Teamsters Local Union No. 938 v. McIntosh Limousine Service Limited, 1989 CanLII 3464

[1989] OLRB Rep. May 395

1358-88-R; 1362-88-R; 1363-88-R; 1364-88-R; 1365-88-R; 1392-88-R Teamsters Local Union No. 938, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Applicant v. McIntosh Limousine Service Limited, Respondent; Teamsters Local Union No. 938, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Applicant v. Airlift Limousine Services Limited, Respondent; Teamsters Local Union No. 938, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Applicant v. Air Cab Limousine Services (1985) Limited, Respondent; Teamsters Local Union No. 938, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Applicant v. Aaroport Limousine Services Ltd., Respondent; Teamsters Local Union No. 938, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Applicant v. Air Cab Limousine Services (1985) Limited, Aaroport Limousine Services Ltd., McIntosh Limousine Service Limited, Respondents; Teamsters Local Union No. 938, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Applicant v. McDonnell-Ronald Limousine Service Limited operating as Airline Limousine Services Limited, Respondent

BEFORE: R. O. MacDowell, Alternate Chair, and Board Members W. A. Correll and B. L. Armstrong.

APPEARANCES: Frank J. Luce, counsel for the trade union and Sam Schouten; Edward V. Johnson, counsel for the respondents, as well as Y. Zahavy for McIntosh Limousine Services, Air Cab Limousine Services and Aaroport Limousine Services Ltd., Nick Lemonis for McDonnell-Ronald Limousine Service Ltd., and L. Tsatsos for Airlift Limousine Services.

DECISION OF THE BOARD; May 17, 1989

1. These are several applications for certification in which the applicant has requested and the Board (differently constituted) has directed the taking of a "pre-hearing" representation vote. Because these applications raise somewhat similar issues, and involve the same counsel, it was convenient to address those issues at a single hearing, even though the proceedings were not formally consolidated. Likewise, it will be convenient to address them in a single decision.

2. In order to appreciate the context in which the present proceedings arise, it may be useful to sketch in the background. For ease of exposition, the Board will occasionally refer to some of its earlier decisions between these same parties. To be properly understood, this decision should be read together with those earlier decisions.

3. There is no dispute and the Board finds that in each of these cases, the applicant is a trade union within the meaning of section 1(l)(p) of the Act.

II

4. In each of the applications currently before us the union seeks to represent the drivers of the airline limousines which carry passengers to and from Toronto International Airport. In each case the union proposes a broadly-based bargaining unit, consisting of both drivers and owner-operators working "under the banner" of the respondent companies. This is, in fact, the second series of certification applications respecting those drivers. They all arise out of an organizing campaign which began, and has continued, since 1984.

5. In the fall of 1984, the union filed a number of certification applications relating to the present respondents or their apparent predecessors (see Board Files 1489-84-R, 1490-84-R, 1491-84-R, 1492-84-R and 1549-84-R). The union asserted that it had the support of the majority of the drivers working for each firm, and that it should therefore be certified to represent them for collective bargaining purposes. The respondents, in reply, took a variety of alternative positions:

"That there was no appropriate bargaining unit at all; that the bargaining unit consisted only of a small number of bus drivers; that all of the limousine drivers were independent contractors and therefore not entitled to engage in collective bargaining; that some of the limousine drivers were independent contractors, some were dependent contractors, and some were employees; that the drivers, or some of them, were not employees of the respondents at all, but rather employees of the so-called 'brokers' who contract with the limousine company for the use of one or more operating permits owned by the 'broker'; that if there was to be any bargaining unit at all, it should include all brokers including multi-permit holders, who do not actually drive but may have the right to do so; and that any bargaining unit should also include certain 'livery drivers' who did not fall within the specific regulatory framework of the airport but who, the respondents asserted, were drivers and should therefore be included in any broadly-described drivers unit."

In addition, the respondents took the position that they need not produce a list of the individuals potentially affected by these applications, and that the trade union had no right of access to such information, nor any right to a copy of any list that might be required by the Board.

