[1990] OLRB Rep. July 778
0915-89-R; 0916-89-U; 1172-89-U United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 175, Applicant v. David Chapman's Icecream Limited, Respondent; United Food and Commercial Workers International Union Local 175, Complainant v. David Chapman's Icecream Limited, Respondent
BEFORE: R. O. MacDowell, Alternate Chair, and Board Members J. A. Ronson and H. Peacock.
APPEARANCES: Douglas J. Wray, Michael A. Church, Michael McBride, William Richardson and John Hurley for the applicant/complainant; R. C. Filion, Mike Failes, Maureen Fitzgerald, David Chapman and John Rammage for the respondent.
DECISION OF THE R. O. MACDOWELL, ALTERNATE CHAIR AND BOARD MEMBER H. PEACOCK; June 26, 1990
I
This is an application for certification which was consolidated with a related unfair labour practice complaint.
The Board finds that the applicant is a trade union within the meaning of section l(l)(p) of the Labour Relations Act.
Having regard to the representations of the parties, the Board finds that there are two units of employees appropriate for collective bargaining. Those units are described as follows:
Bargaining Unit #1 (Full-time)
all employees of David Chapman's Icecream in the Town of Markdale, Ontario, save and except supervisors, persons above the rank of supervisor, office, clerical and sales staff, persons regularly employed for not more than twenty-four hours per week and students employed during the school vacation period,
Bargaining Unit #2 (Part-time)
all employees of David Chapman's Icecream in the Town of Markdale, Ontario regularly employed for not more than twenty-four hours per week and students employed during the school vacation period, save and except supervisors, persons above the rank of supervisor, office, clerical and sales staff.
In support of this application for certification the trade union has filed documentary evidence of membership in the form of cards, each of which consists of a combination application for membership and an attached receipt. Each card is signed by the prospective member, counter-signed by the "collector" and confirms the payment of one dollar in respect of union membership fees. The cards meet the formal requirements of the Act and Rules, and were filed in a timely fashion. There is no allegation of impropriety in the manner in which the cards were collected, and therefore no reason to believe that they do not represent the voluntary wishes of the employees who signed them. In each case the employee, by signing the card and making a one dollar payment, has become a "member" of the trade union within the meaning of section l(l)(p) of the Act, and has indicated his/her desire to be represented by the union in collective bargaining.
On the basis of the documentary evidence before it, the Board finds that more than forty-five per cent (but less than fifty-five per cent) of the employees in the "full-time bargaining unit" were members of the union on July 19, 1989, the terminal date fixed for this application and the date which the Board determines, under section 103(2)(g) of the Labour Relations Act, to be the time for the purpose of ascertaining membership under section 7(1) of the said Act. Similarly, the Board finds that more than thirty-five per cent (but less than fifty-five per cent) of the employees in the "part-time bargaining unit" were members of the union on July 19, 1989, the terminal date fixed for this application and the date which the Board determines, under section 103(2)(j) of the Labour Relations Act, to be the time for the purpose of ascertaining membership under section 7(1) of the said Act. In short, while the union has a significant showing of membership support in each bargaining unit, in neither bargaining unit has it demonstrated the requisite level of membership support to warrant certification without recourse to a representation vote. However, the union asserts that it is entitled to certification, without a vote, by virtue of section 8 of the Act. That section reads as follows:
Where an employer or employers' organization contravenes this Act so that the true wishes of the employees of the employer or of a member of the employers' organization are not likely to be ascertained, and, in the opinion of the Board, a trade union has membership support adequate for the purposes of collective bargaining in a bargaining unit found by the Board pursuant to section 6 to be appropriate for collective bargaining, the Board may, on the application of the trade union, certify the trade union as the bargaining agent of the employees in the bargaining unit.
The union contends that the company has improperly communicated with employees in a manner designed to undermine its organizing campaign and has illegally discharged Kevin Ward ("the grievor") its principle organizer. The union contends that Brenda Springer was also improperly discharged. The company replies that both its communications with employees and the adjustments to its employee compliment were occasioned by a price war with its major competitors. The union had nothing to do with it.
