Such a condition, in our view, cannot be regarded as unduly onerous in light of the fact that it is management which is in the best position to know whether it is in fact carrying out business as before. This is an approach, moreover, that cuts both ways, in some cases preserving an entrenched employer right and in other cases preserving an established employee benefit.

22. The Board considers what the employer's "business as before" was or what the "rea­sonable expectations" of the employees are, if there is uncertainty as to what the "rates of wages or any other term or condition of employment, or any right, privilege or duty of the employer, the trade union or the employees" are in a particular situation. "Business as usual" or "reasonable expectations of the employees" are not substitutes for the language of section 81(2), they are approaches the Board has used to interpret the language of that section in the face of ambiguous facts.

23. When utilizing these approaches, the Board considers the event alleged to be a breach of the freeze in the context of the workplace and, where there has never been a collective agreement, in light of a history of events between the employer and the employees seeking to be union­ized which might be related. The Board considers what, in light of that history, the employees would reasonably expect in the circumstances, and part of that consideration is what constituted "business as before".

24. The majority does not find that the installation of video surveillance cameras would be within the employees' reasonable expectations of what would occur in the event that there was damage to one of the extruder machines of the nature described above. Notwithstanding the notices it posted to employees, the company is not alleging that there was sabotage or malicious damage to the machine. It has accepted that the damage may have been caused accidentally and the president has asserted that he trusts his employees. The majority does not find that employees would expect that they would be subject to video surveillance as a result of such an accident. The last time that such an accident occurred, an employee was suspended for three days and training with respect to cleaning the machines was provided. Employees would reasonably expect the same kind of approach in these circumstances. They would anticipate that there would be an investiga­tion and some attempt at determining how the damage had specifically been caused and perhaps discipline would follow. They may also expect the company to embark on further training on how to clean the machines.

25. The fact that video cameras had been installed three years before in the parking lot and removed a year later, and that there had been a video camera in the lunchroom, does not establish a pattern that would lead employees to believe that video cameras would be installed throughout the workplace in the event that an incident such as this occurred. Nor does the fact that those cam­eras had been installed lead to the conclusion that the installation of such cameras would be busi­ness as before for the company in these circumstances. The previous cameras were not installed in places where employees actually worked. It is not even clear, therefore, that they could be a condi­tion of work. In any event, it is a very different matter to subject oneself to video surveillance if one chooses to use the lunchroom than to be subjected to it the entire time one is actually working. Furthermore, the camera was only installed in the lunchroom as a last resort after the company had attempted other methods of curbing the vandalism. In these circumstances, the company did not attempt to take any other action first. Employees would also not expect that they would be subjected to constant video surveillance of their work if a machine were damaged as a result of one year of parking lot surveillance.

26. The majority does not accept the company's argument that the presence or absence of these cameras was not a working condition at all. The kind of monitoring an employee experiences is one of the conditions under which he or she works. The condition of working under the constant surveillance of a video camera is a significantly different condition from working without one. Employees expect to be subjected to supervision, and an employer certainly has the right to exer­cise supervision over employees. However, the kind of supervision provided by human beings does not intrude on an employee's privacy and dignity in the same way as having his or her every move recorded on videotape. When being supervised by human beings, one can always find the opportu­nity to scratch one's nose or share a joke with a co-worker without the fear that these actions will be recorded on videotape and reviewed sometime in the future. The electronic eye may also change the relationship between an employee and his or her supervisor who is also subject to sur­veillance.

27. It is not useful to consider, as the company suggests, whether the parties have regarded this matter as fixed and within unilateral management control, since prior to an application for cer­tification, all terms and conditions of employment, are within unilateral management control, except for those prescribed by statute.

28. If working without video surveillance is not a "working condition", it is certainly a privilege and therefore subject to the freeze under section 81(2). A "privilege" has been described as "a benefit received by employees to which they have no legal claim" (see Oakville Lifecare Centre, [1993] OLRB Rep. Oct. 980). In St. Mary's Hospital, [1979] OLRB Rep. Aug. 795 the Board wrote at paragraph 10 as follows:

Section 70(2) preserves not only the employees' terms and conditions of employment, but also privileges which, by reason of custom and practice, have become a part of the employment rela­tionship. The term 'privilege' is extremely broad and extends to all of those benefits which an employee is accustomed to receiving but to which he is not legally entitled, and which cannot, therefore, be considered a 'right'. In order to determine whether a particular benefit, or aspect of the employment relationship, has become a privilege, it is necessary to examine the circum­stances of each particular case since privileges can arise from established custom, practice, or policy. The question is an evidentiary one for, by definition, the Board's consideration must be beyond the strictly legal incidents of the relationship ('rights') and include those aspects of the relationship which give rise to 'privileges'.

Therefore, even if employees cannot call upon any statutory or common-law right not to be sub­jected to video camera surveillance while they are working, it is a beneficial aspect of their employ­ment relationship which has become established in this workplace by custom and practice.

26. The majority also finds that the company violated sections 65, 67, 71 and 82(1) of the Labour Relations Act. It is satisfied that the installation of the video surveillance cameras was motivated at least in part by anti-union animus. This conclusion has been reached after considering the following factors: the installation of the cameras is an unusual and extreme reaction to the cir­cumstances which allegedly precipitated it; the timing of the installation and the placement of the cameras.