6. This latter "hide and seek" approach to litigation was rejected in an early decision of the Board for reasons which need not be repeated here. The alternative positions of the respondent, to the extent that they were pursued, were dealt with in a decision of the Board dated March 9, 1988. We shall refer below to certain aspects of both decisions.

7. The initial proceedings were protracted. Although the parties were then agreed that a limited number of witnesses would be representative of all of the various categories of individual potentially affected by the applications, there were still many hearing days before a Labour Relations Officer and hundreds of pages of testimony, together with separate hearings before the Board itself. Ultimately the Board determined that the individuals whom the trade union sought to represent were "dependent contractors" and therefore "employees" entitled to union representation (see section 1(1)(h) of the Act and the Board's reasons in the March 9,1988 decision). The Board further found that the units of employees appropriate for collective bargaining should be described, in general terms, as follows:

all dependent contractors of the respondent(s) [company name(s)], in its limousine service working in and out of the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto and the Regional Municipalities of York and Peel, save and except dispatchers, office and sales staff, supervisors and those above the rank of supervisor.

There was no suggestion by the respondents at that time that there should be an exclusion of part-time driver/owner operators or students employed during the school vacation period. That request surfaced, more than four years later, only in the current round of certification proceedings.

8. In its March 1988 decision, the Board had this to say about the so-called "brokers" who do not drive - that is those individuals who have a contract or franchise arrangement permitting them to supply limousine services but choose not to do so in favour of sub-contracting their contractual rights to "working drivers”:

9. It should be noted again that the brokers or contract holders do not have to drive at all and many do not. Nor is it necessary for a broker to own a vehicle. The service contract may be treated merely as an earning asset or investment. Instead of performing the work themselves, brokers may lease their contract(s) to lessee-drivers, charging monthly payments for the privilege of using their contract(s). This fee then becomes the net income for the broker. The evidence of one non-driving broker indicates that he spends 10 to 25 per cent of his work time on his "limousine business" and considers himself to be a self-employed "franchise operator". According to David Eluik, [a "broker" agreed by the parties to be representative] he has little direct contact with the working drivers using his service contract, and may not even know when substitute drivers are engaged - although the company must be informed about that. He does not monitor the drivers' daily activities, keeps no trip records, and does not engage in any advertising to attract customers. In his opinion, all of the working drivers associated with his contracts are self-employed independent contractors or "subcontractors" of his franchise. He analogized the situation to that of a house, in which the landlord retained title to the property, and his tenants paid rent and utilities.

The Board drew a distinction between the "brokers" and the "working drivers":

87. The brokers who do not drive, whether they own one contract or several, are, we think, in a different category. In a sense, they too are part of the company's organization. They have contractual obligations and reap economic rewards because of their status as a broker. However, their situation is quite different from that of the working drivers because they do not drive, and thus do not supply their own labour in direct service of the company's customers. They are not subject to the same elaborate network of control which makes the working drivers look more like employees of the company than independent contractors. The non-driving brokers need not and do not appear at the airport at 5:45 am, every morning. They do not pick up customers directed to them by dispatch or the platform lineup. They need not wear the regulation uniform or follow the elaborate rules in the drivers' manual. And so on. As one non-driving broker put it, he is "managing a franchise" and, in our opinion, that characterization is not inaccurate. The non-driving brokers are managing and profiting from their investment in a way which is analytically and generically different from the working drivers who, in addition to their ownership or lease of a service contract, are expending their labour in the direct personal service of the company's customers, subject to the detailed controls to which we have already referred at length. In our view, for collective bargaining purposes, the non-working brokers are not dependent contractors within the meaning of section 1(1)(h) of the Labour Relations Act.

88. We should add that we do not think their presence in the economic matrix alters the fact that their subcontractors, the working drivers, are dependent contractors vis-a-vis one or other of the respondent firms. The non-driving brokers, on the evidence, simply do not exercise "employer like" authority over the working drivers any more than does the automobile dealership which leases one of the "lessee-drivers", the vehicle which he needs to fulfill his service obligations. Those controls are exercised by the company. To the extent that a non-driving broker did seek to exercise such employer-like functions, a section 1(4) declaration might be appropriate, but that is an eventuality which need not be pursued here.