Before reviewing the facts as we find them, it may be useful to briefly set out the legal frame work within which the parties' rights must be determined. The provisions of the statute to which reference will be made are as follows:
Every person is free to join a trade union of his own choice and to participate in its lawful activities.
No employer or employers' organization and no person acting on behalf of an employer or an employers' organization shall participate in or interfere with the formation, selection or administration of a trade union or the representation of employees by a trade union or contribute financial or other support to a trade union, but nothing in this section shall be deemed to deprive an employer of his freedom to express his views so long as he does not use coercion, intimidation, threats, promises or undue influence.
No employer, employers' organization or person acting on behalf of an employer or an employers' organization,
(a) shall refuse to employ or to continue to employ a person, or discriminate against a person in regard to employment or any term or condition of employment because the person was or is a member of a trade union or was or is exercii'sing any other rights under this Act;
(b) shall impose any condition in a contract of employment or propose the imposition of any condition in a contract of employment that seeks to restrain an employee or a person seeking employment from becoming a member of a trade union or exercising any other rights under this Act; or
(c) shall seek by threat of dismissal, or by any other kind of threat, or by the imposition of a pecuniary or other penalty, or by any other means to compel an employee to become or refrain from becoming or to continue to be or to cease to be a member or officer or representative of a trade union or to cease to exercise any other rights under this Act.
- No person, trade union or employers' organization shall seek by intimidation or coercion to compel any person to become or refrain from becoming or to continue to be or to cease to be a member of a trade union or of an employers' organization or to refrain from exercising any other rights under this Act or from performing any obligations under this Act.
Since sections 67 and 80 were not pressed in argument, we see no need to reproduce them here.
Sections 64, 66 and 70 appear in that portion of the Act dealing with "unfair labour practices". Their purpose is fairly obvious. Freedom of association, and the principle of free collective bargaining, are both concepts fundamental to our labour relations system. Indeed, the Preamble to the Act provides that "it is in the public interest of the Province of Ontario to further harmonious relations between employers and employees by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining...". Section 3 is a further declaration of employee collective bargaining rights. However these rights would be rather hollow without effective remedies for their infringement.
In applying the unfair labour practice sections to an employee discharge, the Board must determine whether the reasons given for the discharge are the only reasons, and whether they are tainted, in whole or in part, by anti-union animus. The improper motive need not be the only, or even the dominant one. It is sufficient if it is in the mind of the employer and one of the grounds for the action taken. (See R. v. Bushnell Communications Ltd., et al, (1973) 1973 CanLII 475 (ON HCJ), 1 OR. (2d) 442 (H C J), affirmed for O.R. (2d) 288 (C.A.); re: J.M.L. Shirts Ltd. and Industrial Relations Board, 78 CLLC ¶14,122 (N.B.Q.B.), affirmed 1977 CanLII 2380 (NB CA), 18 NBR (2d) 695 (S.C. Appeal Division); Westinghouse Canada Ltd., [1980] OLRB Rep. Apr. 577, affirmed by the Ontario Divisional Court at 80 CLLC ¶14,062).
Determining motive is never a simple task, for employers seldom admit that they have committed an unfair labour practice. Thus, while motive is a key issue in an unfair labour practice case, the Board must generally rely upon circumstantial evidence and draw inferences about the employer's motivation from all of the surrounding circumstances - not just the articulated reason for the discharge. We emphasize, though, that this is not a matter of this Board second guessing an employer's decision, or imposing its own notions of fairness upon the situation. Nor is it a question of whether the employer "likes unions" or is "anti-union" in some general sense. Most employers would prefer to operate their businesses in a non-union environment. The question in each case is whether the impugned conduct was influenced in whole or in part by the fact that employees were engaging in activity protected by the statute. There must be a causal connection between animus and action.
Section 8 appears in the certification portion of the Act and has a somewhat different focus.
Ordinarily, certification is based upon a showing of majority support which is established either by documentary evidence of membership or a combination of membership cards and a representation vote. The union's task is to persuade employees of the benefits of collective bargaining and invite them to sign membership cards or vote in its favour. The Board's task is to determine the appropriate bargaining unit, determine the number of employees in it, then count the number cards and/or ballots to determine whether the union has established majority support. Sometimes, however, illegal conduct on the part of the employer may frustrate this simple statutory process. Unfair labour practices may so poison the atmosphere in the workplace, that employees are reluctant to sign union membership cards or cast ballots in favour of union representation.