27. The installation of the video cameras within two months of an application for certifica­tion and during a highly-contested hearing into that application would have an intimidatory impact on employees and interfere with their ability to exercise their rights under the Act. Surveillance, in any context, has an intimidatory effect. To introduce it at this particular time, and in circumstances where, in the past, other responses have been used, would likely suggest to employees that the employer was interested in the "new" activity in the workplace, i.e., the union activity. The con­nection is unlikely to be lost on employees and is likely to interfere with their ability to freely exer­cise their rights under the Act. The company is taken to have intended this anticipated reaction. The Board has had occasion to consider the effect of surveillance on employees in the context of the vulnerable period prior to certification in previous cases. In K-Mart Canada Limited (Peterborough) it wrote, in part, as follows:

28. Individuals who are aware of surveillance being conducted by authorities against a legitimate activity may come to redefine the activity as being somehow illegitimate and tend to avoid any association with it. Alternatively, even if an individual who is aware that another is under sur­veillance does not develop a personal antipathy to that person's activity, he may nevertheless dissociate himself from the victim of surveillance if only to avoid the stigmatization that tends to attach to anyone who is knowingly being investigated. In one of the earliest studies on contem­porary surveillance the authors drew the following conclusion:

[t]he hazards of being investigated - even if one is subsequently cleared - are so great that individuals are induced to limit their behaviour by avoiding (or trying to avoid) anything that might conceivably arouse anyone's suspicion and thus lead to charges and an investigation. (Johoda and Cook, Security Measures and Freedom of Thought, 61 Yale L.J. 296-333 (1952)).

71. In the instant case the fact that surveillance of O'Connor and Clark was restricted to the store's premises would not necessarily limit the impact of surveillance to that location. The fear of surveillance can have a spill-over effect into union meetings and private encounters off the employer's premises. Employees who know that surveillance is being conducted at the work place can never be certain that it is not going on elsewhere. Askin, in Surveillance: The Social Science Perspective (4 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 59 (1972) at p. 73) relates the fol­lowing observation from a study made by a team of social and behavioural scientists:

Actual surveillance of an individual or group or of a particular event, political or oth­erwise, is not an essential element for chill to occur. With public knowledge that sur­veillance . . has occurred and is continuing to occur, the individual's perception of the actual event has been influenced. Based on the expectation that surveillance might be going on, people exhibit the same verbal inhibitions as if they were certain through direct knowledge that a surveillance agent were present.

28. In these circumstances, the cameras were not only focused on the machines but also on the time clock and on the door and window of the quality control lab. The Board is not satisfied that it was mere coincidence that a window was placed in the door of the lab almost simultaneously with the installation of the cameras and the presentation of evidence about union activity in the lab. Whether or not the tapes of this camera were actually reviewed, the union organizers working in the lab would know that their actions were being recorded and this would have an intimidatory effect.

29. As noted above, the determination that the company violated sections 65, 67, 71 and 82(1) is also informed by the fact that the company did not respond to the damage to the machine as it had in the past. No investigation was even attempted. The installation of seven video cameras, two of which are not even focused on the machines, is an unusual and extreme reaction in these circumstances, which leads the Board to conclude that the decision to install them was made partly for anti-union reasons. The company argued that it responded differently to the damage in this case because in the prior situation the worker came forward and "confessed". This explanation is not convincing because in the prior instance, the machine actually stopped, so the worker had to admit to his error. In this case, the company did not even ask any employee if anything had hap­pened while he was cleaning the machine.

30. For all of the above reasons, the majority ordered, in its decision of October 25, 1993, that all video surveillance cameras in the workplace which were installed subsequent to the appli­cant's application for certification be removed forthwith. We also hereby declare that the company has violated sections 65, 67, 71 and 82(1) of the Labour Relations Act.

31. We will remain seized with respect to any matters that arise with respect to the imple­mentation of this award.

DECISION OF BOARD MEMBER J. A. RUNDLE; January 10, 1994

1. The Board in a majority decision dated October 25, 1993, found that the company had violated section 81(2) of the Labour Relations Act. The present decision provides the reasons for finding the company had violated section 81(2) as well as the reasons the majority found the com­pany had violated sections 65, 67, 71, and 82(1) of the Act. With respect I dissent from the decision of the majority.

2. The respondent has requested the Board reconsider its ruling with respect to the viola­tion of section 81(2) of the Act. In order for the respondent to pursue its request for reconsidera­tion, the reasons for the Boards' findings are required. Due to the need for expedition in this mat­ter, I will provide at a later date more detailed reasons for my dissent. At this point, suffice it to say, I disagree with the majorities characterization of a number of the facts in the case and the conclusions to be drawn from those facts. I also disagree with the conclusions drawn from a review of the case law in this area.

3. The respondent has a right and obligation to protect its property from damage. By pro­tecting its property, it also safeguards the jobs of its employees. I would have ordered the company to remove only those cameras not focused on the production area. I would also not have found a violation of sections 65, 67, 71, and 82(1).

4. As stated earlier, full reasons for my dissent will be issued at a later date.