89. It will be observed that the respondents' initial position in the first round of proceedings was that these non-driving brokers should be treated as "employees" and included in the bargaining unit along with other employees and dependent contractors. Their present position is that they, together with the non-driving brokers, should be treated as one employer pursuant to section 1(4) of the Act, and that this employer assertion must be resolved before the new certification applications can be dealt with. We will return to this issue later.

III

10. As we have already mentioned, the litigation of these earlier applications took some years to resolve. Following the release of the Board's decision in March 1988 affirming the drivers' right to organize, the union decided to withdraw the original applications and file new ones requesting the taking of pre-hearing representation votes. Those votes, by secret ballot, would canvass the wishes of the current complement of driver/owner operators with respect to trade union representation.

11. The respondents resisted those applications urging the Board not to accept the union's proposed voting constituency (framed in the same terms as the bargaining unit determined by the earlier panel to be appropriate) and urging the Board not to hold any representation vote at all. The respondents demanded the exclusion of "part-timers" and "students" - although the lists filed by the respondents did not identify anyone as a "student" or "part-timer" and simply invited the Board to investigate that matter. The respondents also argued that the Board should not direct a vote because of certain applications subsequently made by the respondents themselves, asserting that the non-driving brokers (i.e. those referred to in the earlier Board decision) were really related employers under section 1(4) of the Act who exercised "employer-like functions". The respondents argued that until these "related employer" issues were resolved, no vote should be taken. This was the same generic group from which the respondent(s) had earlier selected members agreed to be representative, who were found by the Board not to exercise "employer-like" functions at all.

12. We also observe that, in a number of these section 1(4) applications, the respondents were unable to supply the Board with the addresses of the so-called related employers whom, it was said, exercised "employer-like" responsibilities, and with whom, it was said, the respondents were engaged in related activities or businesses under common control or direction.

13. Be that as it may, for reasons set out at some length in a decision dated November 17, 1988, the Board, differently constituted, directed that a vote be taken in the following constituency:

14. We determine that the voting constituency for the purpose of any pre-hearing vote in this application shall consist of:

All dependent contractors of the respondent in its limousine service working in and out of the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto and the Regional Municipalities of York and Peel, save and except dispatchers, office and sales staff, supervisors and those above the rank of supervisor.

CLARITY NOTE: The term "dependent contractors" means drivers, lessee-drivers and broker-drivers.

In order to take the respondents' position into account, the Board directed that the ballot of any part-timer or student would be segregated and not counted pending the Board's determination of the bargaining unit issue on its merits. The Board further specified that:

"Insofar as the conduct of the vote is concerned, the voters list will contain the usual notation that persons not named in them who consider themselves eligible to vote should present themselves to the Returning Officer at the time of the vote. As would be the case in the absence of any Board direction to the contrary, anyone asserting the right to vote will be allowed to mark a ballot, and the ballot of anyone whose eligibility to vote is challenged will be segregated and not counted pending resolution of the dispute over their eligibility."

14. The respondents' renewed resistance to supplying a list of the persons potentially affected by this application was resolved by the new panel of the Board in the same way as the earlier panel did. The Board concluded that the trade union was entitled to such list as a matter of law. (See paragraph 17 of the Board's decision and the cases referred to therein.) The related employer issue was deferred to the panel hearing the merits of the case. The ballot boxes were to be sealed pending that hearing. (See paragraphs 3-5 of the Board's decision of November 17, 1988 explaining the purpose and procedure for pre-hearing votes, and see also the remainder of the decision in which the Board reviewed the issues ultimately raised before us.)

15. With one exception to which we will return below, new votes were conducted in accordance with the Board's direction. At the conclusion of the balloting, representatives for each of the respondents executed a document certifying the conduct of the election as follows:

We, the undersigned, acted as scrutineers for the parties herein in the conduct of the balloting at the time and place above mentioned. We certify that the balloting was fairly conducted and that all eligible voters were given an opportunity to cast their ballots in secret, and that the ballot box was protected in the interest of a fair and secret vote.