Section 8 is designed to address that situation. Where the employer has contravened the Act in such a way that the true wishes of the employees are not likely to be ascertained, the Board man certify the applicant union if the union is able to establish support adequate for collective bargaining. Section 8 prevents the employer from undermining the certification process and benefiting from its own illegal conduct.
With this background, then, we turn to the facts in the instant case.
III
The company is a manufacturer of icecream and related products with production facilities in Markdale, Ontario. It is a family firm which is wholly owned by David and Penny Chapman. It is a seasonal business. There is a core of relatively permanent employees, and a shifting group of seasonal employees who work during the peak period from April to August.
The company's main product line or "fighting brand" is its 2 litre package of icecream. This item accounts for between 80 and 90 per cent of total sales. Chapman's has about 10 per cent of the total Ontario market. Its main competitors are "Ault Foods" and "Neilson's", both of which are much bigger.
On or about May 1, 1989 there was a sudden and unexpected burst of competition from Ault and Neilson, both of which drastically lowered the prices of their 2 litre package. The respondent was forced to do the same or risk losing customers. However, even with a significant reduction in price and an active marketing policy, there was a decline in sales and the loss of several accounts.
David Chapman testified that he was concerned by both the vigour and anticipated duration of this competitive challenge. He was worried that the real purpose of the price war was to put him out of business. Accordingly, apart from an aggressive pricing policy of his own, Chapman complained to the federal "Competition Branch" and sought to reorganize and streamline his own business. He promoted new product lines, changed packaging suppliers, and generally tried to "tighten up".
On June 19, 1989 employees were given a bulletin which described the price war and includes the following:
"We project more lost sales. This will require less production, resulting in lay offs. We do not want to worry or upset you. We DO want to keep you informed. This whole situation is very desperate indeed. Foremost in our mind is our faithful employees. We are at the mercy of the giants and we must make some decisions we do not want to make BUT we must make them for the very survival of the company. We have always tried to be decent, fair and considerate employers. We will continue to do so. Our employees, with the longest time with us, must get 8 weeks advance written notice of a lay off When the 8 weeks is over, if the situation has changed, then we hope to keep you with us. This action is both drastic and painful to all concerned.
With the help of everyone pulling together we intend, eventually, to win. We do not wish to surprise any of you with this suddenly in the future, that is why we are explaining the events today. This is NOT a notice of termination. This situation's not right and it is not fair. We are the innocent victims of circumstance. We shall do all we can do to keep everything going. We have contacted the government for there advice and guidance."
[emphasis added]
This bulletin was handed out by members of management and was received by employees during the course of the union's organizing campaign. Despite David Chapman's testimony to the contrary, we find that a notice of this kind was unprecedented.
It will be seen from the bulletin that there is a firm prediction of lost production and the lay off of permanent employees. It did not happen. The only permanent employee to be involuntarily laid off was Kevin Ward - the grievor in this matter.
Much of David Chapman's direct evidence concerned the price war, and his efforts to meet the competition. He was less clear on the reasons for Ward's discharge - indicating that he was not Ward's direct supervisor. Nevertheless, according to Chapman, Ward was lazy and uncooperative. Ward occasionally complained about his work and wanted to confine his duties to the operation of the forklift. On one occasion he had been rude to an office employee. In December 1988, he and other employees wanted to organize their own Christmas party, rather than attend the one sponsored by the company. "Scuttlebutt around the plant" (Chapman could not be specific) suggested to Chapman that Ward was unhappy in his work. According to Chapman, Ward was, the "logical choice to lay off' even though he was a permanent employee with about two and half years service.
In cross examination Chapman conceded that there was no production reason for Ward's lay off. Ward was not laid off because there was no work for him to do. He was terminated because he was an unsatisfactory employee.
The decision to terminate was made at the end of May. The termination actually took place on June 26, 1989.
On June 26, 1989, the grievor came to work at 5:00 a.m. as usual. This was his first day back following his vacation. At about 7:00 a.m. Chapman approached the grievor and told him to come to the office immediately. Chapman appeared to be angry.
When he went into the office, Ward was advised that he was a good employee, but, because of the price war, he had to be laid off. He was given two weeks pay in lieu of notice and told to seek employment elsewhere. Chapman mentioned a company called "Monroe" which might be looking for forklift drivers. When Ward asked if he should leave the plant immediately, Chapman replied in the affirmative. Chapman agreed with counsel that it would have been wiser to advise Ward of his termination before he went on vacation, or at the very least, before to his return to work.
As we have already noted, Chapman maintains that Ward's termination on June 26 was not motivated in any way by anti-union animus. According to Chapman, he did not learn of the trade union's organizing campaign until about July 10-12, when he received a telephone call from an employee named Arnold Kennedy. Kennedy told Chapman that a trade union organizer was approaching employees to see if they wanted to join the union. Chapman told Kennedy that he was unconcerned. As he put it "if they want to unionize, I don't see any problem".
In his evidence before us, Chapman was not so sanguine about the prospect of unionization. He was openly hostile to Ward, and maintained that he would never hire him back because Ward had helped to bring in the union and had disrupted the company's operations. In Chapman's opinion, he had treated his employees well and felt betrayed that some of them, including Ward, would seek to form a union. Indeed, so firm was his antipathy to persons with pro-union sympathies that he refused to hire Jake Keating, Kevin Ward's brother-in-law, who was seeking a job as a driver. Chapman testified that his initial assessment of Keating was quite favourable, but upon learning of the indirect connection with Ward, Keating was rejected because he might share Ward's opinions respecting the value of trade unions. Chapman maintained in cross examination that he was entitled to his opinion.
No one questions Mr. Chapman's right to have his own opinions about trade unions or the desirability of his employees seeking union representation. But, in effect, Mr. Chapman has refused to hire Keating because he may be a union supporter or might exercise rights unter the Labour Relations Act. If this were before us as a complaint, we would be inclined to find a breach of section 66(2) of the Act. The union urges us to conclude that that is precisely what happened on June 26 when Ward's employment was terminated.
There is little doubt that Chapman's assessment of Ward is correct in one respect: Ward was the key union proponent who made the initial approach to the union, helped rally support among fellow employees, helped arrange an employee information meeting at a local hotel, became the principle member of the union's "inside" organizing committee, and solicited a number of membership cards. The organizing meeting was held on May 28, 1989 at a local hotel. A number of employees attended and signed membership cards.
In our view, it is not without significance that the timing of this meeting coincides almost exactly with the timing of Chapman's decision to terminate the grievor's employment. It is also significant that, following the above - mentioned employee notice and Ward's discharge, the organizing campaign ground to a halt. And in our opinion, Chapman's explanation for the grievor's termination simply does not withstand close scrutiny.
Ward was part of the company's permanent employee compliment with some two and half years of satisfactory service. He has progressed up the ladder from one job to another and has received regular wage increases - the latest being a ten per cent increase in February 1989. His most recent bonus was greater than that of a more senior forklift operator whose job functions are similar; and, according to Mark Fisher the plant manager, the bonus level is determined on the basis of merit. In the fall of 1988 Ward was offered a promotion to the position of lead hand on the night shift, and according to Fisher he was more or less "in charge" of his work group. He has been complimented on his work on a number of occasions, and Chapman himself has rewarded him for a job well done. Chapman repeatedly denied ever saying that the grievor was "dependable" or a "good worker" or "in charge" of his work group, but in a staged request for an employment reference, surreptitiously taped by the trade union, Chapman used those very words.
The company has a policy respecting discipline and discharge. According to Mr. Rammage, the office administrator, Mark Fisher makes notes when employee problems come to his attention. There are no such notes concerning the grievor. Ward has never received so much as a written warning.