16. No employee/driver has raised any concern about the way in which the vote was conducted. No employee/driver has suggested that there was any misrepresentation or misunderstanding about what they were voting for (or against). No employee/driver has suggested any improper or irregular conduct on the part of the applicant union, its officials, or supporters. No employee/driver argues that the Board should disregard the ballots cast and direct a new representation vote. Those positions are, however, all advanced by the respondents.

17. During the course of the balloting, the union challenged the voter eligibility of certain individuals. These were persons whom, we were told, the union and its supporters could not immediately identify and whose voter eligibility, therefore, could not be immediately determined. Their ballots were segregated in accordance with the Board's directions respecting the conduct of the vote. Subsequently, however, the union advised the Board that it was withdrawing all of those challenges and was content to abide by the result based upon the expressed wishes of all those who presented themselves at the polling station and indicated a desire to cast a ballot.

18. The employers did not accept that concession. The employers argued that the union should not be permitted to withdraw these challenges and that the individuals' voter eligibility should be resolved before the ballots were counted.

19. At the hearing on February 22, 1989, the Board rejected that argument. Neither on the day of the vote, or later, have the employers, themselves, ever challenged the voter eligibility of the persons casting ballots. Once the trade union had withdrawn its challenge to particular voters (whether they were on the employers' proposed voters' list or simply appeared at the polling station) there was no issue in dispute requiring further litigation.

20. With this background, then we turn to the other submissions made to the Board at the hearing on February 22, 1989. We should note that neither party sought to call evidence in support of their respective positions. Both counsel were content to make argument based upon the record and facts either agreed upon or assumed to be true. As will be mentioned, below, the Board was not prepared to give any weight to the employers' speculations about what might have been in the minds of employees, based upon what might have occurred, based upon what the employer was told about what happened. Such speculation based upon double or triple hearsay is inherently unreliable, and the Board was not prepared to hear testimony which amounted to no more than mere conjecture.

21. At the hearing on February 22, 1989, counsel agreed on the order in which the issues should be addressed. It will be convenient, in these reasons, to follow their agreed format.

SHOULD SOME OF THE NAMED RESPONDENTS BE DECILARED TO BE "ONE EMPLOYER" FOR LABOUR RELATIONS PURPOSES

22. The applicant union asserts that Aaroport Limousine Services Ltd., Air Cab Limousine Services (1985) Limited, and McIntosh Limousine Service Ltd. should be declared by the Board to be one employer for the purposes of the Labour Relations Act. The union relies on section 1(4) of the Act which reads as follows:

Where, in the opinion of the Board, associated or related activities or businesses are carried on, whether or not simultaneously, by or through more than one corporation, individual, firm, syndicate or association or any combination thereof, under common control or direction, the Board may, upon the application of any person, trade union or council of trade unions concerned, treat the corporations, individuals, firms, syndicates or associations or any combination thereof as constituting one employer for the purposes of this Act and grant such relief, by way of declaration or otherwise, as it may deem appropriate.

The union points to paragraphs 91 to 98 of the March 1988 Board decision and observes that the respondents in this earlier, related proceeding were then agreed that "McIntosh" and "Aaroport", at least were properly treated as one employer. The union contends that there have been no material changes since that time, nor is the third company, "Air Cab", in any different position. The union urges the Board to exercise its discretion under section 1(4) to declare all three firms to be one employer for labour relations purposes.

23. It is agreed that Mr. Zahavy is the President of all three companies: Aaroport, Air Cab and McIntosh. All three companies have the same manager, who, incidentally, was designated as the scrutineer in the representation vote. All three companies have a common dispatch system so that there is necessarily, an integrated work force with an interchange of drivers as required to meet the companies' responsibilities. All three companies share the same location. The companies do have different telephone numbers and separate bank accounts, contract for services and to provide services in their own names, have different receipts and business cards and different corporate names/logos. On the other hand, despite these indicia of a separate corporate existence or position in the marketplace, it is conceded that the nature of the work performed by the employees is basically the same as are the conditions under which they work.

24. Although these three respondents may hold themselves out, to the public, to be separate entities, they are in fact engaged in associated or related businesses or activities under common control or direction and, for the purposes of the Act, it is our opinion that they should be treated as "one employer". We so declare.