No doubt there were occasional frictions and the grievor had a strong preference for his job on the forklift, but, in context, these peccadilloes are relatively minor and do not explain either the grievor's sudden termination or the company's failure to offer him alternative work as it did to other employees subsequently laid off. It is one thing to grumble about performing alternative work when one is otherwise permanently employed. It is quite another to refuse other duties when the alternative is termination. The grievor testified that he was both willing and able to perform these alternative duties and had done the work before. On this point we believe him; moreover, it seems a little odd that he would be suddenly laid off at a time when the other experienced forklift operator in the area was off on sick leave. The manner and timing of Ward's termination is also a little unusual.
In our view, the connection between the price war and Ward's termination is not as clear as Chapman made it out to be. The fact is, that despite the notice to employees, Ward was the only permanent employee to be involuntarily terminated. Similarly, - again despite the notice to employees - there was no substantial change in the company's production level or work requirements. There was a moderate decline in the production of its fighting brand, but despite temporarily sagging sales, production for inventory continued, and there was an increased production of other products which the company was actively marketing. In comparison with the previous June, the total number of employees and the total hours worked, were both up. During this period there were a number of new hires and employment ads ran continually in the local newspapers. The price war was real, but it does not explain why it was imperative to discharge the grievor in the manner described. And, we repeat, the decision to discharge is coincident in time with the first really visible organizing meeting which was arranged by Ward.
Having carefully considered the evidence, including the sequence of events and our assessment of the witnesses' relative credibility, we conclude that Kevin Ward was discharged by the respondents because of his trade union activity, contrary to sections 64, 66 and 70 of the Act.
By contrast, we are satisfied that Brenda Springer was not unlawfully terminated. Ms. Springer was a casual employee, hired in June, who almost immediately left work on a workers' compensation claim. She had no active role in the union, and being away from the plant at most relevant times, she had only a sketchy notion of Ward's role. Upon expressing a desire to return to work, she was told by Fisher to come to the plant and he would see if he could "fit her in"; however, upon examining the situation Fisher decided that she should be laid off along with the rest of her shift. There is nothing to make her stand out or distinguish her from these other casual employees who were also laid off. In summary, we conclude that Ms. Springer was not discharged because she was exercising rights protected by the Act.
We turn then to the application of section 8.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, we have found that the company has contravened the Act. We are also satisfied that the trade union has membership support adequate for collective bargaining. When section 8 replaced its predecessor provision (section 7(4) of the Act), the Legislature made it clear that majority support is no longer required before section 8 may be applied; moreover, as we have already noted, in each bargaining unit the trade union was able to establish a substantial core of support before the employer's illegal conduct brought the organizing campaign to a halt. And we have no doubt that that is wha happened. A perusal of the pattern of the solicitation and signing of membership cards suggests a growing enthusiasm among employees, that is abruptly stifled by the employee notice and Ward's discharge. The evidence of Bill Richardson, a union organizer, is to the same effect.
In the circumstances it is very difficult to determine how much more support is there or what support could have been developed had the employer not intervened. Ward testified that further efforts to solicit cards where frequently rebuffed by employees expressing fears for their job security and pointing out what had happened to him. Nevertheless, given an appropriate remedy for the grievor so that employees will know that their rights are protected, the obligation to bargain in good faith, and the option to seek first contract arbitration should that be legally warranted, we are satisfied that there is support adequate for collective bargaining.
The final element of section 8 concerns the wishes of employees, and whether they can now be ascertained - for example, by a Board supervised representation vote. In our opinion, that is now unlikely. By discharging the union's key organizer at the height of the campaign, the employer has signalled in the most graphic way possible, that it is prepared to use its economic power to penalize employees who seek to exercise their rights under the Act. Any illusions about the employer's attitude to trade union adherents, were dispelled by Chapman's candid explanation for not hiring Keating some time after the discharge of Ward. Chapman testified that he would not rehire Ward or hire Keating because of their actual or possible pro-union sympathies. Drivers were told that, because of the certification application and unfair labour practice litigation, there would be no bonuses this year. In the circumstances, we are satisfied that employees who might be disposed to support the union could reasonably fear an employer reprisal; and faced with that possibility, we do not think that even a representation vote is likely to reveal their true wishes.