THE EXCLUSION OF PART-TIME EMPLOYEES AND "STUDENTS" EMPLOYED DURING THE SCHOOL VACATION PERIOD

25. The respondents repeat the submission made to the panel of the Board directing the representation vote that the voting constituency and bargaining unit should exclude some undetermined and unidentified number of drivers who might be classified as "part-time workers" or "students". There is no indication from the respondents as to how many such drivers may exist, or how their terms and conditions of employment differ from those of the broad category of dependent contractors found by the Board in the earlier proceeding to be a unit of employees appropriate for collective bargaining; moreover, in that earlier decision, the Board determined an appropriate bargaining unit which was both consistent with the evidence then before it and the general structure of collective bargaining units established for taxi drivers in Ontario. The union reiterates that its proposed bargaining unit description in these cases is not only consistent with this earlier Board finding, but is also consistent with the pattern of bargaining units established in this industry. The union also notes that the exclusions now said by the respondents to require further investigation and litigation were not raised in the first round of applications and that the respondents were unable in these proceedings to even identify those individuals said to be so different in their community of collective bargaining interests that they should be grouped together in a separate bargaining unit.

26. In the earlier decision, the Board determined that all of the individuals affected by this application were dependent contractors. Section 6(5) of the Act deems a unit of dependent contractors to be appropriate for collective bargaining. The earlier Board decision found such unit to be appropriate in generic terms set out above. And apart altogether from the statutory requirements, the Board's role in constructing bargaining units has been discussed in Hospital for Sick Children, [1985] OLRB Rep. Feb. 266, this way:

We might make an additional but related observation. We are troubled by the fact that a largely administrative and policy-laden determination has mushroomed in some cases into an elaborate, expensive, and time-consuming process for deciding a relatively simple question: does the unit which the union seeks to represent encompass a group of employees with a sufficiently coherent community of interest that they can bargain together on a viable basis without at the same time causing serious labour relations problems for the employer.

Having regard to these considerations, we are satisfied and find that the units of employees that the union seeks to represent in these applications are appropriately described in the manner adopted by the earlier panel of the Board and without an exclusion of part-time employees or students.

IS THERE AN INCUMBENT UNION WITH AN INTEREST IN THESE PROCEEDINGS?

27. In its pleadings the respondents mentioned the possible existence of a drivers' association which might, on its own behalf, or on behalf of its members, have an interest in these applications. There is no evidence before us that this association actually exists. The respondents do not assert that it is a "trade union" entitled to intervene in these proceedings. The respondents do not assert that any arrangement they may have had, some years ago, with this "association" would, today, constitute a collective agreement within the meaning of the Act. There is no evidence before us that the drivers potentially affected by these applications are "members" of this association. The association itself, if it still exists, has taken no interest in these proceedings. Accordingly, the Board was not prepared to adjourn, and therefore delay, these matters in order to undertake an investigation or inquiry about the identity, potential interest, or possible existence of this nonunion entity.

LIST QUESTIONS AND VOTER ELIGIBILITY - "AIRLINE"

28. During the course of its representations, the union withdrew its challenges to the employee lists provided by the respondent companies and the voter eligibility of those individuals who cast ballots. In the case of "Airline" the largest of the respondents, the parties were agreed that the trade union had the requisite 35% to warrant counting the vote. The trade union's challenges were dropped. In the case of Airline the employer's section 1(4) applications were abandoned. The employer makes no allegations respecting the manner in which the Airline vote was conducted.

29. Once the union dropped its challenges in respect of the other companies, it was apparent that the arithmetic requirements had been met for a counting of the ballots cast without further litigation or complications. The results of that vote are recorded below.

ALLEGATIONS OF VOTING DAY OR MEMBERSHIP EVIDENCE IRREGULARITIES

30. The respondent employers assert that the drivers may not have known what they were signing when they signed union membership cards. The respondents complain that there were union supporters in the vicinity of the polling booths and that there were remarks as between employees in some foreign language (e.g. Punjabi) which the respondents' representatives could not understand. Some number of employees used a pen to mark their ballots while others used a pencil - thereby, the employers contend, raising the possibility that the identity and wishes of the employees might be disclosed. The employers also assert that some employees may not have fully understood what union membership involved or may have misunderstood the effect of their signature on a union membership card or the purpose of a representation vote.

31. The respondents neither called, nor sought to call, direct evidence from any affected employee about these alleged misunderstandings. Nor did any affected employee make such argument. There is no evidence to suggest that what was said respecting the vote, in whatever language, was in any way coercive; and the union pamphlet to which the respondents refer merely extols the virtues of collective bargaining and union representation in somewhat the same manner as a political party might promote itself. There is, in our view, no. credible indication of intimidation, coercion, misapprehension, or misunderstanding, and, quite frankly, given the rather complicated contractual and commercial relationships between the respondents and their drivers, it is a little surprising that the respondents assert that the drivers do not know what they are doing in the relatively simple matter posed by the representation vote: do you want to be represented by the trade union or not. Those very same drivers sign contracts in English, follow company rules in English, and are required to use English in their daily work routine. Again, we reiterate, that no employee makes any suggestion of misunderstanding or misrepresentation. The respondents' submissions are entirely speculative.

32. In the case of McIntosh Limousine Service Limited the respondent asserts that the above-mentioned clarity note was missing from the notices to employees and that, therefore, some individuals may have been confused about their eligibility to vote. We note however that:

(1) anyone who appeared at the polling booth indicating a desire to vote was entitled to cast a ballot;

(2) it does not seem likely that drivers working for the Aaroport, Air Cab, McIntosh group, interchangeably (on the evidence) would be under any illusions about what they were voting for or against;

(3) no employee has indicated any confusion or misunderstanding about the process;

(4) the vote took place against a background of years of organizing and efforts by the union to represent the drivers and owner operators working for McIntosh.

Given the prearranged voters list which is not challenged and the availability of a ballot to anyone claiming an interest, we do not think that, in all the circumstances, the omission of the clarity note is sufficient grounds to void the vote or disregard its results.

THE EMPLOYERS' RELATED EMPLOYER ASSERTIONS

33. As we have already mentioned, in response to these applications the respondents filed with the Board a number of applications under section 1(4) of the Act, asserting that certain non-driving "contract owners" ("brokers") exercised "employer-like functions" and that, therefore, these applications could not proceed and no vote should be taken until these "related employer" questions had been resolved. As we have also noted, however, the respondent companies often did not even have an address for the entities that they claimed to be "common employers" of the drivers affected by these applications; moreover, the brokers were apparently quite bewildered by the respondents' assertion that they were "employers" or "common employers" of the drivers who directly, or indirectly, made use of their contracts. In their replies, the brokers denied that they were 'employing" anyone. One said he was a music teacher who was not directly involved in the business. Another said that he was resident in Europe and exercised no direct control over the operation of the car. The individual broker appearing at the hearing was quite puzzled. He told the Board that he did not understand why he was there. The union agrees with his submission that he should not be.

34. The union contended that this alleged section 1(4) issue was just another "red herring" raised by the respondents to delay these proceedings and prevent a Board-supervised assessment of employee wishes. Counsel noted the passages in the earlier Board decisions (mentioned above) wherein "brokers" agreed by the respondents to be representative of their class were found not to have the "employer-like" attributes which the respondents now claim they have. He contrasted the employers' earlier assertion that the brokers were "employees" in the bargaining unit, and their current claim that the brokers are "co-employers" of the working drivers. He noted the incongruity of the respondents' argument that they were engaged in related business activities under common control and direction with persons whose whereabouts they did not even know. He suggested that the section 1(4) applications are just another "ploy" to derail these proceedings, and that they lack even the minimum detail to permit a prima facie assessment of the employers' position.

35. We have some considerable doubt about the merits of the employers' section 1(4) claim, and whether, in any event the Board would exercise its discretion to make a section 1(4) declaration. The union's assertions certainly have some surface plausibility. However, the Board did not and does not now rule on the merits of these section 1(4) applications brought by the respondent employers. We decided only that they would not be consolidated with the current certification proceedings and that their resolution would not delay those proceedings. If the union is entitled to certification (as in some instances it is), then certificates should issue and the parties should get on with collective bargaining as they are obliged to do under section 15 of the Act. If there is some "tidying up" to be done on the "employer side" of the bargaining table pursuant to section 1(4), that can be done later without prejudice to the employee rights directly in issue in these various certification applications, and without diminishing the respondents' bargaining obligations.