Pursuant to section 8 of the Act, the Board hereby certifies the applicant union as the exclusive bargaining agent for each of the bargaining units set out at paragraph 3 above.
Board directs that the grievor, Kevin Ward, be reinstated in employment, forthwith, and compensated for all wages and benefits lost as a result of his unlawful discharge. Such compensation shall include interest calculated in accordance with Practice Note 13.
The respondents are directed to cease and desist from interfering with the formation selection or administration of the union.
The respondent employer is directed to post copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix" after being duly signed by the respondent employer's representative, in conspicuous places where bargaining unit employees are employed in Markdale, Ontario, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted, and to keep these notices posted for 60 consecutive working days. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the respondent to ensure that the said notices are not altered, defaced or covered by any other material. Reasonable physical access to the premises shall be given by the respondent to two representatives of the complainant to satisfy itself that this posting requirement has been and is being complied with.
In our view these steps are necessary to dispel, at least in part, the likely impact on employees of the respondents' illegal conduct. In addition, copies of this notice must be distributed to each employee in the same manner as the bulletin referred to at paragraph 19 above.
V
- The final outstanding matter concerns the status of certain workers whose "employee status" is in dispute. A Board officer is hereby appointed to meet with the parties and attempt to effect a resolution of that issue. If there is no settlement, a formal appoint will be made to enquire into the duties and responsibilities of the disputed persons. This panel is not seized with that question.
DECISION OF BOARD MEMBER JAMES A. RONSON: June 26, 1990
Having carefully reviewed my notes of the evidence in this case, I cannot agree with the inferences drawn and the conclusions made by the majority.
I accept the evidence of Mr. David Champman that his decision to lay off the grievor was made absent any knowledge of the grievor's union activities. The decision was made at a time when the employer needed to cut costs, and went into effect following that stage at which the union campaign had come to a crunching halt for lack of support.
Mr. Chapman was frank in voicing his dislike of unions. But that fact, simply, does not taint his decision to lay off the grievor. Rather than impose upon the majority of employees a union that they do not want, I would dismiss this matter.
Appendix
Labour Relations Act
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the Ontario Labour Relations Board
WE HAVE ISSUED THIS NOTICE IN COMPLIANCE WITH AN ORDER OF THE ONTARIO LABOUR RELATIONS BOARD, ISSUED AFTER A HEARING IN WHICH BOTH THE COMPANY AND THE UNION HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE. THE ONTARIO LABOUR RELATIONS BOARD FOUND THAT WE VIOLATED THE ONTARIO LABOUR RELATIONS ACT AND HAS ORDERED US TO INFORM OUR EMPLOYEES OF THEIR RIGHTS.
THE ACT GIVES ALL EMPLOYEES THESE RIGHTS:
To ORGANIZE THEMSELVES;
To FORM, JOIN OR HELP UNIONS TO BARGAIN AS A GROUP, THROUGH
A REPRESENTATIVE OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING;
To ACT TOGETHER FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING;
To REFUSE TO DO ANY AND ALL OF THESE THINGS.
WE ASSURE ALL OF OUR EMPLOYEES THAT:
WE WILL NOT DO ANYTHING THAT INTERFERES WITH THESE RISHTS.
WE WILL NOT THREATEN OUR EMPLOYEES WITH LAY OFF OR DISCHARGE OR WITH ANY OTHER TYPE OF REPRISALS BECAUSE THEY HAVE SELECTED THE UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION AS THEIR EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING REPRESENTATIVE.
WE WILL NOT REFUSE TO HIRE, REHIRE OR RECALL WORKERS BECAUSE THEY MAY WISH TO JOIN OR SUPPORT THE UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION.
WE WILL REINSTATE KEVIN WARD IN HIS EMPLOYMENT AND COMPENSATE HIM FOR ALL WAGES AND BENEFITS LOST AS A RESULT OF HIS DISCHARGE.
DAVID CHAPMANS ICECREAM LIMITED
________________________________________ PER: (AUTHURIZED REPRESENTATIVE)
This is an official notice of the Board and must not be removed or defaced.
This notice must remain posted for 80 consecutive working days.
DATED this 26TH day of JUNE . 1990