RESULTS OF THE VOTE AND DISPOSITION OF THE CASE - "AIRLINE": BOARD FILE NO. 1392-88-R

36. The Board finds that the unit of employees appropriate for collective bargaining is framed as follows:

All dependent contractors of the respondent McDonnell-Ronald Limousine Service Limited operating as Airline Limousine Services Limited, in its limousine service working in and out of Metropolitan Toronto and the Regional Municipalities of York and Peel, save and except dispatchers, office and sales staff, supervisors, and those above the rank of supervisor.

37. In the bargaining unit description set out above, for the purpose of clarity, the Board notes the parties' agreement that the term "dependent contractors" means drivers, lessee-drivers, and broker drivers.

38. On the taking of the pre-hearing representation vote directed by the Board less than fifty per cent of the ballots cast were cast in favour of the applicant.

39. The application is therefore dismissed.

40. The Board will not entertain an application for certification by the applicant with respect to any of the employees of the respondent in the voting constituency within the period of six months from the date hereof.

41. The Registrar will destroy the ballots cast in the pre-hearing representation vote taken in this matter following the expiration of 30 days from the date of this decision unless a statement requesting that the ballots should not be destroyed is received by the Board from one of the parties before the expiration of such 30-day period.

RESULTS OF THE VOTE AND DISPOSITION OF THE CASE - AAROPORT, AIR CAB AND MCINTOSH: BOARD FILE NOS. 1364-88-R, 1363-88-R, AND 1358-88-R

42. The Board finds that the unit of employees appropriate for collective bargaining is framed as follows:

All dependent contractors of the respondent Aaroport Limousine Services Ltd., Air Cab Limousine Services (1985) Limited, and McIntosh Limousine Service Limited in its limousine service working in and out of Metropolitan Toronto and the Regional Municipalities of York and Peel, save and except dispatchers, office and sales staff, supervisors, and those above the rank of supervisor.

43. In the bargaining unit description set out above, for the purpose of clarity, the Board notes the parties' agreement that the term "dependent contractors" means drivers, lessee-drivers, and broker drivers.

44. The Board is satisfied that not less than thirty-five per cent of the employees of the respondent in the bargaining unit were members of the applicant at the time the application was made.

45. On the taking of the pre-hearing representation vote directed by the Board, more than fifty per cent of the ballots cast were cast in favour of the applicant.

46. A certificate will issue to the applicant.

47. The Registrar will destroy the ballots cast in the pre-hearing representation vote taken in this matter following the expiration of 30 days from the date of this decision unless a statement requesting that the ballots should not be destroyed is received by the Board from one of the parties before the expiration of such 30-day period.

RESULTS OF THE VOTE AND DISPOSITION OF THE CASE - AIRLIFT: BOARD FILE 1362-88-R

48. The Board finds that the unit of employees appropriate for collective bargaining is framed as follows:

All dependent contractors of the respondent Airlift Limousine Services Limited in its limousine service working in and out of Metropolitan Toronto and the Regional Municipalities of York and Peel, save and except dispatchers, office and sales staff, supervisors, and those above the rank of supervisor.

49. In the bargaining unit description set out above, for the purpose of clarity, the Board notes the parties' agreement that the term "dependent contractors" means drivers, lessee-drivers, and broker drivers.

50. The Board is satisfied that not less than thirty-five per cent of the employees of the respondent in the bargaining unit were members of the applicant at the time the application was made.

51. On the taking of the pre-hearing representation vote directed by the Board, more than fifty per cent of the ballots cast were cast in favour of the applicant.

52. A certificate will issue to the applicant.

53. The Registrar will destroy the ballots cast in the pre-hearing representation vote taken in this matter following the expiration of 30 days from the date of this decision unless a statement requesting that the ballots should not be destroyed is received by the Board from one of the parties before the expiration of such 30-day period.